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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
0.1. The structure and format of this Annual Report
are similar to those of recent years, although more con-
cise than last year’s report. Separate chapters deal with
revenue and each of the expenditure areas that fall under
the headings of the financial perspective. The conclud-
ing chapter (Chapter 9) contains the Court’s Statement
of Assurance. The Court’s observations concerning the
European Development Funds are presented separately.
The Commission’s replies and, where appropriate, those
of the other institutions, are published alongside the
observations of the Court.
0.2. Since the last Annual Report, the Court has pub-
lished seven special reports, summaries of which are
included in the relevant chapters of this report. The
Court also adopted 10 opinions, including a second one
concerning the recasting of the Financial Regulation
(Opinion No 2/2002 (1)).
0.3. This general introduction focusses on key matters
concerning the financial management of the European
Union budget in 2001. These were the Commission’s
programme of reform of its administration, in particu-
lar its financial management, which included the adop-
tion of a new Financial Regulation, and the significant
surplus, for the second year running, of revenue over
expenditure.
Statements of Assurance
0.4. With regard to the general budget, in the Court’s
opinion, except for the effect of certain matters men-
tioned in the Statement of Assurance the accounts for
the financial year ended 31 December 2001, as pub-
lished in the Official Journal, reliably reflect the Com-
munities’ revenue and expenditure for the financial year
and their financial situation at the end of the year. The
Court draws attention to the fact that most of its obser-
vations and the matters mentioned are recurrent. To a
large extent the weaknesses highlighted are due to the
nature of the Community accounting system, which
was not designed to provide a complete record of the
assets.
0.5. These weaknesses in the Commission’s account-
ing system are highlighted in paragraphs 9.6 and 9.7 of
this report. The Court has repeatedly drawn attention to
this issue in its previous Annual Reports, in particular
those of 1999 and 2000 where it highlighted significant
prob-
lems with the Sincom 2 accounting system concerning
control and security over the system and the complete-
ness of the data contained therein. Some of the prob-
lems have still not been resolved (2). The Court has been
concerned that, while in the past the Commission has
recognised at least some of the deficiencies pointed out
by the Court, it has not given sufficient priority or
devoted sufficient reflection and appropriate resources
to overcoming them within a reasonable timescale. The
Commission has stated in its reply to paragraphs 9.6 to
9.8 of this report its commitment to the modernisation
and improvement of the accounting system. It now
needs to develop urgently a detailed action plan with
the necessary resources and a timetable that is both
realistic and reasonable. The action plan should clearly
distinguish between those measures required to solve
current operational deficiencies and to enhance the
informative value of the current cash-based accounts,
and those necessary to move towards full accruals
accounting.
0.6. With regard to the legality and the regularity of
the transactions underlying the financial statements, in
view of the results of the audit the Court is of the opin-
ion that the transactions are, taken as a whole, legal and
regular in respect of revenue, commitments and admin-
istrative expenditure; it still cannot provide this assur-
ance in respect of all the other payments.
0.7. With regard to the Statement of Assurance con-
cerning the European Development Funds, the Court is
of the opinion that, except for certain items set out in
the statement, the financial statements at 31 December
2001 and the revenue and expenditure accounts for the
financial year 2001 reliably reflect the revenue and
expenditure relating to the sixth, seventh and eighth
EDFs for the financial year and their financial situation
at the end of the year.
0.8. As far as the legality and regularity of the underly-
ing transactions are concerned, the Court is of the opin-
ion that the revenue entered in the accounts, the amounts
allocated to the EDF’s commitments and payments for
the year are, taken as a whole, legal and regular. How-
ever, the Court is not in a position to provide assurance
regarding the reality of work, supplies and services
underlying the payments at the level of the local ben-
eficiaries.
(1) OJ C 92, 17.4.2002. See also paragraph 0.17. A full list of
the reports and opinions adopted by the Court in each of
the last five years appears in Annex II to the report.
(2) Annual report concerning the financial year 1999, para-
graphs 8.41 to 8.56 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000); Annual Report
concerning the financial year 2000, paragraphs 9.38 to
9.43 (OJ C 359, 15.12.2001).
28.11.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 5
Reform of the Commission : 2001 was a year of transi-
tion
0.9. 2001 was an important transitional year in what
is a profound reform of the administration of the Com-
mission as a whole, and particularly concerning the
reform of financial management. Paragraphs 9.48 to
9.100 set out a number of observations concerning the
reform of the Commission’s internal control system.
0.10. The Court notes in paragraphs 9.63 to 9.70 that
delays have been experienced and that a number of
deadlines in the Action Plan of the ReformWhite Paper
have been put back from end-2001 to end-2002. The
Court considers that such delays were inevitable as the
original timetable of the White Paper was over-
ambitious. The wide-reaching and ambitious nature of
the reform programme means that it requires time for
its effective implementation.
0.11. The annual activity reports and the declarations
made by the Directors-General, which are a key element
in the reform, provide a good illustration of this point.
The Court concludes from its review of these annual
activity reports and declarations, plus the conclusions
of the Internal Audit Service and the summary report
of the Commission addressed to the Council and the
European Parliament (3), that it is too early to draw any
conclusions from the reports and declarations on the
level of assurance that can be obtained about the legal-
ity and regularity of operations carried out and the
sound financial use of resources: in this matter the
Commission acknowledges that much still needs to be
done to improve the methodology and ensure consis-
tent application and reporting (see paragraphs 9.71 to
9.100).
0.12. The nature of the declarations varies consider-
ably, there are problems of coherence between the dec-
laration and the report of some Directors-General, as
well as between the approaches adopted. It is difficult to
assess the significance of the reserves and observations
included by the Directors-General, in particular con-
cerning expenditure under shared management with
the Member States, which accounts for the vast bulk of
the budget. The overall conclusions drawn by the Com-
mission in its summary report are themselves ambigu-
ous. The report concludes that the result reflects a ‘glo-
bally positive situation’ despite the multiple risks and
weaknesses identified in most areas.
0.13. The Commission has, however, taken important
steps to clarify responsibility and accountability for the
management of Community funds. Furthermore, the
Commission has shown its commitment to build on the
results of this first year by presenting an 18-point action
plan to address the weaknesses identified. This shows
that it is aware thatmuch remains to be done to improve
the quality of its financial management on a perma-
nent, long lasting basis. The reports provide much use-
ful information on the areas where further action is
needed to further develop and improve internal control
mechanisms.
0.14. The principal aim of the annual activity reports
and declarations is to increase the accountability of the
Directors-General for the financial management of the
resources they spend. They also have to be taken into
account by the Court in its audit work. Improving the
quality of the annual activity reports and declarations of
the Directors-General as foreseen in the 18-point action
plan of the Commission is essential if the Court is to be
able in the future to obtain from them any of the assur-
ance it needs for its Statement of Assurance. These
reports and declarations are intended to be one of the
cornerstones of the system of internal control over
Community expenditure currently being developed at
the level of the Commission and in Member States. As
the chapters of this report show, there is, however, a
great deal of work which needs to be done to develop a
proper Community system of internal control and audit
which will enable the Court to obtain assurance from
these sources.
0.15. Thus, while in the different financial perspective
areas monitoring and control systems are being devel-
oped and greater attention is being paid by the manag-
ing services of the Commission to the audit of actions
financed from Community funds, the systems in place
do not yet ensure that the information available to the
Commission, or to the Court, on the legality and regu-
larity of the underlying transactions is sufficiently reli-
able. For example, in Chapter 2 (common agricultural
policy) the certification process for paying agencies does
not provide assurance that the facts declared by benefi-
ciaries in claims for payment reflect reality. In the area
of structural measures (Chapter 3) it is concluded that,
despite progressive strengthening and improvements in
the control systems applicable to the different program-
ming periods, the control systems still do not ensure
that the checks on final declarations of expenditure are
rigorous and reliable enough, and for the current period
(2000 to 2006) the structures are not all operational
(3) Synthesis of the annual activity reports and declarations
of theDirectors-General and heads of service, COM(2002)
426 final of 24 July 2002.
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and independent auditing of the operations has not yet
begun. Chapter 4 (Internal policies) shows that signifi-
cant errors resulting from overdeclaration of expendi-
ture by contractors for indirect research actions persist,
despite a significant increase in financial audits by the
Commission in 2001. With regard to external action
(Chapter 5, and the part of the report dealing with the
European Development Funds) the Court concludes
that it cannot yet rely on the Commission’s internal
control and monitoring systems for part of its assur-
ance.
0.16. Concerted action will be needed over a number
of years to develop an effective Community system of
internal control and audit from which the Court will be
able to obtain assurance.
Financial Regulation
0.17. Since the last Annual Report the Council has
adopted anewFinancialRegulationwhichwill be applied
from 1 January 2003. Thus a process that in many
respects started with the Court’s Opinion No 4/97 (4) is
complete. In the general introduction to the Annual
Report concerning the financial year 2000 the Court,
while welcoming many of the changes being intro-
duced, pointed out several areas where its Opinion
No 2/2001 (5) on the Commission’s initial proposal for
recasting the Financial Regulation had not been fol-
lowed in its revised proposal. Indeed, the Court found
it necessary to issue a further Opinion (6) on the revised
proposal dealing with the timetable and procedure for
the adoption of Court reports, and for the presentation
and approval of the financial statements.
0.18. Although the Court supports the general thrust
of the new Financial Regulation it still contains elements
the Court considers unsatisfactory. These include arti-
ficial annual instalments for commitments, unnecessary
derogations in specific fields and marginal items (for
instance, carry-over of appropriations) which render
management and accounting systems unnecessarily
complex with very little financial effect. This last point
is significant in the light of the problems referred to in
paragraph 0.5 above. It is regrettable that the opportu-
nity was not taken to be more radical in the revision.
The budget surplus in 2001 was even larger than the
surplus of the previous year
0.19. For the second year running there was a signifi-
cant surplus of revenue over expenditure amounting to
15 013 million euro (16 % of the final budget). The cor-
responding figures for 2000 were 11 619 million euro
and 14 %.
0.20. There is no valid reason to call on own resources
which are significantly in excess of the needs for the
year. The Commission in its replies to paragraph 1.11 of
this report dismisses the Court’s argument that the
mechanism of the supplementary and amending budget
should be used to avoid excessive budget surpluses.
However, the reasons given by the Commission are
insufficient to avoid the criticism that its budgetary
management lacks adequate rigour.
0.21. A significant factor contributing to the emer-
gence of the budget surplus is the overbudgeting of pay-
ment appropriations, not only for structural measures
but also for the enlargement programmes (7); on struc-
tural measures almost one third of payment appropria-
tions were not needed. The Court considers that the
Commission’s and Member States’ past experience of
spending programmes should have enabled the Com-
mission tomakemore realistic budget estimates in these
areas.
Concluding remark
0.22. The Court celebrates its 25th anniversary in
November 2002. Anyone reading the Court’s reports
since it began its work will be struck by how frequently
the Court has had to repeat similar observations con-
cerning the need for improvements in the management
of Community funds, at all levels, and in all areas of the
budget. The Commission has now made formal com-
mitments to correct deficiencies, through, for example,
the 98 Actions in the Reform White Paper (8), and now
the 18-point action plan in connection with the annual
activity reports and declarations of the Directors-
General. Progress is indeed being made in implement-
ing these various action points. However, as this report
shows in the individual chapters, there remains a great
deal to be done. The Court urges the Commission to
reinforce its efforts, in order that improvements are
made as soon as feasible.
(4) OJ C 57, 23.2.1998.
(5) OJ C 162, 5.6.2001.
(6) Opinion No 2/2002 (OJ C 92, 17.4.2002).
(7) See paragraphs 6.4-6.6 of this report.
(8) COM(2000) 200 final of 5 April 2000.
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REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES FINANCED
FROM THE GENERAL BUDGET
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INTRODUCTION
1.1. In the area of traditional own resources, the Court’s
audit concentrated on the systems for recording duties
established and for making them available, as required
by Community legislation, as well as on the correct pre-
sentation of the amounts in the Commission’s accounts.
In this context, particular attention was paid to the sys-
tem of private customs warehouses.
1.2. For the VAT and GNP own resources, the Court’s
audit concentrated on the drafting of the budget and its
implementation in respect of these resources, the bal-
ances, and adjustments to balances, deriving from these
resources and refunds to Member States. The audit
included as a specific issue the calculation of the UK
correction and its financing in 2001.
1.3. Observations related to the implementation of the
budget, in particular the very high budget surplus, to
administrative cooperation for the safeguarding of VAT
revenue and the follow-up to earlier audit observations
are also presented, in addition to the SOA (Statement of
Assurance) specific appraisal.
ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT
Actual revenue
1.4. Table 1.1 summarises the Community’s revenue
for the financial year 2001 and Graph 1.1 shows the
distribution of the different types of revenue.Graph 1.2
illustrates the evolution of actual revenue over the period
1989 to 2001.
1.5. As part of its analytical review procedures, the
Court compared the amounts of own resources made
available by each Member State with those of previous
years.
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1.6. The total amount of customs and agricultural
duties received in 2001, 15 370,2 million euro, was
2,5 % lower than the amount actually received in 2000,
but5,9 % lower than the final budgeted figureof16 327,5
million euro. The budget total was in fact increased by
10 % by supplementary and amending budget No 3
(adopted on 5 July 2001), reflecting the fact that in
most Member States the revenue trend in the first part
of 2001 was running above that of the previous year.
This remained true up to September, but revenue
decreased in the last quarter as world trade declined. In
Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland and Austria (which
together collect about 4 % of import duties) revenue ran
at a lower rate throughout the year.
Table 1.1 — Revenue for the financial years 2000 and 2001
(Mio EUR)
Type of revenue and corresponding budget heading Actual revenuein 2000
Development of the 2001
budget Actual revenue
in 2001
% change
(2000 to 2001)
Initial budget Final budget
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) = [(d)–(a)]/(a)
1. Traditional own resources 15 267,1 14 259,4 15 600,4 14 589,2 – 4,4 %
— Agricultural duties (Chapter 1 0) 1 198,4 1 180,0 1 180,0 1 132,9 – 5,5 %
— Sugar and isoglucose levies (Chapter 1 1) 1 196,8 1 006,3 1 006,3 840,0 – 29,8 %
— Customs duties (Chapter 1 2) 14 568,3 13 657,5 15 147,5 14 237,4 – 2,3 %
— Collection expenses (Chapter 1 9) – 1 696,3 – 1 584,4 – 1 733,4 – 1 621,0 – 4,4 %
2. VAT resources 35 192,5 33 467,2 30 691,4 31 320,3 – 11,0 %
— VAT resource from the current financial year (Chapter 1 3) 34 187,6 33 467,2 30 691,4 30 695,4
— Balances from previous years (Chapter 3 1) 1 004,9 p.m. 0,0 624,9
3. GNP resource 37 580,5 43 245,5 35 177,8 34 878,8 – 7,2 %
— GNP resource from the current financial year (Chapter 1 4) 37 253,2 43 245,5 35 177,9 34 460,2
— Balances from previous years (Chapter 3 2) 327,3 p.m. 0,0 418,6
4. Budgetary imbalances – 70,9 0,0 0,0 – 70,3 – 0,9 %
— UK correction (Chapter 1 5) – 70,8 0,0 0,0 – 72,5
— Final calculation of UK correction (Chapter 3 5) – 0,1 p.m. 0,0 2,2
5. Other revenue 4 755,3 1 597,3 12 664,9 13 571,2 185,4 %
— Surplus from previous financial year (Chapter 3 0) 3 209,1 900,0 11 612,7 11 612,7 (1) 261,9 %
— Refunds to Member States (Chapter 3 3) 0,0 p.m. 0,0 0,0
— Miscellaneous revenue (Titles 4 to 9) 1 546,1 697,3 1 052,2 1 958,5 26,7 %
Grand total 92 724,4 92 569,4 94 134,6 94 289,3 1,7 %
(1) Exclusive of an amount of 6,3 million euro attributed to EEA/EFTA countries which is included under miscellaneous revenue.
Source: Budget 2001, and 2000 and 2001 revenue and expenditure accounts.
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Graph 1.1 — Breakdown of actual revenue (2001)
Source: 2001 revenue and expenditure accounts.
(1) After deduction of 10 % for collection expenses incurred by Member States.
(2) Exclusive of an amount of 6,3 Mio EUR attributed to EEA/EFTA countries which is included in ‘Other’.
Graph 1.2 — Evolution of sources of actual revenue 1989 to 2001 (Mio EUR)
Source: 2001 revenue and expenditure accounts.
(1) Surplus from previous financial year and miscellaneous.
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1.7. The monthly amounts of agricultural duties made
available by France averaged 4,7 million euro from Janu-
ary to April 2001, but increased sharply to 10,3 million
euro in May 2001 and remained thereafter at the higher
level. For the whole of 2001 this represented an increase
over 2000 of 74 %, contrary to the general trend of
import duties.
1.8. Portugal was late in paying part of its VAT and
GNP twelfths. The sum owed was 5 million euro and it
was paid on 28 December 2001 instead of 3 December
2001. The whole of its VAT and GNP balances, and
adjustments to balances, amounted to 59,5 million euro
and this was paid on 11 January 2002 instead of
3 December 2001.
1.9. Graph 1.2 illustrates how the GNP resource has
grown in importance since 1990 and amounts to more
than 36 % of the revenue in 2001, though it decreased
by 7,2 % compared to 2000 due to the extraordinary
budgetary surplus for the year 2001. Though it has been
rather stable since 1998 it will continue to grow as a
result of the decrease in the VAT call-up rate specified
in the new own resources Decision (1).
Surplus for the year 2001
1.10. The financial year 2000 was closed with a high
surplus of 11 619,1 million euro (13 % of final budget),
the origin and consequences of which were commented
on by the Court in its Annual Report concerning the
financial year 2000 (paragraphs 1.4 to 1.7). The budget-
ary management in the year 2001 produced a further
increase of the surplus to 15 013,5 million euro (16 %
of final budget), the origin being very large cancella-
tions of appropriations, principally for structural mea-
sures (10 538,9 million euro), but also for other areas of
expenditure (for instance: agriculture, 1 857,2 million
euro; preaccession aid, 876,6 million euro; reserves,
668,8 million euro).
1.7. The Commission will contact the French authorities to
discover the underlying reason for the change and take any
action that might be required to protect the Community’s
financial interests.
1.8. The Commission sent a letter demanding payment of
interest (337 107 euro) from the Portuguese authorities on
12 June 2002.
(1) Council Decision No 2000/597/EC, Euratom of 29 Sep-
tember 2000 on the system of the European Communi-
ties’ own resources (OJ L 253, 7.10.2000, p. 42).
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1.11. In order to keep the surplus within reasonable
limits, the Commission should have used the SAB pro-
cedure to adapt the final appropriations for the corre-
sponding expenditure domains to realistic expectations
of financial needs (2). In this way the demands on Mem-
ber States for GNP resources (35 177,9 million euro in
total) could have been reduced by a rate of 30 % to
40 %, depending on the areas and amounts of forecasted
expenditure cancellation taken into account.
Supplementary and amending budgets
1.12. Article 10 of the Financial Regulation states that
supplementary and amending budgets should normally
be published one month after adoption. Supplementary
and amending budget No 3/2001 was published on
19 December 2001, five months after its adoption on 5
July. In the meantime the Commission corrected errors
in the calculation of the financing of the UK correction
through a corrigendum dated 31 October 2001 (3).
1.13. Supplementary and amending budgetNo4/2001
was adopted on 11 December, increasing expenditure
by 24,8 million euro. The published version (4) made no
1.11. The Commission acted in accordance with the finan-
cial rules, which provide that the balance at the end of each
financial year is entered in the budget for the following year.
A supplementary and amending budget can be presented
towards the end of the budgetary year but only in exceptional
circumstances, for example to address one-off needs and for a
limited amount. At this period of the year, when the budget-
ary procedure for the following year is on the point of comple-
tion, it is difficult to discuss and decide on adjustments of
appropriations for the budgetary year under way in the light
of expected underutilisation.
A provisional estimate of the budget surplus for 2001 was
introduced in the amending letter No 2 to the PDB 2002,
adopted by the Commission on 5 November 2001. This was
integrated by the Council into its second reading of the draft
budget, for an amount of 1,2 billion euro. This procedure fol-
lowed the Council’s request, stated in a declaration on revenue
attached to the Council’s first reading of the draft budget
2002.
1.12-1.14. The Commission has redoubled its efforts in
terms of providing technical assistance to the European Par-
liament so that the latter can ensure publication as soon as
possible.
(2) See also Chapter 3, paragraph 3.20.
(3) Member States paid initial amounts on 1 August 2001
following the adoption on 5 July 2001 of supplementary
and amending budget No 3/2001. They paid revised
amounts on 2 January 2002 after publication of the cor-
rected SAB on 19 December 2001. The differences per
Member State ranged from an overpayment of 38,9 mil-
lion euro to an underpayment of 31,8 million euro.
(4) OJ L 14, 16.1.2002, p. 1.
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mention of the amount of GNP own resources required
from each Member State to finance this extra expendi-
ture.
1.14. In its Annual Report concerning the financial
year 2000 (paragraph 1.9), the Court drew attention to
the late publication of supplementary and amending
budgets and the omission of pertinent information. The
Commission replied that it would ensure timely publi-
cation.
Costs of collecting traditional own resources
1.15. The own resources Decision (5) of 29 September
2000 entered into force, following ratification by all
Member States, on 1 March 2002. Under this decision,
the amount that Member States retain by way of collec-
tion costs is raised from 10 % of traditional own
resources to 25 %, effective for duties established after
31 December 2000.
1.16. The decision affects the great majority of the trad-
itional own resources made available in 2001. During
2001, pending ratification of the decision, Member
States continued to retain 10 %. There is thus a repay-
ment now due to them which is provided for in supple-
mentary and amending budget No 2 to the 2002 bud-
get. This liability is referred to in a note to the
Commission’s balance sheet as at 31December 2001 (6).
The Court considers that the note should indicate the
estimated amount of the repayment, namely
2 038,6 million euro (7).
Presentation of the revenue in the revenue and expendi-
ture account
Clarifying the presentation of the revenue
1.17. The introductory sections of the Financial State-
ments (volume I, tome 1, and volume IV) contain a table
of prime importance entitled ‘Budget outturn’. This
table omits a lot of interesting data, whereas other data
1.17. In volume IV for 2001, the Commission substantially
improved the presentation of the implementation of
revenue and expenditure and the link with the outturn
table. It is considering expanding the revenue
(5) Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom.
(6) Annex 3 — explanatory notes to the balance sheet —
Comments on the balance sheet at 31 December 2001,
point 3.
(7) In supplementary and amending budget No 3/2002 this
figure was adjusted to 2 037,9 million euro.
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such as the balance for the financial year, are pointlessly
duplicated elsewhere. It should be replaced with a more
detailed presentation that includes the following con-
siderations:
(a) the development of the budgetary revenue and
appropriations (8) (initial and final budget) as a total
and by principal categories, demonstrating the bud-
getary balance laid down in Article 268 of the
Treaty;
(b) observance of the ceiling on the own resources
entered in the budget (9) and an indication of the
margin still available;
(c) the budgetary implementation for the various cat-
egories of revenue and expenditure, with an indica-
tion of the implementation rate;
(d) the balance for the financial year and its breakdown
in terms of revenue collected in excess or revenue
shortfalls and appropriations not used.
1.18. The ‘revenue’ part of the Financial Statements
(implementation of the budget, volume II, part 1) should
also be made clearer, as regards structure and content.
In particular the detailed budgetary headings should be
observed, the headings should be indexed, the terminol-
ogy in the regulations should be used, the figures for
forecast and actual revenue should be presented in par-
allel and, more generally, there should be harmonisa-
tion of the various parts of the revenue and expenditure
account and the general budget.
VAT/GNP resources and the UK correction
1.19. The actual data for the VAT and GNP bases used
to calculate the balances and the adjustments of the bal-
ances are now entered in the revenue and expenditure-
account, just like the forecast data concerning these
table to include data relating to implementation for the year
n -1 and implementation rates compared with forecasts.
It intends to continue to work towards greater transparency in
the sense desired by the Court. To this end, the outturn table
in volume II will be amended in order to present, by title or
financial heading, the extent of implementation in revenue
and expenditure compared with the budget.
1.18. The ‘Budget revenue’ heading contained in volume II,
tome I, part A of the Financial Statements describes the
implementation of the budget. However, the Commission will
ensure that the link between the budget and the revenue and
expenditure account is made clearer.
1.19. The Commission shares the Court’s view on the cal-
culation of the burdens on the Member States in respect of the
balances. It intends to present such calculations in the next
accounting report.
(8) See the Financial Regulation, Article 78.
(9) Article 19(3) of Council Decision 94/728/CE, Euratom of
31 October 1994 on the system of the Communities’ own
resources (OJ L 293, 12.11.1994, p. 62).
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items. However, the calculation operations concerning
the burdens on the Member States in respect of these
resources should also be set out.
1.20. A special table should be drawn up for the UK
correction (Chapters 1 5 and 3 5) and the essential
information given concerning the basic data and the
calculation operations on which the overall amount of
the UK correction and its financing are based.
Budgetary nomenclature for revenue
1.21. The Financial Regulation (10) stipulates that the
budgetary nomenclature in the context of the budget-
ary procedure must be set out in titles, chapters and
articles. The form of classification used, which must
accommodate the very disparate characteristics of the
different types of revenue, is uneven. Traditional own
resources, VAT and GNP resources, and the UK correc-
tion are now concentrated under Title I. The surplus
available from the previous financial year (Chapter 3 0)
should come under a separate title as it has nothing in
common with the balances, corrections and refunds
concerning the VAT and GNP resources and the UK cor-
rection included under the same title (Chapters 3 1,
3 2, 3 3 and 3 5).
SPECIFIC APPRAISAL IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
Traditional own resources
Accounting for traditional own resources
1.22. Import duties are established by Member States’
customs authorities and are first entered in national
accounting systems. They are then allocated to the ‘A’
account or while the debt remains unpaid and is not
1.20. The Commission will look at whether or not it is
appropriate to include in the revenue and expenditure account
tables on the basic data for the definitive calculation of the
UK correction and its financing.
1.21. The Commission considers that the structure of the
budgetary nomenclature must not be based only on quantita-
tive principles.
It will examine the possibilities of adapting, if need be, the
budgetary nomenclature for revenue.
(10) Article 19(3).
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secured or is under appeal, to the ‘B’ account (11).
Amounts in the A account must be made available to
the Commission in the prescribed time limit.
Audit work done
1.23. The Court has examined the Commission’s
accounts for traditional own resources and has audited,
through an examination of monthly statements submit-
ted to the Commission by the Member States’ customs
authorities, a statistical sample of entries of import duty
receipts in these accounts. In addition, the underlying
national accounting systems in nine Member States,
responsible together for 93 % of the import duties col-
lected in 2001, were examined. However, the Court
recalls that its audit does not cover imports which are
not declared or which have escaped customs surveil-
lance.
Making available of own resources
1.24. In Germany, more than one third of the import
duties collected during 2001 (8,0 % of total European
Union import duties)were accounted for by the deferred-
payment system. Although a new computer system has
since been introduced, the system in use for the own
resources of 2001 was, as highlighted in the past (12),
not transparent. It did not provide systematic account-
ing evidence that the correct total amounts of own
resources were being made available to the Commis-
sion: documentation directly supporting the totals, and
thus representing a full audit trail, could not be pro-
vided. Internal control procedures were not sufficient to
give assurance against misclassification of transactions
or the omission of some of the amounts due.
Amounts established but not yet made available to the Com-
mission (B accounts)
1.25. Established entitlements for which no security
has been provided, and those which have been chal-
lenged and might be subject to change, need not be
made available but must then be entered instead by the
1.24. The Commission also welcomes the German authori-
ties’ introduction of a new computerised system, which is
intended to remedy the shortcomings highlighted over some
years by both the Court and the Commission. The Commis-
sion plans to test the performance of this new system as a part
of its 2003 control programme. Appropriate measures includ-
ing charging interest will be taken if it is found that amounts
due have not been made available completely and promptly.
(11) Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom)No1150/00
of 22May 2000 implementingDecision 94/728/EC, Eura-
tom on the system of the Communities’ own resources
(OJ L 130, 31.5.2000, p. 1).
(12) See Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000,
paragraph 1.14.
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Member States in separate accounts (the B accounts).
Each Member State provides a quarterly statement of its
B accounts to theCommission. Thebalances are included
in the balance sheet under ‘Amounts owed by Member
States’.
1.26. The total balance standing in the B accounts
increased by 3,7 %, from 2 035,4 million euro at
31December 2000 to 2 119,4 million euro at 31 Decem-
ber 2001 (13). For the year 2000 the balances in the B
accounts increased by 4,3 %. The balance includes some
long-standing entries for which full recovery must now
be regarded as very doubtful (see also Chapter 9, para-
graph 9.23). The Court said in its Annual Report con-
cerning the financial year 2000, in paragraph 1.19, that
no useful purpose is served by maintaining items in the
B accounts indefinitely if they are not likely to be recov-
ered, and that amendments to the regulation, already
proposed by the Commission (14), should be made
accordingly. As long as the Council does not adopt such
amendments, the B account balance will continue to
contain many amounts which are de facto irrecover-
able.
1.27. In 2001, as in previous years, problems were
found with the maintenance of the B accounts in sev-
eral Member States. In Germany, it is not at present pos-
sible to confirm the B account balance, because the
database does not allow a breakdown into single entries.
The management of the B accounts in Italy is not yet
uniform and calculation errors can occur at local and
regional level without being detected by controls. Errors
in entries in the B accounts were also found in Belgium
and France, and inspection reports by the Commission
referred to B account errors in Ireland, Sweden and Fin-
land. These errors, though minor in terms of the
amounts, reflect a weakness in the accounting for own
resources under the Community transit system.
1.26. The Court has highlighted precisely the arguments
advanced by the Commission in proposing its amendments.
The Commission will continue to pursue this issue.
1.27. In its response to the Annual Report for 2000 the
Commission expressed the opinion that the current separate
accounting system can lead to both systematic and one-off
errors. Hence the Commission’s efforts to improve the struc-
ture of the system as highlighted in the previous paragraph
and the close attention it pays to the subject during its own
inspections in Member States. Action is already under way to
resolve any financial consequences arising from the Court’s
observations in France and Italy. Appropriate action will be
initiated on the Court’s further observations once all the rel-
evant information from Member States has been received.
(13) Figures given are after deduction of costs of collection
(10 %) as prescribed by Article 2(3) of Council
Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom.
(14) Amended proposal for a Council regulation (EC, Eura-
tom) amending Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom)
No 1552/89 implementing Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom
on the system of the Communities’ own resources (OJ C
150, 16.5.1998, p. 20).
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Customs warehouses
1.28. The customs warehousing procedure is pro-
vided for by the Community Customs Code and its
implementing provisions (15). It permits indefinite sus-
pension of the payment of import duties while goods
are stored in premises or under an inventory system
authorised as a customs warehouse.
1.29. The Court examined the systems in place in nine
Member States to authorise and control private customs
warehouses, as well as a sample of exit declarations
from these warehouses. In all the Member States visited,
the rules concerning authorisation and operation of
warehouses prescribed by the Customs Code and the
implementing provisions had been transposed into
national instructions and procedures.
1.30. The Community regulations do not prescribe
either particular methods of working or the level of cus-
toms control that should be exercised, this being a mat-
ter left to the discretion of the Member States’ customs
administrations. Control strategies for warehouses need
to take account of the risks to revenue arising from the
fact that goods under the warehousing procedure are
removed from the areas at ports under continuous cus-
toms control, balanced by the assurance available from
the quality of the internal controls and of record-
keeping by thewarehouse-keeper. Customs controlwork
for warehouses usually therefore includes careful assess-
ment of the application for authorisation, and of the
quality of the operator’s accounting and internal con-
trol system. This is then a basis for deciding on the level
and type of subsequent controls, usually a mix of physi-
cal spot checks on entry and exit of goods, review of
inventory and stock records, post-clearance accounting
controls, and checks on declarations.
1.28-1.33. As far as the Community dimension of this
question is concerned, the Commission shares the Court’s
opinion on the primordial role of techniques based on risk
analysis in implementing customs controls. As part of the
implementation of the Customs 2002 programme, it ensures
that the best practices implemented in this field are dissemi-
nated and applied in all the Member States and, on this basis,
is developing a shared model for risk management.
1.30. Under the Customs 2002 programme a document is
currently being drafted entitled ‘Inventory on control areas’.
The document provides customs administrations with an
exhaustive list of control areas and subareas as well as com-
mon definitions of control methods.
(15) Articles 84 to 90 and 98 to 113 of Council Regulation
(EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the
Community Customs Code (OJ L 302, 19.10.1992, p. 1),
as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2700/2000 of the
European Parliament and of the Council. Articles 496 to
516 and 524 to 535 of Commission Regulation (EEC)
No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for
the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC)
No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code
(OJ L 253, 11.10.1993, p. 1), as last amended by Regula-
tion (EC) No 444/2002 (OJ L 68, 12.3.2002, p. 11).
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1.31. There are considerable variations in national
practices and instructions both as to the type of control
mix that is required, and on where the responsibility lies
for deciding on the control strategy for each operator.
Particularly if there is a resource problem, the decisions
on the control mix — whether made at national or
local level — need to be based on adequate risk-analysis
methods and reviewed by management to ensure that
the customs administration as a whole is carrying out
an efficient and effective mix of controls in relation to
the risks to the revenue. Several Member States do not
make detailed prescriptions in national instructions, but
allow decentralised decision-making, case by case, by
officers responsible for particular operators. The Court
found an uneven picture in practice.
1.32. For a number of the warehouses examined, the
frequency of physical controls carried out did not reach
the levels prescribed by national guidance. This applied
to one warehouse in France, where the reason was lack
of staff. At one customs office in Italy, the frequency of
controls required by national legislation was not
respected for all warehouses, while in another only
documentary controls had been carried out. In Spain
inventory controls were insufficiently documented and
the rules of the warehouse authorisation were not com-
plied with by the warehouse keeper at the two ware-
houses visited. In Germany, an important part of the
control mix consists of ex post controls at traders by
specific trader control units. However, due to limited
staffing, some of these control units did not carry out
their control plans as prescribed by national guidance.
In the United Kingdom, following reorganisation of
customs offices, one of the largest warehouses had had
no routine physical controls for more than a year. In
Sweden, there had been no physical controls upon exit
at either of the warehouses visited since 1999.
1.33. Minor errors reflecting certain weaknesses in
the control systems were found in the exit declarations,
on the basis of which duty is paid, at several warehouses
(France, Sweden).
1.31. The Commission recognises that the picture in rela-
tion to controls is uneven. Within the Customs 2002 pro-
gramme, project groups of customs experts and Commission
representatives are working on the development of a common
risk management model, standard formats for exchange of
control information and selection of risk categories.
1.32-1.33. As far as the financial aspects are concerned the
Commission is already taking action to recover any amounts
of own resources or interest due from France, while for Italy,
Sweden and Spain the relevant replies from theMember States
are undergoing analysis. Action will be taken for the remain-
ing Member States once all the relevant information has been
provided.
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Customs duties on seized goods
1.34. The Court has found that in the United King-
dom, for goods seized by customs and subsequently
brought into free circulation, customs duties are not
brought to account andmade available as own resources.
Up to now, United Kingdom Customs have not been
able to quantify the amounts of own resources involved.
The Court calls upon the Commission to take appropri-
ate action to ensure that such duties are properly
accounted for and made available as own resources.
Conclusions and recommendations
1.35. In the Court’s opinion, taking into account the
limitation of the scope of the audit (see paragraph 1.23),
the checks and systems analysis carried out gave satis-
factory overall results concerning the reliability of the
accounts, with the exception of the deferred-payment
system operated in Germany, in respect of which the
Court does not express an opinion for the reasons men-
tioned in paragraph 1.24.
1.36. The audit work carried out on the systems and
related transactions which underly the accounts has
allowed the Court to obtain reasonable assurance that
the underlying transactions taken as a whole are legal
and regular. However there is scope for Member States
to improve the national instructions in respect of the
control regime for Customs warehouses so that type,
scope and frequency of controls are clearly set out.
Instructions should also indicate at which level of the
customs service decisions about the control modalities
should be taken. Finally Member States should ensure
that scheduled controls are carried out. In addition, the
issue of import duties on the sale of seized goods in the
United Kingdom needs to be regularised.
VAT/GNP own resource
1.37. In contrast to the EU’s revenue from traditional
own resources, the scope of the audit for the VAT and
GNP own resources is limited because the EU’s receipts
reflect macroeconomic statistics whose underlying data
cannot be tested directly. Therefore, the VAT/GNP audit
takes as its starting point the receipt by the Commis-
sion from the Member States of the macroeconomic
aggregates (either as forecasts or as real figures) and
seeks to assess the Commission’s system for handling
the data until they are ultimately reflected in the final
1.34. The Commission is aware that the United Kingdom
has initiated action to remedy the systemic faults. Quantifica-
tion of the own resources unaccounted for is continuing.
Action will then be taken to recover that amount together
with interest on the delay in making it available.
1.35-1.36. The Commission will continue to seek assur-
ance that Member States’ procedures in the field of traditional
own resources comply with Community rules. The Commis-
sion is also engaged in ensuring that any non-conformity with
Community regulations highlighted by reports of the Court
are pursued and that action is taken where necessary to col-
lect amounts of own resources or interest due.
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accounts. The Court looks at the difficult question of
quality of the macroeconomic data separately in special
reports, such as Special Report No 17/2000 (16).
Financing the UK correction
1.38. In 2001 the United Kingdom correction
amounted to 7 300 million euro. As outlined by the
Court on previous occasions (17) the mechanisms for
the calculation of the financing of the United Kingdom
correction are highly complex and sometimes cumber-
some. They will be further complicated under the new
decision on own resources, giving rise to increased
inherent risks.
1.39. Every year the Commission prepares a working
document which explains in some detail the calculation
and financing of the definitive correction concerning
the year n – 4 (18). This explanatory document does not
form part of the budgetary procedure for fixing the
amount of the UK correction and its financing, but is
only provided to the Council for information purposes,
after the adoption of the supplementary and amending
budget. In 2001 this document was presented to Coun-
cil on5 September, after the adoptionof SABNo 3/2001.
Considering the relevance of the document mentioned
before, it would be appropriate to make it available to
the two arms of the budgetary authority in due time.
Conclusions and recommendations
1.40. Taking into account the limitation to the scope
of the audit, the Court obtained a reasonable assurance
that the VAT and GNP resources were correctly assessed
and collected. However, the Commission should put
forward proposals for the simplification of the final cal-
culation of the financing of the United Kingdom cor-
rection.
1.39. The main purpose of the working document on the
result of the final calculation of the UK correction and its
financing is to explain the method of calculation, while using
the latest available figures. It is not always possible to submit
this document in advance of the adoption of the relevant SAB,
although this was done in 2002. The final calculation is
explained in the explanatory memorandum to the SAB itself.
The Commission will examine the possibility of including fur-
ther details of the calculation of the final correction in the rel-
evant SAB.
1.40. The new Own Resources Decision and its accompa-
nying working document on the calculation of the UK correc-
tion (‘the calculation method’) does give some scope for sim-
plifying for budgeting the result of the final calculation of the
UK correction. This in turn could simplify the final calcula-
tion for the financing of the correction. The Commission
intends to pursue this opportunity for the year 2001 calcula-
tion, to be budgeted in 2005.
(16) Special Report No 17/2000 on the Commission’s control
of the reliability and comparability of the Member States’
GNP data (OJ C 336, 27.11.2000).
(17) Most recently in Opinion No 8/99 on a Council proposal
for a decision concerning the European Union’s system of
own resources (OJ C 310, 28.10.1999).
(18) Final calculation of the 1997 correction of the United
Kingdom’s budgetary imbalance and of its financing, dis-
tributed to the Budgetary Committee of the Council on
5 September 2001.
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FOLLOW-UP TO PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS
Outward-processing arrangement
1.41. In its Annual Report concerning the financial
year 1999 (19) the Court proposed that the outward-
processing arrangement be simplified as regards the
application of economic conditions, granting of author-
isations and the calculation of the duty relief. Such
changes are incorporated in a new regulation (20) issued
by the Commission, rationalising all the customs pro-
cedures that have an economic impact.
Use of statistics to combat fraud
1.42. As part of the Annual Report concerning the
financial year 1999 (21), the Court recommended that a
methodof comparing tax sourceswith statistical sources,
tested by both France and Italy, be extended to other
Member States and used as a possible means of combat-
ing fraud. In its reply the Commission committed itself
to discussing this method with the Member States.
1.43. In its recommendation (22) on the discharge to
be given to the Commission in respect of the imple-
mentation of the general budget for the European Com-
munities for the financial year 1999, the Council wel-
comes with interest the Court’s recommendation and
suggests that this matter should be examined by the
Advisory Committee on Own Resources.
1.44. Although the Commission has taken adequate
steps in carrying out this commitment, the Member
States have been unable to come to an agreement. The
Court again recommends that the Commission should
continue its efforts in this very important area.
1.42. Following the Court’s recommendation, the Commis-
sion asked the national administration of every Member State
to provide information about any studies made of the gap
between VAT actually collected and the theoretical amount of
VAT due on the basis of economic statistics.
1.43-1.44. This item was discussed at both meetings of the
Advisory Committee on Own Resources (ACOR) held in
2001. The conclusion, shared by Italy and France, was that,
regrettably, statistical information about theoretical VAT
receipts requires such extensive disaggregation to be useful in
targeting tax controls that other risk indicators are more
readily accessible, more reliable and easier to use. In addition,
Member States concluded that ACOR was not the most suit-
able forum for any further development. However, the find-
ings remain available for use wherever Member States con-
sider that they may prove useful input for their risk analysis
systems. Furthermore, the Commission systematically raises
this matter on VAT own resources’ control missions, in order
to ensure that national authorities give full consideration to
the implications of discrepancies between theoretical and actual
VAT.
(19) Paragraphs 1.43 to 1.56.
(20) CommissionRegulation (EC)No 993/2001of 4May 2001
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down
provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation
(EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs
Code (OJ L 141, 28.5.2001 p. 1).
(21) Paragraphs 1.63 to 1.70.
(22) Document SN 2088/01 — DGF II.
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ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF VAT REVENUE
The Court’s audit
1.45. The Court has previously examined the adequacy
and the functioning of arrangements for administrative
cooperation between the Member States and the Com-
mission in respect of the safeguarding of VAT revenue.
The observations arising from these audits, together
with the Commission’s responses and proposals for
remedial action, are mentioned in several of the Court’s
reports (23).
1.46. The Court has reviewed the arrangements and
the Commission’s proposal (24) for remedial action par-
ticularly in relation to ‘roundabout’ fraud which consti-
tutes an important threat to the proper collection of
VAT revenue (see paragraph 1.50), with the objective of
assessing how these arrangements are being applied and
whether they are effective.
1.47. The examination was limited to the Commission
and focused on the elements related to a number of
weaknesses in administrative cooperation previously
identified by both the Court and the Commission. Par-
ticular attention was paid to the report by the Council
ad hoc group on fiscal fraud and its recommendations.
Main features of administrative cooperation
1.48. The essential elements of administrative coop-
eration between the Member States and the Commis-
sion are laid down in Council Regulation
(EEC) No 218/92 of 27 January 1992 on administrative
cooperation in the field of indirect taxation (VAT) (25)
(23) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1997, para-
graphs 1.30 to 1.36;
Special Report No 9/98 concerning the protection of the
financial interests of the European Union in the field of
VAT on intra-Community trade, paragraphs 3.32 to 3.37;
Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000, para-
graph 1.79.
(24) In particular the proposal for a regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on administrative
cooperation in the field of value added tax (COM(2001)
294 final, 18.6.2001), which is at present under discus-
sion in the Council.
(25) OJ L 24, 1.2.1992, p. 1.
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andCouncil Directive 77/799/EECof19December1977
concerningmutual assistance by the competent authori-
ties of the Member States in the field of direct taxation
and VAT (26) as amended. They concern:
(a) the value added tax information exchange system
(VIES), comprising the operation of an electronic
database by eachMember Statewhich contains infor-
mation to be submitted by taxable persons and a
register of persons identified for VAT purposes;
(b) the provision by Member States of further informa-
tion in relation to VAT-liable transactions, the pool-
ing by the Commission and the further dissemina-
tion of such information;
(c) the Standing Committee on Administrative Coop-
eration (SCAC), which adopts the measures required
for the application of the exchange of information;
(d) direct communication between Member States on
matters of bilateral interest, exchanges of informa-
tion under Directive 77/799/EEC and communica-
tion by the Commission to each Member State of
any information which it receives and which it is
able to supply.
1.49. The Member States are, therefore, primarily con-
cerned with the exchange of information while the
Commission’s role is limited to evaluating and stimulat-
ing administrative cooperation.
Roundabout fraud
1.50. ‘Roundabout’ fraud consists of a series of com-
mercial operations with the same goods over a rela-
tively short period, which constitute an abuse of certain
characteristics of the VAT collection system. Though
different, sometimes complex forms of roundabout
fraud exist, the basic structure of a roundabout can be
described as follows: trader A ‘sells’ goods to trader B,
charging VAT but not submitting a tax return or return
(26) Directive 77/799/EEC (OJ L 336, 27.12.1977, p. 15), as
amended byDirective 79/1070/EEC (OJ L 331, 27.12.1979,
p. 8).
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ing any amount to the State. Trader B ‘sells’ the goods
to trader C without charging VAT, but claims a refund
of the VAT paid to trader A, pretending that the goods
are to be supplied to another Member State (or exported
outside the EU). The goods are in fact transferred again
to A, and then resold by A to B and then to C several
times (hence the expression ‘roundabout’). In fact, the
goods may even exist on paper only.
1.51. The amounts defrauded in this manner are not
known. According to a Commission document, cross-
border fraud, which constitutes the greater part of
roundabout fraud, cannot be countered without rapid
and intensive administrative cooperation. However, the
existing instruments seem too inflexible and ineffective
to achieve this.
Findings
1.52. The Commission’s proposal in respect of admin-
istrative cooperation in the domain of value added tax
(see footnote 24) closely follows the recommendations
of the Council ad-hoc group on fiscal fraud and con-
tains a number of clear improvements in administrative
cooperation, such as:
(a) the possibility of direct contacts between opera-
tional services in Member States as well as the pos-
sibility for officials of a Member State of participat-
ing in investigations in another Member State;
(b) the possibility forMember States of requesting other
Member States to carry out administrative investi-
gations and to carry out simultaneous controls.
1.53. However, a number of problems, most of which
have been discussed for some years in the framework of
the SCAC and the Standing Anti-fraud Sub-Committee
(SCAF), persist, and continue to hamper the effective-
ness of administrative cooperation in the fight against
the evasion of VAT revenue and roundabout fraud in
particular:
(a) it has still not been decided if and how use can be
made of VIES as a means of an integrated approach
for analysing risk factors and performing controls
in the fight against fraud;
1.53.
(a) The VAT information exchange system (VIES) aims to
ensure compliance by taxable persons by means of ex post
controls; it was not designed as an instrument to tackle
fraud. The Commission has proposed exchanging infor-
mation to tackle carousel fraud outside VIES, thereby:
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(b) there is still scope for improvement in the informa-
tion of both the Member States and the Commis-
sion in the case of suspected and detected cases of
fraud. In this context the consultative and investiga-
tive role of OLAF in fraud matters needs clarifica-
tion;
(c) the absence of remedial actions for not providing
timely information, operational weaknesses in the
SCAF subcommittee (27), and differences in the
operational capabilities of central liaison offices
(CLOs) which are responsible for maintaining con-
tacts with other Member States constitute other
areas where improvements should be made;
— ensuring quicker exchange of data, and
— not increasing disproportionately the administrative
burden on compliant traders.
As concerns risk analysis, the Commission takes the view
that it should not be decided at Community level how the
VIES data should be integrated in the Member States’ sys-
tems for risk analysis, as all have different legal and
administrative structures. However, the Commission has
undertaken several actions offering Member States the
facility to pool experiences in this area, such as Fiscalis
seminars, exchange of officials and risk analysis presenta-
tions by Member States in the Standing Committee on
administrative cooperation in the field of indirect taxation
(SCAC). Moreover, an ad hoc group has been created to
draft common principles on how to build risk indicators.
(b) The Commission shares the view of the Court and under-
lines that agreement has been reached recently in SCAC
whereby Member States report all cases of roundabout
fraud detected on a systematic basis.
As far as OLAF’s operational competence in the field of
VAT is concerned, the Commission included in both its
action plan for 2001 to 2003 on protecting the Com-
munities’ financial interests and the fight against fraud (1)
and its work programme 2001 (2) a proposal for a regu-
lation of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a system for cooperation between the Mem-
ber States’ authorities and the Commission with a view
to protecting the financial interests of the Communities
against illegal activities, including VAT-related activities
and money laundering.
(c) The Commission shares the view of the Court and notes
that its proposal on administrative cooperation deals with
the problem of providing timely information. The Com-
mission has recently reorganised the Committee structure
in order to shorten the decision-making process (by hav-
ing SCAC dealing directly with anti-fraud issues rather
than in a specialised subcommittee). Although action, as
pointed out by the Court, is primarily required at national
level the weakness of the CLOs has been addressed in sev-
eral Commission reports.
(1) COM(2001) 254 final, 15.5.2001.
(2) See sheet 2001/098.
(27) Such as the length of the decision-making process and
unequal contribution by Member States to the work of
the Committee.
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(d) the effectiveness of actions organised under the Fis-
calis programme (28), though they have led, accord-
ing to the Commission, to an increased awareness
of roundabout fraud in Member States, could be
increased by taking follow-up action, coordinated at
Community level by the Commission, for example
in the form of more frequent multilateral controls.
Recommendations and conclusion
1.54. Although the Member States are primarily
responsible for the safeguarding of VAT revenue and the
related administrative cooperation, the following mea-
sures could be taken in order to increase the effective-
ness of administrative cooperation between Member
States and the Commission:
(a) the SCAC and SCAF Committees, as the major
forums for the exchange of information between
Member States could, under the guidance of the
Commission, develop best practice in respect of the
development of an anti-fraud strategy;
(b) exchange of information between Member States
could be facilitated by the further development of
the VIES to combat fraud, of bi- or multilateral
agreements as well as by the introduction of correc-
tive actions in cases where Member States do not
provide timely information;
(d) The Commission follows up the actions organised under
the Fiscalis programme, within the legal framework in
force. The Commission cannot coordinate specific
follow-up by means of multilateral controls which are in
any case initiated and organised by Member States. The
Commission has, however, recently held a special meet-
ing of the SCAC aimed at improving the use of such con-
trols (see also point 1.55 below).
1.54. The Commission agrees with the Court’s recommen-
dations. However, improvements in this regard fall solely
within the competence of the Member States, and therefore
require action at national level.
Under the current legal framework for administrative coopera-
tion in the field of VAT, the role of the Commission is limited
to evaluating the functioning of the arrangements and offer-
ing Member States the facility to pool experience.
In addition, the Commission services are preparing a separate
proposal under Article 280 of the EC Treaty, laying down
specific provisions which confer a role on the Commission in
coordinating administrative cooperation.
(a) The Commission agrees that SCAC should develop best
practice in respect of the development of an anti-fraud
strategy. Therefore it has organised follow-up in SCAC to
the recommendation of the Council ad hoc group on fis-
cal fraud. In this context, SCAC has set up an ad hoc
group with the aim of pooling best practice in preventing
and tackling roundabout fraud.
(b) These problems are dealt with in the Commission pro-
posal for administrative cooperation, although the Com-
mission takes the view that anti-fraud information should
be exchanged outside the VIES.
(28) Programme adopted for the period 1998 to 2002, which
has grouped several actions previously financed under
different budgetary chapters. Its three elements consist of
seminars in which officials from national administrations
and from the Commission and OLAF participate,
exchanges of officials between national administrations
and multilateral controls. One of the programme’s objec-
tives is to ensure efficient and extensive cooperation
between Member States and Commission.
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(c) special control units to tackle specific VAT fraud
cases could be set up to give Member States better
opportunities to fight fraud on the condition that
these units are integrated in, or work closely with,
the CLOs and with the assistance of OLAF;
(d) the scope of the information exchange mentioned
in Articles 11 and 12 of Council Regulation (EEC)
No 218/92 should be clarified and made more
explicit; information exchanges between Member
States could be made more efficient by harmonising
the competences and capabilities of CLOs in Mem-
ber States.
1.55. In conclusion, though the field of application of
administrative cooperation between Member States and
Commission is wider than the fight against (round-
about) fraud in Community trade, this constitutes an
important element, as is also acknowledged by the Com-
mission in its communication to the European Parlia-
ment and to the Council — A strategy to improve the
operation of the VAT system within the context of the
internal market (29). Member States are the main actors
in administrative cooperation and the fight against fraud
but the Commission should play a more effective coord-
inating role given the existence of a single market and
the cross-frontier aspects of fraudulent operations (30).
The Commission’s proposal in respect of administrative
cooperation contains clear improvements but leaves a
number of issues unaddressed. Finally the Court would
like to draw attention to the fact that roundabout fraud
is facilited by the existing transitional VAT system itself.
The entry into force of the proposed definitive system,
with taxation at the origin of the commercial transac-
tions, would considerably reduce the scope for commit-
ting this type of fraud.
(c) The Commission endorses this recommendation. The need
for special control units to tackle specific VAT fraud has
been addressed in several Commission working papers
and reports.
(d) The Commission endorses this recommendation and
points out that the Council is currently discussing a new
draft of Articles 11 and 12 of Council Regulation (EEC)
No 218/92 on the basis of the Commission proposal on
administrative cooperation. The weakness of the CLOs
has been addressed in several Commission reports, but
again primarily requires action at national level.
1.55. The Commission agrees with the Court, although this
proposal only deals with those issues which require a legisla-
tive initiative under Article 95 of the EC Treaty. The Com-
mission emphasises that it has undertaken a considerable
number of other actions to prevent and tackle fraud in the
VAT area.
On 28 January 2000 the Commission produced a report to
the European Parliament and to the Council (3) on VAT con-
trol. This report has been taken up by the Council’s ad hoc
Working Party on Tax Fraud which has made recommenda-
tions to tackle fiscal fraud. These recommendations have been
taken on board by the Commission in three ways:
— those recommendations which fall within the legislative
competence of the Commission are covered by the pro-
posal on administrative cooperation,
— for those recommendations which require Community
action other than legislative action, the Commission has
taken the necessary initiatives in SCAC,
— for those recommendations that fall solely within the
competence of the Member States, the Commission has
organised follow-up and an evaluation of progress. The
action taken at national level has been examined on the
basis of Member States’contributions. The Commission
will present its conclusions in a report to the European
Parliament and to the Council under Article 14 of Regu-
lation (EEC) No 218/92.
In addition, the Commission will make a separate proposal
under Article 280 of the EC Treaty, to lay down specific pro-
visions to confer a role on the Commission in coordinating
administrative cooperation.
Finally, the Commission shares the opinion of the Court about
a system of taxation in the Member State of origin. However,
since it is unlikely that significant progress will be made in the
immediate future, the Commission considers this to be a
longer-term goal.
(3) COM(2000) 28 final of 28.1.2000.
(29) COM(2000) 348 final, 7.6.2000.
(30) See also Special Report No 9/98, paragraphs 4.1 to 4.11.
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INTRODUCTION
2.1. This chapter concerns the expenditure of the Guar-
antee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance
andGuarantee Fund (EAGGF-Guarantee) and the expen-
diture charged to Chapter B2-5 1 (1) (Controls and other
operations in the agricultural sector).
2.2. Virtually all this expenditure is handled by the
paying agencies in the Member States. Before paying the
aid to the recipients, the national authorities have to
subject the claims to checks laid down by the regula-
tions. For two thirds of the aid distributed, this process
includes cross-checking the claims against national data-
bases set up under the integrated administration and
control system (2) (IACS) or the system for the identifi-
cation and registration of bovine animals (3) (SIRB).
These cross-checks are intended to detect any errors in
the declaration of the areas cultivated or the animals
kept.
(1) The figures given under the Analysis of budgetary man-
agement section (paragraphs 2.5-2.8) relate only to sub-
section B1 of the budget. With regard to Chapter B2-5 1,
the initial budget in respect of commitment appropria-
tions was 54 million euro. In the course of the year, these
appropriations were increased by 22 million euro, and
the commitments for the financial year totalled 50 mil-
lion euro (94 %).
(2) IACS was introduced by Council Regulation (EEC)
No 3508/92 of 27 November 1992 (OJ L 355, 5.12.1992,
p. 1) and implemented by Commission Regulation (EEC)
No 3887/92 of 23 December 1992 (OJ L 391, 31.12.1992,
p. 36).
Since 1992, the common agricultural policy has basically
consisted of direct aid to farmers. The amount of aid paid
depends on the eligible surface area (for arable crops) and
the eligible animals (for animal premiums) declared by
farmers. In order to reduce the risk of errors and irregu-
larities, a control system, IACS, was set up. It includes the
recording of claims for aid, a system for identifying agri-
cultural parcels, a system for the identification and regis-
tration of animals, and the use of administrative checks
and a minimum number of on-the-spot checks (5 % for
surface areas and 10 % for animals). The Court has recently
published a special report on IACS (Special Report
No 4/2001 (OJ C 214, 31.7.2001, p. 1)).
(3) Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a
system for the identification and registration of bovine
animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef prod-
ucts, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97
(OJ L 204, 11.8.2000, p. 1).
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2.3. Every month the Commission advances the Mem-
ber States an amount based on the payments declared
in the previous month. These payments are booked
monthly to the expenditure accounts, subject to any
corrections that may be necessary when the accounts
are cleared at the end of the financial year.
2.4. This chapter consists of five parts:
(a) the analysis of the budgetary management for the
financial year 2001;
(b) the Statement of Assurance for the financial year
2001;
(c) the clearance of the accounts;
(d) the follow-up to previous observations;
(e) the principal observations in the Special Reports
adopted by the Court since the last Annual
Report (4).
ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT
A supplementary and amending budget far in excess of
needs
2.5. The initial appropriationsof theEAGGF-Guarantee
budget (5) were 43 798 million euro (including 100 mil-
lion euro in provisional appropriations and the mon-
etary reserve (6) of 500 million euro) (see Table 2.1), i.e.
(4) Since 1997 there have been many special reports or opin-
ions on the subject of the common agricultural policy.
These are listed in full at Annex II.
(5) Final adoption of the general budget of the European
Union for the financial year 2001 (OJ L 56, 26.2.2001).
(6) The monetary reserve is intended to cover (in respect of
amounts above 200 million euro) adverse changes in the
dollar/euro parity used for budget estimates. Conversely,
any savings above 200 million euro due to a favourable
change in this parity are to be transferred to the monetary
reserve.
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47 % of the entire budget. These appropriations were
amended by a supplementary and amending budget
(SAB) (7).
2.6. This SAB added 971 million euro (8) to meet the
extra costs arising from the bovine spongiform encepha-
lopathy (BSE) crisis, partly offset by a 245 million euro
reduction due to a favourable change in the euro/dollar
parity. These needs were greatly overstated: expenditure
on the purchase and culling of cattle amounted to only
212 million euro.
(7) Final adoption of supplementary and amending budget
No 1 of the European Union for the financial year 2001
(OJ L 218, 13.8.2001).
(8) 700 million euro for the purchase and culling of cattle
aged over 30 months not intended for human consump-
tion, 33 million euro for the cost of tests for cattle aged
over 30 months intended for human consumption and
238 million euro for storage costs for beef/veal.
Table 2.1 - EAGGF-Guarantee 2001: Analysis of the budgetary management
(Mio EUR)
Financial perspective heading: 1. Subsection B1: EAGGF-Guarantee (1)
Total heading
Of which:
B1-1 B1-2 B1-3 B1-4 B1-6
Plant products Animal
products
Ancillary
expenditure
Rural development Monetary
reserve
Financial perspective ceiling 44 530
Budget changes
Initial appropriations (2) 43 798 27 595 10 159 1 049 4 495 500
Final appropriations available 44 484 27 404 10 466 1 619 4 495 500
Implementation of the budget
Appropriations used (3) 42 083 26 714 9 558 1 448 4 363 0
% of final available appropriations 95 97 91 89 97 0
Appropriations carried over to 2002 99 0 0 0 99 0
% of final available appropriations 0 0 0 0 2 0
Appropriations lapsing 2 301 690 908 171 32 500
% of final available appropriations 5 3 9 11 1 100
(1) Non-differentiated appropriations.
(2) Including provisional appropriations of 100 Mio EUR (B0-4 0) and the monetary reserve of 500 Mio EUR.
(3) In commitments.
Source: 2001 revenue and expenditure account.
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In the end, expenditure totalled 95 % of the appropria-
tions
2.7. The final appropriationswere 44 484 million euro
and expenditure was 42 083 million euro, i.e. 95 % of
the total available appropriations (seeTable 2.1). Exclud-
ing appropriations for the monetary reserve, which was
not used in 2001, the outturn on the budget amounts
to nearly 96 %.
2.8. This 42 083 million euro in expenditure was
divided up as follows:
— see Graph 2.1 for the breakdown of expenditure by
type,
— see Graph 2.2 for the breakdown of expenditure by
sector.
Graph 2.1 — Breakdown of expenditure by type
Source: The Court of Auditors, on the basis of the Commission’s accounts for 2001.
The classification of expenditure used here differs from that of the Commission (Table 10 of volume I) in the following respects:
(1) The Court of Auditors has considered expenditure on Article B1-1 0 6 ‘Set aside’ as a part of the cost of support for arable crops, increasing expenditure under this
heading by 3 % and reducing that under ‘Other’ by the same amount.
(2) The Court of Auditors has considered expenditure on Item B1-1 2 1 1 ‘Schemes related to production’ and Article B1-1 3 0 ‘Production aid for dried fodder’ as part
of the cost of support for direct aid linked to production, increasing expenditure under this heading by 1 % and reducing that from ‘Other’ by the same amount.
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SPECIFIC APPRAISAL IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
2.9. The Court:
(a) took a representative sample of 156 transactions
from theCommission’s accounts and, for these trans-
actions, examined both the reliability of the accounts
and the legality and regularity of the underlying
transactions. The Court examined each transaction
on the premises of the paying agency and the final
beneficiary;
(b) reviewed the control systems for a number of com-
mon agricultural policy (CAP) schemes;
(c) compared the results of its work with the results of
physical checks carried out by Member States, in
particular under the integrated administrative and
control system (IACS);
(d) took account of the declaration of the Commission’s
Director-General for Agriculture.
Graph 2.2 — Breakdown of expenditure by sector
Source: The Commission’s accounts for 2001.
28.11.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 39
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS
2.10. The observations on the reliability of the accounts
have been grouped together in Chapter 9, paragraphs 9.6
to 9.35. Those concerning the legality and regularity of
the underlying transactions are set out and described
below.
2.11. The Court found CAP expenditure was materi-
ally affected by errors in the declarations made by farm-
ers and other recipients of subsidy rather than at the
level of paying agencies. The audit did not provide evi-
dence of significant improvement in the overall situa-
tion previously remarked on. The following text groups
the Court’s findings under the headings: ‘Area aid
schemes’, ‘Animal premium schemes’, ‘Olive oil’, ‘Rural
development’ and ‘Other expenditure’.
Area aid schemes
2.12. Area aid payments to producers of arable crops
amounted to 16 847 million euro in 2001, 40 % of CAP
expenditure. The greater part of this aid is paid to cereal
growers.
2.13. Payments under these schemes result from the
multiplication of the following three figures:
(a) the subsidy rate, laid down in Community legisla-
tion;
(b) the yield per hectare, calculated by the Member
States (on a regional basis) and approved by the
Commission; and
(c) the area of the parcels devoted to the production of
cereals, as declared by the producer.
Control system
2.14. Under IACS, Member States make administrative
checks on all declarations and physical checks in the
field on a sample of beneficiaries.
Findings of the Court
2.15. In previous reports the Court has criticised sev-
eral aspects of the support scheme for arable crops. Aid
2.11. For this financial year, the Commission would point
out that 82,9 % of the substantial errors detected at the level
of management by Member States’ paying agencies relate to
situations of which the Commission is aware and which have
been or will be corrected in the context of the various recent
and future EAGGF-Guarantee account-clearance decisions.
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payments have generally exceeded the loss to produc-
ers resulting from the 1992 reform. The approved
regional yields are too high in some Member States, for
example in the case of oilseed crops (see para-
graph 2.122) (9).
2.16. The audit performed in 2001 found a material
incidence of error affecting these subsidies. Most of the
errors involved discrepancies between the arable area
declared by farmers and the area found when parcels
were measured in the presence of auditors. Approxi-
mately half of the discrepancies were of less than 3 % of
the declared area. (If such discrepancies are found in the
course of an IACS field inspection, paying agencies are
required to correct the claim, but not to impose penal-
ties.) A similar number of discrepancies related to errors
of between 3 % and 20 % of the area declared. (Such
discrepancies, under the relevant regulations, should
result in the imposition of penalties and are unlikely to
be explained by simple error on the part of the farmer.)
2.17. The audit identified two payments based upon
declarations which were largely or completely
unfounded. The first case involved an unjustified pay-
ment of a subsidy for the production of protein crops
in Italy. The second case involved payment of a subsidy
for the production of maize in Greece, where, due to
the inaccurate information provided by the beneficiary,
and the deficiencies of the control systems of the pay-
ing agency, it was not possible to verify the area culti-
vated. Cases of this nature appear to have a greater
impact on expenditure than the measurement errors
described above (paragraph 2.16).
Results of checks performed by Member States
2.18. Comparison between the results of the Court’s
audit and the inspections carried out under IACS is dif-
ficult. Transactions checked by Member States under
IACS include both declarations identified as presenting
particular risks and declarations selected on a purely
random basis. Community legislation did not require
paying agencies to present the two sets of results sepa-
rately.
2.16. For each Statement of Assurance (SOA) case the spe-
cific knowledge resides with the authorities of the Member
State. The Commission will continue to review the detailed
findings with the Member States.
Apart from auditing the expenditure declared by Member
States and applying financial corrections, where appropriate,
the Commission also plays an active role in improving the sys-
tems implemented by the Member States. For example, Mem-
ber States will have to adopt, at the latest by 1 January 2005,
geographical identification systems in order to reduce human
error in claims submitted and to generally improve their con-
trol systems.
2.17. As regards Italy and Greece, to which the Court refers
specifically, the Commission services have proposed or are pro-
posing flat-rate financial corrections as a consequence of defi-
cient control systems for the marketing year involved.
2.18. The Member States are required under Article 17(3)
of Regulation 3887/92 and Article 52 of 2419/2001 to
send to the Commission, by no later than 31 March each
year, a report covering the previous calendar year. This report
shall among other things give the result of the checks carried
out. For this purpose the Commission services have created a
questionnaire in respect of the arable crops sector in which
Member States are required to report separately the results of
cases selected on a risk and random basis with effect from
2000.
Furthermore, Article 19(1) of Regulation No 2419/2001,
applicable as from 1 January 2002, provides that Member
States ‘shall select randomly between 20 % and 25 % of the
minimum number of farmers to be subject to on-the-spot
checks’.
(9) Special Report No 6/2002.
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2.19. Nevertheless, so far as comparison is possible,
the Court’s audit suggests that the IACS inspection
results may understate overall error. The Court’s audit,
based on random sampling, indicated a higher incidence
of error than do the IACS results, though the latter are
drawn from a mixture of random and risk-based tests.
For 2000, the relevant year for most payments made in
the 2001 EAGGF year, physical IACS checks on nearly
300 000 farmers showed that they had overstated arable
areas by 2,3 % (see Table 2.2 and Graphs 2.3 and 2.4).
This figure is heavily influenced by the results for Italy,
where 43 % of the total number of IACS inspections
were performed, covering 13 %of the total area checked,
and as a result many false declarations were identified.
In the claims examined in Italy the total area claimed
was overstated by 8 %. No results were provided by
Greece. The Court’s audit work also included the re-
performance of some field inspections carried out under
IACS. In some cases this brought to light errors not
identified in the original examination.
Table 2.2 – Area aid – Results of IACS field inspection and remote sensing
Member State
Applications submitted Applications checked Applications with errors
Number Area (ha) Number as % Area (ha) as % Number % Area (ha) %
Belgium 43 058 996 646 5 255 12,20 159 584 16,01 1 084 20,60 1 376 0,90
Denmark 56 229 2 295 566 3 146 5,59 141 613 6,17 569 18,10 1 727 1,20
Germany 339 555 14 072 879 24 211 7,13 1 325 883 9,42 7 254 30,00 7 677 0,60
Greece (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
Spain 453 215 17 158 323 45 682 10,08 2 311 284 13,47 12 546 27,50 52 666 2,30
France 441 404 23 376 044 28 589 6,48 1 988 947 8,51 10 247 35,80 16 105 0,80
Ireland 130 052 4 613 819 7 086 5,45 313 336 6,79 907 12,80 8 993 2,90
Italy 604 332 7 007 936 124 239 20,56 1 459 266 20,82 20 687 16,70 120 537 8,30
Luxembourg 2 128 121 845 188 8,83 18 692 15,34 161 85,50 271 1,40
Netherlands 48 993 592 692 3 971 8,11 71 856 12,12 781 19,70 1 504 2,10
Austria 131 381 2 092 652 10 810 8,23 242 305 11,58 3 899 36,10 2 028 0,80
Portugal 151 327 2 785 028 15 483 10,23 1 482 606 53,23 8 467 54,70 30 141 2,00
Finland 72 529 2 061 292 4 791 6,61 167 753 8,14 1 056 22,00 1 132 0,70
Sweden 63 456 2 720 038 5 389 8,49 308 588 11,34 2 422 44,90 6 138 2,00
United Kingdom 142 536 13 666 049 9 443 6,62 1 009 134 7,38 4 537 48,00 7 194 0,70
Total 2 680 195 93 560 809 288 283 10,76 11 000 847 11,76 74 617 25,90 257 489 2,30
(1) Data not sent to the Commission.
NB 1: Remote sensing involves the use of satellite or aerial photography to check IACS application.
NB 2: Differences in percentage of errors detected may be explained both by differences in the number of inaccurate claims submitted and differences in the efficiency
of detection.
Source: DG AGRI – IACS 2000 Statistics.
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Graph 2.4 — Area aid — Results of IACS field inspections: average overstatement (1) in claims inspected
Source: DG AGRI — IACS 2000 Statistics.
(1) Total overstatement amounted to 257 489 ha, i.e. 2,3 % of the total area checked by the Member States.
(2) Greece: data not sent to the Commission.
Graph 2.3 — Area aid — Result of IACS field inspections: percentage of applications inspected which were
overstated (1)
Source: DG AGRI — IACS 2000 Statistics.
(1) 74 617 applications were overstated, i.e. 25,9 % of the total number of applications inspected by Member States.
(2) Greece: data not sent to the Commission.
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Animal premium schemes
2.20. Aid to livestock producers amounted to 6 824
million euro in 2001, 16 % of CAP expenditure. Nearly
four fifths of this sum subsidises beef producers, the
remainder subsidising the rearing of sheep and
goats (10).
2.21. These schemes typically pay producers a fixed
amount of subsidy per animal. The amount of subsidy
depends on the animal concerned (bulls or steers, suck-
ler cows, etc.). Certain schemes require farmers to
observe stocking density limits, notably the extensifica-
tion payment scheme.
Control system
2.22. In the framework of IACS, producersmustmain-
tain extensive records of animal movements and must
tag cattle. Member States must perform administrative
checks and selective on-farm inspections. As with area
aid, results of on-farm inspections presented by the pay-
ing agencies do not distinguish between random and
risk-based checks.
Findings of the Court
2.23. The errors found by the Court in its sample
chiefly involved discrepancies between, on the one hand,
records kept by the farmer and, on the other hand, the
declaration on which premiums had been paid. The
largest errors of this kind related to payments made in
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Expenditure
on animal premium schemes appears to be materially
affected by error.
2.22. Although Member States are not required to report
their inspection results in the way proposed by the Court, the
breakdown between random and risk-based checks has indeed
been examined regularly, as appropriate in the context of
audits of agricultural expenditure conducted by the Commis-
sion services; the aim being to ensure that the selection of
farmers for on-the-spot checks is representative as provided by
Regulation EEC No 3887/92. Furthermore, IACS legisla-
tion has been strengthened in this respect by Article 19(1) of
Regulation (EC) No 2419/2001, applicable as from 1 Janu-
ary 2002, which provides that Member States ‘shall select
randomly between 20 % and 25 % of the minimum number
of farmers to be subject to on-the-spot checks.’ This regula-
tory requirement will adequately ensure the properly based
audit conclusions implied by the Court’s remark.
2.23. The Commission services’ audits of agricultural expen-
diture have also established that the quality of record-keeping
by farmers, including those in the Member States mentioned
by the Court, is less than satisfactory. IACS Regulations lay
down the means to control and proportionately sanction such
occurrences. Member States’ failings in this respect are duly
considered in the Commission’s clearance of accounts proce-
dure.
(10) Certain livestock producers also receive subsidies from
Chapter B1-4 ‘Rural Development’.
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2.24. The 2001 audit also involved a specific exami-
nation of the extensification payment scheme (11), which
cost 913 million euro in 2001 and accounted for some
2 % of CAP expenditure. Payments are made to produc-
ers who keep the number of animals per hectare within
limits laid down in Community legislation. The results
of the audit in 2001 and in previous years suggest that
overall underlying paymentswere notmaterially affected
by errors of legality and regularity. Most producers paid
under this scheme fall well within the applicable ceiling
for stocking density. Administrative checks are per-
formed on all beneficiaries. However, an examination of
control systems in six Member States found that most
failed to focus selective physical checks on applicants
close to the eligibility limit and that only one had
adopted an integrated approach to checking both crite-
ria (existence of animals and area devoted to pasture
and the production of fodder crops).
2.25. Specific weaknesses in systems were found in
two Member States. In Austria, the extent of eligible
alpine pasture was overestimated by more than 60 % in
some areas, on the basis of information in the land reg-
ister. The introduction of aerial photography in 1998
brought this difference to light, but had only been
applied in some areas of Austria, such as the Salzburg
region, in the 2001 application year. In France, inaccu-
racies in the cattle database used to calculate the stock-
ing density increased the risk of error and were com-
pounded by weaknesses in the forage area inspections.
Producers were paid the premium on the basis of this
unreliable database, regardless of whether they had spe-
cifically requested the aid.
2.24. As a consequence of the Commission services’ audit
findings, the new IACS Regulation (EC) No 2419/2001
explicitly requires the risk analysis factor suggested by the
Court with effect from 2002.
As concerns checks on applicants close to the eligibility limit,
this was not a regulatory requirement prior to 2002 although
the Commission has recommended it as good control proce-
dure. Likewise, the integrated approach suggested by the Court
has always been recommended by IACS legislation.
2.25. The matters raised by the Court in respect of Austria
and France are the subject of enquiries by the Commission ser-
vices in the context of the clearance of accounts procedure.
(11) Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999
establishing the common organisation of the market in
beef and veal (OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 21);
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2342/1999 of 28 Octo-
ber 1999 laying down rules for the implementation of
Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 (OJ L 281, 4.11.1999,
p. 30).
28.11.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 45
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Results of checks performed by Member States
2.26. Since January 2000, Member States have been
required to operate a system for the identification and
registration of bovine animals, enabling the paying agen-
cies to cross-check applications for payment of animal
premiums. Although around half of the Member States
failed to meet this timetable, this new tool is beginning
to bring to light higher levels of inaccurate declarations
in this scheme. Table 2.3 andGraph 2.5 summarise the
results of on-farm inspections for the most expensive
scheme, the suckler cow premium. This shows, for
example, that, in 2000, authorities in the Netherlands
reduced 18 % of claims selected for IACS checks and
rejected a further 2 % outright.
2.26. Whilst some Member States did not have in place
their bovine identification and registration database by the
due date of 1 January 2000, several were nevertheless able to
perform computerised cross-checks to a high degree prior to
payment (in 2001) of the bovine premiums relating to aid
applications lodged during 2000.
The Commission services have also noted the improved control
facility offered in a majority of Member States by a properly
functioning database. It is also recalled that the CAP reform
of 2000 introduced several new, or greatly modified, bovine
premium schemes, whose controllability has been enhanced by
the new tool, which is also central to the control provisions
laid down in the IACS Regulations.
As regards the Dutch authorities’ actions in reducing claims
during 2000, this was possibly the result of the Commission
services’ on-the-spot audit of agricultural expenditure in Sep-
tember 1999.
Table 2.3 – IACS inspections for suckler cow premium – Results of on-the-spot checks in 2000
Member State Total number ofclaims submitted
Claims inspected (CI) Claims partially rejected Claims fully rejected
Number % Number % Number %
Austria 90 224 13 188 14,62 1 021 7,74 37 0,28
Belgium 17 493 1 952 11,16 67 3,43 4 0,20
Denmark (1) 9 732 (1) (1) (1)
Germany (1) 35 626 (1) (1) (1)
Greece (2) (2) (2) (2) (2)
Spain 74 208 8 395 11,31 633 7,54 58 0,69
France (1) 138 303 (1) (1) (1)
Ireland 70 591 8 612 12,20 621 7,21 47 0,55
Italy (3) 60 900 26 552 43,60 2 502 9,42 549 2,07
Luxembourg 515 60 11,65 5 8,33 0 0,00
Netherlands 5 496 520 9,46 94 18,08 11 2,12
Portugal 31 413 3 770 12,00 579 15,36 23 0,61
Finland 1 431 173 12,09 31 17,92 2 1,16
Sweden 10 816 1 274 11,78 67 5,26 9 0,71
United Kingdom 49 400 3 026 6,13 235 7,77 16 0,53
Total 596 148 67 522 11,33 5 855 8,67 756 1,12
(1) Denmark, Germany and France: data sent to the Commission in incompatible format.
(2) Greece: data not sent to the Commission.
(3) Italy: incomplete data sent to the Commission.
NB 1: Differences in percentage of errors detected may be explained both by differences in the number of inaccurate claims submitted and differences in the
efficiency of detection.
NB 2: A claim is fully rejected when a difference higher than 20 % is found between the number of animals declared and that determined to be eligible or when the
difference is the result of irregularities committed intentionally.
Source: DG AGRI – IACS 2000 Statistics.
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Olive oil
2.27. The cost to the budget of aid for the olive oil pro-
ducers amounted to 2 505 million euro in 2001, 6 % of
total CAP expenditure. This subsidy is paid to produc-
ers on the basis of the amount of oil produced, as certi-
fied by approved pressing mills.
Control system
2.28. Member States’ olive oil control agencies must
inspect 30 % of approved mills each year. The Member
States are also required to set up a geographical infor-
mation system for olive cultivation. Producer organisa-
tions must check claims and ensure that, inter alia, they
agree with mill records.
2.28. The Commission services are monitoring the intro-
duction and effectiveness of the new control tools referred to
by the Court.
Graph 2.5 — Suckler cow premium — Percentage of claims inspected with errors
NB 1: Differences in percentage of errors detected may be explained both by differences in the number of inaccurate claims submitted and differences in the efficiency
of detection.
NB 2: A claim is fully rejected when a difference higher than 20 % is found between the number of animals declared and that determined to be eligible or when the
difference is the result of irregularities committed intentionally.
Source: DG AGRI — IACS 2000 Statistics.
(1) Denmark, Germany and France: data sent to the Commission in incompatible format.
(2) Greece: data not sent to the Commission.
(3) Italy: incomplete data sent to the Commission.
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Findings of the Court
2.29. Where aid is payable on the basis of quantities
produced, the reliability of the control system is par-
ticularly important. Evidence as to the accuracy of infor-
mation produced by an olive mill can only be obtained
at the time of milling. The audit of olive oil subsidies
must therefore take account of the extent to which the
control system ensures the accuracy of this informa-
tion. Weaknesses noted in 2001 included the absence of
an olive register in Greece and, in Spain, instances of
mills pressing olives without giving the relevant agency
the opportunity to be present, no olive cultivation geo-
graphical information system and a failure to inspect
the required number of olive mills.
Rural development
2.30. Rural development expenditure amounted to
4 364 million euro in 2001, 10 % of total CAP expen-
diture. The most expensive schemes involve support for
agri-environmental measures, the less-favoured areas
(which now include more than 50 % of the agricultural
area of the EU) and forestry. Expenditure is based upon
rural development plans drawn up by the Member
States and approved by the Commission.
Control system
2.31. There is no common control system for rural
development expenditure. Frequent conditions include
adherence to ‘good farming practices’, and minimum
standards for environmental impact, hygiene and ani-
mal welfare. Member States, however, have significant
discretion in the choice of areas to fund and in the design
of appropriate control systems. Several certifying bod-
ies express concerns about this expenditure, with the
certifying bodies for the French, Portuguese and Bavar-
ian paying agencies primarily concerned with rural
development payments qualifying their audit opinions.
2.29. The weaknesses noted by the Court in 2001 are being,
or will be, followed up in the context of the clearance of
accounts procedure. It should, however, be pointed out that as
from 1 November 1998, the olive register has been replaced
by the geographical information system for olives, for which
the deadline for completion is 1 November 2003. In the
intervening period until the ‘Oligis’ is completed, Member-
States are required to conduct an increasing number of on-the-
spot inspections. The Commission services are closely moni-
toring progress in this domain.
2.31. The Community rules provide a general framework
for the system of management, control and sanctions for rural
development measures. However, considering the great diver-
sity of measures and administrative organisations in theMem-
ber States, the detailed implementing rules are laid down by
the Member States themselves in accordance with the principle
of subsidiarity. The Commission department have neverthe-
less striven to ensure a degree of harmonisation between the
Member States by issuing recommendations in a guidelines
paper. The conclusions of certifying bodies are also taken into
account in the clearance of EAGGF-Guarantee accounts.
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Findings of the Court
2.32. In 2001 the audit incorporated a specific exami-
nation of aid for less favoured areas. This concluded
that significant weaknesses in accounting and control
systems exist. A particular problem is that standards for
‘good farming practice’ are poorly defined or are unveri-
fiable.
2.33. Payments are generally based on arable areas.
All of the types of error discussed under area aid schemes
also occur in payments in this area, with the additional
risk that farmers are failing to respect the conditions
mentioned in paragraph 2.32.
Other expenditure
2.34. Expenditure not covered in paragraphs 2.12 to
2.33 amounted to 11 543 million euro, 27 % of CAP
expenditure in 2001. This includes expenditure on activi-
ties such as cotton production, processing of agricul-
tural products, export refunds and other forms of mar-
ket intervention.
Findings of the Court: aid for cotton
2.35. The Court undertook a specific examination of
aid for cotton, which amounted to 733 million euro in
2001, 2 % of CAP expenditure. It is paid to ginning
undertakings in Greece and Spain on condition that a
minimum price has been paid to the producers for the
quantities of cotton delivered. National authorities must
have in place controls designed to ensure that aid is
paid on the correct quantity.
2.36. One key control is a check on the existence of
producers and the reasonableness of the quantities deliv-
ered. Producers are required to submit an area declara-
tion. National authorities use data from the area decla-
rations to calculate, for each producer, the yield per
hectare of unginned cotton, allowing yields exceeding
acceptable thresholds to be investigated. Such checks,
together with the cross-checks in the context of IACS
and the on-the-spot checks, address the risk that
2.32. The conclusions of the Court’s examination of aid to
less favoured areas will be carefully assessed by the Commis-
sion departments. The Commission departments are well
aware of the issue of the control of good agricultural practices.
Specific recommendations on this subject were included in the
guidelines paper referred to at paragraph 2.31 above.
2.33. Area-related errors are also being evaluated in the
context of compliance clearance, both in general enquiries con-
cerning the IACS and in specific enquiries concerning rural
development measures.
2.36-2.37. The incompatibility of parcel identification for
cotton in Greece, and the consequent difficulty in confirming
the areas of cotton parcels, is the subject of an ongoing enquiry
by the Commission services in the context of the clearance of
accounts procedure. However, regulatory provisions have
already been put in place.
Articles 9a(1) and 13(1)(d) of Council Regulation (EEC)
No 3508/92 require, at the latest by 1 January 2003, the
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producers understate the area devoted to cotton in order
to overstate claims for crops on which area aid is pay-
able.
2.37. In Greece, around 30 % of parcels declared use
references which are incompatible with the IACS refer-
ences. This renders it impossible to confirm the area of
these parcels. In addition, computerised systems allow
multiple entry of reference numbers for individual reg-
istration of parcels.
2.38. Also in Greece there were no clear comprehen-
sive instructions as to the selection, timing and meth-
odology to be applied to on-the-spot checks of area
declarations submitted by cotton producers. As a con-
sequence, for the 2000/2001 marketing year, declara-
tions were selected randomly rather than on the basis
of risk; inspections were undertaken after harvesting
had taken place and often after the parcels concerned
had been ploughed; exceptionally large numbers of
inspections were undertaken on the same day and the
reporting mechanism lacked detail as to the plots exam-
ined, the methodology applied and the bases of the
findings. Due to these weaknesses very few discrepan-
cies were reported (0,05 % of the number examined).
The frequency of error of 0,05 % contrasts with the
results of the Court’s audit testing on the accuracy of
the area declarations for 2001/2002. In 16,7 % of the
declarations checked, significant differences were found
(exceeding national tolerances) between the areas
declared and those cultivated with cotton.
Casein
2.39. The 2001 audit included a specific examination
of aid for skimmed milk processed into casein, which
amounted to 263 million euro, 0,6 % of CAP expendi-
ture. This included examination of a sample of 107 pay-
ments, which were found to be without error.
administration and control systems applied to certain Com-
munity aid schemes to be set up so as to allow, without any
problems or conflicts, a common functioning of, or the
exchange of data between them and the integrated system.
The Community aid schemes concerned, which include pro-
duction aid for cotton, are set out in the Annex attached to
Commission Regulation (EC) No 495/2001, amending the
Annex to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3508/92. All Mem-
ber States were reminded of these obligations by letter dated
8 March 2002, and requested to provide an update of the
situation for each product sector involved.
2.38. The Commission services note the Court’s critical
observations regarding Greece, and have established similar
deficiencies in the context of their audits of agricultural expen-
diture. Any such failings in the national authorities’ admin-
istration or control systems would be duly considered in the
context of the clearance of accounts procedure.
Nevertheless, whilst fully recognising the serious shortcom-
ings established by the Court in respect of on-the-spot checks
of land parcels used for cultivating cotton, especially given that
they broadly reflect those regularly reported by the Commis-
sion services, it must be borne in mind that aid for cotton is
paid on the basis of actual deliveries to the factories and not
on the basis of areas declared. Therefore, when assessing any
risk to the Fund with a view to attaching financial conse-
quences with regard to the deficient checking of parcels, the
Commission services would take account of the possible impact
of such weaknesses on the overall outcome, other controls and
procedures probably having a greater bearing.
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Other significant findings
2.40. The most significant finding in this area was
that in Germany subsidies for grubbing-up vineyards
were being paid for vineyards planted fewer than 10
years ago. Such expenditure is ineligible. In France, a
payment of subsidy for tobacco was found to exceed
the maximum quota.
Horizontal findings
Deductions
2.41. Community regulations normally insist that the
full amount of aid be paid directly to the farmer, exporter
or enterprise concerned. As in previous years, the audit
showed that deductions are still made (12) which go
beyond the exceptions allowed by the regulations and
case-law. This does not involve an additional cost to the
budget.
The clearance audit trail system (CATS)
2.42. The Commission has a database containing all
the information on EAGGF-Guarantee payments that
have been made in the 15 Member States in the course
of the previous financial year (13). The Court tested the
data for the financial year 2000 in order to check
whether they were reliable and plausible, the payment
date and the financial year were consistent and the aid
paid was accurate. The results of these tests showed
that:
2.40. In its reply to the Court’s observation, Germany con-
tests and claims that there would in addition be a linguistic
problem in the German version of the relevant regulation. The
Commission services will therefore further examine this ques-
tion.
As for tobacco and the maximum quota, the Member States
may, under certain conditions, carry out transfers. This mat-
ter needs to be examined in more detail before a final judg-
ment can be made.
2.41. The Commission has followed up with due attention
the respect of the integral payment clause. That is why already
in the past corrections have and are still being made within
the clearance of accounts procedure.
From the financial year 2002, Greece will no longer make
such deductions from CAP aid and premiums in the sectors
referred to by the Court.
2.42. It should be underlined that the CATS database con-
tains 30 million records for the financial year 2000, with
each record containing up to 128 potential fields. Even with
unlimited resources, it is almost impossible to check every
individual value. The Commission accepts that a further qual-
ity control of the CATS data is desirable. However, the need
for this control must be seen in the context of all the priorities
of the Commission. The opinion of the Court will be taken
into account in the risk analysis of the Directorate responsible.
(12) Annual Report of the Court of Auditors concerning the
financial year 2000, paragraphs 2.37 and 2.40.
(13) These data are made available to the Commission by the
Member States pursuant to Commission Regulation (EC)
No 1663/95 of 7 July 1995 (OJ L 158, 8.7.1995, p. 6) and
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2390/1999 of 25 Octo-
ber 1999 (OJ L 295,16.11.1999, p. 1).
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(a) Greece had not supplied the detailed data requested;
(b) most of the data from the otherMember States (with
the notable exception of Luxembourg) had many
shortcomings.
Overall conclusions on common agricultural policy
(CAP) expenditure
2.43. The audit showed that declarations made by
farmers and other recipients of subsidies are materially
affected by error; although the IACS control system
picks up many errors, a material level of error is still
present in the payments made by the paying agencies.
The implementation of IACS is still incomplete and
bovine identification systems, due in January 2000,
were not introduced on time (see paragraphs 2.18 to
2.19 and 2.26).
2.44. Reporting of IACS inspection results needs to be
improved, in particular to distinguish between the results
of risk-based and random checks. The Commission
should reperform and verify a selection of IACS inspec-
tions on an annual and representative basis.
2.45. Rural development is affected by the same types
of error as area aid schemes, with the additional risk
that farmers fail to apply standards of good farming
practice required for these schemes. Standards for good
farming practice are often poorly defined or unverifi-
able.
(a) InMay 2002, Greece started sending the required detailed
information (financial year 2000) to the Commission. It
should be noted that the accounts of Greece for financial
year 2000 have not been financially cleared yet.
(b) The financial year 2000 was the first year for which the
CATS database was fully operational. The following
quality controls have centrally undertaken on the CATS
data:
— completeness of the data in respect of the budget items,
— reconciliation with the annual accounts,
— completeness of the data in respect of the X table,
— respect of code lists.
2.43. The Commission considers that IACS allows the
limitation to a large extent of the incidence of errors. Further-
more, the Commission is continuously improving the control
system by amending the relevant regulations and by encour-
aging their full implementation and development in Mem-
ber States; this is the case for example for the implementation
of the bovine identification system or the introduction at the
latest by 1 January 2005 of a geographical identification sys-
tem (see point 2.16).
2.45. The Commission departments are well aware of the
issue of the control of good agricultural practices. Specific rec-
ommendations on this subject were included in the guidelines
paper referred to at paragraph 2.31 above.
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2.46. Aid paid on quantities produced which cannot
be verified ex post demand a strong control system.
However, the largest schemes of this kind (olive oil and
cotton) show particular weaknesses in terms of the
implementation of checks by the Member States (para-
graphs 2.28 and 2.29 and 2.36 to 2.40).
2.47. The Commission should take the necessary steps
to make the CATS database more reliable and useful.
CLEARANCE OF ACCOUNTS
Introduction
2.48. Under the clearance of accounts procedure the
Commission decideswhether expenditure to implement
the CAPundertaken by paying agencies should be defini-
tively charged to the Community budget. Since 1996
the Commission has taken:
(a) an annual financial clearance decision based on the
certification of paying agencies’ accounts by certify-
ing bodies appointed by the Member States. These
certifying bodies have to give an assurance as to
whether the accounts are true, complete and accu-
rate;
(b) conformity decisions, whereby the Commission
decides to exclude expenditure from Community
financing because it does not comply with Commu-
nity rules. Such decisions may relate to several
EAGGF years.
A conciliation body is responsible for trying to recon-
cile the positions of the Commission andMember States
on any proposed corrections referred to it. Corrections
may also be referred to the European Court of Justice.
2.46. Reference is made to responses given at points 2.29.
and 2.38. The Commission services have also detected control
deficiencies, which are routinely and systematically treated in
the Commission’s clearance of accounts procedure.
2.47. For the future, the quality controls on the CATS data
will be enhanced by using a series of checks, similar to those
undertaken by the Court; in addition stricter quality controls
(e.g. on the use of code lists) will be built in the program used
by the Member States for sending the computer data to the
Commission.
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2.49. The following paragraphs consider:
(a) the financial decision for the EAGGF year 2001 (14),
(b) three conformity decisions in respect of 1996 to
2000 (15).
2.50. The Court’s examination aims to answer the fol-
lowing questions:
(a) in respect of financial clearance:
(i) does the work of the certifying bodies, as
reflected in their reports, provide an adequate
basis for the certificate they give?
(ii) did the paying agencies meet the accreditation
criteria (including information technology (IT)
security)?
(iii) does the Commission’s financial decision reflect
the conclusions of the certifying bodies (where
their work is deemed satisfactory)?
(b) in respect of conformity decisions:
(i) are the corrections in the conformity decisions
adequate and well founded?
Financial clearance
2.51. The Court has examined the reports of the 10
largest paying agencies by expenditure and all those
whose certificates are qualified in any way (see
Table 2.4). The Court has also reviewed the work of the
Commission in preparing the financial decision.
(14) Commission Decision 2002/461/EC of 12 June 2002
(OJ L 160, 18.6.2002, p. 28).
(15) Commission Decision 2001/137/EC of 5 February 2001
(OJ L 50, 21.2.2001, p. 9), Commission Decision
2001/557/ECof 11 July 2001 (OJ L 200, 25.7.2001, p. 28)
and Commission Decision 2001/889/EC of 12 Decem-
ber 2001 (OJ L 329, 14.12.2001, p. 68).
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Table 2.4 — Paying agencies by expenditure declared in 2001
No Member States Paying agency
Amounts
declared in Mio
EUR
% of total Qualifiedaccounts (1)
Corrected
accounts
Disjoined
accounts (2)
1 Italy AGEA 5 111,74 12,19 ✔ ✔
2 France ONIC 4 147,32 9,89
3 Greece Opekepe (previously known asGedidagep) 2 605,78 6,22 ✔ ✔ ✔
4 United Kingdom DEFRA (previously known as MAFF) 2 137,21 5,10 ✔
5 Spain Andalucia 1 614,06 3,85 ✔
6 Ireland DAF 1 533,45 3,66
7 France ONIOL 1 261,37 3,01
8 Denmark EU-direktoratet 1 111,73 2,65
9 Germany Bayern, Landwirtschaft 943,63 2,25
10 Austria AMA 939,09 2,24
21 405,38 51,05
11 Spain Castilla-Léon 888,73 2,12
12 Spain Castilla-La Mancha 876,00 2,09 ✔ ✔
13 France ACCT/SDE 849,67 2,03 ✔
14 France Ofival 847,25 2,02 ✔
15 Finland MMM 815,35 1,94
16 Sweden SJV 779,66 1,86
17 United Kingdom IBEA 740,23 1,77
18 Portugal INGA 720,83 1,72 ✔
19 Spain FEGA 710,38 1,69 ✔
20 Germany Niedersachsen 698,01 1,66
21 Spain Extremadura 590,96 1,41 ✔
22 France CNASEA 584,57 1,39 ✔
23 Belgium BIRB 583,46 1,39
24 United Kingdom SERAD 573,02 1,37
25 France Onilait 559,66 1,33 ✔
26 Germany Hamburg-Jonas 549,24 1,31
27 Germany BLE 504,93 1,20
28 Spain Aragón 458,85 1,09
29 Germany Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 401,06 0,96
30 Germany Baden-Württemberg 393,67 0,94
31 Germany Brandenburg 362,87 0,87
32 Netherlands PZ 362,15 0,86
33 Spain Cataluña 359,60 0,86 ✔
34 France FIRS 359,13 0,86 ✔
35 Germany Sachsen-Anhalt 358,17 0,85 ✔
36 Belgium Min. of Agr. — DG3 330,08 0,79
37 Netherlands LASER 318,20 0,76
38 Germany Sachsen 302,80 0,72
39 Netherlands HPA 297,45 0,71
40 Germany Nordrhein-Westfalen LWK Münst 295,11 0,70
41 Germany Schleswig-Holstein 282,82 0,67
42 United Kingdom DARD 260,91 0,62
43 Germany Thüringen 260,19 0,62
44 United Kingdom NAWAD 258,72 0,62
45 France Oniflhor 253,84 0,61 ✔
46 Italy SAISA (previously known as DCCC) 249,49 0,60
47 France Onivins 222,22 0,53 ✔
48 Germany Hessen 195,96 0,47
49 Spain Canarias 195,06 0,47
50 Germany Rheinland-Pfalz 172,30 0,41
51 France Odeadom 166,61 0,40 ✔
52 Portugal Ifadap 154,14 0,37 ✔ ✔
53 Spain Valencia 139,37 0,33
54 Spain Navarra 128,95 0,31 ✔ ✔
55 Spain Galicia 119,71 0,29
56 Germany Nordrhein-Westfalen LWK Bonn 103,24 0,25
57 Italy ENR 97,48 0,23
58 Spain Murcia 85,13 0,20 ✔
59 Austria BMLFUW Präs B10 64,83 0,15
60 Spain País Vasco 60,92 0,15 ✔ ✔
61 Spain Asturias 57,99 0,14
62 Spain Madrid 52,66 0,13 ✔
63 Spain La Rioja 50,32 0,12
64 Austria ZA Salzburg 48,60 0,12
65 Ireland DMNR 48,60 0,12
66 Netherlands DLG 44,23 0,11
67 Netherlands PT 42,03 0,10
68 Netherlands PVVE 39,23 0,09
69 Luxembourg Min. Agric. 29,27 0,07 ✔
70 Spain Cantabria 27,46 0,07
71 Spain Baleares 21,93 0,05 ✔
72 Germany Bayern, Umwelt 21,38 0,05 ✔ ✔
73 United Kingdom FC 20,55 0,05
74 Germany Saarland 16,38 0,04
75 Belgium Vlaamse Gemeenschap 12,08 0,03 ✔
76 Germany Hamburg 11,26 0,03
77 Belgium Région wallonne 9,07 0,02 ✔ ✔
78 France Ofimer 7,48 0,02
79 Spain FROM 6,33 0,02
80 Germany Nordrhein-Westfalen LfEJ 6,12 0,01
81 Germany Bremen 1,75 0,00
82 United Kingdom CCW 1,72 0,00
83 Germany Berlin 1,60 0,00
TOTAL 41 926,40 100,00
(1) Accounts qualified by the certifying bodies because of financial errors, scope restrictions or other reserves.
(2) Disjoined from the financial decision of April/May 2002.
NB: Exchange rates for Member States outside euro zone:
Denmark: 7,45508, Sweden: 8,98170, United Kingdom: 0,621063.
Source: Summary report of the Commission on the financial clearance of the EAGGF Guarantee Section accounts for 2001.
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Financial decision for 2001
2.52. TheCommission took its financial clearance deci-
sion on 12 June 2002, after the 30 April deadline laid
down in the Regulation. The Commission accepted the
accounts of the paying agencies, subject to the follow-
ing exceptions and conditions:
(a) the Commission excluded (disjoined) the accounts
of four paying agencies from the decision, account-
ing for 3 391 million euro (8 %) of the total expen-
diture declared. The accounts of Greece and the
Flemish Community (Belgium) were not cleared
because they had not provided the Commission
with adequate computer payment data. For FEGA
and Basque Country (Spain), the Commission
requested further information;
(b) as a sanction against late payments, overshooting
expenditure ceilings and failure to collect the milk
super levy on time, the Commission decided that
the advances paid to Member States in 2001 were
131,4 million euro too high, but that Portugal was
entitled to reimbursement of 20,6 million euro fol-
lowing the grant of an additional milk quota to the
Azores;
(c) the Commission adjusted the amounts of expendi-
ture declared by 10 paying agencies by a total of
9,2 million euro on the basis of findings by the cer-
tifying bodies.
The certifying bodies
Late appo intment o f c e r t i f y ing bod ie s
2.53. Two certifying bodies were appointed late: for
the Greek paying agency (the third largest in the Com-
munity) on 14 October 2001, one day before the end of
the financial year; for the largest paying agency in the
Community (AGEA, Italy) not until 12 December 2001.
Final reports and certificates had to be provided by
10 February 2002.
2.53. The Commission strongly regrets that the certifying
bodies for Italy and Greece were not appointed earlier in the
year and will insist that this is done for 2002.
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F ind ings by the ce r t i f y ing bod ie s
2.54. The certifying bodies’ reports indicate that the
level of error in the paying agency accounts in terms of
their truth, completeness and accuracy does not exceed
1 % of the total expenditure declared. The certifying
bodies’ certificates, however, do not provide assurance
that the facts declared by beneficiaries in claims for pay-
ment reflect reality; it is at this level that the Court’s
audits have shown that errors are most likely to occur.
The certifying bodies are required only to certifywhether
the paying agencies’ management and information sys-
tems are capable of ensuring that payments are prop-
erly made.
The paying agencies
Some pay ing agenc i e s do not mee t the acc red i ta t ion c r i t e r ia
2.55. In Greece the former paying agency (Gedidagep)
was replaced by Opekepe in October 2001. The accredi-
tation of the new paying agency on 3 September 2001
was provisional for one year. Full accreditation is depen-
dent upon improvements in the structure and organisa-
tion of the paying agency.
2.56. The certifying body for two of the French pay-
ing agencies (Odeadom and SDE) considers that they do
not meet the accreditation criteria. The main scheme
for which SDE is responsible (suckler cow premium)
will be transferred to another French paying agency
(Ofival) with effect from the EAGGF year 2003. How-
ever, it will continue to be responsible for two very
small schemes, whereas the certifying body, the Com-
mission and the Court are of the opinion that it should
cease to be a paying agency.
2.54. The purpose of the certificate is not to provide assur-
ance that the facts declared by beneficiaries in claims for pay-
ment reflect reality. In accordance with Article 3 of Commis-
sion Regulation (EC) No 1663/95, the certificate by the
certifying body covers compliance of payments with the Com-
munity rules only as regards the capability of the paying agen-
cy’s administrative structures to ensure that such compliance
has been checked before payment is made. However, the Com-
mission would like to underline that the reasonable assurance
that expenditure incurred is in conformity with the rules
derives not only from the financial audit. Indeed, with the
financial audit decision the Commission accepts the accounts
on the basis of the certificates and reports of the certifying
body but without prejudice to subsequent compliance decisions
to recover expenditure that is found not to have complied with
Community rules. Under the reform of the clearance proce-
dure, Member States are required not only to accredit paying
agencies and nominate delegated bodies in charge of controls
but also to install internal audit functions. Therefore, the rea-
sonable assurance is designed to be given by the totality of the
described measures put into place by the reform of the clear-
ance procedure in 1995.
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2.57. The certifying body for Ifadap (Portugal) consid-
ers that the paying agency failed to meet a wide range
of accreditation criteria. According to the certifying
body and the Commission, the Flemish Community
paying agency (Belgium) does not meet the accredita-
tion criteria. The Commission has not yet taken any
corrective measures in either case. If the Commission
considers that a Member State is not doing enough to
improve the situation it can reduce the monthly
advances (16).
Qual i f i ed aud i t c e r t i f i ca t e s
2.58. The certificates for 23 paying agencies were
qualified because of doubts about the eligibility of expen-
diture, inadequate internal controls (Greece, Italy (AGEA)
and Luxembourg) and the level of financial error found
by the certifying bodies. In most cases the Commission
has proposed corrections or will consider the points at
issue in a conformity decision. However, it has not pro-
posed corrections for the extrapolated error found by
the certifying bodies for three French paying agencies
(totalling 51,5 million euro) and for one Spanish pay-
ing agency (0,1 million euro).
In format ion te chno logy ( IT) s e cur i t y in pay ing agenc i e s
2.59. The accreditation criteria for paying agencies
include the protection and control of computer sys-
tems (17). At the end of 1999 the Commission launched
a series of IT audits of paying agencies, drawing on ear-
lier work by the agencies and certifying bodies. Eight
private audit firms examined compliance with the com-
puter security guidelines at 49 paying agencies (which
2.57. In order to reduce the monthly advances the Commis-
sion has to respect the requirements of Article 14 of Regula-
tion (EC) No 2040/2000, that is that monthly advances
may only be reduced in cases of ‘manifest non-compliance
with the rules and a clear misuse of Community funds’.
As part of the follow-up to the 2001 clearance process the
Commission services have informed the Portuguese authori-
ties that a financial correction of 2 % of Ifadap expenditure is
proposed (EUR 2,8 million).
In view of the further regionalisation of EAGGF competen-
cies in Belgium the services of the Commission are monitor-
ing the accreditation process for the enlarged paying agencies
closely.
2.58. For one French paying agency (Cnasea) a correction
(of EUR 1 million) was unfortunately overlooked in the
financial decision. It will be made in the conformity process.
For the other two French paying agencies (Ofival and SDE)
and the Spanish paying agency, the Commission does not
consider that they are in a position to make the corrections
mentioned at the moment. These corrections will be proposed
in the conformity process and fully examined in this process.
(16) Council Decision 94/729/EC of 31 October 1994 on bud-
getary discipline (OJ L 293, 12.11.1994, p. 14).
(17) Paragraph 6(vi) of the Annex to Regulation (EC)
No 1663/95 of 7 July 1995 (OJ L 158, 8.7.1995, p. 6).
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together account for some 90 % of total expenditure
declared) at a cost of 1,1 million euro. Application sys-
tems were not reviewed as such; the audit scope was
limited to a general description of the controls over the
input and processing of accounting and analytical data.
The audit firms scored current performance and planned
changes on a scale of 0 to 5 (18) for 16 aspects of IT
security. The Court reviewed one report produced by
each of five companies (19). On the whole the reports
are of good quality.
2.60. By the end of 2001, 35 reports had been submit-
ted and finalised. They indicate that, for the most part,
paying agencies have failed to meet the accreditation
criterion. None of the paying agencies reviewed achieved
a ‘very good’ (overall 5) rating and only one was assessed
as ‘good’ (overall 4). The most common failings were
absence of or inadequate contingency plans (18 paying
agencies), unsatisfactory logical security systems (15
paying agencies), poor policies, standards and proce-
dures (12 paying agencies) and personnel policy that
does not address information security aspects (10 pay-
ing agencies).
2.61. Many certifying body reports indicate that these
observations have been followed up. On the other hand,
according to the reports, only nine of the 49 paying
agencies reviewed plan to reach compliance in the short
term (a score of 4 or higher). The Commission does not
intend to impose corrections on the basis of the IT audit
findings because it has not identified any risk to the
Fund.
Inspec t ion l e ve l s and foot-and-mouth d i s ease
2.62. Because of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) most
of the inspections required under IACS could not be
carried out in the United Kingdom and Ireland and
many animalswere slaughtered during the scheme reten-
tion periods. The Commission issued a regulation (20)
providing for alternative controls, for example cross-
checks between premium claims and the number of
animals culled.
2.61. The Commission will follow up the weaknesses in
order to improve the systems.
2.62-2.63. In respect of the foot-and-mouth outbreak, hav-
ing introduced Regulation No 882/2001 derogating from
the normal control rules laid down in IACS Regulation (EEC)
No 3887/92, the Commission services are keeping them-
selves fully informed of the dossiers mentioned by the Court
with regard to Ireland and the United Kingdom. In principle,
since the Member States concerned detected the erroneous
nature of the claims prior to payment, the claims have been
rejected in line with IACS requirements. Exclusion for a sec-
ond year is also foreseen under IACS rules.
(18) 0 = not existing; 1 = inadequate; 2 = weak; 3 = to be
improved; 4 = good; 5 = very good.
(19) DT-AGEA; MS-IBEA; PWC-INGA; E & Y-Ofival and
AA-FEGA.
(20) CommissionRegulation (EC)No 882/2001of 3May 2001
(OJ L 123, 4.5.2001, p. 20).
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2.63. InNorthern Ireland investigations based on these
cross-checks revealed that 103 farmers had claimed for
more sheep than were culled and 17 of them had no
sheep on farm when the cull took place. The certifying
body concludes that the livestock inspection quality
control procedures should be re-evaluated. A similar
situation was found in the Republic of Ireland (106
farmers had claimed more sheep than they had at the
time of the cull and 16 of them had no sheep on farm
when the cull took place). For those found to have no
sheep the only sanction provided for in the relevant
regulations is a ban on claiming the premium for two
years.
Conclusion on financial clearance
2.64. In general, the work of the certifying bodies
provides an adequate basis for their certificates, though
it is a matter of concern that the certifying bodies for
the largest and third largest paying agencies were
appointed very late in the day (see paragraph 2.53). The
overall level of error identified from the records of the
paying agencies by the certifying bodies does not exceed
1 % (see paragraph 2.54); however, this figure does not
represent a judgement on the facts declared by benefi-
ciaries giving rise to payments. The Commission’s finan-
cial clearance decision takes into account the findings
of the certifying bodies with the exceptions noted in
paragraph 2.58. Most of the concerns expressed by the
certifying bodies will be followed up in the conformity
context (see paragraph 2.58). Compliance with the IT
security accreditation criterion leavesmuch tobedesired,
and there are paying agencies which fall seriously short
of the general accreditation requirements (see para-
graphs 2.56 to 2.58).
Conformity decisions
2.65. In its conformity decisions the Commission
makes use of one-off and flat-rate corrections. One-off
corrections are typically made for ‘errors’ which can be
precisely quantified, payments after deadlines, advance
payments not followed by settlements, overclaims, etc.
The Commission uses flat-rate corrections when sys-
tems’ weaknesses have a financial impact on the Fund
that cannot be precisely quantified. The rate applied
2.64. The Commission agrees with the general conclusion
of the Court that the work of the certifying bodies provides an
adequate basis for their certificates.
The Commission will insist that certifying bodies are appointed
in time. The low rate of error confirms that administrative
structures in the paying agencies are generally satisfactory.
Those paying agencies falling short of fully meeting all gen-
eral accreditation criteria are closely monitored on the imple-
mentation of measures to improve the situation. Nevertheless,
continued compliance with the accreditation criteria is mainly
a concern for the competent authorities of the Member States
which issue and withdraw accreditation of paying agencies
(Article 4(7) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999
and Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1663/95).
60 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 28.11.2002
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
depends on the Commission’s judgement of the sever-
ity of the failure of controls. Flat-rate corrections, which
make up nearly 90 % of all corrections by value, are
thus more controversial and are often referred by Mem-
ber States to the conciliation body.
Key and ancillary controls
2.66. Key control failures normally attract at least a
5 % flat-rate correction whereas ancillary control fail-
ures attract a 2 % flat-rate correction (unless the risk to
the Fund is demonstrably lower). In order to make the
relationship between systems weaknesses and flat-rate
corrections clearer, the Agriculture DG’s clearance unit
has started to develop definitions of key and ancillary
controls. By the end of 2001 eight areas of the CAP,
accounting for the great majority of expenditure, had
been covered (export refunds, arable crops, animal pre-
miums, rural development, public storage, dried fodder,
olive oil and the over-30-months scheme (21)). The Court
welcomes this initiative by the Commission.
Analysis of the corrections made in 2001
2.67. Graphs 2.6 and 2.7 show the distribution of
expenditure excluded from Community financing per
Member State and per market as a result of decisions
taken in 2001, for the EAGGF years 1996 to 2000, and
totalling 807,2 million euro. Of this total, the Court has
examined corrections amounting to 783 million euro
and concluded that corrections relating to 629,3 mil-
lion euro were soundly based. Areas of concern are dis-
cussed below.
2.66. In accordance with legislation and guidelines govern-
ing the clearance of accounts procedure, the Commission may
correct expenditure only to the extent that there is a risk to the
Community budget. If, after taking all elements into consid-
eration (e.g. viable alternative controls) the risk is deemed to
be reduced, then a lower flat-rate correction, or even no finan-
cial correction at all, is applicable.
(21) These definitions are set out in Commission document
AGRI 17933/2000.
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Graph 2.7 — Corrections in conformity decisions 6, 7 and 8 per market
Source: Commission Decision 2001/137/EC of 5 February 2001 (OJ L 50, 21.2.2001, p. 9),
Commission Decision 2001/557/EC of 11 July 2001 (OJ L 200, 25.7.2001, p. 28),
Commission Decision 2001/889/EC of 12 December 2001 (OJ L 329, 14.12.2001, p. 68).
Graph 2.6 — Corrections in conformity decisions 6, 7 and 8 per Member State
NB: For the United Kingdom the correction is in fact a reimbursement of 13,2 million euro.
Source: Commission Decision 2001/137/EC of 5 February 2001 (OJ L 50, 21.2.2001, p. 9),
Commission Decision 2001/557/EC of 11 July 2001 (OJ L 200, 25.7.2001, p. 28),
Commission Decision 2001/889/EC of 12 December 2001 (OJ L 329, 14.12.2001, p. 68).
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Inadequate corrections — olive oil production aid
2.68. The Court has examined corrections, in respect
of the EAGGF years 1997 and 1998, of 121,9 million
euro for olive oil out of a total of 132,3 million euro
(Greece: 50,8 million euro, Spain: 71,1 million euro).
2.69. The Commission has identified three key con-
trols for olive oil production aid: operational olive oil
registers, computerised files of declarations and claims,
and controls of olive oil mills. The reports of audit mis-
sions carried out by the Commission in 1998, 1999 and
2000 in Greece and Spain indicate that the olive oil reg-
ister and the computerised files were either not opera-
tional or not used as control tools. The Commission
applied a 5 % flat-rate correction for both Member
States for the EAGGF years 1997 and 1998 as it had
done for 1994 to 1996.
2.70. In the Court’s view, as two key controls are still
missing (they should have been implemented 10 years
ago at least), the risk to the Fund is high, and a 10 % or
higher flat-rate correction should have been applied.
The Court criticised the Commission’s position for the
EAGGF years 1994 to 1996 in its Annual Reports for
1998 and 1999.
Failure to make corrections
Milk l e vy
2.71. Although the Commission has identified numer-
ous problems in the management of the milk quota sys-
tem (mainly in Greece, Italy and Spain), no corrections
for systems’ weaknesses have been made. The Court
reiterates (22) that the Commission should take action
to ensure that corrections are applied for systems weak-
nesses which pose a financial risk to the EAGGF.
2.69-2.70. The situation for both Greece and Spain has
not fundamentally changed since a financial correction was
first applied at a flat rate of 5 % for the financial year 1994.
The factors then taken into account when evaluating the risk
to the Fund (i.e. that the Control Agency OEEE in Greece was
operating satisfactorily and, for Spain, that all the oil was sold
through the olive oil mills) also remain valid for the subse-
quent years to which the Court refers. Therefore, given that the
Commission services’ audits have not established a high risk
to the Fund, it is still considered, as previously, that these two
aspects significantly limit the risk to the Fund of over declara-
tion.
2.71. The Commission would point out that many of the
weaknesses detected in the application of the milk quota sys-
tem are mostly related to the collection of the levy. Such weak-
nesses have no direct relation to the quantity of milk declared
to the Member State and reported to the Commission, and as
such do not affect the amount of levy due to the Community.
In any event, as the Court had pointed out earlier itself, the
reductions in advances which result from the Member States’
failure to collect the levy have an immediate and direct impact
on reducing the financial risk to the fund. Also, with regard
to the incomplete implementation of the milk quota regime
the Commission has opened infringement procedures against
Italy (Reasoned Opinion 97/2228) and Spain (Reasoned
Opinion 97/2227) for incorrect application of the regime
and failure to collect the levy.
(22) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, para-
graph 2.58.
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Delays in making corrections
Olive o i l consumpt ion a id
2.72. A correction for Spain (5 million euro)wasmade
more than four years after the end of the relevant
EAGGF year, even though it was notified to Spain in
July 1999. The correction for Greece for 1996 to 1999
is still under consideration.
Cot ton
2.73. The corrections relating to expenditure made
during the EAGGF years 1996 and 1997 took place in
July 2001.
Financial consequence of the 24-month rule
2.74. Corrections can only be applied retrospectively
for a maximum of two years preceding a written noti-
fication to the Member State concerned. In June 1997
the Commission carried out an inspection concerning
proofs of arrival provided by authorised supervisory
companies (23) in the EAGGF years 1994 to 1996. Proofs
of arrival are documents required as evidence that agri-
cultural goods attracting export refunds have been
placed on the market in a non-EU country. The inspec-
tion concentrated on Germany, the main user of super-
visory company proofs.
2.72. The administrative oversight referred to by the Court
in respect of Spain is acknowledged. However, it is emphasised
that the Commission’s legal position was not at risk and nei-
ther was there a risk that the correction would not be applied.
Internal procedures have now been improved to guard against
recurrence.
As regards Greece, financial corrections are pending receipt of
data requested from the national authorities.
2.73. The delays in the application of financial corrections
for cotton expenditure were due to the Greek authorities’ fail-
ure to provide additional information. The corrections had
initially been scheduled for inclusion in a much earlier ad hoc
clearance of accounts Decision.
(23) Amongst other functions, supervisory companies per-
form services on behalf of either buyers or sellers of goods
to ensure that the contractual specifications regarding the
quantity and quality of the goods in question have been
respected. In the context of export refunds they certify on
behalf of the claimant that the goods have been placed on
the market in a non-EU country corresponding to the
description, quantity and quality declared in the refund
claim.
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2.75. Investigations carried out by theGerman authori-
ties led the Commission to conclude that the system
was ‘gravely deficient’ and that there was widespread
evidence of irregularity. A 25 % flat-rate correction was
applied (20,9 million euro). This correction was noti-
fied in September 1997, and under the present Council
Regulation it could only cover the preceding 24months.
Without this limitation, the Commission would have
been able to correct for a longer period. A 25 % correc-
tion, for example, for the period 1994 to 1996 would
have amounted to 93,7 million euro. The Commission
has recently submitted a proposal to extend this period
to 36 months.
Clearance of accounts decisions since 1991
2.76. Table 2.5 shows the results of the Commission’s
clearance decisions for 1991 and subsequent years. Clear-
ance has been completed for the years up to and includ-
ing 1996 but some conformity decisions remain to be
taken for subsequent years. The total amounts disal-
lowed represent the Commission’s view of the amount
of expenditure declared by Member States which,
because of specific identified irregularities or system’s
weaknesses, should not be borne by the Community
budget.
Conclusion on conformity decisions
2.77. The corrections made in recent conformity deci-
sions are well founded, with the exceptions mentioned
in paragraphs 2.69 to 2.74.
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Table 2.5 – Clearance of accounts corrections in conformity decisions (1996 to 2001)
(Mio EUR)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Expenditure declared (including B1-3 7 0) 31 255,9 30 480,2 34 008,0 33 592,8 35 654,4 39 062,5 40 884,3 38 857,4 40 726,2 40 410,6 41 593,8
Corrections in clearance decisions – 1504,1 – 788,2 – 754,7 – 307,8 – 591,9
Corrections in the conformity decisions 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 1,4 – 807,0 – 443,6 – 278,8 – 43,9 – 0,1 0,0
Total amount of corrections – 1 504,1 – 788,2 – 754,4 – 307,8 – 590,5 – 807,0 – 443,6 – 278,8 – 43,9 – 0,1 0,0
of which:
(a) Corrections for late payments – 10,6 – 5,6 – 20,4 – 21,1 – 14,8 – 25,2 – 27,2 – 16,3 – 15,6 0,0 0,0
(b) Milk super levies – 979,2 – 419,7 – 265,4 0,0 – 31,4 – 215 – 110,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
(c) Corrections resulting from Clearance of
accounts unit activity
– 514,3 – 362,9 – 469,2 – 286,7 – 547,1 – 566,8 – 306,2 – 262,5 – 28,3 – 0,1 0,0
Clearance of accounts unit corrections as a
percentage of expenditure declared
1,6 % 1,2 % 1,4 % 0,9 % 1,5 % 1,5 % 0,7 % 0,7 % 0,1 % 0,0 % 0,0 %
NB: Exchange rates:
Those used by the Commission in its summary reports.
Total amount of corrections per EAGGF year:
The amounts in italic are still provisional.
There are still conformity decisions to be taken to clear the expenditure of these EAGGF years.
In order to make comparisons between the level of corrections for EAGGF years, milk super levies and penalties on late payments have been deducted because they are not corrections as a result of Clearance of Accounts Unit enquiries.
Corrections made in conformity decisions for 1993 and 1995:
These positive amounts correspond to corrections cancelled by the Court of Justice (in Conformity Decision 2001/557/EC).
Source: All the Commission’s clearance of accounts decisions covering the EAGGF years 1991 to 2001 taken from 1996 to 2002.
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FOLLOW-UP TO PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS
2.78. The Court has reviewed the information pre-
sented by the Commission on the action taken to deal
with the most important of its past observations. This
limited review, based on information presented by the
Commission, sought to identify the areas within which
such measures have been taken (or not), without mak-
ing a detailed check of their implementation.
2.79. This year’s follow-up deals with observations on
the support scheme for durum wheat published in the
Court’s Annual Report concerning the financial year
1997 (24) andwith observations contained in the Court’s
Special Report No 20/2000 concerning the manage-
ment of the common organisation of the market (CMO)
for sugar (25).
Durum wheat
Main conclusions of the Court’s report
2.80. When this scheme first started, the special aid to
durum wheat was based on actual production of this
cereal and on objective criteria. Over the years, the way
in which the criteria governing entitlement to this aid
have been applied has been eased and broadened, lead-
ing to a marked increase in budgetary expenditure: it
rose from 15,4 million euro in 1971 to 425,9 million
euro in 1993, and by 1997 had reached 1 745,6 million
euro (26). Total expenditure (supplementary aid and
compensatory aid) has since remained stable at around
1 700 million euro per annum.
2.81. If the aid to durum wheat producers had been
determined on the basis of the same principles as were
being followed at the time for establishing the aid for
maize and oilseeds (27), the total amount of this aid
(supplementary aid and compensatory aid) would have
worked out at about 250 euro per hectare, instead of
(24) Chapter 2, Title II.
(25) OJ C 50, 15.2.2001.
(26) This figure can be broken down as follows:
— supplement granted to the traditional zones and to
the non-traditional zones: 1 080,6 million euro,
— normal per-hectare aid (estimate): 665 million euro.
(27) These forms of aid were calculated on the basis of histori-
cal average yields and a specific reference amount, and
were capped according to maximum base areas.
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530 euro per hectare. Had this method been applied
from 1993 onwards, expenditure from the EU budget
would have been reduced by over 3 000 million euro
for the four-year period 1994 to 1997.
The position of the discharge authority
2.82. In its recommendations on the discharge in
respect of the implementation of the budget for the
financial year 1997, the Council observed (28) that the
Court’s report contained a critical assessment of the jus-
tification for the regulations in force, but did not men-
tion any irregularities in implementing the budget for
the regulations concerned in the financial year 1997.
Lastly, the Council welcomed the assessment of the
scheme embarked on by the Commission (see para-
graphs 2.86 to 2.88) and thought that this was a prac-
tice which should be made more widespread.
2.83. In its resolution informing the Commission of
the reasons for the postponement of the decision giv-
ing discharge in respect of the financial year 1997 (29),
the European Parliament expressed its agreement with
the Council’s observations, whilst nevertheless noting
that it would be appropriate for the legislative and bud-
getary authorities to give thought to changing the leg-
islation in respect of the durum wheat aid scheme in
order to make it more equitable.
Action taken by the Commission
2.84. In its ‘Agenda 2000’ published in March
1998 (30), the Commission proposed that the scheme
set up in 1997 be continued unchanged. Following the
publication of the Court’s report in November 1998,
the Commission did not submit any amended propos-
als for the Berlin Summit, which took place in
March 1999. In the absence of any specific proposal
from the Commission, the overall agreement reached in
Berlin on 26 March 1999 on Agenda 2000’s political
and financial guidelines thus, amongst other things,
doubled the base area granted to Portugal for growing
durum wheat, from 59 000 to 118 000 hectares (31).
(28) Council document of 19 February 1999 (reference
5911/99).
(29) Resolution informing the Commission of the reasons for
the postponement of the decision giving discharge in
respect of the implementation of the general budget of
the European Union for the financial year 1997, para-
graph 28 of the Annex (OJ C 279, 1.10.1999, p. 125).
(30) COM(1998) 158 final, 18.3.1998, p. 35.
(31) Council Regulation (EC) No 1251/1999 of 17 May 1999
(OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 1).
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The extra cost to the Community is put at 20 million
euro per year (32).
2.85. In 1998, the Commission ordered a study assess-
ing the Community policy on durum wheat since the
1992 reform of the common agricultural policy. The
final report was sent to the Commission in Decem-
ber 1999 (33).
2.86. This report’s main conclusionwas that the objec-
tives concerning durum wheat laid down by the agri-
cultural policy at the time of the 1992 reform had, in
the main, been achieved, but the report pointed out the
following:
(a) the 1992 reform had not enabled the budgetary cost
of the Community’s durum wheat policy to be
reduced;
(b) the internal durum wheat market had been restabi-
lised, but quality was declining and an increasing
share of the production was being used for animal
feed. Since the latter could be provided using other,
far less subsidised cereals, some 150 million euro in
Community aid was thus being ‘wasted’ every year;
(c) in 1999, the international price of European durum
wheat was close to the world rate, but prices within
the EU fluctuated quite considerably;
(d) the objective of compensation for the foreseeable
loss of income had been largely achieved; produc-
ers’ incomes would still have been maintained if
total aid per hectare had been reduced by over 100
euro/hectare; the potential saving would have been
over 300 million euro per year.
2.87. The main recommendations made in the evalu-
ation report were to:
(a) lower the aid rate used to calculate the durum wheat
supplement;
(32) In 2000/2001, claims were submitted for only 52 917
hectares of the supplementary 59 000 hectares allocated,
thus leading to extra expenditure of 18,2 million euro. In
2001/2002, claims were made for all the additional areas
allocated.
(33) This report is available on the Commission’s Internet site
at the following address:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/eval/reports/
bledur/full %5Ffr.pdf.
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(b) improve the quality of the durum wheat produced
in the EU;
(c) allow Community durum wheat production to be
adjusted to demand;
(d) bring the durum wheat aid scheme into line with
the aid schemes for the other arable crops.
2.88. Since the publication of the Court’s report in
1998, the durum wheat aid scheme has remained
unchanged.
Conclusion
2.89. The Commission’s evaluation report confirmed
the Court’s main conclusion, namely that the durum
wheat supplement greatly exceeds the amount needed
to maintain producers’ incomes. The Community insti-
tutions’ previous conclusions and recommendations
remain valid. The Court considers that, for the four-year
period 1998 to 2001, considerable savings could once
again have been made, had the scheme been changed.
The Commission’s management of the CMO for sugar
Main observations of the Court
2.90. In its Special Report No 20/2000 (34) the Court
concluded that strategic weaknesses existed in the qual-
ity of the Commission’s proposals, decisions and actions
in respect of sugar, and that the continuing high cost to
consumers and overproduction in the EU had not been
tackled in successive renewals of the common market
for sugar. The Court observed that a number of
2.89. As part of the mid-term review, the Commission sent
recommendations for a new common agricultural policy to
Parliament and to the Council in July 2002. In the case of
durum wheat the Commission proposes reducing the specific
additional payment to EUR 250/ha in traditional areas and
abolishing the aid scheme altogether in non-traditional areas,
in line with the Court of Auditors’ analysis of this sector and
the evaluation by independent experts.
In order to increase the production of high-quality durum
wheat there is a proposal to introduce a special payment of
EUR 15/t for durum wheat sold to the industry under con-
tracts guaranteeing fulfilment of certain quality criteria.
(34) Special Report No 20/2000 concerning the management
of the common organisation of the market for sugar
(OJ C 50, 15.2.2001).
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alternatives existed which the Commission should
address in its forthcoming proposal for the reform of
the regime.
The Court’s follow-up
2.91. Although the report was discussed in Parlia-
ment’s Land-use and Food Policy Intergroup and in the
Council’sWorkingGroup onAgricultural Finance (Agri-
fin), there was no reference to the report in the context
of the discharge procedure. Since the Court’s report, the
Council has adopted a new regulation (35) for the quota
arrangements to be applied from July 2001, based on a
proposal by the Commission (36).
2.92. In view of the observations formulated in the
Special Report on the Commission’s preparation of pre-
vious legislative proposals, the Court’s aim in this
follow-up is to assess the soundness of the Commis-
sion’s proposal and, in particular, the explanations given
by the Commission to the legislator and to the public
regarding the basis for and justification of its proposal.
Action taken by the Commission
Significant uncertainties on technical issues
2.93. In March 1999 the Commission launched an
external evaluation study in preparation for its propos-
als for the 2001 renewal of the sugar quotas. The evalu-
ation was due to be completed in January 2000 but was
not finally published until February 2001. Although the
Commission had established the terms of reference, it
judged the report’s quality to be poor in several key
aspects: design of the evaluation, analysis, validity of
conclusions and usefulness of recommendations; and
said that the report was of ‘very limited use for the ser-
vices concerned’.
2.94. The Commission acknowledged in the explana-
tory memorandum to the proposal that: ‘At this stage
significant uncertainties remain on technical issues that
would affect any radical change in the sugar regime. In
addition, the present regime and any changes to it
2.93-2.94. When preparing its proposal COM(2000)
604, the Commission drew on three sources of information:
— the results of the evaluation it started at the beginning of
1999,
— smaller-scale studies it had already carried out,
— numerous independent studies of the sugar sector and the
special report of the Court of Auditors.
Despite its preparatory work for the proposal, the amount of
information available was not completely satisfactory. The
preparation of the evaluation requested by the Commission
ran into difficulties, and the results, though considerable, fell
short of expectations. In particular, the evaluation did not
produce the requisite synthesis of the information available
which is scattered between different sources and sometimes
contradictory.
(35) Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001
(OJ L 178, 30.6.2001, p. 1).
(36) COM(2000) 604 final, 4.10.2000.
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should be carefully examined in terms of their impact
(…). Fundamental reform (…) will require both a review
of the quota system, as well as of the level of interven-
tion prices.’ Given that it was decided in 1995 (37) that
the sugar regime would expire in June 2001, the Com-
mission should have ensured that this basic information
was available in time to prepare its October 2000 pro-
posals.
Incomplete presentation of the EU market
2.95. In the explanatory memorandum, the Commis-
sion presented a table headed ‘The Community sugar
market’ which showed the EU’s supply in the market-
ing year 1999/2000 as just 14,3 million tonnes. This
represents only the sugar produced from EU-grown
sugar beet and cane and ignores the 1,8 million tonnes
of sugar produced in the EU from raw cane sugar, which
is imported mainly from the ACP States.
2.96. However, these imports are part of the EU’s
sugar supply as the EU has indefinite legal obligations,
notably the 1975 Sugar Protocol, to purchase this sugar,
and the imports benefit from the same intervention and
export-refund guarantees in the commonmarket organi-
sation as sugar from EU-grown beet and cane. Exclud-
ing these imports gives the false impression that the
imported sugar is not part of the EU’s supply. In fact,
most of the imported sugar is consumed in the EU, con-
tinuing the traditional supply arrangementsof theUnited
Kingdom, Portugal and Finland before accession, and an
equivalent quantity of sugar from EU-grown beet and
cane is exported with subsidies.
2.95-2.96. The Commission felt that the surplus in Com-
munity sugar production should be treated separately from the
preferential imports from ACP States and India. Being subject
to different constraints they warrant separate treatment. Any
change in Community production quotas has an impact on
European producers without affecting the obligation to import
preferential sugar. Given the objectives assigned to the CMO
for sugar the first priority is to analyse the impact of any
reform on Community producers.Moreover, 1,6million tonnes
of sugar, equivalent to the imports from ACP countries and
India, can be exported without WTO restriction. The Com-
mission does not, therefore, include these in the Community’s
supply balance.
Under these circumstances the Commission presented the situ-
ation objectively and focused its analysis on the quantities of
sugar that pose a problem for the Community market. It
should be stressed here that the relevant information about
preferential sugar imports clearly features in the proposal: the
explanatory memorandum explains the legal provisions gov-
erning them and the fact that the Community funds the export
of an equivalent quantity of white sugar. Similarly, the finan-
cial statement annexed to the proposal clearly mentions the
tonnage involved and the cost to the budget of such exports.
(37) Article 23(5) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1785/81 of
30 June 1981 (OJ L 177, 1.7.1981, p. 4), as amended by
Council Regulation (EC) No 1101/95 of 24 April 1995
(OJ L 110, 17.5.1995. p. 1).
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2.97. The table compared this partial supply figure (i.e.
excluding the supply from imports) to the total EU con-
sumption (including the consumption of imports) and
thereby arrived at a figure of 1,5 million tonnes by
which EUproduction exceeded internal consumption. In
the main text of the explanatory memorandum, how-
ever, the Commission only referred to a ‘structural sur-
plus’ of 0,23 million tonnes, this being the amount by
which the EU’s surplus production was likely to exceed
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) limits on subsi-
dised exports.
2.98. In reality, the EU common market organisation
guarantees the supply every year of over 3 million tonnes
more sugar than it consumes, a figure confirmed by the
Commission in its reply to the Court’s Special Report.
Most of this surplus is disposed of by exporting it with
subsidies, which cost the EU agriculture budget a net
700 million euro in 2000 (38). Because of this impact
on the EU budget, the existence and magnitude of the
surplus are important elements in any decision on the
renewal of sugar quotas. Nowhere in the information
presented by the Commission was it made clear that
reducing quotas to 11 million tonnes would still be suf-
ficient to meet the EU’s internal needs, with a conse-
quent budgetary saving of some 700 million euro in
export refunds.
Incomplete information
2.99. The Commission stated that the proposed aboli-
tion of storage aid ‘would lower expenditure by 300
million euro’. Neither in the main text nor in the Annex
relating to storage costs did the Commission mention
that this proposal would also result in an equivalent
loss of income from the storage levy. There was also no
assessment of the likely effect of this measure on the
sugar industry. The importance of such an analysis is
2.97. The table does not take account of either imports or
exports.
2.98. The cost of preferential imports has to be considered
from a broader perspective that embraces international rela-
tions as a whole.
2.99. The Commission prepared the financial statement
accompanying the proposal to amend the common organisa-
tion of the markets in the sugar sector in accordance with the
properly established method. The detailed information on the
likely changes in expenditure and own resources is given in the
abovementioned Annex and includes the changes directly
resulting from the abolition of the compensation system for
storage costs.
(38) The sugar CMO pays for the export refunds for the first
1,6 million tonnes of the surplus. This corresponds to the
export of a quantity of white sugar equivalent to the cane
sugar imported under preferential agreements. Above this
amount, the cost of export refunds is recovered from the
sugar industry in the form of a production levy.
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confirmed by the comments of the European Parlia-
ment’s Agriculture Committee (39) and the Economic
and Social Committee (40) on this subject.
2.100. Calculations by the Commission of the net sav-
ings of the proposals in relation to the existing regime
included elements that were not related to the propos-
als. Instead of the Commission’s net 241 million euro,
the Court calculates the annual net saving to be 134 mil-
lion euro. Several Member States pointed out these
errors to the Commission in November 2000 (41). The
magnitude of the errors should have prompted the
Commission to issue a corrigendum to the explanatory
memorandum and financial statement.
In view of the questions that have been raised, the Commis-
sion accepts that the explanations provided in document
COM(2000) 604 should have been more detailed. It sup-
plied additional explanations in the course of the debates with
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Com-
mittee to which the Court referred.
2.100. The Commission and the Court have different
approaches to calculating net costs. In the interests of trans-
parency, the Commission set out in the Annex to the financial
statement the method used to estimate the expenditure and
revenue associated with the various instruments of the new
regime in 2002 and 2003, aligning itself with the provisions
laid down in the preliminary draft budget 2001 for the cur-
rent regime. In its calculation, which produces savings esti-
mated at EUR 130 million, the Court compares predicted
expenditure and/or revenue for the years 2002 and 2003
with and without amendments to the regime.
It should be noted that the proposed measures would in any
case have been necessary. The Court’s calculations show that
despite everything these measures generate considerable annual
savings.
(39) Report of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment, PE 286.396 of 28 February 2001: ‘(…) it is
inconceivable to abolish a key mechanism for the stabili-
sation of the sugar market which has proved its value
over 30 years without providing any evidence that it is
ineffective and without having calculated the effects of its
abolition on the various parties involved.’
(40) Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, CES
1423/2000 of 30 November 2000: ‘(…) the Committee
regrets to note that the amendments proposed by the
Commission regarding storage have not been subject to
an impact study. It is also surprised that arrangements
which have been considered most valuable in previous
regulations are now suddenly described as unnecessary
without the Commission making the effort to justify its
change of opinion.’
(41) Council Document 8270/01 of 10 May 2001: Report of
the Agrifin meeting of 16 November 2000 on the pro-
posal for a Council Regulation on the common organisa-
tion of the markets in the sugar sector — financial impli-
cations, Section II.4 Specific observations.
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Insufficient consideration of alternatives
2.101. Only brief consideration was given to reform
options in the explanatory memorandum. Three simple
options were put forward, all of which assumed the
continuation of the existing quota and export-refund
systems. These were a one-off 25 % cut in prices (the
Agenda 2000 model); a progressive reduction in prices;
and the continuation of the existing prices. The first
two were dismissed on the basis of the budgetary costs,
estimated at 1 125 million euro a year.
2.102. The Court has examined the Commission’s cal-
culation of this 1 125 million euro cost of compensa-
tion and found that it was based on the intervention
price for white sugar, not on the prices paid to farmers
for sugar beet and cane. Moreover, it did not take into
account the effects on production levies nor the budget-
ary savings on export refunds that would directly fol-
low any price cuts. The Commission has since informed
the Court that this figure should be seen as only giving
an idea of the magnitude of the global loss to the whole
sugar sector. It should not, therefore, have been pre-
sented as an estimate of the budgetary cost, in terms of
compensation to producers, of applying the
Agenda 2000 model.
Conclusion
2.103. The Commission failed to prepare the neces-
sary studies for its October 2000 proposals in time and
the supporting information provided was in places
incomplete and did not show the real Community sur-
plus of sugar. There was no assessment of the likely
impact on the sugar industry of the proposal to end
storage reimbursements. Alternatives to the current
arrangements were not properly considered and the
costs given for the Agenda 2000 model were calculated
on an incorrect basis and therefore overstated.
2.101-2.102. The quota system expired in June 2001 and
had to be renewed. But as the Commission clearly pointed out,
there were numerous uncertainties. Some were connected with
the Commission’s need for further information, others were
beyond the Commission’s control (new negotiations on agri-
culture in the WTO, forthcoming enlargement). Although
unable to carry out thorough analyses, the Commission wanted
to single out certain characteristics and immediate conse-
quences of some of the options being put forward most fre-
quently.
In this connection, the figure of EUR 1 125 million men-
tioned in the explanatory memorandum was simply meant to
show that the budgetary cost of a reduction in the interven-
tion price could be considerable in terms of compensation for
the sector as whole. A more detailed study would have been
based on hypotheses that, if they were to be credible, required
the sort of information the Commission wanted for planning
a more far-reaching reform. Undoubtedly the Commission
should have been more clear, by explicitly pointing out that
the figure of EUR 1 125 million quoted was only an indica-
tion of the order of magnitude, equivalent to 50 % of the pos-
sible losses for the entire sugar sector.
2.103. The Commission provided the legislator with all of
the relevant and useful information for the decision. This
information came from the evaluation undertaken in early
1999 and its monitoring of market trends (see points 2.93
and 2.94). Furthermore, the financial statement, drawn up in
the proper manner in support of the proposal, gave the req-
uisite budgetary details. The estimates of revenue and expen-
diture associated with the various instruments of the regime
in 2002 and 2003 (see points 2.100 to 2.102.) were sup-
plied in an Annex to the financial statement accompanying
the proposal. The Commission believes that the Council
adopted the Regulation on the basis of a full knowledge of the
facts.
On the specific question of the sugar surplus on the Commu-
nity market, it separated the problem of sugar produced within
the EU from that imported under the preferential system.
Finally, it was not possible to explore the alternatives to the
current regime without making assumptions which it would
have been difficult to justify without additional information.
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PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS IN SPECIAL
REPORTS
2.104. The following paragraphs contain a summary
of the principal observations contained in the Special
Reports on EAGGF-Guarantee subjects adopted by the
Court since the Annual Report 2000 which should be
taken into account during the discharge procedure.
The sound financial management of the common organi-
sation of markets in the banana sector (42)
2.105. The banana market is the world’s second larg-
est fruit market after citrus fruits. A common organisa-
tion of the market (CMO) for bananas was introduced
in this sector in 1993. Its main objective was to harmo-
nise and stabilise this market by means of various aid
measures and to limit imports bymeans of a tariff quota
system.
2.106. The main objective of the audit was to examine
the way in which the objectives of the CMO were
defined by the Council and implemented by the Com-
mission and how the implementingmeasureswereman-
aged by the Member States and monitored by the Com-
mission.
Measures financed by the EU
2.107. The lack of precision of some of the basic
implementing texts led to difficulties in the implemen-
tation of the CMO, e.g. deficiencies in the information
required to calculate aid, non-compliance with the rules
applicable to producer organisations, applications for
compensatory aid in respect of quantities presented for
marketing by the producers which were not accepted
subsequently by the purchasers.
2.108. Some producers benefited from additional
national financial support which was not notified to the
Commission in advance. Furthermore, shortcomings
were revealed in the documents provided in support of
aid payments.
2.107. The level of detail in the definition and quantifica-
tion of objectives is similar to the other market organisations
and will be reviewed in depth when the market organisation
is evaluated under Article 32 of Regulation (EEC)No 404/93
(evaluation planned for 2004).
The Commission finds that the method for calculating the
compensatory aid is clearly defined in Article 12 of Regula-
tion (EEC) No 404/93.
The Commission considers that it solved the management
problems that arose in the Member States effectively, by tak-
ing immediate corrective action.
2.108. The Commission will be drawing the attention of
the relevant national authorities to the State aid scheme cited
by the Court with a view to ruling on whether it is compat-
ible with the common market under Article 87 of the Treaty.
The Commission had already identified the shortcomings in
the documents supplied in support of compensatory aid pay-
ments as mentioned by the Court. These are being followed up
under the clearance of accounts procedure.
(42) Special Report No 7/2002 (OJ C 294, 28.11.2002).
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2.109. The premium for final cessation of banana
production had only limited impact.
Measures to regulate the market
2.110. The difference between the world prices and
Community prices leads to a situation known as ‘quota
rents’.
2.111. The system of tariff quotas originally intro-
duced by the CMO has led to a complex system for the
importation of bananas and also to continued non-
compliance with the World Trade Organisation’s rules
(WTO).
2.112. In Member States, poor customs practices and
fraudulent imports have given rise to risks for the effec-
tive management of the quota.
2.109. The grubbing-up aid was a limited measure (1993
and 1994) connected with the transition to the common
organisation of the market. The main purpose of the measure
was to enable a very specific and limited category of produc-
ers to leave the sector.
2.110. The difference vis-à-vis other representative markets
(such as the USA) is not due to the quota rent alone, but also
to other factors such as the distance from the production areas,
distribution costs, product quality and customs duties.
Moreover, a tariff-only system will be introduced on 1 Janu-
ary 2006 at the latest (Article 16(1) of Regulation (EEC)
No 404/93, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 216/2001),
and quota rents are part of all tariff-quota regimes.
2.111. The import arrangements introduced in 1993
replaced a situation which was extremely diverse, given the
existence of 12 different national import regimes. The new
arrangements were designed to ensure fair access to the Com-
munity market for many different types of operators and
bananas from many different origins, taking account of the
situations of the various players in the import system (e.g.
ACP producer States with close ties to particular Member
States of the Community).
The current system has achieved a remarkable stability. It is
widely appreciated for its simplicity by producer third coun-
tries and the Community’s other trading partners.
2.112. The Commission is aware of the Member States’
shortcomings in applying the Community legislation on physi-
cal checks on the net quantity of imported bananas. At the
meeting of the Customs Code Committee of 17 May 2002,
the Commission departments reminded the Member States of
their obligations under the Community rules and stressed the
importance of those obligations. The Commission will moni-
tor this matter within the Customs Committee in order to
achieve full and correct application of the Community rules.
The fraudulent imports were detected by the Commission. It
should be noted that this discovery was possible because
imports are subject to a licensing scheme. The Commission
immediately adopted Regulation (EC) No 1632/2000 to
introduce a procedure for cross-checks on the issuing and use
of licences so that such fraud can no longer occur.
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Developments and evaluation
2.113. After putting in place an interim arrangement,
the Commission decided in favour of a system based
solely on tariffs to be introduced by 2006. The Com-
mission’s intention was to maintain adequate protec-
tion for producers in the EU and ACP (African, Carib-
bean and Pacific) States without affecting the volume of
imports and with minimal impact on prices.
2.114. The Commission is expected to produce a gen-
eral evaluation of the CMO at the end of 2004. This
should allow an overall assessment to be made of the
consequences of the introduction of the CMO and the
degree to which its initial objectives have been achieved.
Conclusions and recommendations
2.115. There have been shortcomings in the imple-
mentation of the CMO’s objectives, some of which have
not been achieved, and some of the measures taken
have had unforeseen and undesired results. Little or no
use has beenmade of grubbing-up premiums andoppor-
tunities to develop alternative crops. Shortcomings in
themethods used to calculate reference prices and prices
for producers have led to overpayment of compensa-
tion aid and corrective financial measures. The quota
rent advantage derived from the tariff quota system by
the multinationals operating in the market is approxi-
mately two to three times as great as the support given
to EU and ACP growers (43).
2.113. The transitional arrangements currently in force are
indeed designed to maintain fair market access for EU and
ACP producers before a tariff-only system is introduced, no
later than 1 January 2006. However, with regard to import
volumes, 100 000 tonnes was transferred from the C quota
(ACP bananas) to the B quota (open to all origins) as of
1 January 2002 following the entry into force of Regulation
(EC) No 2587/2001.
2.114. The Commission attaches the same importance as
the Court to the evaluation of the different aspects of the mar-
ket organisation and its objectives planned for 2004.
2.115. The Commission takes the view that:
(a) the fundamental objectives of the market organisation
have in the main been achieved, in particular the fusion
of several national markets into a single market, the
quantitative balance in market supply, fair prices for con-
sumers and for Community and ACP producers. In the
context of a world market dominated by multinationals,
the Community market has remained diversified and plu-
ralist, in terms of both the origins of bananas and types
of traders;
(b) the grubbing-up premium was a limited measure (1993
and 1994) connected with the transition to the common
organisation of the market. The main purpose of the
measure was to enable a very specific and limited category
of producers to leave the sector;
(c) the method for calculating the compensatory aid is clearly
defined by the Community legislation in force (Article 12
of Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 and Regulation (EEC)
No 1858/93). The Commission has identified the short-
comings in the application of the Community rules and
these are being followed up under the clearance of accounts
procedure;
(43) The figures quoted by the Commission in its reply relate
to the rate of quota rent of 200 euro per tonne estimated
by it, compared to the rate of income compensation aid
of 383 euro per tonne for the year 2000. The Court’s cal-
culations are based on the total value of the quota rent in
relation to the quota of 2 553 000 tonnes, which is some
511 million euro. This is around two to three times the
expenditure for income compensation aid in 1999 and
2000.
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2.116. The vulnerability of producers within their pro-
ducer organisations should be given more attention. In
addition, the import arrangements under the CMO have
proved susceptible to irregularities, and significantweak-
nesses were found in import controls.
2.117. As the Commission has committed itself to
conducting its first major evaluation around 2004, it
should ensure that it keeps to this timetable and that, in
particular, it includes an evaluation of the synergies
developed by the various types of support for the banana
sector.
(d) lastly, concerning the comparison between the quota rent
and the support given to Community and ACP growers,
the Commission notes that:
— there are 3,5 timesmore ‘dollar bananas’ than bananas
produced in the Community (the same applies for
ACP bananas),
— the compensatory aid received by Community produc-
ers in 2000 was 1,9 times the theoretical quota rent
estimated for dollar bananas,
— the producers of bananas in the ACP States enjoy not
only technical assistance but also particularly advan-
tageous preferential treatment (an exclusively reserved
tariff quota, zero import duty inside all the quotas
and a duty reduced by EUR 300 outside the quotas),
— the existence of tariff quotas, and therefore, inevitably,
a quota rent, also makes it easier to sell Community
and ACP bananas and indirectly benefits Community
and ACP producers.
2.116. The Commission has identified the shortcomings in
the way the Member States apply the rules applicable to pro-
ducer organisations and the matter is being followed up under
the accounts clearance procedure.
The Commission has also adopted a number of measures to
improve the cash-flow situation of producers.
The Member States’ customs procedures on import have yet
to be improved and the Commission stressed this point to the
Member States at the meeting of the Customs Code Commit-
tee on 17 May 2002. The Commission will continue to insist
that the Member States find a permanent solution to the
problem.
2.117. The Commission attaches the same importance as
the Court to the evaluation of the different aspects of the mar-
ket organisation planned for 2004. It will ensure that it keeps
to this timetable.
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The Commission’s management of the Community oil-
seed support scheme
2.118. In its Special Report No 6/2002 (44), the Court
examined the management of the common organisa-
tion of the market (CMO) in oilseeds and the implemen-
tation of the aid scheme for oilseeds produced on set-
aside land.
2.119. During the period 1993 to 1999, annual bud-
getary expenditure on oilseeds was about 2 700 mil-
lion euro, or around 15 % of the Community expendi-
ture devoted to arable crops.
2.120. In 1991, the Community radically reformed the
CMO by replacing the aid paid to the oilseed crushers
with area-based aid paid direct to the oilseed produ-
cers. The level of the aid was based on the historical
yield of the region concerned andwas subject to changes
in world prices.
2.121. Under the Agenda 2000 reform, the same level
of aid was introduced for cereals, oilseeds and set-aside
land, as of the marketing year 2002/2003.
2.122. Despite the high level of budgetary expendi-
ture, the Commission has not carried out an evaluation
of the 1991 reform. It has accepted regionalisation plans
containing overstated historical yields. For the period
1992/1993 to 1999/2000, the irrecoverable aid (45) paid
out as a result of this exceeded that laid down in the
Community regulations by 474,7 million euro. The
Commission’s annual calculations of aid levels resulted
in 366 million euro in additional irrecoverable budget-
ary expenditure for theperiod1992/1993 to1999/2000.
In two of the five Member States visited, the prescribed
penalties for failing to comply with the conditions stipu-
lated in the industrial set-aside scheme were incorrectly
applied.
2.122. A detailed evaluation by an independent consulting
firm was carried out only recently because it was necessary to
view the oilseeds sector in conjunction with the cereals sector,
where the CAP reform of 1992 has only applied fully since
1995.
The Commission does not intend to ask the Member States
concerned to change their regionalisation plans, because after
discussions at Council level these plans formed a key element
in the conclusion of Agenda 2000. The Commission acted in
conformity with the rules laid down by the Council.
The Commission does not agree with the Court’s conclusions
on the cases relating to the method of calculating aid. It
believes that it did comply with the rules laid down by the
Council. Consequently it cannot share the Court’s conclusion
regarding the extra cost to the budget calculated on the basis
of the alleged incorrect application of the rules. The system
criticised by the Court was replaced by Agenda 2000.
The Commission is aware of the shortcomings of the penalty
system described by the Court and takes appropriate measures
under the clearance of accounts procedure.
(44) OJ C 254, 22.10.2002.
(45) Given that the additional expenditure referred to results
from Commission decisions, its recovery from Member
States or beneficiaries is no longer possible, bearing in
mind that the protection of legitimate expectation and
the principle of legal certainty are principles of law.
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2.123. The Commission should give consideration to
the advisability of adjusting the overstated historical
average yields in certain regionalisation plans and should
examine to what extent unduly paid Community aid
can be recovered. The Court recommends that clear and
quantified objectives be defined and that the Commis-
sion should reassess the support given to products
which may be grown instead of oilseeds.
Extensification premium and payment schemes (EPS) in
the CMO for beef and veal
2.124. In Special Report No 5/2002 (46) the Court
examined the extensification payment scheme (EPS), a
direct beef payment scheme under the common organi-
sation of the market for beef and veal aimed at encour-
aging extensive beef production in an environmentally
sustainable way and reducing surplus production. The
aims of the audit were to consider the extent to which
the EPS had encouraged extensive cattle production in
the European Union and to examine the implementa-
tion of the scheme as reformed under Agenda 2000.
The EPS co-exists with agri-environmental and com-
pensatory allowance schemeswith similar stocking den-
sity requirements for qualification.
2.125. The Court found that the EPS had had little
influence on encouraging extensive and environmen-
tally sustainable beef farming, particularly before the
2000 reforms, and that the Commission had little infor-
mation on the effectiveness and efficiency of the scheme.
One important effect of the EPS was to support the
incomes of farmers who farmed extensively. EPS pre-
miums paid on a per head basis encourage producers to
maximise their subsidy revenue by maximising produc-
tion within the given stocking density limits.
2.126. Weaknesses in the implementation of the
scheme were found in all the Member States visited
(Spain, France, Ireland, Austria and the United King-
dom).
2.127. The Court recommends that the Commission
should assess the effectiveness and the efficiency of the
EPS and its consistency with other schemes such as
agri-environmental and compensatory schemes.
2.123. The Commission does not intend to ask the Member
States concerned to change their regionalisation plans, because
after discussions at Council level these plans were included in
Agenda 2000. The Commission has acted in conformity with
the rules laid down by the Council.
The objective of market equilibrium is a familiar concept, the
exact nature of which changes according to the state of the
market (equilibrium between demand and supply). The ques-
tion of reassessing the support given to other sectors will be
examined in the mid-term review of Agenda 2000.
2.125-2.127. The Commission has planned and will carry
out the assessment of the common organisation of the market
in beef and veal in 2004/2005 and will analyse the impact
of the various instruments planned in this sector, particularly
the new extensification premium introduced byAgenda 2000.
More generally, the questions raised by the Court are exam-
ined in the study carried out for the purposes of the proposal
for a mid-term review of Agenda 2000 which is intended
partly to limit the obligation to produce in order to benefit
from premiums and partly to reinforce cross-compliance.
Consistency between agri-environment measures, compensa-
tory allowances and the EPS is ensured by clear provisions in
Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/99, implementing rules
of which address explicitly the extensification payment. Con-
sistency is also ensured by the fact that the implementing bod-
ies in the Member States are using the same control tools.
(46) OJ C 290, 25.11.2002.
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INTRODUCTION
3.1. This chapter is devoted to structural measures. It
deals with the implementation of the Cohesion Fund
and of the four Structural Funds (SFs): the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European
Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural Guidance
and Guarantee Fund, ‘Guidance’ section, (EAGGF-
Guidance) and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Guidance (FIFG).
3.2. These measures are listed under heading 2 of the
financial perspectives. For the 2000 to 2006 period,
this heading accounted for appropriations totalling
213 000 million euro (1).
ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT
Introduction
3.3. Structural measures are managed on the basis of
multi-annual programmes. Each intervention (2) is
accompanied by an indicative financing plan which
specifies the amount of Community aid and the Mem-
ber State’s contribution. Contributions for structural
measures are committed in annual instalments and are
paid in the form of advances, payments on account,
and intermediate and final payments.
Implementation of appropriations
3.4. As a proportion of the entire Community budget,
the implementation of the structural measures
accounted for 40,5 % of the commitments entered into
(41 166,0 million euro) and 28,7 % of the payments
made (22 455,8 million euro).
3.5. Table 3.1 shows the implementation of the appro-
priations for structural measures. Tables 3.2 and 3.3
present in detail the implementation of the appropria-
tions in subsection B2 of the budget (‘structural opera-
tions, structural and cohesion expenditure, financial
mechanism, other agricultural and regional operations,
transport and fisheries’) (3).
(1) i.e. 195 000 million euro for the Structural Funds and
18 000 million euro for the Cohesion Fund.
(2) Project in the case of the Cohesion Fund and programme
or single programming document (SPD) in the case of the
Structural Funds.
(3) Titles B2-5 to B2-9 of subsection B2 of the budget do not
concern the structural measures.
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Table 3.1. — Evolution and implementation of the 2001 budget
(Mio EUR)
Heading in the financial perspectives: 2. Structural measures
Total for heading Structural Funds Cohesion Fund
Commitment
appropriations
Payment
appropriations
Commitment
appropriations
Payment
appropriations
Commitment
appropriations
Payment
appropriations
Ceiling in the financial perspectives 32 720,0 30 005,0 2 715,0
Evolution of the budget
Initial appropriations (1) 32 720,0 31 572,4 30 005,0 28 712,4 2 715,0 2 860,0
Available final appropriations (2) 41 362,5 32 994,8 38 233,9 29 834,8 3 128,5 3 160,0
Implementation of the budget
Appropriations utilised 41 166,0 22 455,8 38 040,7 20 472,4 3 125,2 1 983,4
% of available final appropriations 99,5 68,1 99,5 68,6 99,9 62,8
Appropriations carried over to 2002 175,2 0,1 171,9 0,1 3,3 0,0
% of available final appropriations 0,4 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,1 0,0
Appropriations cancelled 21,3 10 538,9 21,3 9 362,3 0,0 1 176,6
% of available final appropriations 0,1 31,9 0,1 31,4 0,0 37,2
(1) Budget definitively adopted by the European Parliament on 14 December 2000 (OJ L 56, 26.2.2001).
(2) Budgetary appropriations amended taking account of supplementary and amending budgets and of transfers, including appropriations carried over from 2000,
appropriations from revenue resulting from contributions by third parties and other revenue for a specific purpose and appropriations made available again.
For more detailed information on budgetary implementation, see graphs III and IV of Annex I to this report.
Source: 2001 Revenue and expenditure account.
Table 3.2. — Budgetary implementation for measures and the Structural Funds in the financial year 2001
(Mio EUR)
Budget
refer-
ence
Appropriations
Total avail-
able appro-
priations
(c) + (d) + (e)
Implemen-
tation of
available
appropria-
tions
Rate of
implemen-
tation of
available
appropria-
tions (%)
Appro-
priations
carried
over to the
financial
year 2002
Appropriations
cancelled at the end of
the financial year
Initial
budget
Final
budget
after SABs
and
transfers
Carry-
overs from
the
previous
financial
year
Other
additional
appro-
priations
Amount
(f) – (g) – (i) % (j)/(f)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) = (g)/(f) (i) (j) (k)
C
Objective 1 B2-1 0 20 832,0 20 832,0 5 374,8 0,2 26 207,0 26 202,9 100,0 3,9 0,1 0,0
Objective 2 B2-1 1 3 613,0 3 613,0 2 648,7 3,4 6 265,1 6 263,6 100,0 1,5 0,0 0,0
Objective 3 B2-1 2 3 575,0 3 575,0 187,8 3 762,8 3 762,3 100,0 0,5 0,0
Other structural measures
(excluding O1) B2-1 3 164,0 164,0 14,0 178,0 173,4 97,4 4,6 0,0 0,0
Community initiatives B2-1 4 1 683,0 1 607,3 1 607,3 1 433,8 89,2 161,8 11,6 0,7
Innovative and technical
assistance measures B2-1 6 138,0 213,7 0,1 213,8 204,7 95,7 0,1 9,1 4,2
Sub-total ‘Structural Funds’ B2-1 30 005,0 30 005,0 8 225,3 3,6 38 233,9 38 040,7 99,5 171,9 21,3 0,1
Cohesion Fund B2-3 2 715,0 2 715,0 413,5 3 128,5 3 125,2 99,9 3,3 0,0 0,0
Total 32 720,0 32 720,0 8 638,8 3,6 41 362,5 41 166,0 99,5 175,2 21,3 0,1
P
Objective 1 B2-1 0 18 745,2 18 535,5 1 020,0 0,1 19 555,6 13 789,4 70,5 0,1 5 766,1 29,5
Objective 2 B2-1 1 4 323,2 4 323,2 150,0 4 473,2 3 137,9 70,1 1 335,3 29,9
Objective 3 B2-1 2 3 205,4 3 205,4 3 205,4 1 630,3 50,9 1 575,1 49,1
Other structural measures
(excluding O1) B2-1 3 463,5 463,5 463,5 115,6 24,9 347,9 75,1
Community initiatives B2-1 4 1 745,4 1 907,4 1 907,4 1 701,4 89,2 206,0 10,8
Innovative and technical
assistance measures B2-1 6 229,7 229,7 0,1 229,8 97,9 42,6 0,1 131,9 57,4
Subtotal ‘Structural Funds’ B2-1 28 712,4 28 664,7 1 170,0 0,1 29 834,8 20 472,4 68,6 0,1 9 362,3 31,4
Cohesion Fund B2-3 2 860,0 2 860,0 300,0 3 160,0 1 983,4 62,8 1 176,6 37,2
Total 31 572,4 31 524,7 1 470,0 0,1 32 994,8 22 455,8 68,1 0,1 10 538,9 31,9
Source: Sincom and revenue and expenditure account.
NB: C = Commitments; P = payments.
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Table 3.3. — Detail of budgetary implementation for the Structural Funds in the financial year 2001
(Mio EUR)
Budget item Description
Commitments Payments
Available
appro-
priations
Implemen-
tation %
Available
appro-
priations
Implemen-
tation %
B2-1 0 0 Objective 1 — EAGGF-Guidance 3 220,0 3 219,8 100,0 1 822,5 1 273,8 69,9
B2-1 0 1 Objective 1 — FIFG 385,2 385,1 100,0 306,8 154,9 50,5
B2-1 0 2 Objective 1 — ERDF 15 684,8 15 682,9 100,0 9 554,4 6 934,7 72,6
B2-1 0 3 Objective 1 — ESF 6 710,9 6 709,1 100,0 3 360,6 2 707,8 80,6
B2-1 0 4 Objective 1 — PEACE 206,0 206,0 100,0 104,0 37,2 35,7
B2-1 0 5 Objective 1 — Completion of previous programmes 0,2 0,0 0,0 4 407,2 2 681,1 60,8
Total Chapter B2-1 0: Objective 1 26 207,0 26 202,9 100,0 19 555,6 13 789,4 70,5
B2-1 1 0 Objective 2 — ERDF 5 598,3 5 596,7 100,0 2 164,1 1 562,0 72,2
B2-1 1 1 Objective 2 — ESF 663,5 663,5 100,0 445,1 168,2 37,8
B2-1 1 2 Objective 2 — Completion of previous programmes 3,4 3,4 100,0 1 864,0 1 407,6 75,5
Total Chapter B2-1 1: Objective 2 6 265,1 6 263,6 100,0 4 473,2 3 137,9 70,1
B2-1 2 0 Objective 3 — ESF 3 762,8 3 762,3 100,0 2 447,1 1 346,5 55,0
B2-1 2 1 Objective 3 — Completion of previous programmes 0,0 0,0 0,0 758,3 283,8 37,4
Total Chapter B2-1 2: Objective 3 3 762,8 3 762,3 100,0 3 205,4 1 630,3 50,9
B2-1 3 0 FIFG (excluding Objective 1) 178,0 173,4 97,4 112,4 37,0 32,9
B2-1 3 1 Completion of previous programmes — FIFG 0,0 0,0 0,0 20,0 9,2 46,1
B2-1 3 2 Completion of previous programmes — EAGGF-Guidance 0,0 0,0 0,0 331,1 69,4 21,0
Total Chapter B2-1 3: other structural measures
(excl. Objective 1) 178,0 173,4 97,4 463,5 115,6 24,9
B2-1 4 0 Leader 329,6 271,3 82,3 132,5 82,0 61,8
B2-1 4 1 Interreg 703,7 594,3 84,5 200,9 82,9 41,3
B2-1 4 2 EQUAL 464,6 458,8 98,8 208,2 208,1 100,0
B2-1 4 3 URBAN 109,4 109,4 100,0 50,9 43,0 84,5
B2-1 4 4 Completion of previous programmes 0,0 0,0 0,0 1 314,8 1 285,4 97,8
Total Chapter B2-1 4: Community initiatives 1 607,3 1 433,8 89,2 1 907,4 1 701,4 89,2
B2-1 6 0 Innovative and technical assistance measures — EAGGF-
Guidance 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,6 0,0 0,0
B2-1 6 1 Innovative and technical assistance measures — FIFG 1,1 1,1 99,9 2,2 0,8 34,2
B2-1 6 2 Innovative and technical assistance measures — ERDF 171,0 166,6 97,4 60,9 10,5 17,2
B2-1 6 3 Innovative and technical assistance measures — ESF 40,3 35,8 88,9 30,0 7,6 25,4
B2-1 6 4 Completion of previous programmes 1,4 1,2 84,3 132,0 79,0 59,8
Total Chapter B2-1 6: innovative and technical
assistance measures 213,8 204,7 95,7 229,8 97,9 42,6
Total ‘Structural Funds’ 38 233,9 38 040,7 99,5 29 834,8 20 472,4 68,6
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Commitment appropriations: almost 100 % utilisation
3.6. The financial year 2000 was characterised by a
rate of implementation of 58 % of available appropria-
tions, and by considerable recourse to carry-overs of
appropriations (8 639 million euro). In 2001, this ten-
dency was reversed. Almost 100 % of the available
appropriations were used (38 234 million euro in the
case of the Structural Funds and 3 129 million euro in
the case of the Cohesion Fund). Consequently, the carry-
over of appropriations to the financial year 2002
(175 million euro)was appreciably lower than the appro-
priations carried over to the financial year 2001.
3.7. Maximum budgetary implementation was a par-
ticular concern in 2001 as, from the financial year 2001
onwards, no unused appropriation could be carried
over to subsequent financial years (4). Consequently, for
certain programmes (5) where commitment proved
impossible during the financial year, the appropriations
were used for other interventions (6). In addition, in the
case of certain interventions concerned by carry-overs
of appropriations from2000 to 2001 two annual instal-
ments were committed from the appropriations for a
single financial year.
3.8. As a result of very late decisions, certain commit-
ments had to be carried over to the following financial
year (see paragraph 3.73). Others could be entered into
only in the very last days of the year. For example, seven
Interreg III interventions were adopted on 31 December
2001. In the case of the Cohesion Fund, the majority of
the projects were approved by the Commission in
December, as was the case in 2000. In fact, the approval
procedure tookmuchmore than the threeweeks allowed
by Regulation (EC) No 116/94 (Article 10.6).
3.7. The decisions to amend the programmes were taken
with the agreement of the Member State concerned. The Com-
mission would point out that the indicative distribution of
appropriations was made by Member State and not by pro-
gramme. This distribution makes it possible to allocate or
reallocate appropriations, the only constraint being the need
to comply with the national profile.
As regards the commitment of two annual instalments from
the appropriations for a single financial year, these carry-overs
were decided within the framework of the Financial Regula-
tion and relate to an instalment from the previous year added
to the instalment for the current year.
3.8. Considering the late presentation of these Interreg pro-
grammes, their approval at the end of the year was satisfac-
tory. For the Cohesion Fund projects, some proposals ready for
adoption were received as late as the last quarter, although the
Commission had asked the Member States to bring forward
their application submission schedules as far as possible.
(4) Interinstitutional agreement of 6 May 1999 between the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission
on budgetary discipline and the improvement of the bud-
getary procedure (OJ C 172, 18.6.1999, p. 1).
(5) In particular, Interreg and Urban to promote innovative
and technical assistance measures.
(6) For example, the 2001 instalments of the Greece-Italy
Interreg (9,96 million euro) and Archimed (6,8 million)
programmes were used temporarily for the Italy-Slovenia
(1,5 million) Western Mediterranean (6,92 million) and
Greece-Bulgaria (8,34 million) programmes.
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3.9. The Court also wishes to draw attention (7) once
again to the consequences for the management of com-
mitments of a system which is modelled on the annual
breakdown of the appropriations specified in the finan-
cial perspectives. That means that the legal obligations
entered into by the Commission are not all entered in
the accounts when the interventions are decided on,
but gradually, in annual tranches (see paragraph 9.14).
It follows that the financing plans for each intervention
must also be made compatible with the annual tranches
of the financial perspectives. For this reason, some 240
financing plans for interventions for the 2000 to 2006
period had to be updated, with the administrative cost
that that entails.
3.10. The result is a situation where the accounting
entry is later in time than the legal obligation, just as the
financing plans are not representative of actual forecasts
of interventions, either by measure or globally. More-
over these forecasts are not available from other sources
either.
Payment appropriations: a rate of implementation which
has been falling for three years
3.11. The payment appropriations available, which
totalled 29 835 million euro for the Structural Funds
and 3 160 million euro for the Cohesion Fund, were
used up to the extent of 69 % (8) and 63 % respectively.
This rate of implementation is the lowest since 1999
and confirms the downward trend observed to date.
3.12. The low rate of implementation of the payment
appropriations is explained by delays in implementing
the 2000 to 2006 programmes and in presenting and
settling expenditure for the previous programming
3.9. As in previous years, the Court questions the system of
commitments by annual instalments laid down in the finan-
cial provisions of the general Structural Fund Regulation. In
its reply to the Court’s 1999 report (paragraphs 3.21 and
3.22), the Commission already pointed to the advantages
offered by commitments made in this way. As that Regula-
tion was approved by the Council in 1999, after endorsement
by the European Parliament, it will cover all the 2000 to
2006 period and commitments will have to be made bymeans
of annual instalments during the forthcoming period in accor-
dance with the financial perspectives laid down by the two
arms of the budget authority.
The financing plans were updated under the Interinstitutional
Agreement (paragraph 17).
3.10. The timelag between the accounting entry and the
legal obligation is a direct result of the regulatory and finan-
cial framework. The progress of interventions in the field can
be measured for each programme by means of monitoring
indicators. The Member States take these evaluation compo-
nents into account in the annual report. It must also be pointed
out that the financing plans for assistance do not include
financial programming at individual measure level and that
these are given in the programming complements with a
multiannual allocation.
3.11 to 3.15. In 2001 the Commission honoured virtu-
ally all the payment requests submitted to it by the Member
States.
The years 2000 and 2001 were not only the first two years
of the new programming period, but also the last two years
of financial implementation of the 1994 to 1999 period. In
addition to an amount outstanding under the Community
budget of about 10 % of the allocation for this period, at the
end of 1999 there was a ‘hidden’ amount outstanding, con-
sisting of the difference between the advances paid to the
Member States and the expenditure actually incurred by them
up to that date. The authorities at all the various levels of the
Member States concentrated their efforts on completion of the
programmes under the old period and were slow in launching
programmes covered by the new period.
(7) See, in this connection, paragraph 4.5 of Special Report
No 16/98 and paragraph 3.132 of the Annual Report
concerning the financial year 2000.
(8) Of which almost three quarters for 2000 to 2006.
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periods. This under-implementation concerns almost
all budget headings relating to the structural measures,
both for the 2000 to 2006 programming period and
for the completion of previous programmes.
3.13. The low utilisation of the appropriations is
responsible for the cancellation of all of the unexpended
balance, i.e. 10 539 million euro (9), including1 470 mil-
lion euro (10) carried over from the previous financial
year. For this reason, the Commission decided not to
carry over any appropriations to the financial year
2002 (11).
3.14. Despite the introduction, in cooperation with
the Member States, of a system for forecasting payment
requests (12), the estimates of the necessary payment
appropriations needed are still not very reliable. More-
over, in cases where the available information is such as
to modify these estimates no account is taken of it for
the purpose of updating budget forecasts (amending let-
ter, supplementary and amending budget) (13). Under
these circumstances, as in the case of commitment
appropriations, budgetary estimates of payment appro-
priations continue to be unrelated to the process for
adopting interventions and to the progress of the inter-
ventions themselves.
3.15. As regards the staggering of payments through-
out the financial year, payments in respect of the Struc-
tural Funds and the Cohesion Fund made in December
account for almost 30 % of the total, an appreciable
increase when compared with the previous financial
year (when the rate was almost 20 %). For the 2000 to
2006 programming period alone, these percentages
were considerably higher, in particular for Objective 1
interventions and the Community Initiatives, where
more than 40 % and 51 %of payments respectivelywere
made in December.
The low utilisation referred to by the Court is also explained
by a particularly wide gap between the Member States’ fore-
casts and their implementation, while the Commission and
the budget authority allocated lower appropriations than the
total amount requested by the Member States.
For example, under the ERDF (with a difference of EUR 7,8
billion between forecast and implementation), just threeMem-
ber States account for 84 % of this difference, and two Mem-
ber States account for two-thirds of it. In the case of the Cohe-
sion Fund (with a difference of EUR 1,7 billion between
forecast and implementation), one Member State accounts for
two-thirds of the difference.
The Commission did not submit any preliminary draft amend-
ing budget to avoid needlessly calling up own resources when
it observed that payment appropriations were under-utilised
because it relied on the Member States’ forecasts, all the more
so as the latter even suggested that appropriations would be
insufficient.
The Commission points to the difficulty of forecasting despite
the introduction of a system by which the Member States send
in forecasts of their payment requests. At Member State level,
the host of decentralised agencies involved comes on top of the
fact that the rate of payments on the ground is subject to a
considerable degree of uncertainty since they are made on the
basis of expenditure statements submitted by recipients, for
projects whose progress is dependent on a range of external
factors. The Commission itself does not yet have historical
information on the rate of payments under the new payment
arrangements, which are now based on the reimbursement of
actual expenditure instead of making advance payments. Con-
sequently, it is no easy task to predict the budget implementa-
tion of payment appropriations.
The Commission will look closely into the causes of the dif-
ferences between actual and forecast payments. It has requested
the Member States to improve the quality of their forecasts by
drawing them up programme by programme and sending
them by e-mail.
To avoid a build-up of appropriations uptake at the end of the
year, Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 makes it compulsory
to group payment requests together and submit them on three
dates in the course of the year, the last being 31 October, but
the Member States were not yet complying with this new rule
in 2001.(9) i.e. 9 362,4 million euro (31 % of the available appropria-
tions) for the Structural Funds and 1 176,6 million euro
for the Cohesion Fund (37 % of available appropriations).
(10) Of which almost 80 % was for the Structural Funds.
(11) The amount of 0,1 million euro in Tables 3.1 and 3.2
refers to appropriations for reuse (Article 27 of the Finan-
cial Regulation). See also the revenue and expenditure
account, Volume 11, page 687.
(12) The Commission’s reply to paragraph 3.13 of the Annual
Report concerning the financial year 1999.
(13) In addition, the working documents drafted by the Com-
mission within the framework of the preliminary draft
budgets provide no indication as to how these estimates
are reached.
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Review of the Commission’s comments on financial
management
3.16. The information provided by the Commission
on the analysis of the financial management is more
comprehensive than in previous years but improve-
ments in the 2001 revenue and expenditure account (14)
compared with the objectives set are still called for. In
particular, the Commission provides no information on
the actual results of expenditure on the structural mea-
sures in relation to the latter’s objectives either for the
current period or for previous periods, whereas the
Financial Regulation states that the revenue and expen-
diture account should supply detailed information on
compliance with the principles of sound financial man-
agement (15). Nor, with regard to outstanding commit-
ments in respect of periods prior to 1994, does the
Commission provide figures for each type of problem.
which would have prevented these files from being
closed (in particular concerning cases of suspension for
legal reasons and the corresponding amounts).
3.17. As regards interventions for the 1994 to 1999
period, no details are provided of outstanding commit-
ments. The Commission indicates the number of closed
files which are jointly financed by the Social Fund only
in the case of Objective 2 interventions for the 1994 to
1996 period, even though almost all of these interven-
tions (72 out of 73) involve more than one Fund (ERDF-
ESF).
3.18. The Commission has discontinued the ‘lessons
to be learnt’ sections, which were a feature of the previ-
ous financial year. This is despite the fact that the struc-
tural shortcomings observed in recent years would have
required much more detailed analysis with a view to
suggesting at the right time improvements to be made
in the future to the financial and budgetary frameworks
(i.e. the financial perspectives and the procedures for
drawing up estimates of appropriations) as well as the
programming and management provisions contained
in the regulations governing the structural measures.
3.19. It would also have been beneficial for the Com-
mission to consider its own responsibility as regards
delays in the programming procedure, shortcomings in
the estimates of appropriations and the increase in
transactions at the end of the financial year. Further-
more, the Commission does not provide a satisfactory
3.16. The information referred to by the Court is not yet
available for the periods 1994 to 1999 and 2000 to 2006.
Nevertheless, some information is given in the annual reports
on individual programmes, the annual Structural Funds report
and the mid-term and ex post evaluations, and the report on
the analysis of Structural Fund expenditure.
The budget authority is regularly informed by means of these
documents of the implementation, progress, results and impact
of the measures taken.
3.18. As regards the discontinuation of the ‘lesson to be
learnt’ sections, the Commission takes the view that there is
no loss of information because detailed analyses are always
given in the revenue and expenditure accounts.
3.19. The Commission intends to submit more detailed
information on appropriations forecasts and the build-up of
transactions at the end of the financial year in the next rev-
enue and expenditure accounts. The presentation of a supple-
mentary and amending budget towards the end of the finan-
cial year can only be the exception, for example to cover
(14) Volume 1 of the 2001 Revenue and Expenditure Account,
Analysis of the financial management.
(15) Articles 2 and 80 of the Financial Regulation.
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explanation as to why, when it would appear already to
have observed widespread non-utilisation of payment
appropriations, it did not submit a preliminary draft for
a supplementary and amending budget, which would
have made it unnecessary to call up own resources
totalling 15 000 million euro (the out-turn for the finan-
cial year).
Conclusions and recommendations
3.20. The accounting commitment is entered into long
after the legal obligations have been contracted and the
financing plans for the measures do not correspond to
the actual forecasts for these measures (see para-
graphs 3.9 and 3.10). The situation as reflected in the
budgetary accounts thus continues to bear no relation
to the status of the interventions.
3.21. Furthermore, the implementation of payment
appropriations, which has been falling continually for
three financial years now, is symptomatic of a forecast-
ing system which is not very reliable, despite improve-
ments to the legislative framework (see paragraphs 3.11
to 3.14).
3.22. The Court also notes an increase in transactions
at the end of the year. In the case of commitments, it is
Cohesion Fund projects which are concerned (see para-
graph 3.8). This increase occurs across the board in the
case of payment appropriations where the low level of
implementation of appropriations in 2001 gives reason
to fear a build-up of payment requests in the future (see
paragraph 3.15).
3.23. The Court recommends that budgetary transac-
tions should be more evenly spread out over the finan-
cial year. Such a step would provide an additional guar-
antee that the legislation is rigorously applied, thus
ensuring that decisions are not adopted to meet very
tight deadlines, at a time when the possibility of appro-
priations being cancelled may constitute a source of
pressure.
specific needs of limited amount. At this time of the year,
when the budgetary procedure for the following year is being
completed, it is difficult to discuss and decide on adjustments
of appropriations for the current financial year on the basis
of a foreseeable under-utilisation.
3.20. The time lag between the accounting entry and the
legal obligation is a direct consequence of the regulatory and
financial framework.
3.21. The under-utilisation is explained to a large extent by
the delay in adoption of the programmes, spread out over
2000 and 2001. But it is also explained by a particularly
wide gap between the Member States’ forecasts and imple-
mentation. The Commission will look closely into the causes
of these errors in forecasting. It has requested the Member
States to improve the quality of their forecasts.
3.22 and 3.23. The increase in commitments in December
is linked to the late adoption of decisions at the end of the
year. To avoid a build-up of payments at the end of the year,
Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 makes it compulsory to
group payment requests together and submit them on three
dates in the course of the year, the last being 31 October, but
the Member States were not yet complying with this new rule
in 2001.
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3.24. The Court also recommends that the Commis-
sion and the Member States should take appropriate
action to ensure that actual requirements are more
accurately reflected in budgetary forecasts.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMMES
Introduction
3.25. The management of the structural measures is
divided upbetween various programmingperiodswhich
take the financial perspectives as their frame of refer-
ence. In addition, modifications have been made to the
regulatory framework between the various periods.
3.26. The Court has carried out checks in respect of
the new 2000 to 2006 programming period and will
report on its findings in greater detail at a later date.
However, it considers it beneficial to illustrate some of
its observations in the present context.
Periods up to 1999: delays in closure and increases in
requests for final payments
3.27. At the end of 2001, the amounts outstanding for
the periods prior to 1994 totalled 532 million euro for
all of the Structural Funds, i.e. approximately half the
total as at 31 December 2000.
3.28. Delays in closure stem mainly from the fact that
the Commission had not taken the necessary measures
at the right time in response to its own findings and
those of the Court. As a result, when the interventions
were closed, it found itself faced, sometimes ten years
after the checks, with many problems, the resolution of
whichmay involve protracted discussionswith theMem-
ber States. Examples include the need to provide fuller
supporting documentation, to establish any errors or
irregularities or precisely to identify transactions which
have been suspended for legal reasons (see also para-
graphs 3.48 to 3.52).
3.24. Under the partnership and the principle of subsidiar-
ity, the Member States are responsible for monitoring and
managing their programmes. Expenditure cannot always be
scheduled by the Commission since the Member States are
given a great deal of latitude in their management. Neverthe-
less, the Commission is endeavouring to improve its forecast-
ing (see reply to paragraphs 3.11 to 3.15).
3.27 and 3.28. Clearly measurable progress was made on
the closure of files relating to periods prior to 1994. The
Commission has assigned the major resources required for this
task.
As at 30 June 2002 the amounts outstanding totalled
EUR 370 million, i.e. 0,6 % of the budget allocation for the
period 1989 to 1993. By the end of 2002 this should be
reduced to a small number of files which cannot be closed
until legal procedures have been completed.
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3.29. As regards the 1994 to 1999 programming
period, the amounts outstanding totalled 16 707 mil-
lion euro at the end of the financial year. As the expen-
diture was eligible until 31 December 2001 (16), all
interventions should, under normal circumstances, be
closed in 2002 or 2003.
2000 to 2006 period: improvements which are limited
when compared with the objectives
3.30. One of the main objectives of the new legisla-
tive framework (17) was to speed up and simplify pro-
gramming procedures. However, the proper program-
ming work, which took place in several successive
stages (18), proved to be especially cumbersome and dif-
ficult to manage. It was typefied by a lack of clarity in
the division of responsibilities between the Commission
and the Member States and by the absence of a precise
pre-established programming framework. Long nego-
tiations between the Member States and the Commis-
sion proved to be necessary (19) but in spite of that the
3.29. Starting from an amount outstanding for 1994 to
1999 of EUR 41,2 billion at the end of 1999, the Commis-
sion’s efforts led to a reduction by almost EUR 17 billion at
the end of 2001. In line with the regulations and the dead-
lines laid down, it is to be expected that approximately 50 %
of this amount outstanding will be settled in 2002, followed
by 45 % in 2003, leaving 5 % for cases where projects are
suspended for legal reasons.
3.30. Programming was complicated by the added require-
ments designed to ensure that assistance measures comply
with the rules and to improve their quality. Thus, as a pre-
condition for programme approval, the Commission insisted
on the lists and procedures required by the Natura 2000
Directives. It also had a list of the State aid schemes to be used
together with information on the measures taken to check for
any overlap in funding sources inserted in each programme.
In addition to these regulatory requirements, the focus was on
greater quality in programming, for example by means of
closer incorporation of the results of ex ante evaluation, tak-
ing account of the Commission’s horizontal priorities (employ-
ment, sustainable development, innovation and the informa-
tion society, and equal opportunities) and, in the case of the
ESF, of the European Employment Strategy, close attention to
defining monitoring indicators backed up by quantified objec-
tives, and establishing criteria for allocating the performance
reserve. The Commission also paid close attention to the reli-
ability of the structures introduced to manage assistance
operations.
Of course, the large number of matters to be negotiated and
their complexity represented a major workload for all the part-
ners involved, including the Commission, despite its efforts to
put it into a manageable framework. Thus, to help the Mem-
ber States, the Commission published guidelines on the con-
tent of assistance measures, a vademecum on programming
procedures, and working papers covering in particular ex ante
evaluation, indicators and the performance reserve. It also
drew up, for use by its own staff, guides on ESF program-
ming, negotiating briefs, etc.
(16) This deadline does not apply to 73 interventions concern-
ing the 1994 to 1996 subperiod of Objective 2. Of these
73 interventions, nine had not been closed as of 31Decem-
ber 2001 in the area of the ESF (35,2 million euro) and
44were yet to be closed in the area of the ERDF (540,5 mil-
lion euro).
(17) Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999
laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds
(OJ L 161 du 26.6.1999, p. 1). The new legislative frame-
work for the 2000 to 2006 period stipulates, for each
intervention, that:
— total Community assistance shall be broken down by
year, on the basis of financing plans which are com-
patible with the applicable financial perspectives,
— the first commitment shall be made when the corre-
sponding decision is adopted,
— subsequent instalments shall be committed automati-
cally on 30 April of each year.
(18) Plans, Community support framework, single program-
ming document, operational programmes and additional
programming.
(19) In its opinion No 10/98 on certain proposals for regula-
tions in the context of Agenda 2000 (the part concern-
ing the Structural Funds, paragraphs 4.1 to 4.7, the pro-
gramming procedure), the Court questioned the actual
usefulness of the various programming stages, in which
only the last document, the programming supplement,
implements the strategy and main priorities of the inter-
vention and contains details about the measures.
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operational framework for the intervention was still not
completely defined.
3.31. The Commission specified its role in checking
the compliance of additional programming only in
October 2001. Consequently, it was possible to release
intermediate payments to the Member States, but at the
expense of an agreement restricting the Commission’s
checks to the form and consistency of the financing
plans. In the end, instead of simplifying the program-
ming of the Structural Funds, a new procedure was cre-
ated which accentuated delays and led to problems of
interpretation. The cumbersome nature of the proce-
dures was also confirmed by the review of interventions
which also proved to be drawn out.
3.32. In addition to these problems with program-
ming procedures, the legislation governing expenditure
proved to be complex, and uncertainty persisted as
regards the interpretation of a number of basic ques-
tions such as the eligibility of certain items of expendi-
ture, the rates at which revenue-yielding investments
were jointly financed or the definition of the final ben-
eficiary (see paragraphs 3.74 to 3.78).
At a practical level, a lack of clarity in the division of respon-
sibilities became apparent when dealing with programming
complements (see following paragraph). Otherwise, the nego-
tiations took place on the basis of partnership. Without going
into the details of the specific measures taken, the limit on the
duration of negotiations at strategic level is laid down in the
rules, although compliance proved difficult.
3.31. The Regulation provides for programming comple-
ments to be forwarded to the Commission for information,
but also as a precondition for meeting interim payment
requests. The Commission recognises that it took some time
to find the solution described by the Court in order to resolve
the situation without creating legal uncertainty for subsequent
implementation of the programmes.
It is too early to draw conclusions as to whether the Commis-
sion’s procedures for programming complements are more
straightforward or not. The scope for amending programmes
afforded by this new instrument should make it possible to
speed up the adjustment of assistance measures to actual con-
ditions on the ground.
3.32. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1685/2000 of
28 July 2000 clarifies the eligibility of types of expenditure
for which a common EU treatment is necessary. The sources
of the expenditure and the timing of its inclusion in interme-
diate declarations of expenditure to the Commission for reim-
bursement were discussed with Member States in the Struc-
tural Fund management and advisory committees in 2001.
In September 2001 the Commission sent a guidance note on
these issues to the Member States. The guidance note makes
it clear that payments by ‘final beneficiaries’ that administer
aid schemes or multi-beneficiary programmes must be sup-
ported by expenditure on projects on the ground before the
expenditure is declared to the Commission. This is to avoid the
need to recover advance payments of aid to project promoters
that are not used. In July 2002 DG REGIO presented a guid-
ance note on the financing of revenue-generating infrastruc-
ture projects to the Committee on the Development and Con-
version of Regions. This note, too, will be finalised shortly
and sent to the Member States.
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3.33. The establishment of the areas eligible forObjec-
tive 2 interventions is a specific example of difficulties
in getting the programming phase off the ground. The
list belatedly adopted by the Commission covers areas
which do not necessarily correspond to the statistical or
administrative categorisation of the regions concerned.
The result was eligible areas which were artificial and
very far away from one other, which led to practical dif-
ficulties in defining the measures. A further difficulty is
geographical overlapping: Objective 2 interventions
overlap with those of Objective 3, which led to subse-
quent delays in the definition and management of mea-
sures on the ground.
3.34. These various reasons explain the general and
substantial exceeding of themaximumperiod laid down
in the regulations for adopting a series of interventions,
almost all of which could not be approved by the Com-
mission until the end of the financial year 2001. What
is more, it was during this same financial year that about
a third of the Objective 1 interventions were approved,
along with almost all the Objective 2 interventions and
the first Community Initiatives (20).
3.33. The procedures laid down in the Regulation for deter-
mining which areas are eligible under Objective 2 consist of
three stages: first, on the basis of the criteria laid down in the
Regulation, the Commission establishes population ceilings.
Then the Member State proposes a list of the national areas
meeting the criteria, which are also defined in the Regulation.
Lastly, the Commission draws up the final list in close coop-
eration with the Member State. This zoning method gives the
Member States greater flexibility, in accordance with the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity. But, coming on top of the complexity of
negotiations on the content of programmes, it made program-
ming for Objective 2 longer than desirable.
The Commission already pointed to the fragmented nature of
zoning for Objective 2 in its second report on economic and
social cohesion. It also referred to the possibility of giving the
Member States greater responsibility for Objective 2 zoning
in future.
The side-by-side implementation of Objective 3 programmes
in areas covered by Objective 2 is provided for in the Regula-
tion, which requires integrated programmes covering all Struc-
tural Fund assistance only for Objective 1 regions.
3.34. The amount of work to be covered in the negotiations
meant that it was difficult to meet the five-month deadline.
The regrettable overruns, especially for Objectives 1 and 2,
were to some extent the price to be paid for improved quality
in programming.
The adoption of Community Initiative programmes in 2000
was practically ruled out owing to the obligation under the
Regulation to consult Parliament and the Structural Fund
committees on guidelines before launching the programming
process. Given the preliminary stages required, the time taken
for programming was not excessively long.
(20) The interventions adopted concern Interreg (54 interven-
tions), Urban (70 interventions), Leader (56 interven-
tions), and Equal (17 interventions).
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Existing information on the Structural Funds: a lack of
overall vision
3.35. In the past, the Court pointed out that it was
difficult to monitor the implementation of the Struc-
tural Funds, owing to a lack of reliable, up-to-date infor-
mation, both physical and financial, and at all levels of
management (Community, national and regional) (21).
Furthermore, it was this observation which led the
Council, within the framework of the 1999 Discharge,
to ask for a solution to be found to this problem (22).
3.36. As regards financial information, the latest over-
all information available for the 1994 to 1999 period
still concerns the implementation of the budget as at
31 December 1999 (23). The 2000 annual report on the
Structural Funds (24) gives no figures for the period
1994 to 1999. All it contains are a few sporadic com-
ments on the implementation of the interventions in
the Member States. In the case of the 2000 to 2006
period, the 2000 Annual Reports restricts itself to pro-
viding information on the implementation of commit-
ments and payments.
3.35. For earlier periods (before 2000) there was no com-
mon database for the Structural Funds as a whole.
However, at the end of 2001 a common database called SFC
(Structural Funds Common System), became operational and
was used by the four DGs responsible for the Structural Funds.
It contains the tables in the Structural Funds vademecum with
a breakdown of resources by Objective, Fund, Member State
and Community Support Framework (CSF).
Also, in Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 the Commission has
laid down what information the Member States must keep on
individual operations.
As regards the actual progress of assistance measures on the
ground, the annual reports will provide information on the
physical indicators used.
3.36. Concerning the 1994 to 1999 period, since almost
all the commitment appropriations and 75 % of the payment
appropriations had been used by the end of 1999, the Com-
mission does not think it necessary to provide detailed figures
on this period. Annexed to the 2000 annual report covering
the 2000 to 2006 period are details of financial implemen-
tation by Objective, Member State and Funds, plus the bud-
get implementation for the year in commitment appropria-
tions and payment appropriations (Annex 3) for the three
Objectives, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance
(FIFG) outside Objective 1, the Community Initiatives, and
innovative measures and technical assistance.
(21) Seeparagraphs2.5, 4.1 and4.7of Special ReportNo16/98
and paragraphs 3.25 to 3.27 of the Annual Report con-
cerning the financial year 1999.
(22) Chapter 3, paragraph 2, of the Council Recommendation
of 12 March 2001 on the discharge to be granted to the
Commission in respect of the implementation of the gen-
eral budget of the European Union for the financial year
1999.
(23) The Commission’s 11th Annual Report on the Structural
Funds (1999) (COM (2000) 698 final of 13.11.2000).
(24) 12th Annual Report on the Structural Funds (2000),
(COM(2001) 539 final of 3.10.2001).
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3.37. As regards non-budgetary information, several
initiatives to improve the situation have been taken by
the Commission and the Member States in the 2000 to
2006 (25) programmes. However, some significant
improvements have still to be made. Consequently, at
the end of 2001 there was still little knowledge of the
actual progress of interventions on the ground, and the
nature and results of jointly-financed projects. The divid-
ing up of the management of structural measures
amongst various Commission departments meant that
it was still difficult to arrive at an understanding of the
overall situation. Moreover, the common database for
the Structural Funds, which is intended to make elec-
tronic exchanges of information possible, was not opera-
tional when the programmes were being negotiated. At
the end of 2001 some information in particular con-
cerning the IFOP, was still missing.
3.38. As regards the interventions themselves, the
Annual Reports submitted by the Member States are the
principal monitoring tool (26). Improvements have been
planned for the new2000 to 2006 period. These reports
must now be forwarded each year on 30 June. As they
are no longer linked to the closure of each annual
tranche this will, in principle, ensure that information
is provided on a regular basis. The situation during the
1999 programming year, for which the reports will not
be available till themoment of closure, in 2002 or 2003,
should no longer occur. However, it must be observed
that the majority of reports for 2000 were submitted
after the deadlines had expired.
3.39. The new legislation also requires that these
reports should compare, inter alia, the progress of the
main priorities and measures for each of the funds, with
their specific objectives. However, for the first full year
of implementation of the majority of the interventions,
the Commission reached agreement with the Member
States regarding the provision of a slimmed-down ver-
sion of these reports, including an exemption from the
requirement to quantify physical, result-based and
impact indicators.
3.37. The Commission would refer to its reply to para-
graph 3.35.As regards non-budgetary information, the 2000
report concentrated on a presentation of the implementation
of programming for 2000 to 2006.
Further information on the FIFG will be added in 2002.
3.38. The annual implementation reports for 2000 should
have been forwarded to the Commission by 30 June 2001 at
the latest. There were delays in sending these in some Member
States, due to the fact that, for most of the new programmes,
2000 was the year in which they were adopted and the moni-
toring committees set up, leading to a low rate of implemen-
tation on the ground.
3.39. It was not possible to assess the quality of this infor-
mation on the basis of the 2000 implementation reports
available in 2001. This is because these initial reports do not
always quantify the physical indicators, since they cover the
period in which the assistance measures were launched and the
management systems set up at national and regional level.
Although eligibility of expenditure is retroactive to the date
the plans are submitted, the late adoption of the assistance
measures and the programming complements defining the
indicators made it difficult for the managing authorities to
collect physical data in 2000. The 2001 annual reports
should rectify this.
(25) In this connection, the Commission has published lists of
specimen indicators, divided up by area of intervention. It
has also defined the nature of the information to be made
available to it and has created computerised systems for
exchanging data. The Member States have started to
develop new computer systems to improve intervention
management and to meet the new legislative require-
ments.
(26) Article 37 of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999.
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Conclusions and recommendations
3.40. Contrary to its objective, the programming of
the 2000 to 2006 period has not been characterised by
swifter and simpler procedures than in the past. Con-
siderable delays were noted at all levels.
3.41. This situation is explained in general by persis-
tent uncertainty about the responsibilities of the Com-
mission and the Member States and by legislation which
is still complex in terms of the programming, manage-
ment and booking of expenditure (see paragraphs 3.30
to 3.34). The Court therefore recommends that the nec-
essary measures should be taken so as to prepare in due
course an appropriate framework for future pro-
grammes, in particular in the context of the future
enlargement.
3.42. Although the budgetary data do not make it
possible to assess the actual situation on the ground,
the question may nevertheless be asked as to whether
the low budgetary implementation which has been the
case for three years now is indicative of delays in imple-
mentation. However, reliable information on the
progress of interventions is still unavailable (see para-
graphs 3.35 to 3.39).
3.43. The Court reiterates the requirement for up-to-
date information on interventions on the ground and
for an overall vision of the management of the struc-
tural measures. To this end, the monitoring resources
for which the regulations already provide should be
employed. The Commission would thus also be able to
improve on the information provided in the documents
on budgetary implementation (see paragraphs 3.16 to
3.19).
3.44. The fact that problems identified by the checks
are still unresolved at the time of closure several years
later is one of the reasons for the delay in settling pay-
ments (see paragraph 3.28).
3.40. The Commission would refer to its replies to the
Court’s observations in paragraphs 3.30 to 3.34.
3.41. In addition to its replies to paragraphs 3.30 to 3.34,
the Commission refers to Regulation (EC) No 438/2001,
which clarifies the requirements to be met by management
and control systems.
On the Commission’s initiative, the simplification of future
programming procedures is currently under review (see also
the reply to paragraph 3.34). The Commission hopes that the
timetable for adoption of the texts by the European Parlia-
ment and the Council will allow the programmes to be negoti-
ated before the beginning of the period in which they are
scheduled to be implemented. The pre-accession instruments
are currently preparing the accession countries for program-
ming and managing assistance under the Structural Funds
and Cohesion Fund.
3.42. The Commission would refer to its replies to para-
graphs 3.30 to 3.34. The low rate of payments in 2000 and
2001 for assistance measures covered by the 2000 to 2006
period is due mainly to their late start. For the programmes
for which commitments were made in 2000, the Commission
will have exact information on the implementation rate at the
beginning of 2003, after the rule of automatic decommit-
ment in year n + 2 is applied for the first time.
3.43. The Commission would refer to themonitoring instru-
ments mentioned in its replies to paragraphs 3.35 to 3.39.
3.44 and 3.45. Clearly measurable progress was made on
the closure of files relating to periods prior to 1994. The
Commission has assigned the major resources required for this
task (see reply to paragraphs 3.27 and 3.28).
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3.45. The Commission should take the necessarymea-
sures in due course in the light of its own findings and
of those of the Court. This would obviate the need to
resolve problems likely to entail protracted discussions
with the Member States and would also make it pos-
sible, where appropriate, to provide all of the Member
States with useful information.
SPECIFIC APPRAISAL IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
Introduction
3.46. In 2001 the Court continued its evaluation of
the procedures for the closure of structural measures
assistance and of the Member States’ control systems
for assistance from the period 1994 to 1999 (27). A
review of the management and control systems for the
period 2000 to 2006 (28) was initiated. The Court also
examined the legality and regularity of individual com-
mitment and payment transactions at the Commis-
sion (29). A selection (30) of interim payments (31) and
closures (32) was audited in the Member States.
(27) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 of 15 October
1997 establishing detailed arrangements for the imple-
mentation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 as
regards the financial control by Member States of opera-
tions co-financed by the Structural Funds (OJ L 290,
23.10.1997, p. 1).
(28) Commission Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 of 2 March
2001 laying down detailed rules for the implementation
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 as regards the
management and control systems for assistance granted
under the Structural Funds (OJ L 63, 3.3.2001, p. 21).
(29) The samples for the Commission comprised 91 commit-
ments and 146 payments of the year, as well as 213 earlier
commitments still outstanding at the end of 2001.
(30) The transactions examined on the spot comprise:
— 13 interim payments for the period 1994 to 1999 in
six Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Portugal,
Spain and the United Kingdom),
— six closed measures in five Member States (Denmark,
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain),
— 12 interim payments for the period 2000 to 2006 in
nineMember States (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain).
(31) Interim payments for the period 1994 to 1999, see para-
graph 3.59.
Interim payments for the period 2000 to 2006 see para-
graph 3.74.
(32) Closures: interventions for which the final balance has
already been the subject of a payment or a recovery order.
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3.47. The observations concerning the reliability of the
Community accounts and the reform of internal con-
trol at the Commission, as well as the general observa-
tions on the legality and regularity of the transactions,
are set out in Chapter 9 of this Report. The specific
observations on the systems examined and the legality
and regularity of the structural measure operations that
depend on these systems are set out below.
Periods before 1994
Closure procedures still inappropriate
3.48. The closure procedures again applied in 2001
did not always allow reasonable assurance of the legal-
ity and regularity of the expenditure presented for any
given form of assistance. The procedures for examining
final payment requests still took the form of inter-
departmental consultations, and respective responsibili-
ties had not been amended since the previous period.
The primary aim of these procedures is to ascertain
whether anomalies detected during any previous on-the-
spot checks have been resolved. The follow-up of such
audit observations continued to rely on various data-
bases that had been set up without any coordination as
the unified database announced by the Commission
could not be operational before 2002 (33). As in the
past, the Commission did not subject the interventions
to be closed to random sampling or risk analysis in
order to carry out more thorough checks.
3.49. The Court’s audits of 15 interventions closed in
2001 (threeERDF, elevenESFandone EAGGF-Guidance)
demonstrated the real risk associated with the insuffi-
cency of specific checks and regular monitoring by the
Commission and confirmed previous observations on
this matter.
3.48. The aim of the Commission is to have reasonable
assurance at closure with regard to the expenditure declared for
co-financing, and it has worked to establish procedures which
will achieve this objective for the closure of the 1994 to 1999
programmes which will take place from 2002 onward. It is
harder to attain the same level of assurance for the pre-1994
programmes because the legal requirements on the Member
States were less rigorous and no independent declaration of
validity was required. The Commission considers nevertheless
that it would have been inappropriate to modify the alloca-
tion of responsibilities for closure. It is correct that there were
few on-the-spot controls of pre-1994 programmes in 2001.
In fixing priorities for its audit activities, the Commission has
focused its efforts in particular on the preparation for closure
of the 1994 to 1999 programming period (thus taking
account of comments made by the Court concerning the need
for assessment of the application of Regulation (EC)
No 2064/97 in the annual report concerning the financial
year 2000 paragraphs 3.47 and 3.56) and on the systems
put in place for management and control for the 2000 to
2006 programming period. The new application (Sysaudit)
for planning and follow-up of Commission audits for the
Structural Funds is currently at the test stage and will be in
use shortly.
3.49. Follow-up of many of the cases has been complicated
by the particular circumstances of the dossiers.
(33) See Annual Report 2000, Commission’s reply to para-
graph 3.70.
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3.50. This insufficiency in terms ofmonitoring is illus-
trated by the examination of 11 ESF files (Portugal) most
of which had been suspended for a long time on grounds
of a presumed irregularity (Article 7 of Decision
83/673/EEC of 22 December 1983). However, in nine
cases all the information required for closure of the
measures and, more specifically, cancellation of the
unused amount, had already been available to the Mem-
ber State or the Commission one or two years previ-
ously. In the case concerning the EAGGF-Guidance (34),
closure took place three years after the information
needed had been received by the Commission, in spite
of a decision of May 1998 ordering the closure of the
OP with immediate effect.
3.51. The checks carried out by the Commissionwhile
programmes are in progress are not systematically
exploited. In the same EAGGF-Guidance case the Com-
mission carried out an audit on the spot in 1996, but it
neither prepared a mission report nor sent any conclu-
sions to the Member State. For one ERDF SPD (35)
on-the-spot audit by the Commission in 1995, only part
of the findings was forwarded to the Member State in
1997. In both these cases the absence of any analysis of
the findings or, where relevant, of the Member State’s
comments (ERDF SPD), made it impossible for them to
be taken into account in the calculation of the final con-
tribution from the Funds.
3.50. In the ESF cases, the delays in processing highlighted
by the Court result from the following circumstances:
— major timelags have been observed between completion of
the procedures and notification of this fact to the Com-
mission by the relevant national authorities,
— the consultations which must take place before modifica-
tion of certain decisions on participation in Community
funds, as a result of findings of investigations communi-
cated to the Commission, were held up by the complexity
of the cases involving a large number of bodies (entities)
or by the fact that the same entity was involved in sepa-
rate cases.
The closure of the operational programme relating to EAGGF-
Guidance took place after the Commission had examined the
information necessary to calculate the exact amount of finan-
cial corrections regarding all programmes managed by the
same administration.
3.51. TheCommission agrees that for the EAGGF-Guidance
case no formal mission report had been drafted. This case
should be considered an isolated one.
For the ERDF SPD mentioned, all the observations consid-
ered relevant, following consultations with the various depart-
ments, were forwarded to the French authorities.
The Commission deducted from the amounts declared by the
French authorities all expenditure found not to be eligible as
a result of the audit concerned.
The audit file contained no traces of an analysis of the Mem-
ber State’s replies. The Commission will take steps to improve
documentation on audit follow-up in future.
(34) Regional OP 92. DE.06.016 Saxony.
(35) SPD Objective 1 Guyana 1990 to 1993.
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3.52. Expenditure declarations and progress
reports (36) do not always contain sufficient informa-
tion. For the EAGGF-Guidance OP, as a final report, the
regional authorities only submitted a table summaris-
ing the payments made to recipients. In the case of the
ERDF, the progress reports did not always show clearly
the amounts actually paid to final beneficiaries. In the
case of the ERDF SPD already mentioned the Commis-
sion cleared the balance without checking whether, in
the case in point, the modulation of the aid rates led to
over-funding in the Member State’s favour. Although it
is not formally required by the regulations, these reports
should also contain more information, such as details
of checks carried out, to provide assurance on the legal-
ity and regularity of the expenditure declared.
Automatic cancellation rarely applied
3.53. At the end of 2001 there were still 549 files
open, representing more than 532,5 million euro of
uncleared commitments (i.e. 119 ERDF commitments
totalling 377,1 million euro, 380 ESF to a total of
117,3 million euro, 34 EAGGF-Guidance to a total of
31,4 million euro, 16 FIFG to a total of 6,7 million euro).
3.54. Regulation (EC) No 1260/99 provided for the
automatic decommitment, by 30 September 2001 at
the latest, of the sums corresponding to any interven-
tion approved before 1994 in respect of which no appli-
cation for final payment had been received by 31 March
2001 (excluding operations or programmes that have
been suspended because of legal proceedings). The Com-
mission had undertaken only four automatic decom-
mitments.
3.52. Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 does not
specify the precise information which has to be contained in
the reports on implementation, but for the final reports for the
1994 to 1999 period, the Commission has established a
guidance document to ensure that the necessary information
will be included. In addition, the guidelines on the closure of
the 1994-99 programmes specifically require information on
the amounts actually transferred to final beneficiaries. Finally,
under Article 8 of Regulation (EC No 2064/97, informa-
tion on the checks carried out will have to be given as part of
the closure statements. The final report for the operational
programme relating to EAGGF-Guidance has been submit-
ted by the Member State according to Article 2 and Annex II
of Regulation (EC) No 1844/94 of 27 July 1994, specify-
ing detailed rules for operational programmes under Regula-
tion (EEC) No 866/90. The Commission considers that the
report has been presented in accordance with the conditions of
the applicable legislation.
As regards the comment on the balance paid to the Member
State for the ERDF SPD, it was calculated on the basis of the
internal rules applied to this period.
3.53 to 3.55. The Commission is endeavouring to close
the files for periods before 1994 as quickly as possible, bear-
ing in mind specific difficulties in a majority of cases, such as
pending court proceedings or suspensions on account of a pre-
sumed irregularity.
(36) Required by Article 25(1) of Council Regulation (EEC)
No 4253/88.
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3.55. The Court examined a sample of 140 commit-
ments that were still open at the end of 2001 and found
that 24 files should have been decommitted automati-
cally; in addition, the Commission was unable to pro-
vide seven files (four ERDF and three ESF). On that basis,
the Court estimates that 11 % of the 532,5 million euro
of commitments still open at 31 December should have
been decommitted automatically as at 30 September
2001 (see paragraph 9.34).
Intervention for the period 1994 to 1999
Progress still to be made in control arrangements
3.56. Special Report No 10/2001 (37) and the 2000
DAS (38) discussed the implementation of Regulation
(EC) No 2064/97 (39). In spite of the Commission’s and
theMember States’ efforts, themain points that emerged
were:
3.55. The cases of automatic decommitment identified by
the Court for the ERDF comprise four files that were not pro-
vided and five other files. Of the four files not provided, for
which the commitments outstanding add up to EUR 4.2 mil-
lion, two relate to technical assistance contracts, one to an
integrated Mediterranean programme and one to a transi-
tional support project. For three of the five files provided, the
Member States had indeed failed to apply for final payment
before 31 March 2001 and did not refer to cases of suspen-
sion for legal reasons. The Commission is in the process of
analysing the documents provided subsequently by the Mem-
ber States with a view to closure in accordance with the leg-
islation. As regards the other two files, the Commission con-
siders that the requests for final payment from the Member
States were received before 31 March 2001, even though in
one case the request was not accompanied by the final report
and in the other it was subsequently amended by the Member
State. Automatic decommitment can therefore not be applied.
As regards the ESF, the six cases identified by the Court are
being resolved.
For one of the two commitments of DG FISH identified by the
Court, the payment request reached the Commission before
31 March 2001. In the other case, in view of the exchange of
correspondence between the recipient and the Commission
with a view to determining the amount to be paid, the Com-
mission decided not to decommit the balance at 30 September
2001.
3.56. The Commission would point out that from the adop-
tion of the Regulation onward, it has provided detailed guid-
ance on its key requirements, most notably in the Structural
Funds Audit Manual, and has responded systematically
to questions of interpretation. Whilst the implementation
(37) Special Report No 10/2001 on the financial control of
the Structural Funds–Regulations (EC) No 2064/97 and
(EC) No 1681/94 of the Commission.
(38) Annual Report 2000, paragraph 3.44 to 3.56.
(39) Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 provides that Member States
are to verify the effectiveness of the management and
control systems in place and verify selectively, on the basis
of risk analysis, expenditure declarations made at the
various levels concerned The on-the-spot controls, which
are carried out before the closure of each form of assis-
tance, must cover at least 5 % of the total eligible expen-
diture and a representative sample of the projects or
actions approved.
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(a) the Commission’s evaluation of Member States’
implementation of the Regulation was limited;
(b) problems of interpretation and the absence of clear
guidelines from the Commission, both of which are
necessary for effective control of interventions;
(c) untimely and fragmented implementation by the
Member States.
3.57. The audits carried out by the Court as part of
the 2001 DAS in respect of 10 interventions spread
over six Member States (Germany, Spain, France, Italy,
Portugal and the United Kingdom) showed that the
implementation of Regulation (EC) 2064/97 in the
Member States had started to improve, though substan-
tial progress was still necessary. The Commission car-
ried out a series of on-the-spot visits, mostly for the
ERDF. The results of these checks, which confirmed the
Court’s findings, were notified to the Member States
concerned, along with recommendations. They were set
out in a working document, submitted in September
2001. One of the aims of the document was to clarify
which years should be audited, how the samples should
be selected, definition of the expenditure audited, and
the content of reports. In addition, DG REGIO coordi-
nated the various Commission departments as regards
the Regulation, even if some differences existed in the
approach to the audits.
of the Regulation has been seriously delayed in a small num-
ber of Member States, and there are instances of incorrect
application of certain provisions, many Member States have
made serious and effective efforts to establish control systems
which comply with the principal provisions laid down. Whilst
the assessment of the application of the Regulation up to
2000 was carried out mainly on the basis of the reports pro-
vided by the Member States and in annual coordination meet-
ings, the Commission has subsequently carried out detailed
systems audits in all the Member States.
3.57. All the Structural Funds services have focused their
audit efforts on the national systems required under Regula-
tion (EC) No 2064/97. The work has been coordinated by
DG REGIO with the other Structural Funds services through-
out the year, and the methodology established for the audit
enquiry for the ERDF has been largely followed by the other
services. For the ERDF, 25 audit missions were carried out;
for the ESF, 11; for EAGGF Guidance, 14 during the second
semester and 13 further missions on the same subject during
the first semester 2002; and for FIFG, five audit missions
were carried out. The results of these audits together with rec-
ommendations were set out in reports communicated to the
Member States. In some cases, letters were also sent to Mem-
ber States to notify them immediately of urgent findings. In
many cases the weaknesses identified were similar to those
previously found by the Court. On the basis of interim find-
ings from the audit enquiry, an information note covering 11
different questions relating to the application of Regulation
(EC) No 2064/97 was presented in September 2001 to the
Committee for theDevelopment andConversion of theRegions,
and to the other Structural Funds Committees. From the
follow-up of its audit work the Commission has established
that Member States have made significant efforts to follow
recommendations and to correct errors in the application of
the Regulation where they have occurred. This is for example
the case, as regards ERDF, for certain regions of two Member
States referred to by the Court (Italy and Germany).
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3.58. The impact of these initiatives still has to be
determined, especially as regards the resolution of the
significant problems that remain (e.g. the definition of
audited expenditure, composition of samples, risk analy-
sis, and the low coverage of the expenditure for years
1994 to 1997). If these weaknesses are not corrected
rapidly there is a risk of delays arising and of errors not
being detected when interventions are finally closed,
which should be from mid-2002 onwards.
Persistent errors in interim payments
3.59. The Court’s audits of 13 payments in the same
six Member States (see paragraph 3.57) indicated the
persistence of errors (nine of the payments contained
errors) in the declarations that give rise to interim pay-
ments for the 1994 to 1999 measures. For the main
part the substantial errors of legality/regularity directly
affecting the totals for the underlying transactions are at
final beneficiary level. The most frequent errors affect-
ing the eligibility of expenditure are of the same kind as
those found previously, namely, actions unrelated to the
programme concerned (40), revenue generated by
projects not included in the accounts (41), estimated
amounts not actually incurred (42), failure to comply
with a job-creation clause (43) and expenditure without
supporting documents (44).
3.60. The errors of a formal nature are also similar to
those of previous years, namely, at Commission level,
non-observance of the two month deadline for making
payment following receipt of an acceptable application,
and at beneficiary level, the submission of lump-sum
expenditure without adequate supporting docu-
ments (45), inadequate information on the purchase price
of a plot of land (46) and incomplete documentation in
respect of expenditure (47).
3.58. The results of the Commission’s audit activity are
already apparent, and additional control work has been car-
ried out in Member States as a result of recommendations
made in order to ensure that there will be an adequate basis
for closure and in particular for the closure statement by the
independent body under Article 8 of the Regulation. Follow-
ing reception of the request for closure, the Commission will
verify that material shortcomings identified in its audit work
have been satisfactorily dealt with prior to payment of the
final balance.
3.59. Given the date when the Commission received the
information from the Court on the individual cases, it has not
been able to obtain a full set of replies from the Member
States. It will analyse all the replies and undertakes to make
any necessary corrections.
For one of the cases cited, the Member State and the Com-
mission do not agree with the Court that the job-creation
clause was not complied with, since it did not apply to the
project concerned, which had exceptionally moved from the
previous programming period to the 1997 to 1999 period,
with a specific allocation of funds. All the other projects under
the measure audited by the Court complied with the job-
creation clause.
3.60. The Commission recognises that some delays in pay-
ments led to the two-month deadline being exceeded. The rea-
son for this was, in general, the Commission departments’
exceptional workload during the period of overlap between the
closure of the 1994 to 1999 period and the start of the 2000
to 2006 period.
The Commission carried out an audit of the project concern-
ing which the Court identified a lack of information on the
purchase of a plot of land. The Court’s comments will be fol-
lowed up in the context of this audit.
The Member States’ replies in respect of the other formal
errors listed by the Court will be analysed as soon as they are
received.
(40) SPD Objective 2 Industrial South Wales 1997 to 1999,
OP Objective 2 Cataluña 1997 to 1999.
(41) SPD Objective 2 Greater Manchester 1997 to 1999, OP
Objective 1 Infrastrutture Aeroportuali 1996 to 1999, OP
Objective 2 Cataluña 1997 to 1999.
(42) SPD Objective 2 North Rhine-Westfalia 1997 to 1999, OP
Objective 1 Infrastrutture Aeroportuali 1996 to 1999,
SPD Objective 5b Poitou-Charentes 1994 to 1999.
(43) SPD Objective 2 Greater Manchester 1997 to 1999.
(44) OP Objective 2 Cataluña 1997 to 1999, SPD Objective 2
Industrial South Wales 1997 to 1999.
(45) SPD Objective 2 Northern Ireland 1997 to 1999.
(46) CF Portugal, Setúbal, water treatment.
(47) OP Objective 1 Infrastrutture Aeroportuali 1996 to 1999.
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3.61. The persistence of the anomalies found in dec-
larations in support of interim payment requests dem-
onstrates that there is still a significant risk of their
affecting the Community budget, due either to prema-
ture payment of advances or, in view of the weakness
of the checks made at the closure, payment of excessive
final payments (48).
Overpayments on closure (Objective 2 1994 to 1996 and
Cohesion Fund)
3.62. In 2001 the Commission finally closed 53 1994
to 1996 Objective 2 interventions (16 ERDF and 37
ESF). At the end of 2001 there were still 53 interven-
tions open, representing 575 million euro of commit-
ments outstanding (including 44 ERDF for a total of
540 million euro and nine ESF for a total of 35 million
euro). The closure procedures applied to 1994 to 1996
Objective 2 measures and Cohesion Fund projects are
substantially identical to those for the preceding period.
The observations in paragraph 3.48 thus apply equally
to this category.
3.61. With regard to interim payments, as the Commission
has previously indicated, any impact on the Community bud-
get would be limited and transitory because the effect would
be on the timing of the advance payment and not on the
amount, and because any anomaly can be rectified at final
closure.
For the 1994 to 1999 period, the Member States are required
prior to closure to take steps to ensure that all non-eligible
expenditure has been excluded, and to provide a declaration
by an independent body to this effect.
For the closure of the programmes which will take place from
2002 onward, the Commission has put in place procedures
intended to give reasonable assurance that non-eligible expen-
diture will not receive co-financing. In addition, closure audits
will be carried out on a selection of programmes to check on
the reliability of the information provided by the Member
State at closure, and to identify and exclude all irregular
expenditure.
3.62. For the ERDF, the Commission carried out closure
audits on a selection of Objective 2 programmes for the 1994
to 1996 period during the first half of 2002. The objective
of the audits is to verify the accuracy of the expenditure dec-
larations submitted by the national authorities and to make
financial corrections where necessary. In the first instance, six
programmes have been audited and the conclusions are being
established. The Commission will then determine whether the
scope of the audit work should be extended.
(48) As the Court has pointed out in its previous reports in
support of the Statement of Assurance, errors detected in
expenditure declarations do not in themselves necessar-
ily affect the payments made by the Commission. If the
declared expenditure exceeds the required threshold, the
level of eligible expenditure after the errors have been
deducted may still justify payment of the advance or of
the balance of the instalment concerned.
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3.63. Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 as amended by
Regulation (EC) No 2406/98 (49) in fact exempts the
1994 to 1996 interventions from the closure statement
certifying that the prescribed checks have been carried
out. It does not, however, exempt them from applica-
tion of the minimum checking rate of 5 % of eligible
expenditure (the rate may be reduced for intervention
approved before the entry into force of the Regulation),
which applies to the whole of the 1994 to 1999 period.
The Commission nevertheless finally closed the 1994 to
1996 interventionswithout verifyingwhether the checks
had been carried out.
3.64. The Court carried out in-depth audits in four
Member States (Denmark, Spain, Ireland and Luxem-
bourg) at subprogramme level for three ERDF measures
and two of the Cohesion Fund projects. This work
showed that the prescribed checks for the ERDF (see
paragraph 3.63) had been very partially applied by the
Member States and in most cases the final declarations
of expenditure still contained significant errors which
affected the payments from the Community budget, in
line with previous years’ findings (50):
(a) in the case of the ERDF interventions ineligible
expenditure was identified amounting to 83 % (51),
9,3 % (52) and 19 % (53) of the declared expenditure,
resulting in overpayments by the Fund for the three
subprogrammes audited of 29,8, 0,4 and 1,5 mil-
lion euro respectively;
3.63. For programmes for which the commitment deadline
was 31 December 1996 or earlier, the Commission has not
systematically required, as a precondition of closure, an assur-
ance on the controls carried out by the national authorities
either under Article 23 of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 or
under Regulation (EC) No 2064/97, given that Article 8 of
Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 requiring a closure statement
by an independent body is not applicable. Nevertheless, infor-
mation on controls is included in the final implementation
reports for the 1994 to 1999 period. The audits currently
being carried out on a sample of Objective 2 1994 to 1996
programmes will provide a basis for determining whether the
controls effected by the Member States were adequate.
3.64.
(a) For the first programme referred to by the Court, the
Commission has also carried out a closure audit and
identified certain additional irregularities, and is already
in contact with the Member State concerned in relation
to the correction of certain matters identified by the Court,
and will now also follow up its own audit findings. How-
ever, there are other observations of the Court that still
require information from the Member State before the
Commission can confirm the percentage of the error found
by the Court.
For the two other programmes referred to by the Court,
the Member States concerned have partly contested the
observations of the Court, and therefore the percentage of
error may be reduced. The Commission will carry out a
case-by-case examination of the answers of the Member
States and will make the necessary recoveries.
(49) OJ L 298, 7.11.1998, p. 15.
(50) See Annual Reports concerning the financial years 1997
(paragraph 8.80), 1998 (paragraphs 3.29 and 3.30), 1999
(paragraphs 3.49 to 3.52) and 2000 (paragraph 3.39).
(51) OP Objective 2 Madrid 1994 to 1996: university con-
struction and equipment expenditure ineligible in the
context of a subprogramme in support of research.
(52) SPD Objective 2 Luxembourg 1994 to 1996: projects car-
ried out outside the eligibility period, expenditure of an
ineligible nature, non-recovery of undue assistance.
(53) SPD Objective 2 Nordjylland DK 1994 to 1996: ineligible
expenditure per se, expenditure on the construction of
schools which was ineligible within the framework of
Objective 2 and a project which was not eligible within
the framework of the programme.
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(b) for the Cohesion Fund projects, ineligible expendi-
ture accounted for 1,7 % (54) and 2,6 % (55) of the
declared amounts; in the first case this led to over-
payment by the Fund of 7,7 million euro for the
entire project; in the second case a declaration of
11,4 % more than the minimum had no effect on
the amount paid.
Interventions for the period 2000 to 2006
Implementation of control arrangements still limited
Introduction
3.65. Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 specifies the obli-
gations of managing authorities (56), paying authori-
ties (57) and intermediate bodies (58) as regards the defi-
nition and separation of functions within them, the
effectiveness of the systems for verifying the reality of
expenditure and the existence of an audit trail. It also
provides for procedures for certifying expenditure and
lays down the extent of the checks to be carried out by
Member States. As with Regulation (EC) No 2064/97,
on-the-spot checks must cover at least 5 % of the total
eligible expenditure spread over the entire period and
must make it possible to verify the effectiveness of the
management and control systems, and to examine on
the basis of a risk analysis expenditure declarations
made at the various levels concerned. The Court
(b) The first case cited by the Court relates to a situation of
apparent infringement of the Community public procure-
ment legislation, which is contested by the Member State.
The Commission will carry out a detailed analysis of this
case to determine whether the Member State’s arguments
are valid.
In the second case, the Court’s comments have been only
partially accepted by the Member State. The Commis-
sion will follow up the case, but recovery will not be nec-
essary owing to the over-declaration mentioned.
(54) CF Spain Autopista Rias Baixas: non-compliance with
directives concerning public procurement.
(55) CF Ireland N4 Collooney/Sligo: expenditure outside the
eligible period, failure to take account of the sale of a plot
of land and inclusion of additional work.
(56) Managing authority: authority or body designated by the
Member State to manage assistance; responsible for the
efficiency and regularity of the management.
(57) Paying authority: authority or body designated by the
Member States for the purposes of drawing up and sub-
mitting payment applications and receiving payments
from the Commission.
(58) Intermediary body: any body which acts on behalf of a
managing authority or a paying authority or which car-
ries out tasks on their behalf.
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verified the implementation of Regulation (EC)
No 438/2001 for 12 interventions in nine Member
States (59).
The Commission’s role
3.66. In order to satisfy itself that the management
and control systems meet the standards imposed by the
regulations, the Commission is required to examine the
functioning of the systems at regular intervals. For that,
on-site visits are necessary. However, a small number of
visits were made in 2001 by DG REGIO and PÊCHE,
one wasmade by DG EMPLOI and DGAGRImade none
at all. As a result the Commission did not have adequate
assurance in 2001 regarding the reliability of these sys-
tems.
3.66. Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 entered into force in
March 2001. Under Article 5, a description of the systems
should have been communicated by the end of June 2001, but
most Member States submitted descriptions only during the
fourth quarter of 2001.
The main reason why not more of the new programmes have
been audited on the spot is the allocation of resources to the
other priority for audit work in 2001/2002, namely Member
States’ preparations for closure of the 1994 to 1999 pro-
grammes. On-the-spot audits of the systems put in place for
the current programmes will be continued in future years. In
the meantime all the systems are being desk-checked using the
descriptions submitted under Article 5 of Regulation (EC)
No 438/2001 and any concerns will be followed up. In gen-
eral, the Commission is encouraged by results of the on-the-
spot and the desk checks of new systems, indicating that the
more stringent requirements laid down and the increased audit
activity are leading to an improvement in standards.
DG REGIO carried out 29 preventive audits in 2001 in rela-
tion to the management and control systems established by
Member States under Regulation (EC) No 438/2001. By
mid-2002 DG REGIO had checked on-the-spot 31 % of the
management and control systems for 2000 to 2006 Objec-
tive 1 and 2 programmes.
In 2001, four programmes were audited by DG FISH, with
four further programmes audited in the first half of 2002.
This is equivalent to 50 % of exclusively FIFG programmes
and 16 % of all programmes with FIFG participation.
DG EMPL carried out one systems-audit for the new period
(Denmark) in (December) 2001. By the end of 2002 it plans
to have covered 34 % of 2000 to 2006 Objective 3 pro-
grammes and 17 % of all programmes with ESF participa-
tion for this period. The planned numberof preventive audits
(59) Belgium ESF, Germany ERDF and ESF, Greece ERDF and
EAGGF-Guidance, Spain FIFG, Finland ERDF, France ESF,
Italy ESF, Austria ESF and Portugal ERDF and ESF.
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Application of the Regulation by the Member States
The cont ro l sys t ems of the managing author i t i e s and inte r-
med ia t e bod i e s
3.67. In some Member States (60) weaknesses, such as
the absence of checks on paid invoices or equivalent
documents, are present in the procedures for verifying
the reality and eligibility of expenditure. As a conse-
quence expenditure declarations are drawn up without
any check on whether the expenditure was actually
incurred (see paragraph 3.77).
3.68. In one Member State (61) the initial statements
of expenditure were presented even though no on-the-
spot check had been made. In two other Member
States (62) the managers’ reports did not always mention
on-site inspections. Lastly, in one Member State (63),
there was no audit trail, the declared expenditure cor-
responded to neither the payments made to the regional
authorities nor the payments from the latter to those
responsible for projects (see paragraph 3.77).
for 2001 by DG EMPL concerning a first evaluation of the
descriptions of management and control systems (Article 5 of
Regulation (EC) No 438/2001) had to be reduced mainly
because of missing descriptions or late transmission of descrip-
tions. As a result, only one preventive audit mission was car-
ried out in 2001. This type of mission will form a major part
of the controls in 2002.
In addition to the reasons mentioned above DG AGRI has
not yet been able to start auditing EAGGF-Guidance in the
new programmes due to the limited human resources avail-
able for the EAGGF-Guidance controls and the need to main-
tain an appropriate level of controls in other risk sectors. Its
intention is to ask for assistance from a private audit firm to
carry out this task.
3.67. The importance of monitoring of projects, on the
ground and thorough and timely checking of expenditure dec-
larations at source against invoices and other supporting
documents, has already been drawn to the attention of Mem-
ber States by the Commission in its audits as the key to ensur-
ing regular payments. Articles 4, 7 and 9 of Regulation (EC)
No 438/2001make clear the crucial importance of this work.
3.68. As a result of the activities of the Commission, all
programme authorities should now be in no doubt about the
requirements for on-the-spot checks (Article 10 of Regulation
(EC) No 438/2001), the recording of monitoring visits
(Article 4) and a sufficient audit trail (Article 7 and Annex I).
The Commission will continue its verification of the systems
of management and control and their functioning and will
take appropriate measures when deficiencies are detected.
Given the date when the Commission received the informa-
tion from the Court on the individual cases, it has not been
able to obtain a full set of replies from the Member States.
(60) Spain FIFG, Portugal ESF, Germany ERDF and ESF and
Finland ERDF.
(61) Portugal ERDF.
(62) Spain FIFG and Greece ERDF.
(63) France ESF.
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Pay ing author i t i e s
3.69. Some paying authorities (64) have not imple-
mented adequate procedures for satisfying themselves
that expenditure declarations contain only eligible
expenditure. Certificates of expenditure collate the data
recorded in the information systems by managing
authorities or intermediate bodies and the paying
authorities simply verify that it is consistent with the
partial certificates or declarations already forwarded by
the former (see paragraph 3.77).
3.70. In some cases, these paying authorities have
made provision for carrying out checks, but have not
yet established guidelines and check-lists for doing
so (65) or, the methodology has already been laid down,
but was not being applied in 2001 (66).
3.71. In two Member States (67), the intermediate bod-
ies act as paying authority for measures implemented in
the territory or activity sector for which they are respon-
sible, by making out partial certificates of expenditure.
In this case, the designated paying authority often has
only a limited knowledge of these bodies’ systems and
the possibilities of auditing their operations are limited.
In another Member State (63) the body that certifies
expenditure at the regional level does not have the req-
uisite independence in relation to the authoriser of the
payments.
Sample check s
3.72. At the end of 2001 the resources and proce-
dures needed for carrying out sample checks had not
been fully put in place in any of the nine Member States
visited and no checks had been carried out in relation
to the minimum of 5 % over the full period.
3.69. Before certifying declared expenditure to the Commis-
sion for payment of the Structural Fund contribution, the
paying authority must gain reasonable assurance of the accu-
racy, regularity and eligibility of the underlying claims. The
Commission audits have also detected some inadequacies in
the work of certain paying authorities. These have been fol-
lowed up and in some cases improvements have already taken
place. The Commission will maintain its efforts to ensure that
the certification process provides a reliable basis for making
interim payments in all Member States.
3.70. The Commission in its audits also identified delays in
certain cases in establishing operational control systems, and
has taken measures to remedy this.
3.71. In cases of allocation of certain functions of a paying
authority to intermediate bodies, the Commission has insisted
on formal agreements between intermediate bodies and the
paying authority governing procedures, systems and report-
ing. Where the issue of the independence of the certifying body
has arisen, the Commission has required an adequate separa-
tion of functions.
In the specific case in France referred to by the Court (footnote
63), the lack of independence of the body that certifies expen-
diture must be viewed in the light of the Community regula-
tions and the terms of the circular from the Prime Minister of
15 July 2002 on improving the arrangements for managing,
monitoring and auditing programmes part-financed by the
Structural Funds.
3.72. The provisions of Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 on
sample checks of expenditure are essentially the same as those
in Regulation (EC) No 2064/97, and in many Member
States the structures put in place for the earlier Regulation
will continue to operate for the new period. Because Member
States are having to ensure that all necessary controls have
been carried out to allow closure of the 1994 to 1999 pro-
grammes, it is the case that sample checks of operations for
the current programming period have been slow to start.
(64) Spain FIFG, Finland ERDF, France ESF, Greece ERDF and
EAGGF-Guidance and Portugal ERDF and ESF.
(65) Greece EAGGF-Guidance and ERDF.
(66) Portugal ERDF and ESF.
(67) Spain FIFG and Finland ERDF.
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Commitments: legal obligations not entered in the
accounts
3.73. As in 1999 and 2000 (68), but to a substantially
lesser extent, there were some decisions that had not
been the object of budgetary commitments (see para-
graph 9.13). The Court notes that the budgetary com-
mitment accompanies a legal commitment and is an
obligation imposed by Article 36 of the Financial Regu-
lation and may not be subordinate to technical consid-
erations. The Court also wishes to point out that the
carry-over of appropriations in order to cover these
decisions does not comply with the conditions defined
by Article 7(2) of the Financial Regulation which was
intended to cover the case of items which have been vir-
tually completed at 31 December, not for legal obliga-
tions that have already been entered into by that date.
Payments: ineligible expenditure
3.74. The payments effected in 2001 for the period
2000 to 2006 correspond, firstly, to the payment of the
7 % advance payment on the last interventions adopted
in 2001 and on the interventions for which decisions
were taken at the end of 2000 and which had not
received an advance, and secondly, to the first reim-
bursements of incurred expenditure, based on the expen-
diture declarations certified by the Member States.
3.75. Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 states that
interim payments shall be calculated at the level of mea-
sures contained in the financing plan for the interven-
tion. In the absence of any guidelines on the subject the
departments responsible for the management of the
various Funds applied different methods in 2001 when
the actual rate of co-financing applied by the Member
State did not coincide with the forecast rate. Some
applied the actual rate, others applied the forecast rate.
3.73. The Court points out that legal obligations were
entered into without there being a corresponding budgetary
commitment. This results from differing practices in the pro-
cedure for adopting programmes.
In these circumstances, it is right for this kind of commitment,
that has not yet been booked, to be included in off-balance-
sheet commitments.
Where certain legal obligations were not covered by budget-
ary commitments at the end of the financial year, the only
alternatives to carrying over the appropriations would have
been to leave the legal obligations without any corresponding
budgetary commitments, which would have been unaccept-
able, or to revise the financial perspective.
3.75. The Commission laid down the rules for calculating
interim payments in the spring of 2002, and more specifi-
cally, stipulated the need to comply with the rates per measure
set out in the financing plan for the intervention at each pay-
ment. However, these rules are currently under review.
(68) Annual Report 1999, paragraphs 3.41 and 8.17 and
Annual Report 2000, paragraphs 3.28 and 9.16.
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3.76. TheCourt checked interimpayments at the Com-
mission and in the Member States (see paragraph 3.46).
The checks showed that ineligible expenditure had been
submitted in some declarations. In view of the fact that
interim payments are reimbursed expenditure, ineligible
expenditure has a direct effect on the Community bud-
get, in proportion to the rate of co-financing applied.
3.77. In the framework of the 12 interventions audited
(see paragraph 3.65) the Court identified seven in which
there were errors of a type similar to that found in the
context of the previous period, namely: projects that
were wholly or partly ineligible (69), expenditure of an
ineligible nature (70), expenditure without supporting
documents or with insufficient supporting docu-
ments (71), over-stated general expenses (72), revenue not
included in the accounts (73), sums not yet incurred (74),
non-compliance with public procurement obliga-
tions (70).
3.78. In the case of one Spanish ERDF OP, the Com-
mission, having found a discrepancy between the total
given in the expenditure declaration for a measure and
that stated in the subsequent implementation report,
obtained confirmation from the national authorities
that the lower figure shown in the report was correct,
as the main projects in the measure had been ruled
ineligible. The Commission nevertheless calculated the
amount for payment on the basis of the declaration and
accordingly made an undue payment of 1,4 million
euro.
3.76. The paying authority designated by theMember State
must satisfy itself that the expenditure it certifies to the Com-
mission is eligible. In the specific instances identified by the
Court, the Commission will take the necessary action to recover
the amounts it considers to be ineligible. As part of its audit
activities (see reply to paragraph 3.66), the Commission is
currently verifying that paying authorities are functioning
effectively, especially as regards certification of expenditure,
and are complying with Regulation (EC) No 438/2001. If
shortcomings are identified, the Commission will take appro-
priate action under Articles 38 and 39 of Regulation (EC)
No 1260/1999. It would point out that Regulation (EC)
No 438/2001 entered into force in March 2001, and that it
did not necessarily have an obvious impact on all the expen-
diture presented by the Member States.
3.77. The Commission has not yet completed the examina-
tion of the replies received from the Member States, but notes
that, in the cases mentioned by the Court, some of its com-
ments have not been accepted by the Member States.
The situations identified by the Court indicate that shortcom-
ings persist in the Member States’ management and control
systems. The Commission is in the process of completing its
first audits of the systems put in place by the Member States
pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 438/2001, in order to
ensure that the main components required are reliable.
3.78. The amount paid in excess was deducted from the
payment made to the Member State in April 2002. The
Commission reminded the Member State of the need to ensure
consistency between the financial data in the annual report
and the declarations of expenditure.
(69) SPD ERDF Objective 2 Lower Saxony and SPD FIFG non-
Objective 1 Spain.
(70) OP ERDF Objective 1 Competitiveness Greece.
(71) SPD ERDF Objective 2 Lower Saxony, OP ERDF Objec-
tive 1 Algarve and SPD ESF Objective 3 France.
(72) OP ESFObjective 1 Educaçao Portugal and SPDESFObjec-
tive 3 France.
(73) SPD ESF Objective 3 France.
(74) SPD ERDF Objective 2 Lower Saxony and SPD ERDF
Objective 2 Southern Finland.
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Conclusions and recommendations
3.79. Interventions in the periods before 1994 were
not governed by effective management and control sys-
tems, whether at the Commission or in the Member
States. The closure procedures for these interventions
were still unchanged in 2001. As a consequence the
Commission does not have sufficiently reliable infor-
mation. Furthermore it does not make up for this defi-
ciency by means of its own controls in order to satisfy
itself of the legality and regularity of the expenditure
presented when these interventions are finally closed
(see paragraphs 3.48 to 3.52).
3.80. The interim payments for the period 1994 to
1999 are still affected by the persistence of errors in the
expenditure declarationspresentedby theMember States
(see paragraphs 3.59 to 3.61). This situation is reflected
in the closure of the 1994 to 1996 Objective 2 interven-
tions, where the Court regularly finds high levels of
ineligible expenditure. In the absence of adequate con-
trols on the part of the Member States and the Com-
mission, these anomalies result in undue payments from
Community funds (see paragraphs 3.62 to 3.64).
3.81. The checkswhich theMember States are required
to perform before the completion of each form of inter-
vention from the period 1994 to 1999 are an essential
component in the reliability of their systems and the
regularity of requests for payments. Despite some
improvements which are intended to bring about uni-
form application of the rules, the control systems still
do not ensure that the checks, on which final declara-
tions of expenditure rely, are rigorous and reliable
enough. In view of the closures that will occur from
2002 onwards the Commission should therefore rein-
force its initiatives, including improving the coordina-
tion of the work of the departments that are respon-
sible for the different structural measures (see
paragraphs 3.56 to 3.58).
3.79. The legal framework for the management and control
of the pre-1994 programmes was not as rigorous as that
which is applicable for programmes which will be closed from
2002 onward. The Commission has endeavoured, given these
limitations, to apply procedures at closure which ensure that
irregularities identified have been satisfactorily dealt with. It
has not carried out a full audit enquiry relating to the closure
of the pre-1994 programmes, because it has given priority to
the preparation for the closure of the much more significant
1994 to 1999 programmes and the review of the systems for
the financial management and control of the 2000 to 2006
programming period.
3.80. For Objective 2 1994 to 1996 programmes, the
Commission is auditing a sample of closed programmes and
will draw the appropriate conclusions. For the closure of all
other programmes of the 1994 to 1999 period, for which
there is a requirement of a closure statement by an indepen-
dent body, the Commission has established procedures at clo-
sure to give a reasonable assurance that only regular expen-
diture is taken into account for determination of co-financing.
In addition a selection of closed programmes will be audited
to verify the reliability of the information based on which the
closure took place and to eliminate any irregular expenditure
identified by way of recovery of undue amounts paid to Mem-
ber States.
3.81. The Commission undertook a very substantial pro-
gramme of audit activity in 2001 to obtain assurance with
regard to the implementation of Regulation (EC)No 2064/97
by the Member States. As a result of the detailed recommen-
dations communicated to the bodies concerned, significant
efforts have been made by Member States to complete the nec-
essary control work in line with the requirements of the Regu-
lation prior to closure. The Commission will ensure that all
material shortcomings are adequately dealt with prior to clo-
sure. It will also maintain and develop the effective coordina-
tion between the Structural Funds services which has been
operating in relation to preparations for closure.
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3.82. The regulatory management and control
arrangements for the 2000 to 2006 period have been
strengthened. However, their implementation is already
marred by delay, the structures are not yet all opera-
tional and independent auditing of the operations
effected has not begun (see paragraphs 3.67 to 3.72).
Among the interim payments the Court detected the
presence of ineligible expenditure of the same types as
for previous periods, which suggests that some of those
involved are not sufficiently conversant with the rules
applicable (see paragraphs 3.74 to 3.78). The Commis-
sion should therefore try to complete its checks in the
Member States as soon as possible and should ensure
that the control standards and rules of eligibility, as well
as the sanctions to be imposed for non-compliance, are
circulated and understood at every level (see para-
graph 3.66).
FOLLOW-UP OF PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS
Special Report No 18/98 on Community measures to
encourage the creation of joint enterprises in the fisher-
ies sector
Introduction
3.83. The joint enterprises schemewas created in 1990
by the Council so as to help reduce the size of the Com-
munity fishing fleet by redeploying fishing vessels in
the waters of non-member States.
3.84. The Court’s main observations concerned the
shortcomings of the monitoring and inspection proce-
dures and the existence of anomalies in several projects
which could give rise to recoveries. The Council, in its
recommendation on the discharge for the financial year
1997, emphasised the need for stricter management and
asked for all amounts paid in error to be recovered.
New monitoring and inspection procedures
3.85. In its replies to the Court’s report, the Commis-
sion stated that it had taken or was going to take mea-
sures to improve the ‘fleet’ file, to develop an I. T. tool
for monitoring aid for each vessel and to step up checks.
3.82. Despite the delay in establishing the systems to meet
the higher standards, Member States have now made signifi-
cant efforts to put the necessary structures in place and are
better informed of the requirements and better able to meet
them than before. In its system audits and desk checks of sys-
tem descriptions the Commission is focusing on the controls
necessary to ensure accurate, regular and eligible expenditure
from the bottom up. It will continue auditing these systems
in future years, giving priority to programmes not yet covered
and to the Cohesion Fund, for which similar requirements
have now been laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1386/2002
of 29 July 2002.
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A restructured but still unreliable ‘fleet’ file
3.86. Major changes have been made to the system for
managing the ‘fleet’ file in terms not only of the com-
puter application but also of the procedure for record-
ing the information forwarded by the Member States.
Since February 2001, this system has thus provided the
Member States in real time with the data concerning
them and has enabled them to make the necessary
changes in the event of divergences from their own
information.
3.87. However, an analysis of the data in the ‘fleet’ file
revealed problems in terms of the quality and the exhaus-
tiveness of the data on individual vessels, in particular
as regards the main capacity management parameters,
namely tonnage and power. Inconsistencies, in particu-
lar, were singled out with the global data forwarded by
the national authorities in the context of the multian-
nual guidance programme. In addition, the present defi-
nition of engine power is not suitable, inasmuch, as it
is the power guaranteed by the shipbuilders and not the
power actually developed.
A new vessel-basedmonitoring systemwhich is not yet opera-
tional
3.88. For the 1984 to 1994 period, the Commission
made a considerable effort to create a database listing
the main features of the allocated aid. The anomalies
thus detected were individually monitored and more
than half of the presumed infringements have already
resulted in recoveries. For the more recent period, the
Infosys system should make it possible to identify Com-
munity aid for each vessel. This system was still not
fully operational in September 2001.
3.87. The Commission considers that the new software
application for the Fleet Register enables Member States to
submit exhaustive data and correct them at any time, there-
fore any inconsistencies should and could be readily corrected
by the Member States.
The Commission is of the opinion that the GT tonnage, as
defined by Regulation (EEC) No 2930/86, is the most reli-
able indicator of vessel tonnage that can be used. By the end
of 2003, when its implementation is completed, the EU will
have, for the first time, tonnage figures of Member States’
fleets expressed in a homogeneous unit.
As for the measurement and certification of engine power, the
Commission has undertaken actions to improve it, although
technical difficulties raised by Member States have so far pre-
vented a definitive solution which would justify a substantial
revision of Community legislation.
3.88. For the 1994 to 1999 and 2000 to 2006 periods,
under the terms of Regulations (EC) No 1796/95 and (EC)
No 366/2001Member States are obliged to provide a detailed
annual report on the aid granted. This report contains finan-
cial and technical indicators for the projects funded. Since the
Infosys computer system is not yet fully operational, the data
provided by the Member States are currently processed manu-
ally, allowing reasonable monitoring of aid and its compli-
ance with the rules, in particular by means of cross-checks
with the data in the fleet register.
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More infrequent on-the-spot checks
3.89. After checking 18 projects (30 vessels) on the
spot in 1998, i.e. before the Court’s report was pub-
lished, the Commission only carried out six more over
the following 31 months (from 1 January 1999 to
31 July 2001), half of which gave rise to observations
which, in some cases, recommended the recovery of the
aid. The stepping-up of the on-the-spot checks
announced by the Commission in its reply to the spe-
cial report did not last, despite the frequency of the
anomalies observed.
Adequate new legislation
3.90. Since the Court’s report, the legislation has
changed several times. Only the provisions currently in
force (75) were examined.
3.91. As regards the conditions for intervention, almost
all of the shortcomings noted in the report gave rise to
new legislation. The only exception was the abolition of
alternatives to the payment of capital grants, which the
Court wished to see encouraged. The nature of the
information to be forwarded by the Member States
should enable the Commission to carry out systematic
file-based checks of compliance with the essence of the
legislation. The new provisions substantially seek to rec-
tify the weaknesses noted by the Court. However, they
came into force too recently for an opinion to be given
on their implementation.
3.89. As soon as the Commission was informed of the
anomalies identified by the Court, it decided to carry out an
increased number of on-the-spot checks.
As regards the six projects mentioned by the Court, it should
be noted that for the three projects which gave rise to observa-
tions the financial assistance provided was cancelled in one
case and reduced in the other two cases.
To improve the cost-effectiveness of inspections and given the
nature of joint enterprise projects, the Commission subse-
quently gave priority to checking supporting documents by
setting up a task force which so far has examined 44 projects.
(75) Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December
1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements
regarding Community structural assistance in the fisher-
ies sector (OJ L 337, 30.12.1999, p. 10) and Commission
Regulation (EC) No 366/2001 of 22 February 2001 lay-
ing down detailed rules for implementing the measures
provided for in Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999
(OJ L 55, 24.2.2001, p. 3).
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Satisfactory monitoring of the anomalies
3.92. An analysis of these files shows that the Com-
mission handled each of the 19 cases cited in the Court’s
report with sufficient care. As a result of its work, it
confirmed the existence of irregularities in respect of
nine projects (76) and initiated the relevant procedures
to recover, where appropriate, the sums paid in
error (77). In 10 other cases, it concluded, or confirmed,
its opinion that there were no grounds for further
action.
Conclusions and recommendations
3.93. Improvements have been made to the legisla-
tion and the monitoring mechanism for the ‘joint enter-
prises’ measure. Appropriate action has also been taken
in respect of the individual anomalies observed. How-
ever, the restructuring of the system for managing the
Community fishing-fleet register has so far not made it
possible to resolve shortcomings in terms of the exhaus-
tiveness, consistency and reliability of the capacity indi-
cators. The Commission should therefore make qualita-
tive improvements to this register in view of its key role
in defining and managing Community fisheries policies
(see paragraphs 3.86 and 3.87).
Follow-up of observations on the Statement of Assur-
ance
ERDF and Cohesion Fund: occasionally limited recover-
ies
1998 Statement of Assurance
3.94. In its Annual Report concerning the financial
year 2000, the Court pointed out that the Commission
had not adequately monitored certain substantial errors
detected in the context of the 1998 Statement of Assur-
ance, in particular as regards five ERDF programmes
closed in 1998, in respect of which the Court estimated
that excess payments of 47,5 million euro (78) had been
made.
3.93. Following substantial changes to procedures and the
exchange of information between the Member States and the
Commission in the management of fleet data, the register has
been considerably improved. However, these improvements
could not ensure that all Member States consistently met their
obligations in full, which sometimes affected the reliability of
the database. Infringement procedures were also opened against
some Member States. Lastly, the Commission proposal for the
reform of the common fisheries policy (CFP) provides for
tougher sanctions (quota and fishing effort penalties).
(76) For an overall minimum of 1,3 million euro.
(77) An amount 0,9 million euro has already been recovered.
(78) Paragraphs 3.113 and 3.115.
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3.95. In one case (79) which had not been monitored,
the Commission initiated the financial correction pro-
cedure in June 2001 by informing the Member State of
the possible recovery of 19,4 million euro, the amount
estimated by the Court. Since then, although the Mem-
ber State did not reply within the two-month deadline,
no recovery order has been issued.
3.96. In one case (80) where the financial correction
procedure had been initiated in September 2000, the
Commission received the last comments from theMem-
ber State in June 2001. The Court believes that the
excess paid, which was initially estimated at 13,9 mil-
lion euro, may be reduced, in the light of the support-
ing documents since supplied, to 9,9 million euro. The
Commission, however, has done nothing in this case
and no sum to be recovered has been calculated.
3.97. In three cases (81) where the Commission envis-
aged financial corrections totalling 10,9 million euro,
the procedures leading to the issuing of recovery orders
lasted more than 16 months. In addition, the Commis-
sion restricted the amounts to be recovered to ineligible
expenditure on projects audited by the Court. It neither
carried out additional checks nor extended the observa-
tions to all expenditure which was potentially con-
cerned. As a result, the amounts recovered total 4,10 mil-
lion euro as opposed to the 12,50 million euro estimated
by the Court.
3.98. Furthermore, in one of these three cases (82), the
subprogramme audited also entailed the Member State
receiving excess financing of 1,6 million euro due to the
fact that the Commission paid the ERDF contribution at
the initially planned rate, even though the actual imple-
mentation reveals a financing rate of less than 9 %. The
3.95. The Member State concerned has provided new ele-
ments in order to reassess the case after the expiry of the dead-
line. Considering the importance of the case, the Commission
has agreed to this extra time. The case can now be concluded,
with a recovery to be made for which the amount has not yet
been definitively fixed.
3.96. The Commission is now preparing a Decision in the
light of the detailed replies received from the Member State.
These replies have an impact upon the extrapolation calcula-
tion, but at present it is not possible to give a final figure.
However, the final evaluation is likely to be of the order of
EUR 9,9 million.
3.97. Until recently it was difficult for the Commission,
with the audit staff and resources available, to extend inquir-
ies in cases of error found by the Court as well as to carry out
its own audit programme. With additional human resources,
the situation has now significantly improved.
As regards the difference between the amounts, the figure for
the recovery effected by the Commission relates to the project
costs found not eligible following completion of the examina-
tion procedure with the Member State; whilst the Court figure
was an estimate.
3.98. In the case cited by the Court, the Commission used
at closure the internal rules applicable during this period.
After examining the Court’s comments and the information
provided by the Member State, the Commission issued a
recovery order for EUR 700 515.
(79) 1992 to 1993 Nordrhein-Westfalen O2 SPD.
(80) 1989 to 1993 Tourism Ireland O1 Operational Pro-
gramme (OP).
(81) 1992 and 1993 Pays de la Loire O2 SPD; Provence-Alpes-
Côte d’Azur IntegratedMediterranean Programmes (PACA
IMP); 1989 to 1993 Martinique O1 OP.
(82) 1992 and 1993 Pays de la Loire O2 SPD.
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Commission is not recovering this excess payment. The
Court considers that the payment of aid in excess of the
amount actually due to final beneficiaries contravenes
the principles of Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 (83).
1999 Statement of Assurance
3.99. The Court checked whether the Commission had
adequately followed up the cases of substantial errors,
requiring action by the Commission, pointed out in the
context of the 1999 Statement of Assurance, in respect
of 12 ERDF interventions and four Cohesion Fund
projects.
3.100. As regards the interventions and projects which
were not closed, the measures taken by the Commis-
sion proved satisfactory in eight cases (84), as the adjust-
ments to declared expenditure were made. In six
cases (85), the action taken by the Commission has not
yet yielded results. In one of these cases (86), the Com-
mission nevertheless made several payments to the pro-
gramme concerned.
3.100. As regards the six cases for which the Court indi-
cated that the measures taken had not yet yielded results at the
time of its examination, the Commission would stress that
these are complex cases, on account of the significant differ-
ences between the facts identified by the Court and the claims
made by the Member States, and of situations involving inter-
pretation of the ERDF implementing rules or non-compliance
with Community polices, requiring contacts to be taken up
with the national authorities and the recipients concerned in
the Member States and inter-departmental consultations to
be held within the Commission before any launch of financial
correction procedures. To date, three of the six cases have been
resolved by the Commission, and the other three will be dealt
with as soon as possible.
The Commission considers that there is not a sufficient basis
to suspend interim payments for programmes in respect of
which checks are still ongoing. However, it will ensure that all
instances of error are resolved before accepting the Member
State’s request for the final payment for forms of intervention,
and will at that point take appropriate action to recover any
amounts unduly paid.
(83) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of 24 June 1988
on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their effective-
ness and on coordination of their activities between them-
selves and with the operations of the European Invest-
ment Bank and the other existing financial instruments
(OJ L 185, 15.7.1988, p. 9).
(84) 1994 to 1999 Thüringen O1 OP; 1994 to 1999
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern O1 OP; 1994 to 1999 Sach-
sen O1 OP; Pilot project / IDAN/METT, Nordrhein-
Westfalen; 1994 to 1999 Canarias O1 OP; 1994 to 1999
Bretagne O5b SPD; Lough Ree Catchment, CF Ireland; OP
O1 Attica; 1994 to 1999.
(85) OP O1 Central Macedonia 1994-1999; 1994-1999 Infrae-
structura CientíficaOP; 1994-1999ValenciaO1OP; 1997-
1999 Madrid O2 OP; Digue de Botafoc, CF Spain; Residus
solides Galícia, CF Spain.
(86) 1997 to 1999 Madrid O2 OP.
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3.101. In the case of one closed ERDF programme (87),
where the Court estimates the impact of the errors on
Community payments to be 1,3 million euro, the Com-
mission took action vis-à-vis the Member State in July
2001. However, no results have yet been obtained and
no recovery procedure has been initiated.
3.102. Concerning Cohesion Fund project closed in
1999, many questions regarding the rate of financing
granted, the entry of revenue in the accounts, the break-
downof expenditure, the availability of accounting infor-
mation and the eligibility of certain expenditure had
been raised by the Court (88). The Commission has
admitted that there are high risks and has introduced
into the applicable regulations, with effect from 2000,
new obligations concerning the payment of balances
and has strengthened its own control system.
ESF
3.103. During the 1999 DAS procedure for the Social
Fund the Court observed eleven substantive errors con-
cerning cases of ineligible expenditure or measures (89).
For these errors the Commission has since initiated cor-
rection procedures, except for one case (90) concerning
a project in the context of the ‘equality of opportunity
between men and women’ measure of an operational
programme. The Court maintains that the expenditure
on this project, totalling 1,16 million euro, is not eli-
gible because, contrary to the objectives of the measure,
the promoter did not organise specific courses but
financed participants attending various general courses
without documenting relevant selection criteria.
Conclusions and recommendations
3.104. The Court notes that, in general, the Commis-
sion’s follow-up to the observations made in the 1999
and following Statements of Assurance has been more
diligent than for previous DASs (see paragraphs 3.99 to
3.103). Nevertheless, although the Court’s observations
often reveal management and inspection shortcomings
which are common to many programmes, the Com-
mission rarely extends its investigations beyond the
3.101. This case relates to a programme from the
1992/1993 period. Given the time that has passed and the
complexity of the case, it took longer than usual to make
enquiries of the Member State. The Commission has now
reached a final position on the case, which has been commu-
nicated to the Member State. The financial consequences
resulting from the Commission’s analysis are similar to those
indicated by the Court.
3.102. The Commission accepted that the particular type of
project structure gave rise to difficulties in verifying eligibility
of expenditure, even if there was no financial impact in this
particular case. For the period 2000 to 2006 the control pro-
visions of the Council Regulation have been reinforced, and a
Commission Regulation setting out detailed rules on financial
management and control has been adopted.
3.103. The Commission still considers that no error was
committed as regards the eligibility of the whole project men-
tioned by the Court and that, as a consequence, no correction
was to be applied. The promoter provided the Commission
with explanations showing that ‘the project, as initially sub-
mitted and operated, met the objective of delivering vocational
training in areas where men or women are under-represented,
and, as such, was clearly eligible for funding under Priority 3
(Pathways to Equal Opportunities between men and women),
and was not an inappropriate use of the equal opportunities
funding’.
3.104. It has been difficult during recent years for the Com-
mission, with the staff and resources available, to extend
inquiries in cases of error found by the Court as well as to
carry out its own audit programme. With additional human
resources, the situation has now significantly improved.
(87) 1989 to 1991 Fife O2 OP.
(88) Annual report concerning the financial year 1999, para-
graph 3.50.
(89) Annual report concerning the financial year 1999, para-
graph 3.44.
(90) Project 989592UK3 (United Kingdom).
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necessarily limited samples examined by the Court. Par-
ticularly with regard to closed interventions, the Com-
mission should evaluate the impact of errors on the
entire intervention concerned rather than confine itself
to recovering undue financing in respect only of indi-
vidual cases which have not been contested.
PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS IN SPECIAL
REPORTS
Special Report No 3/2002 on the ‘Employment-Integra’
Community Initiative
3.105. Integra was launched in 1996 as a new, fourth
strand of the ‘Employment and development of human
resources’ (91) Community initiative (CI) for the pro-
gramming period 1997 to 1999. From 1994 to 1997,
Integra was an integral part of Horizon, but the impor-
tance attached by the European Parliament and the
Council to the subject of people excluded from the
labour market resulted in recognising this as a separate
issue. With 418 million euro of appropriations made
available, the Member States initially selected approxi-
mately one thousand projects for implementation dur-
ing the 1997 to 1999 period.
3.106. The overall aim of the Court’s audit was to
ascertain whether:
(a) the selection procedures for choosing promoters
and projects ensured that projects were innovative
and targeted people most at risk of exclusion from
the labour market;
3.106. As regards the objectives pursued by the Integra Ini-
tiative, the Commission feels that, inevitably, various meth-
odological questions arise as to the means to achieve the end.
Exclusion is a complex and multi-factored phenomenon. As
a large number of assessments have shown, the effectiveness
of assistance measures is not easy to gauge because the indica-
tors frequently prove to be inadequate.
(91) This CI was launched on 15 June 1994, in the context of
Article 11 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of
19 December 1988 laying down provisions for imple-
menting Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coor-
dination of the activities of the different Structural Funds
between themselves and with the operations of the Euro-
pean Investment Bank and the other existing financial
instruments (OJ L 374, 31.12.1988, p. 1), as modified by
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2082/93, of 20 July 1993
(OJ L 193, 31.7.1993, p. 20).Originally it had three strands:
Now, Youthstart and Horizon.
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(b) the experience acquired and lessons learnt were
evaluated and followed up in a systematic, coherent
and comparable way;
(c) monitoring and disseminationwere performed effec-
tively and used in creating new models for combat-
ing exclusion from the labour market.
3.107. The Commission did not explicitely provide
definitions of the keywords used in the guidelines or of
the population of each target group and did not estab-
lish a priorities/problems list. At neither Commission
nor Member State level were any benchmarks or base-
line criteria developed and it is therefore difficult to
assess when and howprojects were innovative and likely
to give added value or to improve or change existing
approaches.
3.108. There is no evidence that the funds have been
directed towards specific concentrations of the target
groups, such as disadvantaged urban areas, and that the
distribution of Integra funds was the most efficient way
of gathering knowledge about the target groups and
how to include them in the labour market.
3.109. The experience acquired and lessons learntwere
not evaluated and followed up in a systematic, coher-
ent and comparable way, either at Commission level or
at that of the Member States.
3.107. No precise and inflexible definition of target groups
beyond those listed in the communication to the Member
States was attempted by the Commission in view of the often
different circumstances prevailing in the various Member
States. Concepts and definitions can differ from Member State
to Member State, and a detailed top-down definition by the
Commission risked limiting the scope of action of the Member
States.
Moreover, selection of projects to participate in Integra was
the prerogative of the selection committees established in each
Member State by the managing authority for the Initiative.
The precise interpretation of innovation in each Member State
was a responsibility of the selection committee.
For the successor Initiative, Equal (1), the Commission pro-
vided a clear and comprehensive set of definitions, based on
the typology which emerged from the evaluation of Employ-
ment. Nevertheless, despite this definition, the appraisal of the
innovative character of a project remains the exclusive respon-
sibility of the project selection committees which arrive at a
decision on the basis of their knowledge of conditions on the
ground and the local context, among other things.
3.108. The requirement for projects to be proposed by pro-
moters working directly with the target groups led to an auto-
matic concentration of effort on areas with a concentration of
target groups. The specific problems of disadvantaged urban
areas have also been specifically tackled by the Urban Com-
munity Initiative programmes.
3.109. As regards evaluation and follow-up of the lessons
learnt, an EU-wide mid-term evaluation was carried out from
August 1998 to January 2000, and an ex post evaluation
of the Employment Initiative will be carried out in 2002 and
2003.
(1) The Community Initiative Equal concerning transnational coop-
eration to promote new means of combating all forms of dis-
crimination and inequalities in connection with the labour mar-
ket, for the 2000 to 2006 programming period (OJ C 127,
5.5.2000, p. 2).
124 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 28.11.2002
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
3.110. The Commission and the Member States did
not consider using indicators to describe the basic situ-
ations of the various target groups included in the ini-
tiative. Had they done so, they could then have formu-
lated clear, unified and measurable criteria and created
a baseline against which to evaluate the impact of the
Integra initiative.
3.111. No evidence was found to prove that the dis-
semination was performed systematically and effec-
tively and used in creating new models for combating
exclusion from the labour market for each target group.
3.112. For none of the Member States visited was evi-
dence found either at the national or transnational level
of the organisation of systematic transfer of good prac-
tice. At promoter and local/regional level there was
more evidence of such transfers. However, there was no
systematic organisation of it and promoter contact and
networking with local authorities and other promoters
appear to have been the most important factors.
As regards the achievements of the Initiative, considerable
progress was achieved by the Commission and the Member
States in drawing conclusions from the experience gained,
among other things by means of:
— a series of publications,
— publication of several hundred descriptions of best practice
on the Web,
— regular meetings of working parties at Community level,
and
— several conferences.
3.110. The Commission stresses the importance of the work
currently being carried out on indicators as part of the ‘Inclu-
sion’ process (following the Lisbon and Nice summits). This
exercise clearly shows the difficulties involved in identifying
harmonised indicators to shed light on the problem of exclu-
sion.
3.111. The Commission produced guidance in 1997 entitled
‘Impact Guide for Employment Project Promoters’. The Guide
provides methods for planning a strategy to disseminate the
successful outcomes of a project (2). This was followed in 1999
by a ‘Guide to Public Relations Activities for Project Promot-
ers’, to enable projects under the Community Initiatives to
realise their full potential through effective communication (3).
As regards dissemination and mainstreaming applied to Inte-
gra, the new knowledge about combating exclusion from the
labour market has been principally disseminated at EU,
national and local levels via publications and web sites.’
3.112. The Commission’s website at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/equal contains the publications referred to above, and
many more, giving examples of good practice and is freely
accessible to all labour market decision-makers in the EU. The
majority of the publications produced by the Commission
have been printed and distributed widely throughout the EU.
The events organised at national and Community level and
the systematic feedback of the achievements into the pro-
grammes that took over from Integra (in particular the Equal
(2) CE-V/7-97-003-XX-C, p. 32, 1997.
(3) P. 28, 1999.
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3.113. The Integra initiative has raised public aware-
ness of excluded groups. Nevertheless, it is not possible
to draw any firm conclusion on the extent to which the
Integra initiative has resulted in new knowledge about
how to promote measures to combat exclusion from
the labour market in the different target groups and
whether that knowledge has been effectively dissemi-
nated to political decision-makers.
Special Report No 4/2002 on local actions for employ-
ment
3.114. Local employment promotes the creation of
locally sourced jobs (92) and covers a wide range and
typology of actions and activities: some pertaining to
the European Employment Strategy (EES), which brings
together Member States’ national employment policies,
some financed under the European Social Fund (ESF),
which is administered by the Commission in partner-
ship with the Member States, others directly managed
by the Commission. While each of these strands derives
from a different legal basis and has its own specific
objectives, they each address the overall common objec-
tive of furthering a local employment strategy for job
creation. The areas also differ in regard to the allocation
of responsibilities for their achievement, as in the case
of the ESF operational programmes, for which Member
States have shared responsibility under the subsidiarity
principle, and innovative and preparatory actions, for
which the Commission has overall responsibility. In the
1994 to 1999 period, the Commission estimated that
local employment accounted for approximately 10 % or
5 000 million euro of the total ESF funding, out of an
overall total of approximately 20 455 million euro of
Community funding spent on local development (93).
Initiative) are indicative of the level of programme coordina-
tion activity. As far as transnational cooperation is concerned,
the achievements are described in several publications avail-
able on the web.
3.113. The final assessment of the effectiveness of Integra
in achieving its objectives cannot be made in advance of the
receipt and analysis by the Commission of the national final
reports (due in June 2002) and the publication of the ex post
evaluation in 2003.
3.114. The Commission endeavours to provide a more
favourable framework for local employment with the various
components of this policy area, on the assumption that the
effectiveness of policy development and implementation can be
improved by broadening the range of persons and institutions
involved. The Commission must take into account the prin-
ciples of proportionality and subsidiarity, as well as the open
method of coordination established in Lisbon, which are par-
ticularly relevant in the field of local development, notably by
fully respecting the national administrative and constitutional
arrangements of the Member States.
(92) Second pillar (entrepreneurship) of Council decision
2001/63/EC of 19 January 2001, on guidelines for Mem-
ber States’ employment policies for the year 2001 (OJ L 22,
24.1.2001, p. 18).
(93) SEC(1994) 2199 of the Commission.
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3.115. While the Treaty makes provisions for a coor-
dinated strategy, it provides no legally enforceable basis
for a European employment policy as such. Thus the
setting of employment priorities and actions, including
the importance given to local employment actions in
each Member State, remains the sole prerogative of
national governments.
3.116. The Court’s audit examined the Commission’s
(DG Employment) policy formulation and information
gathering functions in the area of local employment
and also the Commission’s management of innovative
projects which it directly funded in the period 1994 to
2001. Local employment projects were also visited on
the spot in six Member States (Germany, Spain, France,
Austria, Finland and United Kingdom).
3.117. The Community policy development on local
employment measures lacked definition and a clear and
detailed development plan for the scope and applica-
tion of the policy in the Member States. Furthermore,
the Commission did not have sufficient information at
its disposal to fulfil its facilitative and coordinating
function.
3.118. In the case of a sample of innovative and pre-
paratory local employment projects which were directly
funded by the Commission, the Commission’s financial
management procedures had not been sufficiently strin-
gent in some cases. In addition, value for money on
such projects was not assured due to a degree of overlap
between thedifferent innovativemeasures and the autho-
risation of some projects.
3.117. The Commission naturally recognises the need to
improve Community policy formulation.
However, due to the great variety of activities, and above all,
of situations amongMember States (size, powers and resources
at infra-regional level), a single Community-wide definition
of a local employment policy action would not be operational
or desirable, and would not be within the remit of the ESF
Regulation or the European Employment Strategy (EES). Such
definition has not yet been attempted by any other interna-
tional organisations such as the OECD’s LEED programme.
The Commission provides policy guidance, and promotes
exchanges of experience through innovative and preparatory
measures, including for local actors themselves, as shown in
its November 2001 communication on local employment.
3.118. The Commission agrees with the Court’s general rec-
ommendation to rationalise budgetary support and improve
financial management procedures for local employment actions
under innovative and preparatory measures. It undertakes to
implement these budget lines in the best possible way with the
available human resources.
As regards the ‘late authorisation’ of some projects, technical
problems at promoter level have sometimes delayed the sign-
ing of agreements.
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3.119. The audit also identified a number of difficul-
ties and obstacles arising in the effective implementa-
tion of local employment measures in Member States.
For example, the introduction of a small provision in
the ESF Regulation, whereby intermediary bodies are
delegated responsibility for the allocation of assistance
to final recipients, resulted in significant delays and
administrative complexities in some Member States,
with two Member States (Germany and Austria) post-
poning their participation in this innovative mecha-
nism. Secondly, the prohibition in some Member States
of advance payments to final recipients in the voluntary
and community sectors, due to national administrative
restrictions also presents obstacles to the advancement
of local employment measures.
3.119. As regards small grants, the complexities and restric-
tions rightly identified by the Court should be dealt with indi-
vidually by the Member States and/or the managing authori-
ties concerned. The Commission has pleaded for more
simplification in this area but has no authority over national
mechanisms or administrative arrangements.
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INTRODUCTION
4.1. The European Union’s internal policies focus in
particular on the implementation and development of
the single market covering four complete subsections of
the budget and several headings in another subsection:
(a) training, youth, culture, audio-visual media, infor-
mation and other social operations (subsection B3);
(b) energy, Euratom nuclear safeguards and environ-
ment (subsection B4);
(c) consumer protection, internal market, industry and
trans-European networks (subsection B5);
(d) research and technological development (subsec-
tion B6); and
(e) other agricultural operations, other regional opera-
tions, transport as well as other measures concern-
ing fisheries and the sea (Titles B2-5 to B2-9 of sub-
section B2), and Article B1-3 8 2 (Enhancing public
awareness of the common agricultural policy, for-
merly part of B2-5 1 2 2).
4.2. The responsibility for implementing the internal
policies and managing the corresponding budget is
spread across 13 Directorates-General (DG), the princi-
pal ones being the DGs Research (RTD), Energy and
Transport (TREN) and Information Society (INFSO) in
terms of appropriations managed.
ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT
Budgetary execution and financial perspectives
4.3. Table 4.1 gives an overview of the budgetary
execution in 2001 in comparison with the ceiling of the
financial perspectives. In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the use of
the available appropriations during the financial year
2001 is summarised.
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Table 4.1. — Evolution and Implementation of the 2001 budget and comparison with the financial perspective ceiling
(Mio EUR)
Heading of the financial perspective: internal policies
Total internal policies
of which
Research and technological develop-
ment (B6)
Consumers, internal market, labour
market, TEN (B5)
Education, youth, culture, informa-
tion and social operations (B3)
Others = energy, environment and
agricultural operations
(B4 and parts of B2)
CA PA CA PA CA PA CA PA CA PA
Financial perspective ceiling 6 272,0
Evolution of the budget
Initial appropriations (1) 6 232,2 (4) 5 854,8 (4) 3 920,0 3 610,0 1 068,5 1 036,8 810,3 762,7 283,6 390,8
Final appropriations available (2) 7 178,2 (4) 6 485,4 (4) 4 497,6 3 865,6 1 171,6 1 100,6 1 017,0 1 051,8 472,0 444,3
Implementation of the budget
Appropriations used (3) 6 703,3 5 303,1 4 183,7 3 195,9 1 119,7 865,8 966,0 880,6 433,9 360,7
% of final appropriations available 93,4 81,8 93,0 82,7 95,6 78,7 95,0 83,7 91,9 81,2
Appropriations carried over to 2002 315,1 707,4 269,3 432,9 8,6 155,3 32,5 97,4 4,7 21,9
% of final appropriations available 4,4 10,9 6,0 11,2 0,7 14,1 3,2 9,3 1,0 4,9
Appropriations cancelled 159,9 (4) 474,9 (4) 44,7 236,8 43,3 79,5 18,6 73,8 33,4 61,7
% of final appropriations available 2,2 7,3 1,0 6,1 3,7 7,2 1,8 7,0 7,1 13,9
(1) Budget as finally adopted by the European Parliament on 14 December 2000 (OJ L 56, 26.2.2001) including the relevant provisional appropriations for Heading 3 written in Chapter B0-4 0.
(2) Budget appropriations as amended after taking account of supplementary and amending budgets and transfers, including appropriations carried over from 2000, reuse of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participation
of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available again.
(3) Appropriations used, including appropriations carried over from 2000, reuse of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participation of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available again.
(4) Including chapter B0-4 0 (reserve).
NB: CA = Commitment appropriations; PA = Payment appropriations.
Source: revenue and expenditure account of the European Communities — volume II, section I (SEC(2002) 404-FR).
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Table 4.2. — Evolution and Implementation of the 2001 budget, broken down by subsections
(Mio EUR)
Subsection of the
budget Heading
Commitment appropriations
Initial budget (1)
Final budget after
SAB and
transfers (2)
Additional
appropriations,
such as carry-
overs from 2000,
reuse of revenue
etc. (3)
Final budget after
SAB and transfers
and additional
appropria-
tions (4) (d) + (e)
Appropriations
used, but exclud-
ing appropria-
tions carried over
from 2000,
reuse of revenue
etc. (5)
Appropriations
used, but includ-
ing appropria-
tions carried over
from 2000,
reuse of revenue
etc. (6)
Appropriations
carried over to
financial year
2002
Appropriations
cancelled at year
end
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Total in B2 Other structural operations 119,8 155,8 0,0 155,9 140,3 140,3 1,0 14,6
Total B3 Training, youth and social operations 810,3 880,3 136,8 1 017,0 938,7 966,0 32,5 18,6
Total B4 Energy, Euratom and environment 163,8 168,7 147,5 316,2 158,1 293,6 3,8 18,8
Total B5 Consumers, internal market, industry and
networks 1 068,5 1 105,0 66,5 1 171,6 1 074,7 1 119,7 8,6 43,3
Total B6 Research and technological development 3 920,0 3 987,6 510,0 4 497,6 4 158,8 4 183,7 269,3 44,7
B0-4 0 Provisional appropriations = reserve 149,7 19,9 19,9 19,9
TOTAL 6 232,2 6 317,4 860,9 7 178,2 6 470,6 6 703,3 315,1 159,9
Payment appropriations
Total in B2 Other structural operations 199,6 199,6 0,9 200,4 152,6 152,7 12,1 35,6
Total B3 Training, youth and social operations 762,7 840,3 211,5 1 051,8 865,7 880,6 97,4 73,8
Total B4 Energy, Euratom and environment 191,2 206,6 37,4 243,9 186,7 208,0 9,8 26,1
Total B5 Consumers, internal market, industry and
networks 1 036,8 1 066,3 34,3 1 100,6 855,7 865,8 155,3 79,5
Total B6 Research and technological development 3 610,0 3 334,2 531,4 3 865,6 3 192,8 3 195,9 432,9 236,8
B0-4 0 Provisional appropriations = reserve 54,6 23,0 23,0 23,0
TOTAL 5 854,8 5 669,9 815,5 6 485,4 5 253,4 5 303,1 707,4 474,9
(1) Budget as finally adopted by the European Parliament on 14 December 2000 (OJ L 56, 26.2.2001) including the relevant provisional appropriations for Heading 3 written in Chapter B0-4 0.
(2) Budget appropriations as amended after taking account of supplementary and amending budgets and transfers, but excluding appropriations carried over from 2000, reuse of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participa-
tion of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available again — see Volume II, column 3 of table ‘Composition et évolution des crédits d’engagement’ and also columns 3 of table ‘Composition et évolution
des crédits de paiement’.
(3) Appropriations carried over from 2000, reuse of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participation of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available again — see Volume II, column 8 of table
‘Composition et évolution des crédits d’engagement’ and also columns 17 of table ‘Composition et évolution des crédits de paiement’.
(4) Budget appropriations as amended after taking account of supplementary and amending budgets and transfers, but including appropriations carried over from 2000, reuse of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participa-
tion of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available again — see Volume II, column 9 of table ‘Composition et évolution des crédits d’engagement’ and also columns 18 of table ‘Composition et évolution
des crédits de paiement’.
(5) Appropriations used, excluding appropriations carried over from 2000, reuse of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participation of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available again —
Volume II; in columns 2 of table ‘Exécution des crédits d’engagement’ and columns 17 of table ‘Exécution des crédits de paiement’.
(6) Appropriations used, including appropriations carried over from 2000, reuse of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participation of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available again —
Volume II; in columns 5 of table ‘Exécution des crédits d’engagement’ and columns 20 of table ‘Exécution des crédits de paiement’.
Source: revenue and expenditure account of the European Communities — volume II, section I (SEC(2002) 404-FR).
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Table 4.3. — Evolution and Implementation of the 2001 budget, broken down by titles
(Mio EUR)
Title/Subsection
of the budget Heading
Commitment appropriations Payment appropriations
Initial budget (1)
Final budget after
SAB and transfers
and additional
appropriations (2)
Appropriations
used (3)
Rate of
implementation of
initial budget
(%)
Rate of
implementation of
final budget
(%)
Initial budget (1)
Final budget after
SAB and transfers
and additional
appropriations (2)
Appropriations
used (3)
Rate of
implementation of
initial budget
(%)
Rate of implementa-
tion of final budget
(%)
B2-5 Other agricultural operations 53,6 53,6 49,8 93,0 92,9 107,5 107,5 79,2 73,7 73,7
B2-6 Other regional operations 15,0 15,0 15,0 100,0 100,0 15,0 15,9 15,2 101,3 95,8
B2-7 Transport 25,2 25,2 23,1 91,8 91,8 21,3 21,3 14,5 68,2 68,2
B2-9 Other measures concerning fisheries and the sea 26,1 62,1 52,4 201,1 84,4 55,8 55,8 43,8 78,5 78,5
Total in B2 119,8 155,9 140,3 117,1 90,0 199,6 200,4 152,7 76,5 76,2
B3-1 Education, vocational training and youth 491,3 605,4 582,2 118,5 96,2 427,8 657,5 567,6 132,7 86,3
B3-2 Culture and audiovisual media 120,1 141,8 130,9 109,0 92,3 109,8 138,9 97,1 88,5 69,9
B3-3 Information and communication 86,6 114,7 104,3 120,5 90,9 91,4 110,5 93,5 102,3 84,6
B3-4 Social dimension and employment 112,4 155,1 148,6 132,2 95,8 133,7 145,0 122,4 91,6 84,4
Total B3 810,3 1 017,0 966,0 119,2 95,0 762,7 1 051,8 880,6 115,5 83,7
B4-1 Energy 33,8 65,5 62,6 185,1 95,6 33,0 44,3 34,6 104,8 78,1
B4-2 Euratom nuclear safeguards 17,7 18,0 17,7 99,9 98,4 17,3 19,2 17,6 101,6 91,5
B4-3 Environment 112,3 232,8 213,4 190,0 91,7 140,9 180,4 155,8 110,6 86,4
Total B4 163,8 316,2 293,6 179,2 92,9 191,2 243,9 208,0 108,8 85,3
B5-1 Consumer policy and consumer health protection 22,5 22,9 21,2 94,3 92,6 20,0 20,3 19,1 95,3 93,9
B5-2 Aid for reconstruction 1,3 3,3 3,3 258,6 99,9 1,3 3,3 3,3 258,6 99,9
B5-3 Internal market 144,3 157,1 142,3 98,6 90,5 159,9 167,8 126,7 79,3 75,5
B5-4 Industry p.m. p.m. n.a. n.a. n.a. p.m. p.m. n.a. n.a. n.a.
B5-5 Labour market and technological innovation 119,6 144,8 133,1 111,2 91,9 122,8 143,6 111,0 90,4 77,3
B5-6 Statistical information 32,6 36,5 35,2 107,9 96,3 31,0 36,2 32,6 105,0 90,1
B5-7 Trans-European networks 650,6 665,8 655,2 100,7 98,4 595,2 605,4 482,1 81,0 79,6
B5-8 Area of freedom, security and justice 92,6 136,1 125,1 135,1 91,9 101,8 117,8 85,6 84,1 72,7
B5-9 Measures to combat fraud 5,0 5,0 4,4 87,3 87,3 4,8 6,2 5,5 115,5 89,4
Total B5 1 068,5 1 171,6 1 119,7 104,8 95,6 1 036,8 1 100,6 865,8 83,5 78,7
B6-1 Joint Research Centre – Staff and Resources 209,3 255,6 252,5 120,7 98,8 211,2 250,6 243,2 115,1 97,1
B6-2 Joint Research Centre – Direct operating appropriations – Scientific
and technical support for Community Policies – EC Framework
programme 1998 to 2002 29,6 55,1 28,9 97,5 52,4 32,3 43,7 30,4 94,3 69,6
B6-3 Joint Research Centre – Direct operating appropriations EAEC
framework programme 1998 to 2002 10,8 18,5 11,0 102,3 59,8 12,0 15,8 12,4 103,1 78,5
B6-4 Joint Research Centre – Direct action – Completion of previous joint
and supplementary programmes and other Joint Research Centre
activities p.m. 114,5 19,3 n.a. 16,9 1,5 101,6 18,2 1 213,8 17,9
B6-5 Indirect Action (Shared-Cost Projects) … Completion of Earlier
Projects… p.m. 296,6 163,7 n.a. 55,2 693,5 1 087,7 672,8 97,0 61,9
B6-6 Indirect Action (Shared-Cost Projects) … fifth framework programme
1998 to 2002 3 670,3 3 757,4 3 708,2 101,0 98,7 2 659,5 2 366,2 2 218,9 83,4 93,8
Total B6 3 920,0 4 497,6 4 183,7 106,7 93,0 3 610,0 3 865,6 3 195,9 88,5 82,7
B0-4 0 Provisional appropriations = reserve 149,7 19,9 54,6 23,0
TOTAL 6 232,2 7 178,2 6 703,3 107,6 93,4 5 854,8 6 485,4 5 303,1 90,6 81,8
(1) Budget as finally adopted by the European Parliament on 14 December 2000 (OJ L 56, 26.2.2001).
(2) Budget appropriations as amended after taking account of supplementary and amending budgets and transfers, but including appropriations carried over from 2000, reuse of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participation of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available again.
(3) Appropriations used, including appropriations carried over from 2000, reuse of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participation of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available again.
NB: p.m. = token entry; n.a. = not available.
Source: revenue and expenditure account of the European Communities — volume II, section I (SEC(2002) 404-FR).
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4.4. Internal policies account for a global amount of
7 178,2 million euro in final commitment appropria-
tions and 6 485,4 million euro in final payment appro-
priations (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3). As can be seen from
Table 4.1, the available commitment appropriations
exceeded considerably (by more than 14 %) the ceiling
of the financial perspective. The largest part of the com-
mitment and payment appropriations (4 497,6 million
euro and 3 865,6 million euro, respectively) relates to
research and technological development, and the major
part of this (3 757,4 million euro and 2 366,2 million
euro, respectively) to indirect actions co-financed under
the fifth framework programme. The amounts relating
to the trans-european Networks (TEN) were 665,8 mil-
lion euro and 605,4 million euro for commitment and
payment appropriations, respectively.
Review of the revenue and expenditure account (1)
4.5. In comparison with the document provided for
the 2000 closure of accounts, the revenue and expen-
diture account for 2001 (2) has again improved gener-
ally in terms of form and content. However, with regard
to specific budget headings, important information on
the management of these budget headings is still miss-
ing.
4.5. The Commission appreciates the Court’s statement that
the Financial Management Report 2001 has generally again
improved in form and content.
The Commission pre-selected the most important budget lines
and programmes (34 in heading 3 and 30 in heading 4,
among others) for a detailed analysis. The selection criteria
took into account both the size of the budget appropriations
and the perceived political importance of the programme.
This analysis covers not only variations between the final bud-
get appropriations and the initial budget adopted by the Par-
liament or the level of the utilisation of appropriations, but
also the ‘output’ resulting from the expenditure.
(1) The Court has reviewed the information presented by the
Commission in Volume 1 of the revenue and expenditure
account. The purpose of this volume is to provide a com-
mentary on budgetary management for the year and, in
particular, explanations of variations between the initial
approved budget and the appropriations finally available,
as well as between the appropriations finally available and
those utilised. The review only sought to identify any sig-
nificant variations for which explanations are not pro-
vided and to identify any explanations that might be con-
sidered misleading, and not to provide assurance as to the
reliability of its contents.
(2) SEC (2002) 404-FR.
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4.6. As can be seen from Table 4.3, the budget imple-
mentation with regard to both final commitment and
payment appropriations for titles B6-2, B6-3, B6-4 and
B6-5 was low. However, no explanation for this was
given in the Commission’s document.
4.7. In addition, the Commission’s document does
not, for example, give any information on budget head-
ing B5-2 (aid for reconstruction), where the final com-
mitment and payment appropriations were more than
twice the amount foreseen in the initial budget.
Analysis of non-automatic carry-overs
4.8. Non-automatic carry-overs of commitment
appropriations according to Article 7.2 of the Financial
Regulation for the past two years (from 2000 to 2001
and from 2001 to 2002) have been relatively high for
budgetary items relating to education, youth policy and
culture (items B3-1 0 0 0 and B3-2 0 0 8), and for item
4.6. With regard to the JRC appropriations (B6-2, B6-3,
B6-4), a distinction should be made between two compo-
nents:
— in the case of the institutional appropriations for the
framework programme (which account for 62 % of com-
mitment appropriations and 71 % of payment appro-
priations), 98 % of commitments and 94 % of payments
were implemented,
— however, in the case of earmarked revenue needed to
implement shared-cost projects and other competitive
activities (accounting for 38 % of commitment appro-
priations and 29 % of payment appropriations), the vol-
ume of commitment and payment appropriations is set
when the revenue is received, whereas implementation
normally takes a number of years.
Title B6-5 covers the completion of indirect shared-cost projects
from previous framework programmes. It contains an item for
revenue accruing from third parties as a result of association
agreements under the fifth framework programme which
accounts for 99,4 % of commitment appropriations and
34,7 % of payment appropriations.
High utilisation rates for commitment appropriations were
possible only in part, owing to uncertainties and occasional
delays in making funds available.
There are structural reasons for the failure to use payment
appropriations in full. Payment appropriations correspond-
ing to third-country contributions are not estimated on the
basis of annual requirements, but, on the contrary, are set at
the level of the commitment appropriations as and when con-
tributions are made, although implementation normally
extends over a number of years as is the case for other research
projects.
4.8. For education and culture as a whole (B3), carry-overs
from 2000 to 2001, the first year of implementation for four
programmes, three of which were adopted only in the course
of the year, accounted for only 2,6 % of appropriations avail-
able; carry-overs from 2001 to 2002 accounted for only
1,2 % of appropriations available.
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B5-3 0 0 2 A (Operation and development of the inter-
nal market, particularly in the field of notification, cer-
tification and sectoral approximation— expenditure on
administrative management). The carry-overs for the B3
items were mainly due to the late decision on the new
Socrates, Culture 2000 and Youth Policy. As sum-
marised in Table 4.4, an increase in carry-overs was
also noted with item B5-7 2 1 0 (Networks for the inter-
change of data between administrations (IDA)).
4.9. Frequent non-automatic carry-overs of payment
appropriationswere identified in article B5-7 1 0 (Finan-
cial support for energy infrastructure; TEN-E) for the
years 1999 to 2000 and 2001 to 2002 as well as article
B5-8 1 0 (European refugee fund) for the past two years.
As regards energy infrastructure measures, the amount
for the 55 commitments for which the final due date
had expired at the end of 2001 amounted to a total
value of 23,7 million euro. In contrast to that, the total
payment appropriations for 2001 amounted to 18,0 mil-
lion euro only. Due to difficulties in the contract man-
agement of grants, 3,6 million euro were carried over to
2002 (see Table 4.4). The Commission was unable to
use these appropriations within the budgetary year due
to late allocation of payment appropriations to budget
headings, late signing of contracts and payment delays.
— In Item B3-1 0 0 0, the main reason for the carry-overs
from 2000 to 2001 (EUR 2,5 million) was the time
required to finalise a call for proposals in the field of
minority languages; carry-overs from 2001 to 2002
amounted to only EUR 0,5 million.
— In Item B3-2 0 0 8, the carry-overs from 2000 to 2001
(EUR 10.5 million) were largely due to the delay in
adopting the new legal base; carry-overs from 2001 to
2002 amounted to only EUR 0,5 million.
As for Item B5-3 0 0 2 A, the amount carried over (EUR
112 900, i.e. 10,3 % of the allocation in this line) was
intended to finance two projects which were ready, but could
not be authorised, in December 2001. The carry-over here is
not of a structural nature.
The carry-over of EUR 1 428 235 in Item B5-7 2 1 0,
(6,1 % of the 2001 appropriation) concerned a file on which
the ACPC gave a favourable opinion at the beginning of
December, but for which the legal commitment could not be
finalised before 31 December.
4.9. As regards Article B5-7 1 0, implementation of a new
framework contract designed to afford better protection to the
Commission’s financial interests (bank guarantee for an
amount equal to the advance payments), led to a delay in
signing the contracts in question. As a result, the Commis-
sion was unable to make all the advance payments on TEN-E
contracts.
The delay in adopting the legal base setting up the European
refugee fund (Articles B5-8 1 0 and B5-8 1 1) meant that
all the payment appropriations had to be carried over from
2000 to 2001 (the legal base was finally adopted on 28 Sep-
tember 2000). The Member States were unable to use up the
first advance payment in the course of 2001, so that part of
the appropriations had to be carried over once again from
2001 to 2002.
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Table 4.4. — Budget articles with frequent non-automatic carry-overs
(1 000 EUR)
Commitment appropriations
Article / Item Heading
1999 2000 2001
Authorised
Carried over to 2000
Authorised
Carried over to 2001
Authorised
Carried over to 2002
Amount % Amount % Amount %
B3-1 0 0 0 Preparatory action for cooperation in the fields of education and
of youth policy (1) (1) — 3 426,5 2 512,8 73,3 5 910,0 454,0 7,7
B3-1 0 0 1 Socrates (1) (1) — 231 840,0 1 913,6 0,8 239 306,0 3 330,1 1,4
B3-1 0 2 1 Leonardo Da Vinci 140 393,0 1 851,9 1,3 138 230,0 619,9 0,4 142 397,0 579,1 0,4
B3-2 0 0 8 Framework programme in support of culture — — — 35 843,0 10 521,7 29,4 31 580,0 527,6 1,7
B5-3 0 0 2 A Operation and development of the internal market, particularly
in the field of notification, certification and sectoral approxima-
tion — Expenditure on administrative management — — — 1 215,0 99,0 8,1 1 093,5 112,9 10,3
B5-6 0 0 Policy on statistical information concerned with non-member
countries 32 525,0 172,8 0,5 30 481,5 87,9 0,3 30 183,1 77,3 0,3
B5-7 2 1 0 Networks for the interchange of data between administrations
(IDA) (1) (1) — 22 371,0 275,2 1,2 23 516,0 1 428,2 6,1
B5-7 2 1 1 Networks for intra-Community statistics (Edicom) 10 950,0 1 459,0 13,3 (1) (1) — 9 370,0 149,2 1,6
B6-6 1 1 1 Quality of life and management of living resources — Operating
expenditure 529 500,0 1 106,0 0,2 542 222,0 262,0 0,0 604 158,0 941,2 0,2
B6-6 1 4 1 Preserving the ecosystem (EC) — Energy, environment and
sustainable development (EC) — Environment and sustainable
development — Operating expenditure (1) (1) — 235 077,0 1 467,3 0,6 276 386,0 5 137,8 1,9
Payment appropriations
Article Heading
1999 2000 2001
Authorised
Carried over to 2000
Authorised
Carried over to 2001
Authorised
Carried over to 2002
Amount % Amount % Amount %
B5-7 1 0 Financial support for energy infrastructures 16 000,0 4 550,0 28,4 (1) (1) — 18 000,0 3 591,0 20,0
B5-8 1 0 European refugee fund — — — 16 280,0 1 746,0 10,7 47 090,0 6 337,7 13,5
(1) No carry-overs to next year.
Source: Commission (SEC(2000)481; SEC(2001)449; C(2002)1055.
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SPECIFIC APPRAISAL IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
Audit objectives and scope of the audit
4.10. The objectives of the audit for the 2001 State-
ment of Assurance (DAS) in the internal policies (IP)
budgetary area were:
— to contribute to the Court’s Statement of Assurance
on the general budget for 2001 (see Chapter 9 of
this Annual Report) through the collection of suf-
ficient, relevant and reliable audit evidence on the
reliability of the accounts for the year ending
31 December 2001 and on the legality and regular-
ity of the underlying transactions at Commission
level, including an assessment of the reform of the
Commission’s internal control system, and
— to perform a system analysis of Trans-European
transport networks (TEN-T) (see points 4.11 to 4.36)
and a follow-up of the 2000 DAS system analysis (3)
on the fifth European Community (EC) framework
programme for research and technological develop-
ment (see points 4.37 to 4.51).
System analysis of the trans-European transport net-
works (TEN-T)
Nature of the expenditure and audit approach
4.11. The TEN-T management system, which is wholly
managed by DG TREN, is, in value terms, the largest
non-research management system of the IP area. In the
2001 general budget, the budget heading TEN-T
(B5-7 0 0) corresponds to commitment and payment
appropriations of 575 million euro and 525 million
euro respectively (99,5 % of which are for operational
credits).
(3) Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000.
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4.12. TEN-T actions are grants (4) which may take one
or more of the following forms:
— co-financing of studies (including preparatory, fea-
sibility and evaluation studies and other technical
support measures);
— interest rebates whose duration may in general not
exceed five years;
— contributions towards fees for guarantees;
— direct grants to investments in duly justified cases;
and
— risk-capital participation.
4.13. According to Commission statistics, 803 TEN-T
actions with an EU contribution of 2 987 million euro
were funded between 1995 and 2001. Studies and direct
grants to investments, amounting to 1 331 million euro
and 1 417million euro respectively, constitute themajor
part of the TEN-T actions funded, followed by interest
rebates representing a total funding of 239million euro.
4.14. TEN-T actions are implemented by Commission
Decisions only or by Commission decisions accompa-
nied by contracts, which both define a maximum EU
contribution based on estimated eligible costs. Con-
tracts are concluded with the final beneficiaries for less
than 6,5 % of TEN-T actions amounting to 16 % of
commitment appropriations. These Commission deci-
sions must be addressed directly to the beneficiaries and
to the Member States and must always state the respon-
sible implementing authority, the recipient and the final
beneficiary of aid. Although required by Article 10 of
Council Regulation (EC) No 2236/95, 13 cases were
found where Commission Decisions were notified to
Member States only but not to final beneficiaries.
4.14. The Commission states that from 2002 the decisions
will also be notified to the beneficiary.
(4) Regardless of the intervention system chosen, the maxi-
mum EU contribution is fixed at 10 % of the total invest-
ment cost (including studies), except for TEN-T actions
concerning ‘Galileo’ satellite positioning and navigation
systems (other than studies) for which the EU contribu-
tion can reach a maximum of 20 % as from 2003. For
studies related to projects including preparatory, feasibil-
ity and evaluation studies and other technical support
measures, the EU contribution should not exceed 50 % of
the total cost of the study.
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4.15. Payments for TEN-T actions are made as:
— advance payments which may not exceed 40 % for
direct grants and 50 % for studies of the maximum
EU contribution,
— intermediate payments upon provision of evidence
that the actual costs for the TEN-T action have
reached at least 70 % of the total estimated eligible
costs, and
— final payments when the action has been duly com-
pleted.
4.16. For interest rebates, payments follow a schedule
set out in the corresponding Commission decision and
may be made in whole or in part. Advance and interim
payments may not exceed 95 % of the maximum EU
contribution granted.
4.17. The audit of TEN-T system was based on an
evaluation of the system design and on a verification of
its consistent, continuous and effective operation. For
this purpose, a description of the administrative and
control procedures as at December 2001 was estab-
lished, walk-through tests were performed to check the
accuracy of the description, and the operation of the
key controls was tested on the basis of a sample of 32
TEN-T actions (covering 39 % of 2001 payment appro-
priations by value). Control and substantive tests were
carried out at Commission level for all actions sampled,
while cost claim-based payments were also audited at
final beneficiary level.
Inadequate definition of work and eligibility of costs
4.18. The definition of eligible and ineligible costs
provided for in the legal basis and the Commission
decisions is insufficiently specific to establish the actual
costs incurred by the beneficiary. The definition of eli-
gible costs for TEN-T actions differs from the definition
applied to similar infrastructure projects co-financed
through Structural Measures, and the use of different
funding rates carries the risk that beneficiaries may
maximise funding by wrongly allocating costs to stud-
ies:
4.18. More detailed indications on eligibility of costs can be
found in the TEN Financial Assistance Committee Glossary.
Concerning studies in particular, as from 2000, the applica-
tion forms include information regarding external and inter-
nal costs. As from 2002, the standard text of the TEN-T
Commission Decision for studies and projects has been sub-
stantially revised, it was inspired by the Cohesion Fund deci-
sion and provides more details of eligible cost and takes on
board the Court’s observations. The revised text will be appli-
cable from the Commission’s 2002 decision.
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— Regulation (EC) No 2236/95, as amended by Regu-
lation (EC) No 1655/99, and Annex II of all relevant
Commission decisions simply specify that direct
costs exclusive of VAT incurred by the action, as
well as indirect costs subject to the application of
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
are considered as eligible. In addition, a glossary
adopted by the TEN Financial Assistance Commit-
tee exists which is, however, not legally binding,
— studies and direct grants to investments co-financed
through TEN-T often relate to larger-scale infrastruc-
ture measures similar to those funded by structural
measures. However, these programmes have amuch
more detailed definition of the eligibility of costs. In
addition, cost categories not eligible for co-financing
under structural measures (such as entertainment
costs, interest charges or personnel costs for national
civil servants are considered eligible under TEN-T,
— the use of different rates of EU contributions (up to
50 % of eligible project-related costs for studies as
compared to up to 10 % of eligible costs for direct
grants to infrastructure projects) carries the risk that
costs associated with the construction of infrastruc-
ture may be charged to studies.
Moreover, no detailed technical annex defining what
work has to be carried out under TEN-T actions is pro-
vided except for those actions implemented by means
of contracts.
4.19. Given the lack of concise guidelines, final ben-
eficiaries interpret the eligibility of project-related costs
differently. The absence of standardised cost statement
forms further complicates the review and evaluation of
claims and makes it more difficult for Member States to
exercise their control responsibilities. In addition, it was
shown that Commission officials, when carrying out
on-the-spot controls, assess the eligibility of costs on a
case-by-case basis.
The examples given by the Court are not eligible according to
the Glossary and as a general rule are always excluded when
detected in a declaration.
As far as studies are concerned, the risk mentioned by the
Court may exist. However, in general cost claims, have to be
substantiated and they are thoroughly examined, both techni-
cally and financially in order to minimise the risk of over-
declaration or wrong allocation of costs.
The Commission is committed to improving the clarity of the
definitions of eligible costs and the definition of works covered
by a decision. However, the Commission also has the firm
intention to keep the TEN-T funding mechanism as simple as
possible.
4.19. In the framework of the general review of the TEN-T
procedures, DG TREN will examine the possibility of elabo-
rating a more detailed standardised cost statement form, based
on the existing payment claim form.
Nevertheless, the absence of a standardised cost statement has
no bearing on the Member States’ capacities to exercise their
responsibilities in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation
(EC) No 2236/95.
It is clear, that during on the spot controls, judgement on the
eligibility of specific costs relating to specific actions within a
project has to be made case-by-case, whilst adhering to the
general cost eligibility criteria and principles of the TEN Glos-
sary.
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4.20. In addition, both the Regulation and the con-
tracts or annexes of the Commission decisions include
provisions (such as the duration of the co-financing
period for each action) that allow for different interpre-
tations (5). Some requirements (for instance with regard
to the publicising of EU co-financing) differ depending
on the legal relationship (i.e. Commission decisions or
contracts) between the Commission and the final ben-
eficiary. Such differences cannot otherwise be justified.
This simply adds unnecessary complexity to the pro-
gramme.
Official proceduresmanual not fully applied, no adequate
segregation of duties and insufficient IT-support pro-
vided for TEN-T actions
4.21. The officially approved administrative and finan-
cial procedures of DG TREN are not always followed for
the TEN-T programme. Instead, an unofficial and less
detailed TEN-T process description is used for the man-
agement of this programme. This is not in line with the
Commission’s internal control standards. (6)
4.22. Regarding evaluation and monitoring, the seg-
regation of duties is inadequate as officials evaluating
proposals are also responsible for monitoring the
retained projects. Only road traffic management pro-
posals are evaluated by two external experts who estab-
lish a ‘project assessment form’, which is later reviewed
by the desk officer. Also, the Court found evidence that
seconded national experts were in charge of evaluating
and monitoring projects submitted by their own Mem-
ber States, which presents the risk of a potential conflict
of interests.
4.20. The revised Commission decision text, as from 2002,
introduces fixed start and completion dates.
In those cases where Member State, implementing authority,
recipient and final beneficiary are notified of the Commission
Decision, the legal relationship with the final beneficiary is
the same irrespective of whether there is a contract in addition
to a Commission Decision or not. The Commission agrees
however, that provisions regarding certain issues, such as pub-
licity, are more specific in the contracts than in the Commis-
sion decisions.
4.21. In 2001 the TEN-T procedures had not been com-
pletely integrated in DG TREN’s official Manual of admin-
istrative and financial procedures. The procedures in use since
the adoption of the TEN-T legal basis in 1995 were still
applied. The second revision of the Manual is expected to be
completed by the end of 2002 and the new release will incor-
porate the procedures which are applicable to the TEN-T pro-
gramme.
4.22. The Commission confirms that the desk officers play
an important role in the evaluation of proposals and in the
monitoring of projects. However, regarding the selection pro-
cedure, the desk officer’s preliminary proposal for support for
an individual study/project is subject to extensive consulta-
tions within Commission Services before it becomes a final
proposal. The application of the practices followed in Road
Traffic Management will be examined as to their suitability
for expansion to other modes as well.
The evaluation andmonitoring of projects by seconded national
experts for projects submitted by their own Member States
cannot always be avoided. It is recognised that this situation
is not entirely satisfactory, and supervision by the hierarchy is
meant to minimise the risks.
(5) Regulation (EC) No 2236/95 as amended by the Regula-
tion (EC) No 1655/99: this is for instance the case when
using expressions such as ‘in general’, ‘as a general rule’,
‘indicative’, ‘in duly justified cases’ or ‘suitable’ without
identifying when exceptions to the general rule are to be
accepted.
(6) DG Budget — Central Financial Service, ‘Standards for
Internal Control within the Commission’s services’ (2 Feb-
ruary 2001): point 15 ‘Documentation of procedures’,
p. 18.
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4.23. The central IT system of DG TREN, which has
an interface to Sincom since early 2002, is not yet used
for the TEN-T programme. Three different databases
(providing information on proposals, evaluation and
project monitoring) exist and they can also be used for
the preparation of statistics on programme implemen-
tation. These three databases are incomplete, partly
duplicate information and lack certain basic functions
(such as progress and final reports, technical and finan-
cial appraisals related to studies or cost statements and
due dates). Moreover, the information contained in the
database which provides statistics on payments could
not be reconciled with Sincom, calling into question its
reliability.
Deficiencies in the operation of key controls
4.24. Tests of the operational key controls revealed
that some have not been operating effectively. In par-
ticular, deficiencies were identified in respect of:
— the acceptance of proposals received after the final
due date (7),
— the operation of the evaluation process, and
— the authorisation of cost-claim-based payments for
studies where ineligible costs had been claimed by
the final beneficiaries and accepted by the Commis-
sion following on-the-spot controls.
4.25. Furthermore interim and final payments were
authorised and paid by the Commission, although spe-
cific pre-conditions required to consider the action as
completed, or as one that had made sufficient progress,
had not been fulfilled at the time of the authorisation.
For example, technical reports and/or financial apprais
4.23. The three databases mentioned by the Court provide
information on proposals, evaluation and project monitoring,
thus are specific local applications for different purposes. The
exercise for the integration of TEN-T into the central DG
TREN IT project management system is under way. The first
phase of the integration process will be operational by end
2002.
4.24. There are cases, where the official final due date for
the acceptance of proposals has been extended either through
official correspondence with the Member States or during the
TEN-T Financial Assistance Committee meetings.
The occasional flexibility exercised with regard to the accep-
tance of proposals after the due date is linked largely to the
fact that there are different planning and budgetary timetables
and considerations in the Member States. Each request for
acceptance after the final due date is carefully examined and
approval is only granted if the case is fully justified.
See paragraph 4.22 above regarding the evaluation process.
On the basis of evidence provided by the final beneficiaries
and controlled by the Commission, the latter considers that no
ineligible costs have been accepted that have an influence on
the final amount paid. The Commission will review the cases
identified by the Court.
4.25. The obligation for Member States to submit apprais-
als to accompany final claim documentation was introduced
in the TEN-T decision in 1995 only for studies. Only the
recently proposed new revised decision text extends this obli-
gation to works.
(7) In addition the reception date is not systematically regis-
tered, making it nearly impossible to assess whether the
verification of this eligibility criterion is done correctly or
not.
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als from Member States were missing in 12 out of 19
cases but were required by Article 2.1 of Annex II to
Commission decisions. This resulted in payments not
being charged to the correct budgetary year.
4.26. In addition, the documentation on the controls
operated was not always adequate. Evaluation forms,
technical approvals and authorisation forms for pay-
ments and commitments (i.e. CECOF fiche) were not
always dated and signed and included in the file.
The audit concludes that, except for studies, assurance
can be given as to the legality and regularity of transac-
tions
4.27. Despite these weaknesses in internal controls, the
audit concludes that overall reliance can be placed on
the system and assurance can be given as to the legality
and regularity of transactions, except for payments for
the matters raised in paragraph 4.29 below.
4.28. Although all commitments audited were legal
and regular, the Court has the following observations to
make:
— the proposals were not always submitted within the
deadlines set by the Commission, and
— the evaluation process was in some cases not suf-
ficiently documented.
4.29. Payments were legal and regular except for stud-
ies, where in five out of the seven studies audited on-the-
spot, evidence of overpayment due to the inclusion of
non-eligible costs charged for work related to the con-
struction of infrastructure were identified. For direct
grants to investments, the audit found that, despite the
risk that costs may be overstated by final beneficiaries,
It is acknowledged that in a number of cases payments had
been released before the formal receipt of the required reports
because alternative evidence existed that the actions had pro-
gressed sufficiently. This evidence could be for instance the
result of a site visit by the responsible desk officer. As the
Commission agrees that formally the reports should have been
received before the release of the payment, the Manual of
administrative and financial procedures, which is under devel-
opment for the TEN-T part, will emphasise the necessity to
obtain the reports before making the payments.
4.26. The Commission has taken note of the Court’s find-
ing. The reinforcement of the formal documentation of the
operated controls and the archiving of all documents will
accompany the release of the updated Manual of administra-
tive and financial procedures.
4.28. In these cases an extension had been agreed as men-
tioned in paragraph 4.24.
The individual appraisal forms per project, which were intro-
duced in mid 2000 will facilitate an appropriate documenta-
tion of the evaluation process by the Commission services in
the future.
4.29. In the five cases mentioned by the Court the Com-
mission’s interpretation of the definition of eligible costs for
‘studies’ differs from the Court’s interpretation.
Article 4(1)(a) of TEN-T Regulation (EC) No 2236/95,
states that Community aid for projects may take the form of
co-financing of studies related to projects, including
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the declaration of ineligible costs for direct grants to
investments is unlikely to result in an overpayment by
the Commission. This is mainly due to:
— the limitation of the EU contribution to 10 % of the
total investment costs, and
— the fact that actual project costs are usually higher
than initially budgeted whereas a maximum EU
contribution is defined in the contract or Commis-
sion decision.
In addition, for some final payments not all the require-
ments for their release were observed. As a result, these
payments were charged to an incorrect budget year.
4.30. Moreover, the TEN-T programme is not being
implemented consistently since different rules can apply
to beneficiaries and ambiguity in some provisions may
lead to different interpretations.
Strengthening of the legal and control framework for the
TEN-T programme recommended
4.31. The Commission should aim for a homogeneous
implementation of the TEN-T programme, applying the
same provisions to all beneficiaries in all Member States.
The legal framework of the TEN-T programme should
be strengthened in order to improve the protection of
the Community’s financial interests. Where contracts
are not concluded with final beneficiaries, offer letters
could be implemented by Member States based on a
framework set by the Commission. These offer letters,
requiring awritten acceptance by the beneficiary, should
define the terms and conditions of the grant, thus
enhancing the beneficiaries’ awareness of the specific
requirements to be met when implementing the action.
preparatory, feasibility and evaluation studies, and other tech-
nical support measures for the studies. Under technical sup-
port measures, all preparatory phases concerning the techni-
cal, environmental and geological preparation ofmajor projects,
prior to construction, are being considered.
Development studies for traffic management applications or
preparatory construction works linked to the exploring of the
construction site, the construction of trial bore tunnels, drill-
ing or geotechnical investigations, are considered eligible as
technical support measures, qualifying for up to 50 % Com-
munity financial support. These pre-construction phases, entail
the highest risk element of a project and are necessary for the
award of building permits. It is obvious that the boundary
between preparatory construction works and regular construc-
tion works is not always easy to define. Therefore, in most
cases the Commission officials perform an on-the-spot visit to
decide case-by-case whether the beneficiaries classification of
the costs under preparatory works was acceptable.
As explained in paragraph 4.25, alternative evidence existed
to satisfy the Commission that actions had progressed suffi-
ciently and that payment could be released.
4.30. The same legal basis and decision text is applicable
to all beneficiaries receiving financial aid under TEN-T. To
avoid interpretation problems the Commission will produce a
Handbook for TEN-T users, based on the example of the
Cohesion Fund Manual.
4.31. The new Commission decision text introduces stricter
provisions and complements the existing legal framework.
The Legal Service of the Commission has given an opinion,
stating that it is not necessary to conclude contracts in addi-
tion to Commission Decisions. The Commission Decisions
are to be notified directly to both the Member State and the
final beneficiaries in accordance with Article 10 of Regula-
tion (EC)No 2236/95. The Commission acknowledges, how-
ever, that until the end of 2001 only the Member State was
notified, and the Member State informed the beneficiary.
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4.32. The Commission is also encouraged to develop
and implement clearer rules with regard to the eligibil-
ity of costs. For that purpose, existing rules applied for
similar types of infrastructure projects co-financed as
structural measures could be used as a basis. In particu-
lar, the definition of eligible costs should also include a
clear delimitation of which costs are eligible for studies
(in particular for costs associated with exploring the
construction site and preparatory construction works).
The Commission should also provide for standardised
cost statement forms. Ambiguous expressions should
be avoided when drafting the legal basis and/or contrac-
tual provisions.
4.33. While regular on-the-spot checks are already
performed by the Commission officials in charge of
monitoring TEN-T actions, it is recommended that these
controls should be complemented by ex-post financial
and technical audits (where appropriate, carried out by
DG TREN or external experts).
4.34. In order to comply with the Commission’s Inter-
nal Control Standards, DG TREN is also invited to apply
the procedures approved by its Director-General, modi-
fied where necessary to reflect the actual procedures in
place for managing the TEN-T programme. Operational
procedures should then be kept up-to-date.
4.35. DG TREN should rigorously apply eligibility cri-
teria for proposals (in particular with regard to the
reception dates) and strengthen the evaluation process
by widening the use of external experts, as well as prop-
erly documenting all controls operated.
4.32. As mentioned in paragraph 4.18, as from 2002, the
standard text of the TEN-T Commission Decision for studies
and projects has been substantially revised and provides more
details on eligible costs.
As explained in paragraph 4.29, Article (4)(1)(a) of Regula-
tion (EC)No 2236/95, states that Community aid for projects
may take the form of co-financing of studies related to projects,
including preparatory, feasibility and evaluation studies, and
other technical support measures for the studies.
The Commission will examine the possibility of producing a
more detailed standardised cost statement form as stated in
paragraph 4.19.
4.33. Financial control and technical verification visits on
the spot at the closing stage of projects have been a long-
standing practice for TEN-T. In general they are carried out
by the Commission departments in charge. Only in a few
exceptional cases have external experts been used. With the
entry into force in early 2002 of a framework contract cover-
ing technical assistant activities, including particular provi-
sions for audits on TEN-T projects, more use of external
resources is likely to be made.
In conformity with the Court’s recommendation DG TREN’s
central financial audit cell will include a sample of TEN-T
actions in its audit programme for the years 2002 to 2003.
4.34. As mentioned in paragraph 4.21 the revision of the
manual is in progress and the new release will incorporate the
procedures which are applicable to the TEN-T programme.
4.35. As mentioned in paragraph 4.24 late receipts of pro-
posal are justified by appropriate extensions.
Regarding the evaluation process a wider use of external
evaluators is a sensitive issue for reasons of confidentiality.
Further in depth discussion and consultation (including the
Member States) would be necessary.
The integration of the TEN-T procedures in the official manual
of procedures will clarify the requirements concerning the
appropriate documentation of controls.
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4.36. A migration from the current databases to the
central DG TREN IT system should be done as quickly
as possible, taking into account the specific require-
ments of TEN-T. In the meantime, solutions should be
sought on how to cope with key functions with regard
to proposal, contract and/or projectmanagement which
are as yet missing or incomplete in the current IT sys-
tems.
Continuing the system analysis of the fifth framework
programme
Nature of the expenditure and audit approach
4.37. Research activities financed under the EC section
of the fifth framework programme consist mainly of
indirect actions (about 93 % of the budget) carried out
through contracts with third parties co-financed by the
Community budget. The budget headings concerning
the four thematic and three horizontal programmes
(indirect actions) in the European Community (EC) sec-
tion of the fifth framework programme correspond to
payment appropriations of 2 366 million euro in the
budget for 2001, which represents more than 60 % of
the payment appropriations in subsection B6 Research
and technological Development.
4.38. The Community section of the fifth framework
programme is operated by five Research DGs (Research,
Information Society, Energy and Transport, Enterprise
and Fisheries). According to statistics provided by the
Commission, 11 836 contracts for fifth framework pro-
gramme indirect RTD actions with an EU contribution
of 10 974 million euro had been signed by the Commis-
sion before the end of December 2001.
4.39. In the context of the 2001 DAS, the Court con-
tinued and extended its analysis of the administrative
and control system of the fifth European Community
frameworkprogramme for research, technological devel-
opment and demonstration (RTD) activities. Whilst the
DAS specific appraisal in last year’s Annual Report (3)
aimed at a qualitative assessment of the strengths and
weaknesses of internal control at the Commission, the
main objective of this year’s audit was to provide a con-
clusion as to the legality and regularity of underlying
transactions at the final beneficiary level.
4.36. As mentioned in paragraph 4.23 the integration of
TEN-T into the central DG TREN IT project management
system is under way.
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4.40. In total, a sample of 19 contracts for indirect
RTD actions with cost- claim-based payments autho-
rised in 2001 were audited at the final beneficiary level.
This sample provided a coverage of all programmes and
most DGs and was intended to allow broad conclusions
to be drawn. The contracts selected (all of which were
included in the sample selected for the system analysis
of the fifth framework programme reported last year)
represent an EU contribution of up to 73,3million euro.
Significant incidence of overpayments mainly due to
beneficiaries not complying with the contractual provi-
sions
4.41. For research framework programmes, financial
contributions are granted based on claims for costs
actually incurred, duly justified and necessary for car-
rying out the indirect RTD action. The audit concluded
that, in all of the 19 contracts examined, costs had either
been overstated by the beneficiary or the beneficiary
was unable to justify the costs claimed. For the sample
audited a significant incidence of overdeclaration in the
cost statements audited was found, leading to a corre-
sponding rate of overpayments by the Commission.
4.42. The main reason for these overclaims was due
to the beneficiaries’ non-compliance with contractually-
defined obligations for the reimbursement of costs. In
particular it was found that:
— the supporting documentation (such as time records
for personnel costs) justifying the costs incurred was
either non-existent or inadequate,
— the calculation methodology for personnel costs
and overheads (for those beneficiaries participating
under the full cost model) was incorrect,
— the beneficiary charged budgeted rates rather than
actual costs, or average employment costs, which
deviated significantly from actual costs, and
— the beneficiary claimed ineligible expenditure (such
as VAT or subcontracting costs not approved by the
Commission) or transferred parts of the budget
between cost categories or contractors without the
mandatory authorisation of the Commission.
4.41. The Commission acknowledges that there were errors
in the cost statements of the beneficiaries audited by the Court.
The Commission continues to reinforce its efforts to reduce
such errors, both in the implementation of the fifth framework
programme and with a view to the sixth framework pro-
gramme (see replies 4.47 to 4.50).
4.42. The Court has identified key areas of difficulties for
beneficiaries to apply correctly and fully the contracts of the
fifth framework programme. The Commission acknowledges
that some of these may have created errors.
The Commission has taken and will continue to take initia-
tives to raise awareness among contractors in order to reduce
the significant number of errors which are due to misunder-
standing or misinterpretation of contractual conditions by
beneficiaries.
Specifically:
— the Commission agrees with the Court about the require-
ment of time recording (or records of presence). Alterna-
tive documentation fulfilling the terms of the contract has
to be taken into account,
— the calculation methodology for personnel costs and over-
heads has been applied incorrectly in some cases,
— the charge of budgeted rates rather than actual costs is
foreseen in the contract and if necessary needs to be cor-
rected in the final cost statement. With regard to the
choice of contractors between the use of actual or average
employment costs, only a significant difference
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Most of these irregularities can only be detected when
carrying out an audit on the premises of the contrac-
tor.
4.43. In three cases, overpayments were also caused
by administrative mistakes at the Commission (use of
the wrong exchange rate, incorrect encoding of cost
claims in IT systems, acceptance of expenditure outside
the eligibility period or cost categories not provided for
in the contract and the signing of contracts with ineli-
gible types of activities) which should have been pre-
vented or detected and subsequently corrected by the
internal control system of the DGs concerned.
The audit concludes that there are serious concerns about
the level of assurance that can be given as to the legality
and regularity of transactions at beneficiary level
4.44. Cost claim-based payments for indirect RTD
actions of the fifth framework programme recorded
during the year revealed a significant incidence of errors
mainly due to an overdeclaration of costs by final ben-
eficiaries. Based on the sample audited, no overall
improvement was noted as compared with the previous
framework programme (8).
4.45. Based on the audit of the Commission’s man-
agement system (covering mainly the parts of the sys-
tem from the submission of proposals up to the pay-
ment of advances), the Court concluded in its Annual
Report for the year 2000 that ‘only a limited assurance
can be derived from the internal control procedures in
place’ (9). The continuation and expansion of this work,
in respect of cost-claim based payments, found a
constitutes an error. The Commission insists that the sig-
nificance of a deviation between average and actual rates
can only be judged on a case-by-case basis. The assess-
ment of the significance needs to take the structure of per-
sonnel cost categories of the recipient into account, and
must maintain the objective of simplification. Neither the
use of budgeted rates nor that of average rates has to be
indicated by participants when submitting their cost state-
ments.
4.43. The cases of overpayment connected with an admin-
istrative error which have a financial impact identified by the
Court have been corrected and appropriate measures have
been taken to adjust the amounts in question.
4.44. The Commission agrees that overdeclaration contin-
ues to be an important issue. The first audit reports of the
Commission on a much larger scale will be available by the
end of 2002 and will enable further conclusions to be drawn.
4.45. Following the Court’s system audit of the year 2000
and also in the context of the ongoing financial reform, the
Commission has already improved several aspects of the inter-
nal control mechanisms.
The current cost system is undoubtedly complex, and a further
simplified approach has been proposed for the sixth frame-
work programme (see 4.47 to 4.50). Sanctions exist, but will
(8) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999.
(9) According to the Commission services, an auditable con-
tractor is defined as a contractor participating in an active
contract who has submitted at least one cost statement,
which is recorded in the central database of the DGs con-
cerned.
150 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 28.11.2002
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
sufficiently high incidence of errors to raise serious
concerns about the reliance that can be placed on the
control operated by the Commission to prevent or
detect and correct overdeclarations by final beneficia-
ries. The current system of cost reimbursement with
three main types of systems, i.e. additional cost (AC),
Full Cost (FC) and Full Cost Flat Rate (FF), and ten dif-
ferent categories for direct, indirect and coordination
costs, is too complex to be controlled effectively by the
Commission services. Given the limited number of
ex-post financial audits undertaken (with the objective
of auditing up to 10 % of all contractors during the
duration of the fifth framework programme) by, or on
behalf of, the Commission (see paragraph4.60), together
with the absence of contractually-defined sanctions,
there is little dissuasive effect to prevent beneficiaries
from overstating their actual costs.
4.46. Moreover, as far as the AC system (which pro-
vides for a 100 % reimbursement of the costs claimed)
is concerned, only costs additional to the recurring costs
have to be substantiated and justified to the Commis-
sion. In the case of contractors covered by this cost sys-
tem (mostly universities and public research institutes
without an appropriate cost accounting system) a veri-
fication of the reality and the extent of their co-financing
of indirect shared-cost RTD actions is, by definition,
impossible.
Simplification of the cost reimbursement system and the
introduction of more effective sanction mechanisms rec-
ommended
4.47. In order to reduce the risk of non-eligible expen-
diture being unintentionally or intentionally declared by
final beneficiaries and to allow for more accurate and
effective financial management of indirect RTD actions
by the Commission services, a fundamental simplifica-
tion of the cost reimbursement system in the forthcom-
ing sixth framework programme (2002 to 2006) is rec-
ommended. The three main types of cost systems (AC,
FC, and FF) should be replaced by a single system and
the ten cost categories should be reduced to three (i.e.
personnel, coordination costs and specific costs) with a
much wider use of flat rates:
— personnel costs for staff directly employed by the
beneficiary and carrying out scientific and
also be reinforced (see 4.51). At the same time the efforts of
explanation and communication, of significantly increasing
the coverage of on-the-spot audits ofcontractors in fifth frame-
work programme, of putting in place a more effective recu-
peration of amounts overcharged have been significant, and
will be reinforced in the light of the findings of the Court
4.46. The AC system is based on explicit provisions of the
legal base and provides for a technical facility to basically
those public bodies which do not have complex accounting
systems comparable to private companies. The substantiation
and verification of the co-financing of those contractors is
therefore excluded by definition through the explicit provision
of the legislator.
4.47. The proposal of the Court of Auditors has the merit
of genuinely simplifying procedures and at the same time
offering greater legal and financial certainty to the Commu-
nity and to contractors alike. It was proposed by Commission
departments when they were preparing the rules on participa-
tion and dissemination of results for the sixth framework pro-
gramme 2002 to 2006. This proposal for a new single cost
calculation system was rejected by the Council and Parlia-
ment.
While the Council acknowledged that this new method was
indeed simpler and more secure than those used in the fifth
framework programme, it saw in it the major disadvantages
of restricting the autonomy and flexibility of participants, and
of being financially ‘unfair’ for individual participants (= same
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technical work should be claimed on the basis of
actual costs (gross remuneration and related charges)
incurred and necessary for the project and the aver-
age number of productive hours negotiated before
the signature of the contract,
— coordination costs (which should cover the admin-
istrative and financial coordination of the indirect
RTD action, travel and subsistence costs, consum-
ables, computing and all indirect costs) should be
defined as a flat rate amount,
— other substantial specific costs would cover itemised
costs such as subcontracting, durable equipment
purchased or used specifically for the indirect action
or the protection of knowledge. However, given
their exceptional character, they must be negotiated
and clearly specified in the contract.
4.48. Such a drastically simplified cost reimbursement
system would allow improved planning for all parties to
the contract. In addition it would set the basis for a
more efficient and cost-effective external certification of
cost statements (as recommended in the Court’s Special
Report No 17/98 on the fourth framework programme
‘Joule-Thermie’ (10).
4.49. Alternatively, in particular where scientific and
technological deliverables can be clearly defined, the
Commission could negotiate value-based contributions
for specific activities within an indirect RTD action. Fol-
lowing this approach a pre-set Community financial
contribution per activity could be paid upon approval
of completion or receipt of the deliverables defined in
the contract.
Community financial contribution where efforts are the same)
compared with the methods used in the fifth framework pro-
gramme.
The Council and Parliament made it clear that this new
method could not be the only one in use for full-cost partici-
pants but that it might stand alongside a real full costs method
with no flat-rate component and based on ex post audit.
Commission departments are therefore bound to use simpli-
fication options other than those recommended by the Court
of Auditors.
4.48. As regards the certification of cost statements, both
the Commission’s proposal and the relevant Council and Par-
liament texts clearly state that participants’ costs in an indi-
rect action must be certified by an external auditor or, for
public-sector entities, by a competent and independent public
officer (Article 14 of the rules on participation and dissemi-
nation of the results of the sixth framework programme). The
experience of DG INFSO, DG ENTR and DG RTD’s pilot
projects in this area will be taken into account.
4.49. While the Commission’s amended proposal of
10 January 2002 explicitly included the possibility of apply-
ing the concept of value per activity, its intention was to resort
to this only in very specific and infrequent cases, and at the
discretion of the authorising officer where he considered it rel-
evant and appropriate.
On this point, the text adopted by the Council and Parlia-
ment on the rules for participation and for the dissemination
of results states explicitly that value per activity may be used
only with the agreement of the participants (Article 14(2))
and by way of exception to the general principle of real costs.
(10) OJ C 356, 20.11.1998.
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4.50. As recommended in the Court’s Special Report
No 9/99 on ‘FAIR’ (11) (covering one of the specific pro-
grammes of the fourth framework programme), model
contracts for indirect RTD actions should provide for
participants to bear unlimited joint and several liability
for the use made of the Community financial contribu-
tion (with the exception of participants such as public
universities who cannot for legal reasons be held jointly
and severally liable).
4.51. Finally, as stated in last year’s Annual Report, the
Commission is encouraged to protect the Community’s
financial interests by imposing the sanctions provided
for in Council Regulation (EC, Euratom)
No 2988/95 (12). In addition to the recovery of the
wrongly obtained advantage, these sanctions should be
visible and provide for proportionate administrative
measures and penalties in order to be both effective and
dissuasive. These sanctions could be defined in model
contracts or introduced by means of a specific sectoral
rule.
4.50. The principle of unlimited joint and several liability
of participants was explicitly contained in Article 13 of the
Commission’s amended proposal of 10 January 2002 on the
rules for participation and for dissemination of the results.
The unlimited scope of liability was dropped at the request of
the Council and Parliament.
However, in the text adopted by the Council and Parliament,
the principle of joint and several liability is contained in
Article 13, even though it is not referred to as such.
The text also defines the way in which this liability can be put
into effect, instruments and situations being clearly distin-
guished.
4.51. The reference to Regulation (EC, Euratom)
No 2988/95, which the Commission made in its proposal,
also appears in the text adopted by the Council in Article 19
of the rules on participation and dissemination of results. In
addition the standard contracts will, where appropriate, pro-
vide for the penalties to which the Court of Auditors alludes,
given that for the time being there are no sectoral rules.
Furthermore, on a more general level, the Commission’s action
plan for 2001 to 2003 on the fight against fraud (COM
(2001) 254 final) envisages the preparation of an initiative
to integrate administrative measures and sanctions in the field
of direct expenditure. This initiative should provide the pos-
sibility to impose administrative measures and sanctions in
the field of direct expenditure. This initiative raises several
legal questions, i.e. concerning the scope of new rules and pro-
cedural aspects (1), which the Commission is examining.
Within the framework of Actions 73 (Advice on contracting),
74 (Contracts database) and 94 (‘Fraud proofing’ of legisla-
tion and contract management) of the White Paper on the
reform of the Commission, a process of revision of contracts
is under way in order to include clear clauses for the protec-
tion of the Communities financial interests (standard clauses,
concerning checks and sanctions, making them more effec-
tive).
(1) See also the Commission’s Annual Report 2001 on the fight
against fraud (COM(2002) 348 final).
(11) OJ C 92, 30.3.2000.
(12) OJ L 312, 18.12.1995, p. 1.
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ANALYSIS OF AUDITS CARRIED OUT BY THE
COMMISSION IN INTERNAL POLICIES AND
RESEARCH
Decrease in the number of completed audits
4.52. A comparison of the information received from
the 13 DGs involved in internal policies reveals that in
2001 the number of 392 completed audits was lower
than in 2000, when 537 audits were finalised (see
Table 4.5). The number of contracts audited in the table
shows an increase from 872 to 892 and the value of the
contracts audited increased by more than 50 %.
4.53. However, exlcuding DG Justice and Home
Affairs’ (JAI) intensification of its internal control of
training, exchange and cooperation programmes
(articles B5-8 2 0) which are not ex post audits of con-
tracts, the average number of contracts audited for the
other DGs decreased by 28 %. Apart from DG JAI, both
the audits completed and the number of audits effected
by or on behalf of DG INFSO increased by 50 % from
2000 to 2001. The overall increase in the value of
audited contracts was mainly due to the increase of DG
TRENs audits which increased from 209 million euro to
1 026 million euro (see Table 4.5).
4.54. A considerable decrease in the number of audits
completed and the number of contracts audited was
noted in particular for DG Education and Culture
(DG EAC). Considering DG EAC has more than 20 000
open contracts, and given the significant audit findings
by the Court in the case of the Socrates and Youth for
Europe programmes (see paragraphs 4.64 to 4.72), the
audit of only 12 contracts in 2001 (compared with the
audit of 172 contracts in 2000 ) is insufficient.
4.55. According to theCommission, the actual amount
recoverable as a result of the 2000 audits was given as
25,5 million euro. Excluding the veterinary and phy-
tosanitary actions managed by DG SANCO, the recov-
erable amounts increased considerably from 10,4 mil-
lion euro to 16,2 million euro (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6).
This is mainly due to the more intensive audit activities
4.52. Taking into account all the indicators presented, the
Commission feels that its audit activities are generally stable.
4.53. The Commission considers that the wide year-on-year
variations for a particular DG are explained by cyclical fac-
tors.
4.54. In the case of DG EAC, the reason for the fall in the
number of audits carried out in 2001 compared with 2000
is that the DG’s audit resources were redirected towards the
internal audit function, in line with the administrative reform
of the Commission. At the end of 2001, DG EAC concluded
framework contracts with three audit firms in order to increase
significantly the number of audits of beneficiaries and any
intermediaries involved. In the first half of 2002 alone, nearly
one hundred audits were contracted out to these firms.
4.55. The size of the outstanding amount concerned is
linked to the increase in audit efforts resulting in an increase
in recoverable amounts in 2001.
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Table 4.5. — Audits completed by the Commission in 2000 and 2001 (1)
(Mio EUR)
Directorate-General
Number of audits completed Number of contracts audited Number of open contracts Value of audited contracts Value of open contracts
Amounts recoverable or
reduced payments as a result
of the audits
2000 (2) 2001 2000 (2) 2001 2000 (2) 2001 2000 (2) 2001 2000 (2) 2001 2000 (2) 2001
AGRI — Agriculture 4 4 (6) (6) 550 387 12,29 12,94 73,66 69,40 (6) (6)
EAC — Education and
Culture 106 11 172 12 25 306 20 165 56,29 1,87 654,04 670,56 0,92 (9) 0,44
EMPL — Employment and
Social Affairs 13 (2) 14 24 (2) 36 1 742 (2) 1 697 7,35 (2) (3) 8,15 (3) 114,77 (2) (3) 125,64 (3) 0,10 (2) 0,65
TREN — Energy and
Transport 35 21 93 55 4 774 2 996 209,17 1 025,86 1 656,20 (3) 2 124,65 (3) 1,28 (9) 1,67 (9)
ENTR — Enterprise 8 2 37 12 746 2 857 53,60 3,75 181,10 451,86 0,15 0,21
ENV — Environment 30 31 40 39 2 505 2 345 12,56 21,47 295,12 308,44 0,10 0,78
FISH — Fisheries 5 4 13 19 188 211 7,04 4,51 194,53 125,80 0,03 0,05
(8) 3 4 9 13 13 22 27,60 35,40 95,84 91,01 — 0,02
JAI — Justice and Home
Affairs 64 (5) 5 65 (6) 269 (7) 713 754 4,26 (5) 1,78 31,95 30,87 0,45 0,06
SANCO — Health and
Consumer Protection 8 12 18 25 978 712 3,03 5,65 85,48 93,26 0,05 0,21
(4) 10 14 12 14 n.a. n.a. 96,65 109,21 (7) (7) 15,03 (9) 10,18
INFSO — Information
Society 25 38 66 99 4 765 (2) 4 502 40,09 66,60 1 481,60 (2) (3) 1 657,80 (3) 2,00 (2) 5,17
MARKT — Internal Market 1 0 1 0 175 268 (6) 0,00 8,79 8,54 0,00 0,00
RTD — Research 220 232 317 299 11 358 14 441 820,20 699,80 3 387,00 4 302,00 5,30 6,90
TAXUD — Taxation and
Customs Union 5 0 5 0 164 57 0,58 0,00 44,10 33,84 0,04 (2) 0,00
TOTAL 537 392 872 892 52 518 50 660 1 350,71 1 996,99 8 123,08 10 093,67 25,45 26,34
(1) Definitions used in generating this table:
— number of audits completed: number of financial audits where a final audit report was issued during the year,
— number of open contracts: number of contracts signed in the year that have not yet been completed, plus the total number of contracts that were open at the beginning of the year that were not completed during the year. The word
’contract’ denoted both contracts (either a shared-cost action or a contract awarded through the public procurement procedures) and subsidies (where a financial agreement has been reached). A ‘completed contract’ is a contract
where the terms of the contract have been fulfilled, all financial and technical reviews have been completed and the final payment has been made,
— value of audited contracts: the value of only the contractor’s share of the contract audited on the spot,
— amount recoverable: amounts calculated in the on-the-spot audits as recoverable and evidenced in the audit reports.
(2) See 2000 Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000, Table 4.3a. In certain cases, data had subsequently been modified.
(3) Commission’s share only.
(4) Veterinary and phytosanitary actions. Value of audited contracts means here claims of the Member States.
(5) In the table prepared for the year 2000, the number of ’audits completed’ included those files where a final check of the supporting documents submitted at the final payment stage was made.
(6) Not specified, or not available.
(7) Includes Internal Audit Capability examination of internal control systems in place for budget line B5-8 2 0 audited on a sample basis (265 contracts).
(8) Fishery control measures. ‘Contract’ here means programme of a Member State; ‘value of audited contracts’ here means value of audited items within a programme; ‘value of open contracts’ here means the total value of the pluriannual
measures for all Member States.
(9) The amounts recoverable are indicative only.
Source: Commission.
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Table 4.6. — Recovery status
(1 000 EUR)
Directorate-General
Amounts recoverable or
reduced payments as a
result of the audits (1)
Actual recovery as at 31 December 2001
2000 Deducted from furtherpayments
Actually recovered due
to a recovery order
Not yet recovered;
recovery order issued,
but repayment
outstanding
Not yet recovered;
recovery order not yet
issued or adjustment still
outstanding
Not recoverable TOTAL
AGRI — Agriculture (2) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
EAC — Education and Culture 920,00 20,00 250,00 480,00 170,00 — 920,00
EMPL — Employment and Social
Affairs
100,64 (5) — 23,89 — 74,74 2,01 100,64
TREN — Energy and Transport 1 280,72 (4) 77,02 14,44 — 1 074,42 — 1 165,88
ENTR — Enterprise 153,00 152,16 — 0,96 — — 153,12
ENV — Environment 100,00 29,95 25,52 12,79 39,39 — 107,65
FISH — Fisheries 33,50 33,50 — — — — 33,50
JAI — Justice and Home Affairs 452,00 400,00 — — — 53,00 453,00
SANCO — Health and Consumer
Protection
49,00 49,00 — — — — 49,00
(3) 15 025,00 (4) 15 602,00 — — — — 15 602,00
INFSO — Information Society 2 000,00 (5) — 500,84 1 270,37 197,18 — 1 968,39
RTD — Research 5 300,00 2 640,49 575,39 926,11 1 080,92 54,72 5 277,63
TAXUD — Taxation and Customs
Union
38,71 (5) — 36,90 — 1,81 — 38,71
TOTAL 25 452,57 19 004,12 1 426,98 2 690,23 2 638,46 109,73 25 869,52
(1) As reported by the Commission; see 2000 Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000, Table 4.3a.
(2) Not specified.
(3) Veterinary and phytosanitary actions.
(4) The amounts recoverable are indicative only.
(5) Modified by the Commission.
NB: n.a. = not available.
Source: Commission.
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of the five Research DGs responsible for the manage-
ment of the research framework programmes, account-
ing for recoverable amounts of 14 million euro (see
paragraphs 4.57 to 4.60). Particularly in the case of DG
INFSO, the recoverable amounts increased significantly
from 2,0 million euro to 5,2 million euro. As far as the
veterinary and phytosanitary actions managed by DG
SANCO are concerned, the recoverable amounts
decreased from 15,0 million euro in 2000 to 10,2 mil-
lion euro in 2001.
4.56. However,more than 5,3 million euro (more than
20 %) of the amount estabablished as recoverable at the
end of 2000 had not yet been recovered as at 31 Decem-
ber 2001. Specifically DG RTD, DG INFSO and DG
TREN had the recovery of considerable amounts out-
standing (see Table 4.6).
Intensified audit activities in the area of research have
not yet reached the 10 % target
4.57. Since 1999 the five Research DGs (DG RTD, DG
INFSO, DG TREN, DG ENTR and DG FISH) operating
the RTD Framework Programmes have significantly
intensified their ex-post financial audits of final benefi-
ciaries. This was suggested by the Court in its Annual
Report concerning the financial year 1998 (13). The
overall target defined by the Research DGs is to audit
10 % of the contractors (14) during an RTD Framework
Programme. For this purpose, and given the limited
number of human resources, the Commission signed a
framework contract with an external audit firm. An
examination of these reports showed a distinct improve-
ment in terms of the time needed to produce and exploit
them, which was reduced, on average, from 23 to five
months during the period 1999 to 2001. This facilitates
the adoption of adjustment measures where necessary.
4.56. Overall nearly 80 % of amounts recoverable have
been recovered. The main reason in the research area for the
outstanding balance is that cost statements against which
adjustments will be made had not yet arrived at 31 December
2001. The Commission has refined its recovery procedures
and there is an intensive and improved follow-up in progress
to recover all outstanding balances. In the future with regard
to indirect RTD actions of the fifth framework programme,
recoveries can be made against other contracts for indirect
RTD actions signed with the same beneficiary.
4.57. The Commission welcomes the statement of the Court
that the average number of months needed to close an audit
has dropped from 23 in 1999 to five months in 2001. This
reduction is in itself a positive indicator of the Commissions
efforts.
(13) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1998, para-
graph 4.19 and reply of the Commission to this para-
graph.
(14) Written Commission reply to the questionnaire of the
Budgetary Control Committee of the European Parlia-
ment, paragraph 4.3, dated 21 December 2001. See also
Court of Auditors, Annual Report concerning the finan-
cial year 1999. Reply of the Commission to para-
graph 4.23.
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4.58. In 2001 DG RTD (which manages approxi-
mately two-thirds of all contracts for indirect RTD
actions) finalised 232 audits on 299 contracts for indi-
rect RTD actions under the fourth framework pro-
gramme (see Table 4.7). More than 94 % of these audits
were by an external auditor.
4.59. According to DG RTD, unwarranted payments
amounting to a cumulative total of 6,3 million euro had
to be repaid to the Commission (see Table 4.8). The
over-declaration rate established on the basis of the
audits conducted by DG RTD rose from 4,8 % of the
expenditure audited in 1999 to 8,7 % in 2001. The
Court notes, contrary to the intention expressed by the
Commission in its replies to the Annual Report on the
4.58. The audit firms act as contractors for the Commis-
sion. The Commission has ultimate responsibility in all cases.
See also paragraph 4.61.
4.59. The Commission points out that the rates of 2001
are the results of its new and more comprehensive audit strat-
egy. The Commission now considers that it is not appropriate
to measure progress in the area of audit on the basis of seek-
ing reduction in the rates of overdeclaration.
Table 4.7. — DG Research (RTD) — Statistics on audit reports examined and time-to-audit analysis
1999
Type Number of auditreports examined
Period from audit start to date of
report (in months)
Period from date of report to final
assessment (in months)
Total period from audit start to final
assessment (in months)
Information avail-
able for number
of audits
Average
(months)
Information avail-
able for number
of audits
Average
(months)
Information avail-
able for number
of audits
Average
(months)
Internal (1) 21 9 8,7 10 8,4 21 25,4
External (2) 25 17 13,6 20 11,7 24 21,2
Total 46 (3) 26 11,9 30 10,6 45 23,1
2001
Type Number of auditreports examined
Period from audit start to date of
report (in months)
Period from date of report to final
assessment (in months)
Total period from audit start to final
assessment (in months)
Information avail-
able for number
of audits
Average
(months)
Information avail-
able for number
of audits
Average
(months)
Information avail-
able for number
of audits
Average
(months)
Internal (1) 13 8 2,3 11 1,7 9 5,2
External (2) 219 217 3,8 218 0,9 217 4,7
Total 232 (4) 225 3,7 229 1,0 226 4,7
(1) Carried out by the DG Research services.
(2) Carried out by external audit firms.
(3) Extensive sample of total number of audit reports (74).
(4) Total number of audit reports.
Source: Analyses made by the Court based on the Commission’s information.
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Table 4.8. — DG Research — Summary tables on audits and adjustments (1)
(1 000 EUR)
1999
Total
number of
audits
Audits not
included
in the
analysis (2)
Number
of audits
analysed
Total
audited
amount
Adjustments in favour of the EU Adjustments in favour of the contractor No adjustments
Number
of audits
% of
audits (3)
Audited
amount
Adjust-
ment
Level of
adjust-
ment on
audited
amount
Number
of audits
% of
audits (3)
Audited
amount
Adjust-
ment
Level of
adjust-
ment on
audited
amount
Number
of audits
% of
audits (3)
Audited
amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Internal
audits 21 5 16 12 053,7 12 75,0 % 3 995,8 544,6 13,6 % 2 12,5 % 432,6 7,2 1,7 % 2 12,5 % 7 625,3
External
audits 25 10 15 9 419,7 10 66,7 % 7 300,3 491,5 6,7 % 2 13,3 % 1 117,6 31,5 2,8 % 3 20,0 % 1 001,8
Total 46 15 31 21 473,5 22 71,0 % 11 296,2 1 036,2 9,2 % 4 71,0 % 1 550,3 38,7 2,5 % 5 16,1 % 8 627,0
Level of adjustment in favour of the EU on
total audited amount 4,8 %
Level of adjustment in favour of the
contractor on total audited amount 0,2 %
(1) For the preparation of this table the adjustment considered is the global one for the audit, not the individual for each of the projects audited.
(2) Concerns audits not requiring a review of cost claims.
(3) Over number of audits stated in column 3.
2001
Total
number of
audits
Audits not
included
in the
analysis (2)
Number
of audits
analysed
Total
audited
amount
Adjustments in favour of the EU (1) Adjustments in favour of the contractor (1) No adjustments (1)
Number
of audits
% of
audits (3)
Audited
amount
Adjust-
ment
Level of
adjust-
ment on
audited
amount
Number
of audits
% of
audits (3)
Audited
amount
Adjust-
ment
Level of
adjust-
ment on
audited
amount
Number
of audits
% of
audits (3)
Audited
amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Internal
audits 13 2 11 4 223,2 5 45,5 % 2 212,2 448,1 20,3 % 1 9,1 % 372,9 59,3 15,9 % 6 54,5 % 1 638,1
External
audits 219 3 216 68 346,7 150 69,4 % 46 275,1 5 861,4 12,7 % 59 27,3 % 16 431,4 1 306,8 8,0 % 29 13,4 % 5 640,2
Total 232 5 227 72 569,9 155 68,3 % 48 487,3 6 309,5 13,0 % 60 26,4 % 16 804,3 1 366,1 8,1 % 35 15,4 % 7 278,3
Level of adjustment in favour of the EU on
total audited amount 8,7 %
Level of adjustment in favour of the
contractor on total audited amount 1,9 %
(1) For the preparation of this table the adjustment considered is the global one for the audit, not the individual one for each of the projects audited. As the audits usually cover several projects, different kinds of adjustment are possible
within the same audit (adjustment in favour of the EU, adjustment in favour of the contractor, no adjustment). To avoid double counting of the audited amounts, for those audits where different adjustments or no adjustments were
noted, the way the amounts were split up was done with reference to the project. For the same reason, the sum of the number of audits of columns 5, 10 and 15 does not correspond to the total stated in column 3. To get the correct
figure one has to deduct the number of audits where different adjustments were made.
(2) Concerns audits of four fusion projects and one audit of the Marie Curie Fellowship Association.
(3) Over number of audits stated in column 3.
Source: Analyses made by the Court based on the Commission’s information.
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financial year 1999 (15), that the efforts undertaken by
it to carry out checks have not resulted in a reduction
of the overdeclaration rate but in better identification of
the amounts overdeclared.
4.60. On the other hand, the Court found that the tar-
get defined by the five Research DGs of auditing 10 %
of the contractors during the fifth research framework
programme would be difficult to achieve despite the
significant increase in the audits performed. According
to figures provided by DG RTD, the number of audits
completed in 2001 and 2000 was 9,2 % and 8,5 % of
the auditable population of contractors (16), respec-
tively. It should also be noted that the definition of ‘aud-
itable population’ used by the Commission results in
significantly less than 10 % of indirect RTD actions or
cost statements being audited.
4.61. Furthermore, the framework contract signed
with the external audit firm acting on behalf of the
Commission provides that audit findings reported to
the Commission should be agreed with the audited ben-
eficiary. The Court found that in its assessment of
reported audit findings the Commission relies exclu-
sively on the audit firm’s working documents and
reports.
4.60. The Commission believes it will be able to meet the
target of auditing 10 % of contractors. Whereas the commit-
ment period for the fifth framework programme period ends
at the end of 2002, the auditing activities will continue
beyond this date as many cost statements of the framework
programme will only be submitted later.
The projection for 2002 for DG RTD is to close about 280
audits. With this DG RTD is approaching its target.
4.61. The framework contract signed with the external audit
firms requires that it ‘will discuss with the audited organisa-
tion the adjustments made… if the audited organisation dis-
agrees, … the contractor should obtain a written declara-
tion… and annex it to the audit report.’ This does not mean
that audit reports are always agreed.
According to the framework contract there is a coordination
structure which supports the overall network of auditors con-
ducting the individual audits. This coordination structure is in
close contact with the Commission services, and ensures a har-
monised audit process across the member states as well as
compliance with the Commission audit standards laid down
in the contract. The external audit firm’s adherence to profes-
sional standards and to the Commission’s audit guidelines
and manuals are verified for each audit by Commission audi-
tors when reviewing the draft audit reports.
(15) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, reply
of the Commission to paragraph 4.37.
(16) The auditable population of contractors means contrac-
tors participating in an active contract who have submit-
ted at least one cost statement recorded in the central
databases of the respective DG.
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FOLLOW-UP OF PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS
Direct management by DG Employment
4.62. The Court had observed the following manage-
ment weaknesses in the past (17) within DG Employ-
ment: lack of harmonisation of procedures; lack of
evaluation of the contractor’s financial situation; lack of
evidence of checks on the total aid applied for; lack of
guidelines on the reports to be supplied; lack of finan-
cial guarantees when large advances were disbursed.
4.63. Following these observations the Commission
established a vade-mecumon subsidies andDGEmploy-
ment developed procedures and guidelines for direct
management in which it included standards for the
financial statements that are to be provided. All the
same, there are still some weaknesses: the financial situ-
ations of contractors are not systematically examined;
checks on aid applications are not documented; there
are no guidelines for the intermediate and final imple-
mentation reports which contractors are required to
supply.
SUMMARY OF SPECIAL REPORT NO 2/2002
CONCERNING SOCRATES AND YOUTH FOR
EUROPE (18)
4.64. The Socrates and Youth for Europe programmes
have been allocated budgets of 920 million euro and
126 million euro respectively. They have contributed to
a strengthening of cooperation between universities in
the European Union and in the other participant coun-
tries and have made multicultural exchange activities
possible for the benefit of young people.
4.62 and 4.63. The Commission is pursuing its efforts to
remedy the shortcomings found by the Court in the field of
direct management. It would stress the existence within its
departments, and more specifically in DG Employment, of:
— an active financial training policy, widespread dissemina-
tion of information to financial managers via web tech-
nology and access to various databases enabling the
evaluation committees set up for each invitation to tender/
call for proposals to assess the financial soundness of a
potential beneficiary or contractor at an earlier stage,
— networks of financial managers, led by DG Employment’s
financial unit, which are charged with examining certain
specific issues and establishing harmonised procedures
and guidelines for all authorising departments in the DG.
The issues referred to by the Court at point 4.63 are
being discussed within these networks that were set up as
part of the Commission’s financial reform.
4.64 and 4.65. Certain contextual factors cast light on the
design and management of these programmes, which were
considerably more generously funded than the preceding ones
and whose annual funding grew by 39 % between 1995 and
1999. As they were the first programmes open to the associ-
ated countries, management was significantly complicated;
they were also mass programmes subject to severe constraints,
(17) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1995, and in
particular paragraphs 6.129 et seq (OJ C 340, 12.11.1996).
(18) Special Report No 2/2002 (OJ C 136, 7.6.2002).
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4.65. Nevertheless, the Court’s audit has revealed
weaknesses in the design of the two programmes and
shortcomings in the management of their implementa-
tion.
Design weaknesses
4.66. The two programmes Socrates and Youth for
Europe (YfE) both suffer from shortcomings in their
design. The design of the Socrates programme, in par-
ticular, is complex, with a heterogeneous array of 38
actions, subactions and measures. In consequence the
programme was interpreted in different ways and coop-
eration between the Member States became more com-
plicated. Likewise, the absence of definitions of criteria
and parameters has made it difficult to evaluate the
results obtained following implementation of the pro-
grammes. Furthermore, the design did not include an
appropriate framework for producing synergy from the
various Community programmes.
4.67. The Commission manages a number of mea-
sures from Brussels, which, for this reason, are referred
to as centralised, through a technical assistance office
(TAO), while those subject to decentralisedmanagement
in the Member States and other beneficiary countries
are run through national agencies. In both cases, the
management system was marked by various types of
shortcomings.
notably as regards the timetable; in addition, they were some-
times addressed to beneficiaries who were somewhat less orga-
nised than for other Community measures. Against this back-
ground, we should not underestimate the very real tension
between ensuring rigorous management and the need to adopt
user-friendly modes of management which ‘respect’ the prin-
ciple of proportionality, having regard to the generally very
small sums involved and the beneficiaries concerned, and the
desire for simplification expressed by all parties involved in the
programmes.
These programmes directly benefited over one million persons,
in terms of mobility, and almost 10 000 cooperation projects.
They helped to boost cooperation in their specific fields, along
with other, more political, measures, which they rendered pos-
sible. All these parallel developments put great pressure on the
Commission’s inadequate human resources and explain the
need to rely on alternative management methods (which have
already been redefined for the future in the framework of the
reform).
4.66. These two programmes already constitute a first
attempt to rationalise Community measures in the field of
education and youth policy. Socrates, in particular, which cov-
ered all the levels of education set out in the new Article 126
of the EC Treaty was the successor to no fewer than five dis-
parate actions or programmes. The result may have been a
complex architecture, but this did not act as a hindrance to
participation in the programmes. These programmes have
been simplified with the entry into force of the new genera-
tion (Socrates II and Youth), and improvements have been
made as regards evaluation and cooperation with other Com-
munity programmes.
4.67. The two programmes are mass programmes involv-
ing thousands of transactions annually (generally for small
sums of money). The Commission did not have sufficient
internal resources for direct internal management, hence the
reliance (degressively over the period) on a technical assistance
office (TAO), which was constantly supervised and monitored.
Because of their closeness to the beneficiaries and the volume
of operations to be managed, the Commission also relied on
national agencies; on the basis of experience in implementing
the Socrates and Youth for Europe programmes, this decen-
tralised instrument was significantly reinforced for the new
generation of programmes.
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4.68. The delegation of responsibilities to the TAO
gave rise to weaknesses which the Court was to come
across repeatedly: irregularities in the delegation of
responsibility, both with regard to the principle of del-
egation and the form its implementation took, various
confusions of interest and risks for the Community’s
assets, and the costly nature of the management. The
situations which arose from this were, however, noth-
ing like as serious as those encountered in other Com-
munity programmes.
4.69. With regard to the decentralised actions, their
implementation suffered both from the absence of a
legal framework setting out the precise division of
responsibilities between the Commission and the Mem-
ber States and of an appropriate status for the NAs,
which, in the majority of cases, did not have adequate
means at their disposal to carry out the tasks entrusted
to them.
Delays and shortcomings in implementation
4.70. Because of the time required by the legislator to
adopt the relevant decisions, the start of the two pro-
grammes was delayed and there were delays in the
implementation of new actions because of the lack of
structures and of an appropriate information policy.
The cumbersome nature of the management system
caused additional delays in implementation of the pro-
grammes, the main consequence of which was to make
achievement of the general objective of prefinancing
the projects illusory. In fact, the beneficiaries sometimes
did not receive Community aid until after the projects
had been carried out. The accumulated delays made it
impossible to close the actions by the deadlines set in
the financial framework agreements. The management
of these agreements was, in general, inadequate. Imple-
mentation was hampered by the use of unsuitable IT
network systems.
4.68. The general question of reliance on external assis-
tance in the form of a TAO has been at the heart of the inter-
institutional debate for several months, and new perspectives
have been developed for the future; the Commission has
already indicated that in the future it will rely on other instru-
ments to manage the education and youth programmes. No
such possibilities were available in 1995, and so the Com-
mission had to rely on a TAO, as for other programmes. An
in-depth audit by Financial Control recognised the quality of
this organisation, even entrusting to it, under its control,
instruments which the draft reform of the Financial Regula-
tion says cannot be delegated.
4.69. Despite this insufficient legal supervision, the Com-
mission took various measures to improve the effectiveness of
reliance on networks of national agencies. For the future it has
significantly strengthened the mechanism, with the entry into
force of the new programmes: contractual relations with the
national agencies are now part of a strict legal framework,
which lays down the obligations of the Member States as
regards ensuring that the agencies it nominates are properly
funded.
4.70. To take account of the late adoption of the legal bases
and the constraints of a timetable which is often based on the
academic year, the Commission has to have recourse to tran-
sitional measures to avoid any interruption in the coopera-
tion established via earlier programmes and actions. The
Commission recognises how difficult it is to speed up its
financing decisions, because of the huge mass of dossiers, the
complexity of the management rules (notably in the wake of
enlargement of the programmes to applicant countries) and
the complexity of the internal and external consultation pro-
cess. However, significant improvements have been made dur-
ing the lifetime of the programmes, which have also made it
possible to prepare more balanced proposals for the new pro-
grammes.
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4.71. Management shortcomings were found in the
majority of the 27 national agencies audited and the
TAO, from the selection of projects to the monitoring
of their implementation. These failings were aggravated
by the lack of any genuine control and evaluation cul-
ture on the part of the managing bodies, both national
and Community. For instance, the audit identified sev-
eral projects where the Court notified the European
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) of suspicions of fraud. On a
more general level, these weaknesses had negative con-
sequences for the results and the overall impact of the
measures, although they cannot always be quantified
due to the absence of relevant statistical data. This is the
case for the Youth for Europe programme, which it is
impossible to verify whether the wish expressed by the
European legislator, that help should be given to disad-
vantaged young people, has been fulfilled.
4.72. Evaluation reportswere delayed and their impact
remains questionable. The contracting procedure and
the management and monitoring of study and evalua-
tion contracts revealed serious deficiencies and irregu-
larities occurred at both Commission and contractors
level.
RECOMMENDATIONS
4.73. With regard tobudgetarymanagement, theCom-
mission should continue to improve its presentation of
the revenue and expenditure account by giving explana-
tions for those budget headings where either there is a
considerable variation between the final budget appro-
priations and the initial budget adopted by the Parlia-
ment or the utilisation of appropriations falls below a
certain level.
4.71. The Commission concedes certain weaknesses inman-
agement which it is endeavouring to correct in the framework
of the new programmes, while stressing the impact and results
of this first generation of programmes. The various analysis
and evaluation exercises, including those conducted by certain
Member States, and the existence of intergovernmental initia-
tives such as the Sorbonne and Bologna Declarations (signed
by all the participating countries and acknowledging the
impact of the Socrates programme on their education sys-
tems), testify to the major impact of this programme. As
regards the Youth for Europe programme the Commission
considers, on the basis of the conclusions of the external
ex-post evaluation of the programme, that the objective laid
down by the legislator in favour of young disadvantaged people
has been achieved. As regards the dossiers of which OLAF has
been informed, the Commission will take the appropriate
measures in due course.
4.72. The question of adapting the evaluation cycle to the
life cycle of a programme is a general problem, having regard
to the succession of programmes and the deadlines for nego-
tiating the legal bases; in this connection, the few months’
delay are without consequence. Rather, evaluation should be
seen as a continuous progress whose conclusions are taken
into account not only when preparing a new proposal for a
legal basis, but also in the context of implementing the pro-
grammes. Numerous improvements which the Commission
wishes to introduce into the management of the new pro-
grammes derive from the evaluation work done, at various
times, on these two programmes.
4.73. The Commission appreciates the Court’s statement
that the Financial Management Report 2001 has generally
again improved in form and content.
The purpose of the Financial Management Report is to give
an overview of the budget implementation in a readable form
and with a manageable workload for the Commission Ser-
vices. The above selection of budget lines and programmes
implies that not all budget lines are commented upon in detail
in the Report. However, such information is available in spe-
cific reports by the Services concerned or on the basis of ad hoc
requests.
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4.74. For the TEN-T programme, the Commission
should strengthen the legal and control framework in
order to improve the protection of the Community’s
financial interests (for instance requiring offer letters
betweenMember States and final beneficiaries and devel-
oping and implementing clearer rules with regard to the
eligibility of costs). The evaluation of proposals should
be improved by using external experts more intensively
and should be properly documented. Administrative
procedures and IT-systems should be modified by tak-
ing into account the specific requirements of the TEN-T
programme. Completed TEN-T actions should be regu-
larly audited.
4.75. With regard to the framework programmes for
RTD activities, the Commission should fundamentally
simplify the cost reimbursement system, introducing a
single cost system with three main categories and using
flat rates, thus allowing for a more efficient and cost-
effective external certification of cost statements. Alter-
natively, the Commission could negotiate value-based
contributions. Model contracts for indirect RTD actions
should provide for participants to bear unlimited joint
and several liability for the use made of the Communi-
ty’s financial contribution. The Commission should also
improve the protection of the Community’s financial
interests by imposing visible and dissuasive sanctions.
4.76. The efforts to recoveroverpaidCommunity funds
from beneficiaries need to be intensified, specifically
with regard to DGs RTD, INFSO and TREN.
4.77. In its Special Report No 2/2002 (Socrates and
Youth for Europe) the Court made a number of recom-
mendations for improving the management of these
programmes which should be taken into consideration.
These include the replacement of the TAO with a Com-
munity agency, clearly defining the relationship between
4.74. As stated in paragraphs 4.18 to 4.36 the Commis-
sion is already well advanced in some of the directions indi-
cated by the Court.
The revision of the standard texts of the Commission decisions
as well as the introduction of additional annexes with more
detailed specifications, definitions and requirements intends to
provide an improvement to the current situation.
The recommendations made by the Court with regard to the
evaluation of proposals, the administrative procedures and the
IT systems are taken into consideration.
TEN-T ex-post audits will be included in the audit pro-
grammes for the years 2002 and 2003.
4.75. The measures proposed by the Court were contained
in the rules on participation prepared by the Commission for
the sixth framework programme. The Council and Parliament
rejected the idea, regarding it as an obstacle to the autonomy
and flexibility of the participants, chiefly because of the need
for ex ante negotiation of costs. They considered it financially
‘unfair’ for individual participants because flat-rate amounts
would have to be used. They consider reference to real costs to
be the basic principle, flat rates being an exception to be used
only with the agreement of the participants.
The Court’s other proposals which were made by the Com-
mission (external certification of costs, unlimited joint and
several liability of partners and entry of penalties on the basis
of Regulation (EC), Euratom 2988/95) were taken over with
some adjustments by the Council and Parliament.
4.76. The Commission will continue its efforts with regard
to recoveries. The increase of the audit efforts has already
resulted in a greater level of recovery and in particular as far
as the fifth framework programme is concerned, the Commis-
sion has simplified its recovery procedures.
4.77. A number of the Court’s recommendations actually
correspond to improvements already decided on or introduced
by the Commission on the entry into force of the programmes
that succeeded Socrates and Youth for Europe. In particular,
the Commission announced its intention of relying on an
executive agency for the future management of programmes in
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the Commission and national authorities, improving
control and monitoring at all levels and providing effec-
tive and timely evaluations.
the field of education and youth. It has significantly strength-
ened its reliance on a network of national agencies. Under the
new ‘Provisions concerning the responsibilities of the Member
States and the Commission as regards the national agencies’,
which are the cornerstone of this policy, national authorities
are required to provide the national agencies with sufficient
resources to accomplish their tasks. The Commission has
already begun intensifying its scrutiny and monitoring of pro-
grammes, among other things by increasing the number of
field visits. Evaluation frameworks have been defined for
Socrates II and Youth, including indicators and timetables
designed to ensure effective evaluation of these programmes.
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INTRODUCTION
5.1. This chapter deals with the traditional forms of aid
financed from the general budget and the operations
adopted by the Council under the Common Foreign
and Security Policy. The aid that is provided through
the European Development Funds (1) appears only as a
token entry in the general budget, as it is financed sepa-
rately. Apart from the analysis of budgetary manage-
ment and the specific appraisal in the context of the
Statement of Assurance (which concentrates on the
specific expenditure on humanitarian and food aid), the
chapter also contains sections on the follow-up of pre-
vious observations and on the principal observations in
recently adopted Special Reports.
ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT
Introduction
5.2. Heading 4, ‘External actions’, of the financial per-
spective applicable to the period 2000-2006 comprises
measures covered by the budgetary headings given in
Table 5.1, which shows the implementation of the bud-
get for 2001.
5.3. In 2001, as in 2000, the apparent overrun of the
financial perspective for this heading is the result of use
of the flexibility instrument, which authorises the ceil-
ing for a heading to be exceeded by 200 million euro,
and of the utilisation, under Heading 4, of the emer-
gency reserve covered by Heading 6. Table 5.2 shows
the changes in expenditure for subsections B7 and B8
over the last five financial years.
5.3. The apparent overrun on the financial perspective is
provided for in the financial perspective itself and in the inter-
institutional agreement — flexibility instrument and emer-
gency aid reserve. These instruments are mobilised on a pro-
posal from the Commission and are specifically authorised by
the budgetary authority.
(1) See separate report on the EDFs.
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Table 5.1 — External actions — Implementation of the 2001 budget
(Mio EUR)
Budgetary heading
Financial
perspective
ceilings
Budget changes (1) Implementation of the budget
Initial
appropria-
tions (2)
Final
appropriations
available (3)
Appropriations
utilised
% of final
appropriations
available
Appropriations
carried over
to 2002
% of final
appropriations
available
Appropriations
cancelled
% of final
appropriations
available
(a) (b) (c) (d) = (c)/(b) (e) (f) = (e)/(b) (g) = (b)–(c)–(e) (h) = (g)/(b)
Commitment appropriations
Pre-accession strategy for the Mediterranean countries (B7-0 4 and B7-0 5) (4) 19,0 19,0 19,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Humanitarian and food aid (B7-2) 928,0 978,0 974,7 99,7 2,3 0,2 1,0 0,1
Cooperation with developing countries in Asia, Latin America and southern Africa,
including South Africa (B7-3) 904,3 866,5 829,0 95,7 24,0 2,8 13,5 1,6
Cooperation with Mediterranean third countries and the Middle East (B7-4) 896,3 912,7 909,1 99,6 0,0 0,0 3,5 0,4
Cooperation with partner countries in eastern Europe and central Asia and the
western Balkan countries (B7-5) 1 308,3 1 344,8 1 269,6 94,4 67,4 5,0 7,7 0,6
Other cooperation measures (B7-6) 389,5 449,2 418,8 93,2 18,8 4,2 11,5 2,6
European initiative for democracy and human rights (B7-7) 102,0 105,4 104,7 99,4 0,0 0,0 0,7 0,6
External aspects of certain Community policies (B7-8) 345,3 267,3 263,8 98,7 0,0 0,0 3,5 1,3
Common Foreign and Security Policy (B8) 36,0 36,0 30,1 83,6 2,8 7,8 3,1 8,6
Total Heading 4 4 735 4 928,7 (5) 4 978,7 (5) 4 818,9 96,8 115,4 2,3 44,4 0,9
Emergency aid reserve (B7-9 1) (6) 208,0 158,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 158,0 100,0
Total 5 136,7 5 136,7 4 818,9 93,8 115,4 2,2 202,4 3,9
Payment appropriations
Pre-accession strategy for the Mediterranean countries (B7-0 4 and B7-0 5) (4) 13,0 13,0 2,5 19,5 0,0 0,0 10,5 80,5
Humanitarian and food aid (B7-2) 873,0 1 100,1 1 038,0 94,4 50,0 4,5 12,1 1,1
Cooperation with developing countries in Asia, Latin America and southern Africa,
including South Africa (B7-3) 757,0 734,5 633,7 86,3 0,0 0,0 100,8 13,7
Cooperation with Mediterranean third countries and the Middle East (B7-4) 459,4 605,7 578,2 95,5 4,2 0,7 23,3 3,8
Cooperation with partner countries in eastern Europe and central Asia and the
western Balkan countries (B7-5) 961,0 1 455,5 1 283,7 88,2 100,0 6,9 71,9 4,9
Other cooperation measures (B7-6) 381,0 421,7 297,4 70,5 65,0 15,4 59,3 14,1
European initiative for democracy and human rights (B7-7) 81,8 75,8 51,1 67,4 0,0 0,0 24,7 32,6
External aspects of certain Community policies (B7-8) 359,8 275,8 233,9 84,8 0,2 0,1 41,8 15,1
Common Foreign and Security Policy (B8) 35,0 35,0 27,2 77,8 7,0 20,1 0,7 2,1
Total Heading 4 3 921,0 4 717,1 4 145,7 87,9 226,4 4,8 345,0 7,3
Emergency aid reserve (B7-9 1) (6) 208,0 168,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 168,0 100,0
Total 4 129,0 4 885,1 4 145,7 84,9 226,4 4,6 513,0 10,5
(1) The appropriations placed in reserve (Chapter B0-4 0) were incorporated into the budget headings for which they were intended.
(2) Budget finally adopted by the European Parliament on 14 December 2000 (OJ L 56, 26.2.2001).
(3) Budget appropriations amended after taking into account supplementary and amending budgets and transfers, but not including appropriations carried over from 2000, appropriations resulting from the re-use of revenue, revenue resulting from contributions by third parties
and other revenue corresponding to a defined purpose and appropriations made available again.
(4) The other amounts of Chapter B7-0 come under Heading 7.
(5) The overrun of the financial perspective was offset by use of the flexibility instrument at an amount of 200 million euro for Chapter B7-5 4 and use of the emergency aid reserve at an amount of 50 million euro.
(6) The emergency aid reserve comes under Heading 6.
Source: 2001 revenue and expenditure account and for the B0-4 0 reserve, the budget and SINCOM2 datawarehouse.
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Table 5.2 — External actions — Comparison of implementation of commitments and payments between 1997 and 2001 against the budget of the financial year
(Mio EUR)
Heading Title Description
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Committed Paid Committed Paid Committed Paid Committed Paid Committed Paid
4 B7-0 4 + B7-0 5 Pre-accession strategy for the Mediterranean countries 19,0 3,0
B7-2 Humanitarian and food aid 1 013,5 891,9 1 057,8 819,7 1 231,5 954,6 943,2 856,4 974,7 1 038,0
B7-3 Cooperation with developing countries in Asia, Latin America and
Southern Africa, including South Africa 797,2 472,2 771,0 463,4 685,8 569,7 802,4 621,9 829,0 633,7
B7-4 Cooperation with Mediterranean third countries and the Middle East 1 075,9 403,9 1 068,7 421,5 1 027,4 333,5 1 005,7 472,9 909,1 578,2
B7-5 Cooperation with partner countries in eastern Europe and central
Asia and the western Balkan countries (1) 1 774,3 1 265,3 1 909,6 1 618,6 2 346,5 1 907,6 1 355,8 1 145,4 1 269,6 1 283,7
B7-6 Other cooperation measures 370,5 297,4 337,0 281,6 343,8 302,0 337,4 272,9 418,8 297,4
B7-7 European initiative for democracy and human rights 89,6 59,3 85,6 65,9 94,1 46,4 93,8 51,0 104,7 51,1
B7-8 External aspects of certain Community policies 305,9 359,9 329,8 332,2 354,4 310,5 201,8 168,9 263,8 233,9
B8-0 Common Foreign and Security Policy 16,1 16,1 29,9 22,4 28,8 27,1 30,8 19,6 30,1 27,2
Total Heading 4 5 442,9 3 766,1 5 589,2 4 025,3 6 112,3 4 451,5 4 770,9 3 608,9 4 818,9 4 146,2
6 B7-9 Emergency aid reserve 5,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Total 5 448,2 3 766,1 5 589,2 4 025,3 6 112,3 4 451,5 4 770,9 3 608,9 4 818,9 4 146,2
(1) To enable comparison, Headings B7-5 and B7-0 3 have been combined since 2000 in the following table:
B7-5 + B7-0 3 Cooperation with partner countries in eastern Europe and central
Asia and the western Balkan countries + Phare 1 774,3 1 265,3 1 909,6 1 618,6 2 346,5 1 907,6 2 922,8 2 346,3 2 886,1 2 443,5
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5.4. By its Decision of 16 May 2000 (2), the Commis-
sion drew up an ambitious reform programme which
will have a major long-term impact on budgetary man-
agement, i.e.:
(a) a full review of the programming of external aid,
(b) the integration of the project cycle into a new man-
agement structure, the Europe Aid Cooperation
Office (AIDCO), which has been operational since
1 January 2001, and
(c) the deconcentration of management towards the
Commission Delegations in third countries.
The deconcentration of management towards the Del-
egations began but had no effect in 2001
5.5. The Commission’s deconcentration objectives for
2001 concerned 21 Delegations, but none of the 14
subdelegations of budget implementing powers granted
right at the end of 2001 had any practical effect before
2002. As a result, and over and above previous initia-
tives for Heading 4 and mainly concerning Bosnia, the
only payments made locally in 2001 consisted of 10
million euro under the regional reconstruction pro-
gramme for central America. The deconcentration pro-
cess envisaged for the 21 Delegations came up against
logistical difficulties.
5.5. 2001 was both:
— a year of preparation of the deconcentration process as a
whole, and
— the period over the course of which all obstacles had to be
removed in order to give powers to 21 delegations before
the end of the year. The object was not to execute the
2001 budget in a deconcentrated fashion.
The logistical aspects (office space, computing connections)
and mobilisation of personnel are the critical elements which
may delay the process.
The payment of EUR 10 million under the Regional Recon-
struction Programme in Central America is based on a 1999
decision, i.e. a decision taken prior to that on deconcentration.
(2) Document SEC(2000) 814/5 of 15 May 2000 on the
Reform of theManagement of External Assistance to third
countries.
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Variable utilisation of payment appropriations
5.6. The efforts made to increase the volume dis-
bursed during the financial year 2001 (14,9 % up on
2000) did not make it possible to cope with the signifi-
cant increase in final appropriations (up by 21,3 %),
whence the fall in the rate of utilisation of payment
appropriations for the financial year is down compared
with 2000 (87 % compared with 92,8 %) and the appro-
priations that remained unutilised were spread over the
various budgetary headings. A more even distribution
of the current payments over the financial year may be
noted, even if the proportion of payments for the year
made during the month of December remains compa-
rable to that of 2000 (approximately 23,5 %).
5.7. In the case of the European Agency for Recon-
struction, it was further noted that significant advances
had been paid out right at the very end of the financial
year (23,7 million euro for Serbia and 64,6 million euro
for Kosovo) which far exceeded the Agency’s immedi-
ate requirements at the very beginning of 2002. This
practice seemed necessary due to the difficulty of using
the 2002 appropriations straightaway, because of the
time required to introduce a new budgetary framework.
5.8. The administrative expenditure headings con-
tained in the operating part of the budget (BA) are still
greatly under-utilised and the Commission has still not
explained this situation.
Increase in the oldest outstanding commitments
5.9. Outstanding commitments (OCs) at the end of the
financial year 2001 (12 674,1 million euro) remained
stable compared with 2000. The trend which emerged
over the last three years (from 1999 to 2001) was char-
acterised by a reduction in the value of OCs that were
less than three years old, from 8 810,3 million euro at
the end of 1999 to 8 309 million euro at the end of
2001. This was due in particular to the considerable
increase in the amounts paid out as from the first year
of commitment compared with the amount committed
during the financial year.
5.6. The level of payments is a more important perfor-
mance indicator than the rate of utilisation of payment appro-
priations because the latter are ultimately fixed and adopted
by the budgetary authority. Thus the 2001 level of payments
is an absolute record in terms of payments made.
While it is true that there has been a deterioration in the
utilisation rate compared with 2000, it should be stressed
that SAB 4/2001 increased the initial appropriations by
EUR 450 million and avoided a halt in payments over the
course of the year. Hence, taking all increases into account, the
available appropriations were EUR 796 million more than
the initial appropriations and the payments made were also
considerably higher than the initial appropriations. Finally, a
number of additional increases were made at the end of the
year, requiring a carryover to the following year so that the
commitments could be honoured.
5.7. Payments were made in favour of the European Agency
for Reconstruction at the end of the year, because of the need
to replenish the accounts of the Agency, whose disbursement
operations are continuing to increase apace, and to provide the
resources needed to make payments in the early part of the
year.
5.8. The rate of payment implementation of the BA lines
managed by the Office is around 47 % of the appropriations
available at the end of the year. In fact, a considerable propor-
tion of these appropriations was intended to finance the sala-
ries of temporary staff recruited to the Delegations and aux-
iliaries recruited to headquarters to replace the BATs. As these
recruitments were mainly made in the second half of the year,
part of the payment appropriations earmarked for them
remained unused.
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5.10. On the other hand, despite the real efforts made
by the Commission to clear OCs dating back five years
or more, their cumulative value increased from 933,9
million euro at the end of 1998 to 1 589,6 million euro
at the end of 2001. The increase was even more marked
for commitments of three years or more, which rose
from 2 758,0million euro at the end of 1998 to 4 364,7
million euro at the end of 2001: the rate of disburse-
ment has not improved for these OCs. These trends
underline the need for constant monitoring of the OCs
in order to contain them. It is important that the Com-
mission equip itself with the means to obtain reliable
and complete accounting and management information
to facilitate the management of the measures financed.
This information should make it possible to carry out
in-depth analyses of the development of the OCs and
the nature of the payments made (advances or others)
in order to compare the rate of disbursement of the aid
with the progress of implementation on the ground.
Room for improvement in the presentation of the analy-
sis of financial management for the discharge author-
ity (3)
5.11. The information presented by the Commission
in respect of the budgetary management (4) of Heading
4 for 2001 improved considerably compared with
2000 (5). The new structure makes it possible, from a
5.10. The increase in the volume of OCs dating back 5
years or more is due to the fact that commitment appropria-
tions increased continuously and substantially between 1994
and 1998 in spite of a payment performance that continued
to grow between 1998 and 2001 (EUR 2 258,67 million
paid in 1998, EUR 2 522,10 million in 1999, EUR
2 992,50million in 2000, EUR3 266,60million in 2001)
for the headings managed by EuropeAid.
The Commission is aware of the need to monitor the share of
old OCs in its external aid management portfolio, and it
endorses the Court’s comment on the need for constant moni-
toring of the OCs in order to contain them. Since 2000 the
spending departments have been pursuing an active policy of
systematic examination and closure of old or dormant exter-
nal aid budgetary commitments wherever possible. This sys-
tematic examination and the closures carried out have also led
to a significant volume of decommitments in 2001 (approxi-
mately EUR 629,7 million for the whole of heading 4).
As regards the accounting and management information
needed to carry out a more detailed analysis of the evolution
of the OCs, in the light of the state of implementation on the
ground, in particular, and of the nature of the payments made,
the CRIS Data Entry instruments (see reply to point 5.5) and
the accounting system as adapted to the new requirements of
the Financial Regulation with regard to different types of pay-
ments should make it possible to undertake such analysis
from 2003.
5.11. The Commission notes the Court’s comments on
improvements in the presentation of information on budget-
ary management, and will continue its efforts to this end,
(3) The Court analysed the information presented by the
Commission in Volume I of the revenue and expenditure
accountwhich provides the comments on budgetaryman-
agement for the financial year and, in particular, explana-
tions on the differences between the appropriations
entered in the initial budget as adopted and appropria-
tions finally available and between the latter and the
appropriations utilised. During this analysis, the Court
has not sought to obtain an assurance as to the reliability
of these explanations but rather to identify the significant
differences which have not been explained and to detect
any explanation which might mislead the reader.
(4) Volume 1, Part II of the Revenue and Expenditure account
‘Analysis of financial management’.
(5) See Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000,
paragraphs 5.19-5.23.
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general presentation, to find detailed explanations of
the management of certain budget headings that are
regarded as being particularly important, especially as
regards the justification for the discrepancies between
the budget and the actual implementation of it. Certain
improvements have still to be made, however, in par-
ticular explanations of the justification of transfers of
appropriations and the systematic production of the
output implementation tables summarising achieve-
ments during the financial year, which are still missing
for a good many major budget headings.
5.12. The search for greater transparency also finds
expression in the decision to publish an annual report
on the implementation of the European Commission’s
external aid. The report concerning the financial year
2001 was not available in time to be used by the Court
in its Annual Report (6). The former aims to provide a
picturewhich goes beyondmere budgetary and account-
ing information and is distinct from the report envis-
aged by Action 82 of theWhite Paper, which is designed
to allow the Commission to satisfy various statutory
obligations (7). The poor quality of the data in the man-
agement information systems adversely affects this exer-
cise.
5.13. Whereas previously only Commission decisions
justifying expenditure commitments were recorded in
the accounts, during 2001 the resulting contracts started
to be recorded as well, as was already the case for the
EDF. This new system helps to reveal in part the actual
stage of implementation of external measures, which
has always been very inadequately perceptible in this
field. For 2001 it may be observed that about a third, in
value terms, of these decisions had already been fol-
lowed, during the same year, by the signing of legal
obligations. However, the Commission has not yet con-
sidered that it needed to include information of this
kind in either the financial statements or the analysis of
the financial management.
including on the explanations of transfers provided in the
‘Analysis of financial management’.
As regards the possibility of systematically producing imple-
mentation tables in this report, this will depend on the prepa-
ration of the preliminary draft general budget for the year in
question, and in particular on the availability of these tables
under ‘working documents, detailed analysis by budget head-
ing’.
5.13. The Commission will take account of the Court’s
comment and will, in future, include information on the utili-
sation of pre-commitments in Volume II of the annual reports.
(6) A document of this type for the financial year 2000 was
published at the end of 2001 and the 2001 annual report
from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on EC development policy and the implemen-
tation of external aid was published in September 2002
(COM (2002) 490 final of 12 September 2002).
(7) By way of example, see Article 15 of Regulation (Eura-
tom, EC) No 99/2000 of 29 December 1999 for the Tacis
Programme, (OJ L 12, 18.1.2000, p. 1).
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SPECIFIC APPRAISAL IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
Introduction
5.14. The Statement of Assurance specific appraisal for
this area has been based in recent years on a cycle of
in-depth audits of different elements of the budgetary
area (see Table 5.1 for the budget headings concerned).
In 1999 and 2000 the Court audited decentralised Phare
expenditure (at the time part of Heading 4), co-financed
activities managed by NGOs and expenditure for aid to
Bosnia and the Tacis programme. In 2001 the Court
decided to focus on humanitarian and food aid (Title
B7-2 of the budget), representing almost 25 % of total
external action (Heading 4 of the financial perspectives)
payments in 2001 (see paragraphs 5.24-5.49).
5.15. In addition, the Court’s review of the internal
control systems in the context of the reform of the
Commission, plus the work of the Commission’s Inter-
nal Audit Service (IAS), has resulted in findings of par-
ticular relevance to the field of external action (see para-
graphs 5.16-5.23).
The reform of the internal control systems still to be
completed
5.16. The introduction of 24 standards of internal
control to implement the general reform which the
Commission is carrying out of its financial systems
coincided (8), in the area of external actions, with the
setting-up of a new administrative structure (AIDCO)
and the preparation of a new method of management
(deconcentration) (9). These two exercises were carried
out, taking common-sense account of the spirit of the
reform and the accompanying measures (increased for-
malisation of decisions, clearer definition of shared
responsibilities providing better security, introduction
of improved professional know-how for the staff who
have to manage the aid). Many of these measures apply
indirectly to the EDFs (10).
5.16. The Commission shares the Court’s view on the intro-
duction of the 24 control standards in its departments.
(8) See paragraphs 9.51 to 9.94 of the DAS Chapter for the
general presentation of the setting-up of a new internal
control system.
(9) Deconcentration will be applied to most of the manage-
ment of Heading 4 of the financial perspectives.
(10) See Chapter 2, paragraph 23 of the report on the EDFs.
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5.17. At this stage, these positive developments are
still too recent to have resulted in all the expected
improvements to the management systems. Neverthe-
less, the Court stresses that:
(a) the internal audit capacity, responsible for provid-
ing the required assurance, was not operational until
during the course of 2002;
(b) no internal control standard, or even any White
Paper specific measure, deals with the audits carried
out by or for the Commission on transactions where
management is entrusted by the Commission to
intermediaries, or on the utilisation of Community
funds by their final beneficiaries; and
(c) considerable work still has to be carried out in order
to develop practical tools (audit check lists, local
management information systems) to complement
the guidelines (financial and other) already prepared
by AIDCO and to adopt the measures guaranteeing
to AIDCO’s senior management that the procedures
and criteria which they have decided upon have
been implemented. These two aspects are particu-
larly important for the success of the deconcentra-
tion exercise.
5.18. In addition, the computerisedmanagement infor-
mation systems have not yet been thoroughly trans-
formed. The upgrading of the contents of the current
tools (which mainly concern the system used in the
areas of Asia, Latin America and theMediterranean (MIS
II)), and the development of new systems for the whole
area of external action (the various modules of the Cris
system) are not based on a detailed analysis of require-
ments and procedures, any more than they were in the
past. Computerisation has not yet helped to make the
method of management more secure, for example, by
abolishing the practice of administrators taking their
own individual approaches, due to the absence of an
adequate procedural framework, and by helping them
to manage better in practice.
5.17. The control standards are being introduced gradually,
in accordance with a precise timetable.
The improvement and strengthening of the control environ-
ment is the result of the implementation of all the measures
set out in the control standards.
A systems-based approach needs to be assessed on its func-
tioning as a whole.
(b) The Commission has put significant additional resources
into auditing and methodologies and standards are being
developed and improved. This will inevitably have an
impact on the Commission’s expectations and require-
ments for sub-contracted audits.
(c) The Commission acknowledges that there is still a con-
siderable amount of work to be done, and it is currently
finalising the necessary instructions and procedures.
5.18. The Court’s analysis is based on the situation in
2001. The introduction of the CRIS (Common Relex Infor-
mation System) in 2002 has considerably improved the situ-
ation.
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5.19. Management cannot obtain a reliable picture of
its area of responsibility from an aggregation of the
information sent to it by the units placed under its
responsibility, since their data are not homogeneous or
complete and are, at least in part, unreliable.
5.20. In the case of Heading 4 (External actions) of
the financial perspective, there are also the effects of a
complex sharing of responsibilities, within and outside
the Commission, in respect of the management of the
budget headings concerned. In this respect, several
Directorates-General, Community agencies and many
third parties acting on the Commission’s behalf are
required to programme or authorise expenditure or
manage funds. Moreover, Delegation staff, including
those performing authorising duties delegated to them
by AIDCO, are placed under the hierarchical responsi-
bility of DG RELEX. Under these conditions, a system of
internal control covering theCommission’s overall needs
in terms of external action is more difficult to intro-
duce.
5.21. The reform does not deal sufficiently with audits
of Community funds carried out by or for the Commis-
sion at the level of intermediaries and final beneficiaries
(see paragraph 5.17(b)). Moreover, the human and finan-
cial resources allocated to this task—whichwere already
insufficient in the past — were further reduced in 2001,
so that the number of audits carried out by or for the
Commissionwas limited. The importance of these audits
is considerable, especially in the light of the high level
of external management at the Commission (see para-
graph 5.20). The Commission should deal with this
matter quickly in order to ensure that systematic audit
programmes are established, including by clearly stipu-
lating the responsibilities required within the Commis-
sion, so that the conclusions of audit reports are acted
upon.
5.19. The Commission does not deny the urgent need to
transform the various systems which existed prior to the cre-
ation of EuropeAid into a unified, effective system. Various
measures were taken in 2001 and 2002 to improve data
entry to make the data more homogeneous and more com-
plete. The introduction of CRIS in 2002 is being accompa-
nied by an ‘upgrade’ of the information in the existing system
to make the data more reliable.
5.20. The Communication approved by the Commission on
2 July 2002 on the Unified External Service answers this
question with a clear definition of the role and responsibilities
and internal control systems of each of the RELEX family
departments vis-à-vis the delegations.
5.21. It is in fact envisaged that, between now and the end
of 2002, an integrated audit programme on external aid be
established to cover the external audit activities of delegations
and headquarters alike.
In order to strengthen its audit activities under the direct
supervision of its operational services AIDCO has launched
a framework contract for audit assignments that became
operational in September 2002. A second framework contract
relating to audit of operations financed by the EDF will be
launched when funds are available.
As far as determining responsibilities for follow-up of the
audit reports within the Commission is concerned, it is the
authorising departments which are responsible. The applica-
tion of line management with the creation of the Office has
enhanced this responsibility though the principle remains the
same. As far as the formulation of instructions for following
up the audits’ conclusions and recommendations is concerned,
it is therefore planned to adapt existing manuals and produce
an audit manual for staff in the delegations and at headquar-
ters.
For humanitarian aid, the Commission has engaged an exter-
nal audit company to undertake audits on behalf of ECHO.
By this means all of ECHO’s partners will be audited every 2
years. Some 50 audits have already been commissioned.
ECHO has devoted considerable resources in the past year to
audits on its partners. Between 1995 and 2002 more than
130 audits have been carried out. Furthermore, the amount
of human resources devoted to auditing has now been tripled
for field and other audits.
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Taking into account the work of the IAS
5.22. In February 2002 the IAS finalised a report
entitled ‘Governance Review of Aid Management in the
External Relations Family’. It includes a comprehensive
review of the Commission’s management of external
aid covering issues which constitute the overall control
environment (organisation, allocation of responsibili-
ties, human resources and accountability). It also cov-
ers internal control mechanisms, including those to be
applied to, and by, partners of the Commission in the
development aid process (intermediaries, other donors
and beneficiary countries).
5.23. The report highlights the need openly to
acknowledge the inherent risks associatedwith the Com-
munity’s development aid programmes, particularly as
they consist essentially of grants. It also touches on sub-
jects of particular interest to the Court in the context of
its audit work in the external aid field, such as manage-
ment information systems, deconcentration to Delega-
tions, and the multiplicity of financial instruments.
Intensive audit in the field of humanitarian aid and food
aid
Scope and nature of the audit
5.24. The objective of the Court’s audit was to provide
conclusions as to the legality and regularity of the under-
lying transactions and to assess the functioning of the
internal control systems of the two policy areas. The
audit examined firstly the system of procedures and
controls covering this area in order to evaluate their
effectiveness in ensuring that transactions are legal and
regular. Secondly, it looked at an examination of a rep-
resentative random sample of 183 payments made in
the year 2001 drawn from the Commission accounts.
The audit was based on documentary evidence available
at the Commission in Brussels, supplemented by visits
to intermediary organisations (United Nations’ World
Food Programme (WFP) in Rome and EuronAid (11) in
The Hague) and on-the-spot audits of underlying expen-
diture and physical inspections in six beneficiary coun-
tries (Bolivia, East Timor, Kosovo, North Korea, Mozam-
bique and Tanzania). The transactions audited at the
5.23. The RELEX family of DGs has set up a working
group to examine the implications of the IAS report.
(11) Euronaid is a Dutch European network of NGOs founded
as an association under Dutch law, in charge of food pur-
chases on behalf of the Commission.
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intermediary level and on-the-spot represent approxi-
mately 30 % of the total sample.
Objectives and nature of humanitarian aid and food aid
5.25. The primary objectives of the EU food aid pro-
grammes are to promote the availability and accessibil-
ity of foodstuffs for the populations in developing coun-
tries, as well as to support their efforts to improve their
own living conditions, alleviating poverty at all levels.
The humanitarian aid programme provides assistance,
relief and protection operations to help people in third
countries who are victims of natural disasters, man-
made crises or exceptional circumstances.
5.26. The regulation concerning humanitarian aid was
adopted on 20 June 1996 (12) to assist people affected
by emergencies or longer-lasting crises. On 27 June
1996 the regulation on Food Aid policy and Food Aid
management and special operations in support of Food
Security (13) was adopted, with the general rules for the
mobilisation of products being adopted on 16 June
1997 (14).
5.27. The majority of the projects in the humanitarian
and food aid areas involve the financing of projects for
the provision of food or non-food items to developing
countries. This area is inherently high risk, exacerbated
by the difficult conditions in the countries in which
these activities take place. Humanitarian aid is normally
planned and executed in a short period of time by vir-
tue of its urgency. For both food aid and humanitarian
aid it is obviously difficult to obtain proper evidence of
the correct distribution of the food (see paragraph 5.30).
5.28. The humanitarian aid and food aid programmes
are managed in Brussels by the EC Humanitarian Office
(ECHO) and AIDCO respectively. They are responsible
for all implementation aspects, control functions and
evaluations.
5.29. The amounts committed and paid in 2001 are
shown in Table 5.3.
5.28. The Commission has taken note of the fact that the
Court considered the ECHO and AIDCO (food aid) pro-
grammes at the same time. For practical reasons and for the
sake of clarity, the Commission will reply separately where
necessary depending on the source of financing.
(12) Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 (OJ L 163, 2.7.1996,
p. 1).
(13) Council Regulation (EC) No 1292/96 (OJ L 166, 5.7.1996,
p. 1).
(14) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2519/97 (OJ L 346,
17.12.1997, p. 23).
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Problems and constraints for the Court’s audit
5.30. As on-the-spot audits of humanitarian aid and
food aid were carried out by the Court after the event,
the work often had to be limited to reviewing the sup-
porting documentation and internal controls at local
level, because carrying out a proper physical inspection
of completed operations is impossible, the aid supplied
having already been consumed.
5.31. The WFP manages a substantial proportion of
the activities in this area and, thus, a considerable num-
ber of payments in the audit sample related to activities
managed by it. The audit of the underlying transactions
at the level of the WFP headquarters in Rome was
affected by constraints on the Court’s direct access to
supporting documentation and by significant delays by
WFP in replying to requests from the Court for account-
ing information. Also, an assessment of the relevant
internal controls at the central level of the WPF could
not be carried out within the time limit allowed. These
limitations were the result of WFP’s restrictive interpre-
tation of the verification clause agreement between the
Commission and the United Nations of 29 October
2001.
Audit findings
Internal controls at the level of the Commission are generally
satisfactory
5.32. The support provided under food aid and
humanitarian aid is in the form of grants. The organisa-
tions responsible for carrying out the activities are
Table 5.3 — Food and humanitarian aid commitments and payments for 2001 (1)
(Mio EUR)
Budget area Commitmentappropriations Commitments
Payment
appropriations Payments
Product mobilisation B7-2 0 0 151,0 150,8 160,0 160,0
Food security B7-2 0 1 157,9 157,5 150,0 149,6
Transport, etc B7-2 0 2 155,8 153,1 179,7 174,2
Total food aid B7-2 0 464,7 461,4 489,7 483,8
Humanitarian aid B7-2 1 523,0 523,0 620,1 561,1
Total 987,7 984,4 1 109,8 1 044,9
(1) Including both appropriations for the financial year and additional appropriations.
Source: Commission’s 2001 revenue and expenditure account.
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NGOs, international organisations and agencies or in
the case of food security also the governments of the
beneficiary countries.
5.33. Usually food aid is contracted directly by the
Commission through international tenders. In the case
of local or triangular (regional) food or non-food items,
purchases can be made by a third party (e.g. NGOs) as
part of overall projects awarded to them. Also transport
and distribution of foodstuffs is done by third parties.
5.34. Where a third party is involved, the activities are
covered by a contract with the Commission. This usu-
ally provides for the payment of a first advance, possi-
bly intermediate payments based on the level of dis-
bursement of the first advance disclosed in the
intermediate report, and a final payment made upon
approval of a financial and technical report.
5.35. The Commission ensures that food has been
properly delivered to the final destination by means of
inspection reports compiled by companies contracted
by the Commission. These reports detail both the quan-
tities and quality of the food. The Court’s audit did not
indicate any weaknesses in this procedure.
5.36. Projects for the mobilisation of food products
and humanitarian aid are monitored on-the-spot by
technical assistants contracted by the Commission staff
in those countries where this is justified by the level of
funding. The role of the technical assitance staff is to
liase with the contractors and to regularly monitor the
projects. They do not have the responsibility to carry
out any review of the tendering done by the contractor
or of the supporting documentation of project expen-
diture.
5.37. For humanitarian aid ECHO carries out audits of
the European headquarters of organisations with which
it has signed contracts Partnership Agreement. Internal
controls are reviewed and checks are carried out on the
supporting documentation of a sample of ECHO-funded
projects. On the food aid and food security operations
only a limited number of audits of projects were carried
out by AIDCO. However, most of the contracts with
NGOs concluded from 2001 onwards contain provi-
sions for independent audits to be carried out the
projects’ financial reports.
5.36. Specialist Technical Assistants are contracted by the
Commission to monitor and control the projects. The role of
these Technical Assistants is to advise and assist in the imple-
mentation as well as monitor the projects and NGO partners
in the field.
5.37. As far as food aid is concerned, audits and evalua-
tions were carried out on NGOs in 2001. 10 audits and
evaluations were planned and implemented (eight countries,
EuronAid and Mitch). It is confirmed that financial audits
are now conducted for all NGO projects by independent audi-
tors.
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Internal controls at the level of the implementing partners
need strengthening
5.38. Internal controls vary considerably according to
the size and resources of the organisation responsible
for carrying out the activities. Account has been taken
of this factor when assessing the appropriateness or
absence of internal controls at intermediary or local
level.
5.39. The internal controls for the maintenance of
supporting documentation on-the-spot are often weak.
This is particularly the case for the smaller organisa-
tions where decisions are taken without being properly
documented, or supporting documentation is lost or
destroyed. For instance, an NGO that was carrying out
a food security project in Mozambique was unable to
provide a proper list of expenditure at the time of the
audit visit. In most cases of weak supporting informa-
tion, however, compensating evidence could be obtained
to show that there was no irregularity.
5.40. In some cases, internal controls on invitations
to tender do not guarantee the transparency and open
competition required by the Commission. In Tanzania,
local food procurement by the WFP consisted of send-
ing invitations to tender to suppliers selected from a
database, but the existence of the database was not
advertised locally nor were the reasons for the selection
of particular suppliers documented. There is a risk that
suppliers may be unfairly excluded from invitations to
tender. For a humanitarian aid project in Mozambique,
in the absence of a proper procedure, the invitations to
tender were carried out by the NGO only by telephone
and the evaluation of the offers received was not docu-
mented.
5.41. Some organisations have difficulties in follow-
ing financial and tender procedures adequately because
of a lack of experience in these areas (see also the
example in paragraph 5.44). In Mozambique, after a
food security project was awarded to private compa-
nies, it transpired that one of the contractors had finan-
cial problems and the first advance to that contractor
was withheld. This situation could have been avoided
by the inclusion of financial capacity as one of the cri-
teria for the eligibility of the applicant.
5.39. On its visit to Mozambique, the Court noted prob-
lems due to the staff’s lack of experience during the project
start-up phase, in connection with the fact that the area where
it was launched was remote and access to it was difficult. The
Mozambique Delegation, the departments at headquarters
and the NGO in question are doing what is necessary to rem-
edy the situation.
5.40. ECHOpartners are given a certain amount of instruc-
tions for procurement procedures and these are given in
Article 16 and Document 14 of the Framework Partnership
Agreement. In Article 16.1 it is stated that the procurement
of goods and services is the responsibility of the partner.
ECHO intends to revise and simplify the tender instructions
so that the rules can be implemented by its partners more con-
sistently.
The Commission notes the Court’s remarks concerning the
project in Mozambique and will follow up the issues raised
with the partner concerned.
5.41. In future, this financial criterion will have to have
greater weighting in the awarding of projects to the private
sector.
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5.42. The audit work undertaken on the basis of docu-
mentary evidence at the level of the Commission in
Brussels did not reveal a significant level of material
errors of legality and regularity on payments made at a
central level. This is explained by the high proportion
of first advance payments for projects, usually amount-
ing to 50 to 80 % of the contract value. The risk of any
such advance payment having an irregularity at the time
it is made is negligible compared to that of an interme-
diate or final payment since only in the latter cases is
the beneficiary required to comply with certain condi-
tions, usually the presentation of a technical and finan-
cial report.
5.43. The Court’s audit of the supporting documenta-
tion for 27 on-the-spot actions revealed significant
irregularities, in particular in respect of project tender-
ing procedures.
5.44. For example, the tendering committee of a
humanitarian aid project in East Timor because of a
lack of experience in this matter wrongly excluded one
of the offers for building materials on the basis that it
had been submitted too late. The offer, which had in
fact been received on time, was significantly cheaper
than the one selected and, in a similar tender carried
out subsequently within the same project, the supplier
was successful and the materials purchased were of
acceptable quality. In respect of a food aid project, a ten-
der launched by the Commission for the purchase of
fertiliser for North Korea indicated an unreasonably and
unnecessarily short deadline for the delivery of the
commodity at the port of arrival, thus considerably
restricting the number of potential suppliers.
5.45. The impact on payments of irregularities in ten-
deringprocedures is impossible toquantify.Oneexample
of such cases is a food security project in Bolivia for
which the organisation in charge set a deadline shorter
than the one set by the applicable national legislation
for the presentation of the offers for the components
submitted to tender. Given the complexity of the project,
it was extremely difficult to prepare a technically valid
offer in the short time given, so that when the tender
committee came to review the financial envelopes for
the three largest tenders, only one valid offer remained
for each, all from the same contractor. The members of
or observers on the committee, none of whom were
independent of the locally-based government official
ultimately responsible for the project implementation,
did not object to this.
5.44. The Commission services will bring the full detailed
instructions for procurement to the attention of the partner
concerned in East Timor.
Following long discussions with the North Korean authori-
ties, the project was presented to the Member States in Octo-
ber 2000 and the agreement of the beneficiary authorities
was received only on 22 January 2001. The invitation to ten-
der was therefore not launched until very late, respecting, for
delivery at the destination (April), the seasonal agricultural
production process and the fact that the ports are closed in
January/February/March.
5.45. The tendering procedures work well generally.
As regards the irregularity observed in the application of
Bolivian legislation (call for tender procedures), this is con-
tested neither by the delegation, nor by headquarters, nor by
the national counterpart, which manages the PASA food
security project. Since 2001, the national counterpart has
improved monitoring and control of the application of proce-
dures throughout the life-cycle of the project for more than
300 micro-projects, in close collaboration with the European
technical assistants. However, the many constraints and bur-
dens in the application of Bolivian legislation in the case of
micro-projects should be noted. In this field also, on the basis
of the experience acquired by the programme, dialogue with
the government should be pursued in order to make the laws
more functional and, hence, make controls more effective.
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5.46. A food security payment of 5 million euro to
theGovernmentofMozambiquewas intended to finance
2000 expenditure in certain priority Ministries and
institutions. However, the payment only took place in
May 2001 and was transferred to the Treasury account
from where it was not possible to trace its use or estab-
lish a link between this payment and the expenditure of
the targeted bodies. The Court is therefore unable to
express an opinion on the utilisation of this payment.
Conclusions
5.47. Taken as a whole, the payments made by the
Commission were legal and regular on the basis of the
documentary evidence available at the central level in
Brussels. However, the audit at the level of the imple-
menting organisations of the 27 operations examined
on the spot revealed that in six cases irregularities had
occurred, in particular concerning project tendering
procedures, which is a matter of concern.
5.48. The limitation in the scope of the audit described
in paragraph 5.31 on WFP as well as the non-opinion
for the project in Mozambique (paragraph 5.46) con-
cern those payments whose underlying transactions
were audited at the level of the implementing organisa-
tions.
5.49. The Commission’s lack of guidance to imple-
menting partners, in particular NGOs, is in part the
cause of inadequate internal control procedures at the
level of such organisations (see paragraphs 5.40-5.41),
the consequences of which remain undetected because
of the Commission’s lack of reviews and audits in cer-
tain areas (see paragraphs 5.36-5.37).
5.46. The payment was expected to be made in early 2001
(disbursements on 2000 budget possible up to 31 March
2001) but were delayed to May 2001 due to the late delivery
of import statistics by the Central Bank.
Despite this delay, the Government has apparently guaranteed
the target public expenditure by pre-financing it as referred in
the September 2001 audit report. This budget support has to
be seen as the primary instrument for channelling financial
resources to the public sector (the budget of Mozambique
depends for 50 % on foreign support), to ensure that public
services will be delivered by the State within and beyond the
reform process the EC food security programme is support-
ing.
5.47. The Commission takes note of the Court’s conclusion
and will review the cases cited. It considers that the measures
undertaken in the context of the reform of the financial man-
agement will address the problems identified.
5.49. The Commission has already taken steps to increase
the number of audits of its partners — in particular NGOs.
In the new call for proposals, the audit procedure is now sys-
tematic for each of the NGO projects.
In the area of humanitarian aid the Commission feels that the
guidelines, rules, level of meetings and contacts, and controls
and audits on the implementing partners are relatively exten-
sive. However, the Commission services intend and always
seek to improve their guidance for the best result.
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Recommendations
5.50. The Court recommends that:
(a) the Commission takes further steps to ensure that
organisations responsible for handling EU funds
strengthen their internal control systems, in par-
ticular to ensure the adequacy of supporting docu-
mentation and their tendering procedures. TheCom-
mission should lay down more specifically the
minimum standards which are required;
(b) the Commission takes the steps necessary to ensure
that sufficient reviews and audits are carried out by
it, or on its behalf, to enable it to judge whether the
internal control procedures applied by its imple-
menting partners are adequate, and takes corrective
action if necessary;
(c) the verification clause agreement between the Com-
mission and the United Nations should be clarified
in order to ensure proper and timely cooperation
between the EU institutions and the UN bodies con-
cerned.
5.50.
(a) 1. For humanitarian aid, the Commission believes that
the problem relates to a small number of cases only. The
ECHOpartner vetting, instructions, communication, dia-
logues, evaluation, monitoring, controls and audits are
extensive and relatively exhaustive. The partners are
informed of the minimum standards but these need to be
modified and streamlined to enable the partners to imple-
ment the rules more consistently.
In the light of the reform, new financial regulations and
implementing rules, a new Framework PartnershipAgree-
ment is being drafted.
2. Regarding food aid, a number of measures have been
taken by the Commission to check the correct application
of procedures as specified below:
— EuronAid allocations: verification that tendering pro-
cedures are respected, with formal agreement on the
award of contracts and external audit of this organi-
sation,
— NGO financial allocations: obligation for the NGOs
to carry out an annual audit as well as a final audit
upon closure of the project and to send the report to
the Commission (Article 16(4) of the General Condi-
tions). These audits also include checks on whether
the expenditure is incurred in conformity with the
rules for awarding contracts,
— direct allocations to governments (see point b).
(b) 1. For humanitarian aid, the Commission engaged in
June 2002 an external audit company to undertake
audits on behalf of ECHO which will substantially
increase the audits already carried out. In particular, by
this means all of ECHO’s partners are expected to be
audited every two years. Furthermore, the human resources
devoted to auditing have tripled.
2. As far as food aid is concerned, mid-term reviews,
final reviews and audits are organised regularly, for both
direct and indirect aid.
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Synthesis of specific appraisal
5.51. The Commission has made a good start on its
reform of the internal control system in the field of
external actions and the IAS has made a valuable con-
tribution to identifying the risks inherent in the field
and the problems which need to be addressed. Certain
issues, however, still need considerable attention before
they can be resolved, notably the putting in place of a
satisfactory systematic audit of Community operations
at the level of intermediaries and final beneficiaries, and
the maintaining of complete and reliable management
information. Furthermore, the measures taken to
improve financial management will only become fully
effectivewhen appropriate tools are developed to ensure
the consistent application of AIDCO’s guidelines in all
the areas for which it is responsible.
5.52. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot
yet rely on the Commission’s control and supervisory
systems to contribute part of the assurance it seeks to
provide for the area of external actions. For 2001, the
Court examined the internal control systems and the
legality and regularity of underlying transactions in the
fields of humanitarian and food aid. It concluded that,
whereas payments made were legal and regular at the
level of the Commission, shortcomings in implement-
ing partners’ internal control procedures meant that
there were irregularities at local level. The Commission
should therefore improve its monitoring and provide
better guidance to its implementing partners on their
internal control procedures (see paragraphs 5.47 to
5.50).
FOLLOW-UP OF PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS
Tendering procedures for service contracts under the
TACIS programme
Introduction
The Court’s earlier audit
5.53. Special Report No 16/2000 (15) covered tender-
ing procedures for service contracts under the Phare
5.51. The Commission accepts that certain issues still need
attention and is already taking the necessary measures.
5.52. The Commission has taken note of the Court’s gen-
eral conclusion. As explained in the preceding points, it has
already taken the necessary measures to step up the control of
the procedures and accounts of the different projects, notably
with NGOs. This policy has already been made systematic for
all new awards of contract or calls for proposals.
In the area of humanitarian aid the Commission feels that the
guidelines, rules, level of meetings and contacts, and controls
and audits on the implementing partners are relatively exten-
sive. However the Commission services intend and always seek
to improve their guidance for the best results.
(15) OJ C 350, 6.12.2000.
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and Tacis programmes. This audit of contracts con-
cluded between 1996 and 1998 highlighted risks in the
awarding of service contracts and weaknesses in the
Commission’s systems at that time, which impaired the
competition between tenderers and the transparency
and effectiveness of procedures.
5.54. Themain recommendations of the Special Report
were:
(a) the procedures for awarding service contracts should
be harmonised within the Commission;
(b) the discipline with which the pre-selection and
evaluation procedures are carried out should receive
particular attention. The Commission should ensure
rigour and independence on the part of evaluators
(avoiding conflicts of interest) and see to it that
Evaluation Committees do not deviate from the
evaluation criteria and rules issued to tenderers;
(c) turnover among the staff allocated to tasks which
are essentially civil service duties should be reduced
and adequate knowledge of procedures provided for;
(d) a database containing details of experts and their
performance should be created and maintained;
(e) the follow-up given to complaints and irregularities
should be recorded accurately and comprehensively.
5.55. The Commission replied that, since the audit,
many measures had been introduced, such as the new
Manual of Instructions (Contracts for Works, Supplies
and Services concluded for the purposes of Community
cooperation with Third Countries, approved by the
Commission in November 1999), the standardisation of
documents and the creation of a website.
Situation in 2002
5.56. During the discussion on Special Report
No 16/2000, the Budgetary Control Committee of the
European Parliament invited the Court to undertake a
follow-up of the new tendering procedures.
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5.57. The objective of this follow-up review was to
examine whether, for the Tacis programme, the Com-
mission had introduced and effectively implemented
the measures recommended by the Court and whether
the measures themselves were proving effective. Evi-
dence was obtained through file reviews and interviews
and by examining a sample of 30 contracts (around
15 % of the total) which passed through the Tacis pro-
curement system in 2001.
Implementation of the Court’s recommendations
Harmonised procedures and rules were introduced in 2001
but their implementation can be improved
5.58. The new Manual of Instructions was comple-
mented by a ‘Practical Guide to EC external aid contract
procedures’ in January 2001. The introduction of mea-
sures such as the use of checklists, standard forms and
contracts (including a simplified breakdown of costs), in
camera evaluation (to ensure security and confidential-
ity) and limited use of interviews during technical evalu-
ations (now practically eliminated) greatly improved the
procurement system.
5.59. Although the Commission’s record-keeping and
filing have seen further improvements, procurement
personnel do not yet benefit from a system of record-
ing and analysis of problems and complaints which
would provide feedback aimed at avoiding future unsat-
isfactory situations.
5.60. In one third of the contracts examined just one
or two firms passed the technical evaluation. The delib-
erate decision, takenwith the introduction of theManual
of Instructions, to increase the basis of weighing the
technical quality against price (from 70-30 to 80-20)
further reduced the price competition in the awarding
of service contracts.
5.57. The contracts examined by the Court were the first
contracts to be prepared in conformity with the Practical Guide
to EC external aid contract procedures. The Service Commun
Relex has just been disbanded. The staff of the former Techni-
cal Assistance Offices had to be integrated into the newly
restructured EuropeAid Cooperation Office. Inevitably, there
was an initial learning period when staff were familiarising
themselves with a new organisation and with new procedures.
This was not therefore a period of normal operation for the
services concerned.
5.59. The network of Financial and Contract Management
Units established within the EuropeAid Cooperation Office
provides a regular forum in which problems are discussed so
that joint solutions are found. Appropriate action to prevent
the recurrence of particular situations takes the form of an
instruction note and/or revision of the standard documents
annexed to the Practical Guide. There are also plans to estab-
lish a Frequently Asked Questions page on the EuropeAid
website.
5.60. This rule was established to demonstrate our empha-
sis on quality rather than price. It is strongly supported by
practitioners, including the Member States. It works well in
practice, and ensures that we do not award contracts to poor
quality tenderers simply because they are cheaper. The maxi-
mum budget is published in the procurement notice so tender-
ers usually attempt to make financial offers as close as pos-
sible to this amount. Hence there is rarely a major difference
between
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5.61. The evaluation committees closely followed the
evaluation criteria issued to tenderers, which is an
improvement on the situation found previously. How-
ever, selection and award criteria were sometimes vague
and difficult to assess.
5.62. Conflicts of interest continue to be a risk factor.
This is particularly relevant for the appointment of
external evaluators and for cases where a tenderer has
gainedunfair competitive advantage through the involve-
ment in writing the Terms of Reference. There was one
such case among the contracts examined (the same
expert wrote the terms of reference and acted as an
evaluator, and was also associated with a national busi-
ness institute which was part of the successful tenderer).
According to the Practical Guide, the tenderer should
have been excluded from participating in this tender. In
another case examined, the Task Manager, all the evalu-
ators and the successful tenderer (company and key
experts) were all of the same nationality, thus increas-
ing the risk of bias. Although it cannot be proved that
another tenderer should have won in this case, such
occurrences reduce confidence in the fairness of the
procurement system.
them. It is therefore inappropriate to place any significant
weight on the comparison between financial offers in decid-
ing between the technically compliant offers. Internationally,
there have been may instances of commercial operators tak-
ing advantage of public tender procedures in which tenderers
won on price but subsequently failed to deliver quality services.
We want to ensure that tenderers are aware that the main fac-
tor for us is the technical quality of their tenders. This weight-
ing is in line with the practice at the World Bank and other
international donors.
5.61. During the transitional phase of the introduction of
the new procedures, it took some time for personnel to get used
to setting appropriate selection and award criteria. The situ-
ation has subsequently improved.
5.62. In the first case, all evaluators had signed a declara-
tion of impartiality and confidentiality in which they attested
to their independence, taking into consideration whether there
exists any past or present relationship, direct or indirect,
whether financial, professional or of another kind. One of the
evaluators, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of an EU
Member State, had also been involved in writing the terms of
reference. He was subsequently found to have been associated
with a national business institute which was part of the suc-
cessful tenderer, contrary to the statement made in his declara-
tion of impartiality and confidentiality. The Commission
investigated this isolated case and concluded that, since this
evaluator had given the lowest score to the successful tenderer,
there was no evidence that the impartiality of the evaluation
had been compromised.
Evaluators are selected for their technical expertise, irrespec-
tive of their nationality. For practical reasons, the Commis-
sion seeks to have at least one voting member of the Evalua-
tion Committee from the beneficiary country, which would
necessarily imply at least two nationalities among the mini-
mum of three voting members. In the second case cited by the
Court, which is exceptional, the beneficiary country’s repre-
sentative was unable to attend and an alternative evaluator
was appointed at short notice. The Commission has investi-
gated this case and concluded that the nationality of the
evaluators had no influence on the outcome of the evalua-
tion. In general, cancelling the tender procedure simply because
the only suitably qualified evaluators available were of the
same nationality would have been criticised by both the ten-
derers concerned and by the beneficiary country.
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The Commission’s reorganisation and associated human
resources problems hindered Tacis procurement planning
5.63. The new EuropeAid Cooperation Office was set
up in January 2001. At the same time many Technical
Assistance Offices (TAOs) were dismantled, including
the Tacis Procurement Unit which was discontinued at
the end of March 2001. Although intended to reduce
the turnover among staff allocated to essentially civil
service duties, these changes adversely affected the Tacis
programme implementationand tenderingprocess.Dur-
ing 2001 continuing high staff turnover and the late
recruitment of permanent procurement managers
delayed the launch of tenders and thus reduced the
effectiveness of the procurement system.
5.64. By the middle of 2001 it had become clear that
a number of tenders already launched or about to be
launched could not meet the deadlines for contracting
and/or disbursement because the Terms of Reference
were not yet ready at all or endorsed by the beneficiary.
For one fifth of the projects examined the duration was
significantly reduced while the same budget was kept
and the Terms of Reference amended, either just before
the invitation to tender was issued, or afterwards while
negotiating the contract or even after the contract had
been signed.
Conclusion
5.65. Theprocurement systemof theTacis programme
has been strengthened, particularly with the introduc-
tion of harmonised procedures and standard contracts.
There are however some areas where further improve-
ment is necessary in implementing these procedures in
order to achieve the highest level of transparency and
fair competition in tendering.
Recommendations
5.66. The Court emphasises its earlier recommenda-
tion that a stable staff situation is crucial and should be
further pursued.
5.63. The Commission accepts the Court’s comments on
staffing in relation to the first part of 2001. The staff of the
former Technical Assistance Offices had to be integrated into
the new structure, which inevitably affected programme man-
agement. Since the second half of 2001 efforts have been
made to improve the situation within the limited resources
available.
5.64. The Commission had to reduce the duration of some
projects financed under older action programmes to allow it
to continue to implement the projects. However in these cases,
even with the reduced time frame, the scope of the work (and
hence the maximum budget available) remains the same. The
Commission nevertheless took care to ensure that the projects
remained feasible and that competition was not at risk.
5.65. The Commission is pleased to note that the Court
welcomes the introduction of the Practical Guide and recogn-
ises the improvements made already. The implementation of
the new procedures improved after the initial transition phase
included in the Court’s period of review.
5.66. The Commission has taken measures to improve the
staffing situation within the resources available.
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5.67. An information and management system con-
taining data on experts and contractors should be devel-
oped.
5.68. The follow-up given to complaints and irregu-
larities, together with descriptions of any problems
occurring during the tendering process, should be
recorded and reviewed regularly by all procurement
officers.
Co-financing of activities implemented by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)
Introduction
5.69. The audit of the co-financing of NGOs carried
out for 1999 covered the management of the Commis-
sion as well as the management and the internal control
systems of a sample of NGOs.
5.70. The main observations made by the Court in its
1999 Annual Report (16) were:
(a) the proposals for projects made by the NGOs usu-
ally did not contain indications on how the sustain-
ability of the projects could be ensured;
(b) the procedures for contracting with NGOs varied
according to the different budget headings;
(c) the delay between the NGOs’ requests for aid and
the Commission’s decisions was too long;
(d) ex-post controls on the implementation of NGO-
actions should be improved and evaluations should
be carried out on a regular basis.
5.67. The Practical Guide to EC external aid contract pro-
cedures already includes contractor assessment forms which
must be completed at the end of each project by the project
manager of the Contracting Authority. This provides the
Financial and Contract Management Units of the EuropeAid
Cooperation Office with information on the performance of
experts and contractors.
While this information is not currently recorded in a comput-
erised database, this is clearly the intention. A Commission-
wide database of contract information is already being devel-
oped.
5.68. See reply to point 5.59. Recurrent problems encoun-
tered during tender procedures are discussed at monthly meet-
ings of a network of procurement officers throughout the
External Relations DGs. Minutes of these meetings are made
available internally in electronic form. Follow-up action has
included internal instructions and revision of the standard
documents of the Practical Guide.
(16) Paragraphs 5.21-5.27 and 5.79-5.93.
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5.71. In the context of the discharge procedure for the
financial year 1999 the Commission announced, in its
Action Plan (17), improvements in monitoring, ex-post
controls and standardising of procedures for contract-
ing with NGOs.
The Commission’s initiatives
NGOs’ proposals and the contracting procedures
5.72. The Commission solved the problem of the
unclear content of the proposals made by NGOs and
the differences in procedures by introducing in 2000 a
new ‘call for proposals’ procedure. According to this
procedure, NGOs can submit proposals for actions to
be (co)financed by the Commission. The proposals
should contain precise information about the NGO
(including its financial situation and previous contracts
with the Commission), on the proposed action, cover-
ing aspects such as the nature of the intervention, the
beneficiaries and monitoring, as well as on the interre-
lationship between objectives, activities, results, inputs
and performance indicators (logical framework), and
the factors determining the sustainability.
5.73. The proposals for the year 2000 were assessed
on the basis of criteria on the relevance of the actions
(e.g. target groups, needs, objectives), the methodology
proposed (e.g. project design, involvement of partners),
the sustainability and thebudget andmanagement capac-
ity of the NGO. Although the procedure foresaw that
the Delegations should play an important role in the
assessment process, in practice their contribution was
restricted because they were not given sufficient time by
the central services to respond. Consequently, most of
the assessment work was carried out in Brussels. Of
approximately 1 100 proposals about 400 projectswere
selected based on the outcome of the assessment and
the availability of funds.
Delays
5.74. The above action has harmonised the procedures
applying to contracting with NGOs and has made the
selection processmuchmore transparent. However, this
(17) Communication from the Commission SEC (2001) 246
final of 5 March 2001.
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intensive and thorough procedure needed substantial
resources and time on the part of the Commission’s
central services. Consequently the delay between the
NGOs’ proposals and the conclusion of contracts with
NGOs was still more than one year for 66 % of the
cases examined.
5.75. The number of proposals to be processed in
future is unlikely to decrease and the number of staff at
central level involved in the management of NGO con-
tracts will presumably remain the same. As a result
delays are unlikely to be shortened as long as the exist-
ing procedures apply. The Commission should consider
having a greater part of the assessment work carried
out by the Delegations on the basis of clear instructions
and guidance from the central services, subject to sub-
sequent monitoring.
Ex-post controls and monitoring
5.76. The Commission is in the process of strengthen-
ing its monitoring and evaluation of projects. In par-
ticular the obligation for NGOs to carry out monitor-
ing and evaluations as specified in the call for proposals
procedure, should provide a sound basis for further
improvements. Moreover, the Commission is setting up
a global monitoring system for development projects,
which should lead to systematic monitoring of projects
on the basis of criteria such as relevance, effectiveness,
efficiency, impact and sustainability. The results of this
monitoring are to be included in a database which
Commission staff will be able to access easily.
5.77. In setting up this monitoring system some 500
projects were monitored. The consultancy firm which
assisted the Commission in implementing the system
made an assessment of the present situation of this
project. The report concluded that the monitoring tools
such as reports and criteria for monitoring are now well
established. Whereas the monitoring system can now
identify projects’ weaknesses, additional work needs to
be carried out to be able to analyse their underlying
causes. Furthermore the quality, performance andmeth-
odology of the monitoring system should be regularly
evaluated by the Commission.
5.75. The existing procedures foresee an active involvement
of delegations in the assessment of proposals, and the Com-
mission will ensure that proposals are received in due time for
them to be assessed.
The Commission has tightened the eligibility criteria and the
areas of priority financing in order to limit the number of pro-
posals for any given call for proposals. This should have the
effect of reducing the time needed to carry out the evaluation
as well as shortening the time between the submission of pro-
posals and the signing of the contracts.
5.76. Improvements in monitoring have taken place, as
described by the Court. The two systems (i.e. the monitoring
system specified in the call for proposals, and the global sys-
tem for results-oriented monitoring) are being kept under
review, but it is too early to make a full evaluation. The inter-
nal database on the results of the results-oriented monitoring
system is already functioning.
5.77. The Commission expects to continue improving and
developing the methodology. There are also firm plans to
assess, after the system has been in use for two or three years,
the usefulness of the monitoring reports and their application
in practice.
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Conclusion
5.78. The Commission has undertaken a number of
significant actions to improve its management of its
co-financing of actions managed by NGOs. However
Delegations should be allowed sufficient time for giv-
ing their opinion on proposals made by NGOs. The
Commission should also examine alternative proce-
dures to shorten the time between the NGO’s submis-
sion of proposals and the signing of the contracts.
PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS IN SPECIAL
REPORTS
Macro-financial assistance to third countries and struc-
tural adjustment facilities in the Mediterranean coun-
tries
5.79. The Court examined European Union macro-
economic level support for general economic transition
and structural reform processes in selected third coun-
tries (18). In the EU Accession countries, the Western
Balkans and the Newly Independent States this assis-
tance usually takes the form of ‘Macro-Financial Assis-
tance’ (MFA),whereas in theMediterraneannon-member
countries (MEDA) it is in the form of ‘Structural Adjust-
ment Facilities’ (SAF) (19). During the period 1998 to
2000, 822 million euro were disbursed as MFA in nine
countries (of which 704 million euro were given in the
form of loans). Between 1996 and 2000, 470 million
euro were paid as grants to five countries under the SAF
programmes.
5.78. The Commission welcomes the Court’s comments on
the actions taken. The consultation process will involve del-
egations, and sufficient time will be allowed for them to com-
ment.
(18) Special Report No 1/2002 concerning macro-financial
assistance (MFA) to third countries and structural adjust-
ment facilities (SAF) in the Mediterranean countries
(OJ C 121, 23.5.2002).
(19) The EU also provides structural adjustment assistance to
the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. See Special
Report No 5/2001 on counterpart funds from structural
adjustment support earmarked for budget aid (seventh
and eighth EDFs) (OJ C 257, 14.9.2001).
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5.80. The main audit objectives were to assess:
(a) the rationale of the design of the instruments;
(b) the quality of the Commission’s payment approval
and monitoring process;
(c) whether the Commission fulfilled satisfactorily its
reporting duty and made comprehensive evalua-
tions.
5.81. When giving MFA assistance the Commission
did not always respect the five policy principles (excep-
tional character, political pre-conditions, complemen-
tarity, conditionality and financial discipline) agreed by
the ECOFIN Council in 1995. For SAF programmes the
Commission did not document how, and on what basis,
it made key decisions such as determining the size of
the grants, or the size and timing of payment instal-
ments. The programme conditions were often limited
to the presentation of legislation and action plans rather
than their actual implementation.
5.82. The Commission has not made comprehensive
specific assessments of the reliability of the budgetary
and accounting processes of MFA and SAF recipient
countries. This is a significant weakness for budgetary
support operations as the money goes directly into the
recipient country’s budgetary system and its use cannot
be separately identified.
5.83. Whereas the need to have a margin of judge-
ment is inherent in an instrument like SAF or MFA, the
Commission has not always clearly established whether
certain conditions had been fulfilled. In particular, the
justification for waiving conditions was not sufficiently
documented.
5.81. The ECOFIN conclusions referred to by the Court are
informal and not legally binding and they provide general
guidance for the design and implementation of MFA. The
vast majority of MFA follows these principles. Some excep-
tions may occur, which is not unexpected given the nature of
the programme, though these are known about and subject to
appropriate review.
As SAFs accompany the reform programmes of the Mediter-
ranean partners, a fixed timetable of disbursements is not
required (instalments are released only upon compliance with
conditionality). This is because (a) the pace of reforms of the
partner country should be respected and (b) SAFs are not
exceptional instruments to be used in the urgent financing of
internal and external deficits.
5.82. All the countries in receipt of such aid are regularly
subjected to IMF Article IV review, when budget implementa-
tion and the quality of the data concerning public finances are
examined and evaluated. These provide a major input to
assessing the quality of budgetary and accounting processes.
5.83. Disbursement can be based on an overall evaluation
of the achievement of set objectives though all relevant avail-
able information should be weighed up to arrive at an appro-
priate conclusion. Some actions which may not have been
foreseen in an original agreement may be important in achiev-
ing the overall objective.
The Commission endeavours in all cases to document fully the
reasons for waiving conditions.
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5.84. The evaluation of the measures by the Commis-
sion was found to be either non-existent (MFA) or of
limited scope only (SAF).
5.85. The Court recommended that:
(a) the added value of the European Union’s interven-
tions in comparison to the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund should bemore clearly
established;
(b) consideration should be given to creating a more
harmonised approach between MFA and SAF, so
that countries in similar situations are dealt with in
a similar manner;
(c) the Commission’s decision-making for the various
phases of themanagement ofmacro-economic assis-
tance should be more transparent, and in particular
the Commission should document its justification
for waiving conditions;
(d) the Commission’smonitoring of the quality of finan-
cial management in beneficiary countries should be
considerably improved and involve all relevant
Directorates General;
5.84. The Commission is planning to initiate independent
evaluations of selectedMFAprogrammes from2003 onwards.
This will complement the evaluation of economic adjustment
and reform in the beneficiary countries already laid down in
the annual reports concerning implementation of MFA.
An evaluation of macro-economic policy support is planned
for 2004/2005. It is not planned to cover MFA. Once the
evaluation report is finalised, it will be made available on the
Commission’s website.
5.85.
(a) A systematic effort is made to ensure adequate comple-
mentarity with IMF/WB programmes. Generally the
mobilisation of MFA and SAFs is associated with addi-
tional reform efforts being required from the recipient
partner countries. Furthermore, the economic policy con-
ditions (notably on structural reform) attached to the
implementation of EC assistance are inspired by the eco-
nomic co-operation agenda between the EU and the
recipient country as set out in association or cooperation
agreements.
(b) Although the MFA and SAF are designed differently and
pursue somewhat different objectives, an effort is under
way to ensure consistency in their implementation pro-
cedures. The observation of the Court will be taken into
account in this context.
(c) The Commission will ensure, in all cases, that reasons for
granting waivers are adequately documented.
(d) Commission departments, including the delegations, regu-
larly monitor the economic and political developments of
the beneficiary countries. The Commission is enhancing
the delegations’ capacity to monitor the political and eco-
nomic conditions in beneficiary countries.
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(e) more priority should be given to carrying out evalu-
ations.
(e) A greater focus on evaluation is already a part of the gen-
eral reform. Evaluations of selected MFA programmes are
planned to take place from 2003 onwards, and all SAFs
approved since 2000 include financial provision for a
final independent evaluation.
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INTRODUCTION
6.1. This chapter deals with the instruments for coun-
tries preparing for accession to the European Union. It
includes observations on budgetary management for
heading 7 of the financial perspectives and on the sec-
ond year of implementation of the Sapard programme
in the area of agricultural and rural development. Head-
ing 7 of the financial perspectives only contains the
appropriations for the pre-accession instruments
(PHARE, ISPA and Sapard) and not those in favour of
the Mediterranean countries, which remain under head-
ing 4.
ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT
6.2. Table 6.1 gives an overview of budgetary man-
agement under Title B7-0, concerning the pre-accession
instruments and the pre-accession strategy in favour of
Mediterranean countries for the financial year 2001.
The Commitment appropriations were fully utilised
6.3. All the commitment appropriations under head-
ing 7 were utilised in 2001. For the two new instru-
ments (Sapard and ISPA), commitments entered into
during this financial year amounted to 540,0 million
euro and 1121,2 million euro respectively (1). For the
Sapard programme this concerned the Commission’s
expenditure decisions (and not actual projects), whereas
for ISPA it concerned legal contractual commitments
actually entered into for each project.
6.2-6.3. The budgets for pre-accession aid are based on an
assessment of the needs of the candidate countries. They are
drawn up in response to calls by the European Council, nota-
bly the Berlin summit, and the wishes expressed by the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament for there to be significant
sums available to the candidate countries from an early date
so that this would not act as a brake on them carrying out all
the necessary activities in order to achieve accession. Sapard is
mainly an institution-building device to ensure the easy
take-up by these countries of Community practices after acces-
sion. ISPA is financing very specific measures in the environ-
mental and transport sectors, although it also certainly includes
some element relating to the preparation of candidate coun-
tries for the Cohesion Fund.
(1) Including 41,2 million euro committed in 2001 on appro-
priations from the financial year 2000 that were carried
over to 2001 by a Commission Decision.
200 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 28.11.2002
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Table 6.1 — Pre-accession aid — Implementation of the 2001 budget
(Mio EUR)
Budget heading
Ceiling of
financial
perspectives
Changes in the budget Implementation of the budget (4)
Initial
appropriations (1)
Definitive
appropriations
available (2)
Utilised
appropriations
% of definitive
appropriations
available
Cancelled
approps
% of definitive
approps
available
(a) (b) (c) (d) = (c)/(b) (e) (f) = (e)/(b)
Commitment appropriations
Aid instrument for Agriculture and Rural Development (Sapard) — pre-
accession (Chapter B7-0 1)
540 540,0 540,0 540,0 100,0 0,0 0,0
Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession (ISPA) (Chapter B7-0 2) 1 080 1 080,0 1 080,0 1 079,9 100,0 0,0 0,0
PHARE Instrument — pre-accession (Chapter B7-0 3) 1 620 1 620,0 1 620,0 1 616,5 99,8 3,5 0,2
Total Heading 7 3 240 3 240,0 3 240,0 3 236,4 99,9 3,5 0,1
Pre-accession strategy in favour of the Mediterranean countries (Cyprus
and Malta) (Chapter B7-0 4) (3)
19,0 19,0 19,0 100,0 0,0 0,0
Pre-accession strategy in favour of the Mediterranean countries (Turkey)
(Chapter B7-0 5) (3)
p.m. p.m.
Pre-accession strategy (Title B7-0) 3 259,0 3 259,0 3 255,4 99,9 3,5 0,1
Payment appropriations
Aid instrument for Agriculture and Rural Development (Sapard) — pre-
accession (Chapiter B7-0 1)
330,8 330,8 30,5 9,2 300,3 90,8
Instrument for Structural Policies for pre-accession (ISPA) (Chapter B7-0 2) 350,0 350,0 203,3 58,1 146,7 41,9
Phare instrument — pre-accession (Chapter B7-0 3) 1 420,4 1 420,4 1 159,8 81,6 260,6 18,4
Total Heading 7 2 101,2 2 101,2 1 393,6 66,3 707,7 33,7
Pre-accession strategy in favour of the Mediterranean countries (Cyprus
and Malta) (Chapter B7-0 4) (3)
13,0 13,0 2,5 19,5 10,5 80,5
Pre-accession strategy in favour of the Mediterranean countries (Turkey)
(Chapter B7-0 5) (3)
p.m. p.m.
Pre-accession strategy (Title B7-0) 2 114,2 2 114,2 1 396,1 66,0 718,1 34,0
(1) Budget adopted definitively by the European Parliament on 14 December 2000 (OJ L 56 of 26.02.2001).
(2) Budget appropriations modified after taking into account the supplementary and amending budgets and transfers, but not including the appropriations carried over from 2000, appropriations resulting from the re-utilisation of revenue
and revenue resulting from the participation of third parties and other revenue corresponding to a specific purpose and reconstituted appropriations.
(3) The pre-accession strategy in favour of the Mediterranean countries comes under heading 4.
(4) Appropriations carried over to 2002: 0,0 Mio EUR except for Chapter B7-0 2: 0,1 Mio EUR.
Source: Revenue and expenditure account 2001.
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Under-utilisation of payment appropriations for the new
pre-accession instruments
6.4. With regard toChapterB7-03, thepayment appro-
priations for the financial year were utilised at a high
rate for the Phare programme as such (81,6 %).
6.5. For the new instruments, the amounts paid out
were very low. For Sapard programme commitments
contracted at the end of 2000, 30,5 million euro, or
9,2 % of the appropriations entered in 2001, and 6,5 %
of available appropriations were paid out in the form of
advances to the administrations of the candidate states,
which transferred 1 million euro to final beneficiaries
(see paragraph 6.11). Since these commitments had thus
hardly been used by the end of 2001, there is a risk that
the extended deadline for payments will not be met (see
paragraph 6.10). For the ISPA programme, the Com-
mission made payments amounting to 25,3 million
euro relating to the commitments for the financial year
and 177,9 million euro for those still outstanding at the
end of 2000, representing 58,1 % of the appropriations
provided.
6.6. In these two cases, the Commission greatly over-
estimated the beneficiaries’ absorption capacity and did
not base its budget estimates on a realistic assessment
of the time needed to set up management systems. For
the ISPA programme, the Commission has stated that,
here too, advances were paid out on the basis of the
approval of the projects to be supported.
6.4. The utilisation of appropriations was high since a good
number of the budgeted activities took place as planned. This
was helped by fact that the Phare programme is well estab-
lished, which was not the case with the other pre-accession
instruments.
6.5. Sapard is being implemented on a fully decentralised
basis and so payments by the Commission require candidate
countries to set up administrative structures capable of ensur-
ing the sound financial management of Community funds.
The five countries that had put these structures in place by the
end of 2001 represented less than one quarter of the overall
SAPARD allocation. An additional factor for low budget
execution was the Commission practice of limiting payments
on account to only half of the legal maximum. Moreover pay-
ments to final beneficiaries are only possible when the latter
have incurred eligible expenditure. This inevitably occurs often
months after the project has been approved, as is the case in
Member States.
6.6. The estimates of expenditure for 2001 were made well
before the end of 2000. Since there was no previous experi-
ence of decentralised management in non-member countries
at the time, the estimates were based on the assumption that
all the countries eligible would be able to start applying the
instrument at the end of 2000 and would do so fully in
2001. This assumption appeared realistic at the time, a view
shared by the countries concerned.
Concerning ISPA, the Commission would like to point out
that most of the projects for that year were decided by the
Commission very late in 2000, as the Court already observed
in its Annual Report for 2000. Moreover, unlike the practice
in Member States, the Financing Memoranda need to be
countersigned by the beneficiary country, and the timing of
this is largely outside the Commission’s control. No payments
were made in 2000, but they started to flow in 2001. Cer-
tain weaknesses in the administrative environment in candi-
date countries and difficulties in the management of large
infrastructure investment led to some delays in the running-in
phase of ISPA implementation.
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Outstanding amounts
6.7. 7,4 %of the 3 206,5million euro committed since
the introduction of the new instruments could be settled
at the end of 2001 (2,9 % of the 1 069 million euro
committed for Sapard and 9,6 % of the 2 137,5 million
euro committed for ISPA). The volume of the outstand-
ing commitments for the Phare programme also
increases regularly.
SAPARD
Introduction
6.8. The Sapard Regulation (2) fixed the starting date
of the Sapard programme at 1 January 2000. Imple-
mentation of Sapard in 2001 mainly involved the set-
ting up of management and control systems in the can-
didate countries (3) and their review and approval by
the Commission. The rules for the approval of the sys-
tems were adopted by the Commission on 29 Novem-
ber 2000 (4) on the basis of its Regulation (EC)
No 2222/2000 (5) of 7 June 2000. Since payments to
final beneficiaries were very low, the Court’s audit of
Sapard concentrated on how theCommission had analy-
sed and monitored the setting up and functioning of the
management and control systems in the candidate coun-
tries.
6.7. The implementation of large infrastructure projects
requires substantial preparatory work before contracts can be
signed and payments flow. Experience shows that the tender-
ing process for large infrastructure contracts takes, in the best
case, at least nine months from publication of the procure-
ment notice to the signing of the contract. Reflecting progress
in implementation, EUR 203 million was paid out in 2001
and the results for the first six months of 2002 show that
payments have accelerated substantially.
With regard to Phare, the increase in unspent commitments
is due to the high level of new commitments made in the
period 2000/2001 which had not been paid at the end of
2001. This is in line with the three-year cycle of implementa-
tion, which means that candidate countries have two years to
implement contracting and a further year to carry out the
projects.
(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1268/1999 of 21 June 1999
on Community support for pre-accession measures for
agriculture and rural development in the applicant coun-
tries of central and eastern Europe in the pre-accession
period (OJ L 161, 26.6.1999, p. 87).
(3) Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia (Sapard
does not apply to Cyprus, Malta and Turkey).
(4) See the Annual Report concerning the financial year
2000, paragraphs 6.43 and 6.52.
(5) OJ L 253, 7.10.2000, p. 5.
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6.9. Sapard is the first EU external aid programme
which has been implemented in a decentralised man-
ner. This means that project selection, tendering and
contracting decisions (6) are not taken by the Commis-
sion but by the candidate countries and that the Com-
mission’s audit of expenditure is limited to ex-post con-
trol. The legal basis for Sapard sets, as a condition for
decentralised management in a candidate country, a
decision by the Commission, which should be based on
an analysis of the management and control systems of
the country concerned. This analysis is made following
so-called ‘national accreditation’, which means that the
competent national authorities approve the manage-
ment and control systems. Table 6.2 shows, for each of
the ten candidate countries, when national accredita-
tion of the systems was granted and when the Commis-
sion approved the management and control systems
(known as conferral of management).
6.10. Sapard funds follow the same procedure for
decommitments as those applied for the Structural
Funds in theMember States. Thus, funds provided under
the 2000 budget which have not been spent in the two
following years (i.e. by the end of 2002) should be can-
celled. The Financial Regulation states that the Commis-
sion may, in special circumstances, adjust the time limit
for the implementation of multi-annual commitments.
As a result of the delays referred to in paragraph 6.8, no
decisions on the conferral of management to the can-
didate countries were taken in 2000. The Commission
decided that these were special circumstances and
extended the expiry date for the 2000 funds from the
end of 2002 to the end of 2003.
Delayed implementation in the candidate countries
6.11. Table 6.2 also shows the implementation status
of Sapard in the 10 beneficiary countries as at 31Decem-
ber 2001. In 2001, the Commission approved the man-
agement and control systems in five countries in respect
of just over half of the measures planned by those
6.9. Implementing Sapard in this decentralised way was
considered the most effective means to prepare candidate
countries for applying the acquis communautaire as set out
in the basic Council Regulation. At the time of accession the
system created for Sapard will require at most minor adjust-
ments in order to fulfil responsibilities relating to both the
existing Structural Funds and EAGGF Guarantee require-
ments.
6.11. The reason for not all measures being involved in the
approved systems at the initial stage, was to minimise delay
in completing preparatory work in each beneficiary country.
(6) Under the external aid provisions of the Financial Regula-
tion these key points are managed by the Commission.
Whilst this is done for Phare and ISPA, Sapard is managed
on a decentralised basis.
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Table 6.2 — Implementation of Sapard in 2001 in candidate countries
(Mio EUR)
National
accreditation date (1)
Date of Commission
Decision (1)
Available EU
funds 2000
Available EU
funds 2001
Available EU
funds total
Number of
projects
approved
Amount of
projects
approved (3)
Execution rate
commitments
(%)
Actual
expenditure
31/12/2001 (4)
Execution
rate
payments (%)
(a) (b) (c) (c)/(a) (d) (d)/(a)
Bulgaria 18/12/00 14/5/01 53,0 54,1 107,1 41 6,1 (2) 5,7 0,7 0,7
Estonia 15/6/01 15/6/01 12,3 12,6 24,9 130 5,9 23,7 0,3 1,2
Slovenia 11/9/01 19/11/01 6,5 6,6 13,0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Lithuania 26/11/01 26/11/01 30,3 31,0 61,3 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Latvia 7/7/01 6/12/01 22,2 22,7 44,9 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Czech Republic 13/11/01 15/4/02 22,4 22,9 45,3 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Slovak Republic 7/1/02 15/4/02 18,6 19,0 37,6 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Poland 21/9/01 2/7/02 171,6 175,1 346,6 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Romania 12/6/02 31/7/02 153,2 156,3 309,5 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Hungary – – 38,7 39,5 78,2 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
TOTAL 528,9 539,7 1 068,6 171 12,0 1,1 1,0 0,1
NB: Situation as at 31 December 2001 except (1) as at 5 September 2002 and (2) as at 10 December 2001.
(3) EU share
(4) Paid to final beneficiaries
Source: Court of Auditors.
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candidate countries (7), which represented 82 % of the
funding foreseen for these countries. Projects were
approved and implemented in only Bulgaria and Esto-
nia. Payments to final beneficiaries in those countries
amounted to 1 million euro. This means that two years
after the programme had been launched, only 0,1 % of
the total available funds had been used.
6.12. In 2001, the Commission made advance pay-
ments amounting to 30,5 million euro to the five coun-
tries where the conferral of management was granted in
2001. Since payments to final beneficiaries in those
countries amounted to only 1 million euro in 2001, the
bulk of these funds have remained unused in bank
accounts. The agreements concluded between the Com-
mission and the candidate countries (known as Multi-
Annual Financing Agreements (MAFAs)), state that all
interest earned shall be used exclusively for the pro-
gramme, and shall be counted as a further contribution
from the Community. The agreements do not explicitly
require the candidate countries to report on the inter-
est earned although the candidate countries do so.
6.13. The MAFAs, which are legally binding interna-
tional agreements, specify that ‘all interest … shall be
counted as a further contribution by the Community’.
Therefore, such information should be entered in the
Commission’s accounts. At present, this is not the case.
The Commission has recorded 289 562,55 euro for
2001, and the Court estimates that the amounts involved
maybe2million euro for2002 (see alsoparagraph9.28).
6.14. For the five countries where the systems were
approved, the conferral of management is provisional
(see also paragraph 6.25) and only covers around half
of the measures provided for in the Rural Development
Plans. Moreover, when the Commission approved the
management and control systems, this was based on
systems which were mainly or exclusively manual for
all countries except Estonia. Thus, the five candidate
countries are still developing their systems and the
Commission will need to examine them further when
they have been automated or when procedures for fur-
ther measures have been completed.
The Commission’s first priority was to ensure that candidate
countries had the structures in place to manage the funds
properly. Payments to final beneficiaries are made only when
they have incurred eligible expenditure, often several months
after the beneficiary has been selected. A similar situation
exists with Member States under the Structural Funds.
6.12. The amount of interest earned on the Sapard euro
bank accounts in 2001 amounted to EUR 289 562,55 for
the countries concerned. The interest earned may only be used
after inclusion in a programme measure. To date no such
decisions have been taken.
6.13. The Commission agrees that both the receipt and use
of interest should be reported (see reply on point 6.12. above).
This will be done after a decision concerning its use has been
taken. Under the new draft implementation rules for the new
Financial Regulation, which will apply from 1 January 2003,
the Commission has made it clear that interest arising from
prefinancing of actions under the pre-accession instruments
will not be considered as belonging to the Commission.
(7) Number of measures identified by candidate countries in
their Rural Development Plans: Bulgaria 11, Estonia 8,
Latvia 8, Lithuania 8, Slovenia 5. Number of measures for
which the Commission decided on the conferral of man-
agement: Bulgaria 3, Estonia 4, Latvia 6, Lithuania 5, Slo-
venia 4.
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6.15. Table 6.2 shows the low number of projects
approved in Bulgaria. In addition, both the number and
the value of the projects approved decreased signifi-
cantly during the year 2001. Whereas 38 projects were
approved in the first four months after the programme
had started (June 1), only three were approved in the
last quarter of 2001. According to a progress report
from the Bulgarian Sapard Agency, it was only after the
start of the programme that it was discovered that
applicants hadmajor problems in obtaining the required
documents and in securing the advance financing of
project amounts. As Bulgaria was the first country to
start with decentralised management, and in view of the
limited time to implement Sapard before the accession
of the beneficiary countries, the Commission should
have analysed the implementation problems and pro-
vided guidance to all beneficiary countries.
6.16. The Court was not able to make a similar analy-
sis for Estonia, showing how the number and value of
the applications have developed, because the Commis-
sion did not have the data. At present, the Commission
receives information on the number of projects and
their value at the six-monthly monitoring committee
meetings. The frequency with which this information is
received is not sufficient to identify trends in Sapard
implementation at an early stage. Decentralising the
management of aid does not release the Commission
from its ultimate responsibility for the implementation
of the programme or from the need to be informed.
Shortcomings in the Commission’s methodology for
approving national management of Sapard
6.17. The first step in the decentralisation of manage-
ment is national accreditation, which should be based
on an examination of management and control systems
by the candidate countries themselves. Subsequently,
the Commission analyses these systems before it decides
on the decentralised management of aid. However, the
documents issued by Estonia and Lithuania, granting
national accreditation, showed that it was conditional
on a satisfactory review of the systems by the Commis-
sion. The Court considers that the Commission should
have required Estonia and Lithuania to resubmit their
accreditation document without such a condition.
6.15. As regards the specific case of Bulgaria, the issue of
project approval difficulties was addressed in the Monitoring
Committee meeting of December 2001. The following Moni-
toring Committee meeting in June 2002 received data show-
ing that 95 projects have been approved involving an EU con-
tribution of EUR 14,6 million. Thus, the figure for the last
quarter of 2001 is not indicative of a trend.
Already at the programming stage the Commission advised
the beneficiary countries to endeavour, where possible, to draw
up rules that would be simple to apply. Subsequently the
Commission financed two seminars in mid-2001 and mid-
2002 giving all the candidate countries the opportunity to
discuss any matter relating to implementation. Moreover the
Commission seeks, in its advisory role in monitoring commit-
tees, to contribute ideas that could facilitate implementation.
Where implementation may be frustrated by provisions in the
Multi-annual Financing Agreements, the Commission has
also asked all the beneficiary countries to consider suggestions
for simplifying the text.
6.16. The Commission considers that the information it
receives from the six-monthly monitoring committee is, as a
rule, sufficient for its management needs.
6.17. It is true that these two countries made their national
accreditation ‘conditional’ on the Commission’s review,
although this has had no implications in practice and the
Commission did not consider it necessary to require the resub-
mission of the Act of Accreditation; both countries have been
monitored and visited since the conferral decision and no sig-
nificant control issues have arisen.
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6.18. The Commission’s analysis of the management
and control systems is of crucial importance, because it
aims to ensure that EU funds will be used properly. The
Court’s audit focused on a review of the Commission’s
analyses, which were in the form of audit files support-
ing the Commission Decisions on the conferral of man-
agement. The main shortcomings noted were a lack of
documentation on the nature, timing and extent of the
audit procedures performed, some conclusions on the
systems that were not supported by sufficient and reli-
able evidence and no systematic file review by the
responsible hierarchy. The Court’s audit concluded that,
in these areas, generally accepted auditing standards
were not applied satisfactorily, because, although cer-
tain file sections met these standards, there were others
that did not.
6.19. The applicable Council Regulation (8) lists the
availability of adequate staff with suitable experience as
one of the minimum criteria and conditions for decen-
tralising management. The importance of this is under-
lined in the Commission’s annual analysis of the enlarge-
ment process. The conclusions to this analysis identify
the need to strengthen administrative capacity for pub-
lic control and for the fight against fraud. For most can-
didate countries, the Commission concluded that fur-
ther efforts were required to ensure the sound, efficient
and auditable management of EU funds (9). Despite the
importance of the issue, the audit files supporting the
Commission Decisions contain insufficient evidence
about the existence, experience and qualifications of
staff.
6.18. The comprehensive audit programme includes a note
specifying how reasonable assurance can be obtained for each
stage of the process. The necessary assurance can often be
obtained and demonstrated by a cross-reference to a procedure
alone, with no need for further elaboration. The Commission
does not generate additional workpapers when the test is self-
explanatory.
The head of each section in the audit programme (‘review of
procedures and documentation’, ‘observation’ and ‘discussions
with the appropriate staff’) mirrors the requirements of the
relevant standard. Computation and analysis are also per-
formed when required. The final conclusions reached (which
served as the basis for the management conferral decision)
were soundly based upon the evidence presented, despite the
fact that this was not always documented in the Commission’s
files.
The objective that the responsible hierarchy should be aware
of the work done and matters arising has been achieved via
(a) meetings with the Director, held each week, and, (b) meet-
ings chaired by the Head of Unit before finalisation of each
audit report. In addition, a ‘peer review’ system was used on
several occasions within the team, as per the relevant stan-
dard.
6.19. The qualifications and knowledge of senior and other
key staff, both at the Sapard Agency and the Regional Offices,
were verified in detail in numerous interviews. The Commis-
sion gained reasonable assurance concerning the capabilities
of the staff, notably in assessing their familiarity with the
tasks assigned to them and the relevant procedures (via obser-
vation of reperformance of duties). It is true, however, that this
was not systematically documented, and this finding will be
addressed in the future.
(8) Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 of 21 June 1999
on coordinating aid to the applicant countries in the
framework of the pre-accession strategy and amending
Regulation (EEC)No3906/89 (OJ L 161, 26.6.1999, p. 68).
(9) The Commission’s political documents related to the
enlargement process: Strategy paper 2001, Regular reports
2001, November 2001.
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6.20. In addition to staff, the following other key risk
areas were not sufficiently covered by the Commission’s
examination:
(a) the Commission did not perform sufficient checks
to ensure that the systems that were set up exam-
ined the economy and cost-effectiveness of projects.
There is a risk that Article 2 of the Financial Regula-
tion (10) requiring sound financial management may
not be respected;
(b) the Commission performed insufficient checks to
determine whether the systems set up prevented the
double funding of projects. Whilst the Commission
verified that application forms contained a question
requiring a beneficiary to declare other sources of
funding for the project, and that this was checked
by the Sapard agency, it did not ensure that the per-
sons checking application forms had the relevant
information on other sources of funding, that there
was an exchange of information between the vari-
ous national and EU programmes, and that audits
by the candidate countries addressed these issues.
6.21. The above shortcomings in the Commission’s
methodology had already been identified in the Court’s
Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000 (11).
TheCommission, however, hasnot sufficiently addressed
this in its methodology, and, as a result, has missed the
opportunity to ensure that these risk areas are covered
by the design of the system.
6.22. To a certain extent, the issues identified above
can be explained by the difficult situation in which the
staff of the Commission examining the systems were
working. These were caused in particular by consider-
able pressure to approve the systems after the delays
encountered, and numerous changes in Commission
staff.
6.20.
(a) Project economy and cost-effectiveness are examined by
means of a review of business/development plans, which
must be satisfactory for the application to succeed.
These matters will receive close attention in subsequent
audits.
(b) The procedures feature a detailed documentary check
where only originals are accepted, as well as a detailed
on-the-spot control visit for each payment claim.
With regard to the absence of exchange of information
and therefore increased risk of double funding: for most
of the accredited measures, the risk of overlap between
SAPARD projects (whose essential characteristic is a
large volume of small projects) and ISPA and Phare
projects (small volume of larger projects) centres on a
small number of projects. Moreover, where national sup-
port schemes are also handled by the Sapard Agency, the
risk of a double submission going undetected is reduced.
These matters will receive close attention in subsequent
audits.
6.21. Concerning point 6.20 (b) above, checks addressing
the risk of double funding have been included in the revised
audit programme, dated 14 September 2001, for both appli-
cations and claims (although the original version does feature
this check at the application stage). As regards point 6.20 (a)
above, which relates to economy and cost-effectiveness, refer-
ence should be made to the Commission’s comments under
that point. Nevertheless as indicated above, these matters will
receive close attention in subsequent audits.
(10) ‘The budget appropriations must be used in accordance
with the principles of sound financial management, and
in particular those of economy and cost-effectiveness’.
Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of
the European Communities (OJ L 356, 31.12.1977, p. 1).
(11) Paragraph 6.50.
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6.23. The Commission Decisions on the conferral of
management are based on its audit reports, which pro-
vide conclusions on its examination of the systems. The
Commission’s audit reports relating to three countries
(Latvia, Slovenia and Lithuania) list a number of items
that need to be rectified before the reception of any
project submissions. However, these items and restric-
tions are not mentioned in the Commission Decisions,
nor did the Commission systematically check that these
items were indeed rectified by the countries concerned.
6.24. The Commission has undertaken detailed work
for its analysis of the management and control systems
of candidate countries. It has prepared the concepts of
a well-defined system to be put in place in the candidate
countries. However, the decisions for the conferral of
management were not based on the sufficient and reli-
able evidence required to ensure that the systems work
as planned. In three of the five Commission Decisions
for the conferral of management made in 2001 (12),
there was insufficient evidence on file on the existence,
experience and qualifications of staff and therefore that
the key processes, such as project selection, which will
be managed by the staff in question, would function
properly.
Insufficient verification that the systems work in practice
Insufficient monitoring of the systems
6.25. Since Sapard has decentralised management of
external aid, and the systems in the candidate countries
are new, the Commission should verify, on a continu-
ous basis, that the systems are working in practice. The
Commission recognised this and laid down (13) that it
should monitor continued compliance with the condi-
tions and provisions for decentralised management. The
Commission was therefore right in conferring manage-
ment on a provisional basis. It stated in its decisions
6.23. The Letters of Observations contain recommended
operational and control improvements, with matters for future
consideration. The detailed requirements flowing from the
audit are not mentioned in the Commission Decision as they
are not of a nature to prevent the system operating properly.
The Commission has already received assurances from certain
candidate countries concerning the rectification process. How-
ever, full verification of corrective action taken can only be
achieved during the on-the-spot compliance audits. These are
already under way. Moreover no reimbursement payments are
made until all relevant weaknesses have been rectified.
6.24. The Commission assessed the familiarity of staff in
situ with the procedures through interviews and on-the-spot
observation of how they performed their duties, thereby gain-
ing reasonable assurance that the key processes would func-
tion properly. For more details, reference should be made to
the Commission’s comments under point 6.19 above.
6.25. The Commission (for example in Article 13(3) of
Section A of the MAFA) can require candidate countries to
provide any information or to take suitable control action to
ensure proper implementation of the programmes. The Com-
mission takes such information into account before authoris-
ing payments.
(12) Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia.
(13) Article 3(3) of Commission Regulation (EC)
No 2222/2000 of 7 June 2000 laying down financial
rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC)
No 1268/1999 (OJ L 253, 7.10.2000, p. 5).
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that full conferral of management was only to be envis-
aged after further verifications had been carried out to
ensure that the systems operated satisfactorily. This is
necessary because the timing and scope of the checks
laid down in the MAFAs (the so-called clearance of
accounts procedure) do not guarantee that weaknesses
and errors are identified at an early stage.
6.26. When the Court carried out its examination (in
April 2002), there had been no systematic further veri-
ficationby theCommission, andnomethodology existed
for this. This is mainly because the Commission’s prior-
ity is still the conferral of management to the candidate
countrieswhere the systems have not yet been approved.
No resources were allocated to monitoring compliance
after provisional conferral. As the Commission has nei-
ther a timetable nor a methodology as to when and
how full conferral of management will be granted, the
candidate countries are unaware of the requirements
they will have to fulfil.
Deficiencies in reporting after conferral of management
6.27. The candidate countries are required by the
MAFAs to submit annual implementation reports and
Certifying Body reports to the Commission (14), provid-
ing information on progress in the implementation of
priorities and measures, steps taken to ensure quality
and effectiveness in the implementation and
co-ordination of all Community pre-accession assis-
tance. The provisions in the MAFAs neither provide for
timely reports nor for timely review and recommenda-
tions for adjustments from the Commission. If the
6.26. The Commission is currently preparing the tendering
procedure for contracting external audit services to check the
financial implementation of SAPARD; this will help achieve
the objective of ‘systematic further verifications’. It will be
financed under the SAPARD technical assistance line.
In addition to the inspections carried out as part of the
clearance-of-accounts process, the Commission has systemati-
cally reviewed internal audit reports (reappraisals of how the
system works following the submission of the first batch of
projects and payment claims), and when necessary carried out
checks on the spot (missions in Bulgaria and Lithuania). The
Commission also asked all candidate countries (at a seminar
in June 2002) to provide a timetable for national accredita-
tion of the remaining measures.
Full conferral of management is not a current priority for the
Commission or the candidate countries.
6.27. In addition to annual implementation reports and
certificates, the Commission is informed through the monitor-
ing committee (which usually meets at least twice a year) and
through working groups as needed. This committee provides
a vehicle for conducting reviews and making recommenda-
tions in a more timely manner than through annual reports
to be submitted at any predetermined time. In addition there
are frequent contacts between candidate countries and the
Commission to address matters as—or, where possible, before
— they arise.
(14) MAFA, Section B, Article 8(1).
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programme starts early in a given year, the Commission
will not be informed of the first year of implementation
until June two years later. For example, in the case of
Bulgaria, conferral of management was decided in May
2001. The Commission will receive the first annual
report 6 months after the first full calendar year, which
is June 2003, more than two years after the start of the
programme, resulting in the Commission’s review, com-
ments and recommendations being unnecessarily
delayed. This is particularly worrying since the first year
of implementation is the most risky due to the opera-
tion of new untested systems.
6.28. The Commission has recognised the need for
additional and more timely information and has
requested the candidate countries to provide, at the ear-
liest moment, audit reports about their verification of
the extent to which the Sapard agency operates as
designed. However, the Commission did not systemati-
cally follow up on the information requests and, as a
consequence, not all the informationwas receivedwithin
the time limits set.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Delayed implementation in the candidate countries
6.29. Unrealistic disbursement schedules were
included in the general budget of the European Union
for the new pre-accession instruments. This has led to
persistently low use and significant cancellations of pay-
ment appropriations in two successive years.
6.30. This is particularly true for Sapard, the imple-
mentation of which, in 2001, principally involved the
setting up of the management and control systems in
the candidate countries and their review by the Com-
mission. Two years after the start of the programme,
payments to final beneficiaries were made in only two
countries and amounted to 0,1 % of the total available
6.28. The Commission has received re-performance reports
and conducted financial clearance audit missions for Bulgaria
and Estonia (the only countries to make payments in 2001).
Conformity audits have also been carried out. In the Com-
mission’s view this constitutes adequate follow-up.
6.29. As indicated in the reply to point 6.6, the disburse-
ment schedules for 2001 drawn up in 2000 were based on
the most realistic information available at the time for the
SAPARD instrument.
6.30. After 2000 the rate of progress is largely a function
of candidate countries’ efforts in constructing agencies fit to
run SAPARD.
Decentralised management of SAPARD requires candidate
countries to set up the necessary administrative structures
capable of ensuring a sound financial management of
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funds. In one of these countries (Bulgaria), the Commis-
sion did not take action following the lower than
expected and decreasing rates of implementation. Infor-
mation for other countries is not available.
Recommendation
— Considering that Sapard is a key instrument for
solving priority agricultural and rural development
problems in the candidate countries before enlarge-
ment and given the fact that funds from the 2000
budget will be cancelled at the end of 2003 if they
have not been spent, the Court considers that the
Commission should analyse the reasons for the slow
rate of implementation. It should also provide guid-
ance in order to diminish the risk of further delays
and similar situations arising in other candidate
countries.
Shortcomings in the Commission’s methodology for
approving national management of Sapard
6.31. Shortcomings were noted in the Commission’s
analysis of the systems set up in the candidate coun-
tries. There were insufficient checks in key risk areas
and therewas insufficient evidence concerning the exist-
ence and experience of staff. For three of the five coun-
tries where conferral of management was granted, there
was insufficient evidence to provide reasonable assur-
ance that all requirements ensuring that EU funds will
be used properly were fulfilled. The Commission itself
also noted items which should be rectified before decen-
tralised implementation but they were not systemati-
cally followed up.
Community resources. Some candidate countries managed to
complete most of the work in 2000 (or by January 2001).
Others have only done so in 2001 and are now at the start-
ing stage in terms of implementation. Some other countries
have not yet reached this stage. In the Bulgarian case men-
tioned, it was the Monitoring Committee, acting in accor-
dance with its remit, and not the Commission, that took steps
to initiate changes to expedite implementation.
The Commission regularly monitors the level of SAPARD
implementation in each country. With few exceptions com-
mitments to beneficiaries are rising over time in line with the
expectations of the implementing authorities. In the case of
some countries they now forecast that the instrument will be
running at a rate consistent with normal annual execution by
the end of 2002. Information concerning execution for all
countries where conferral decisions have been taken is made
available at each monitoring committee. At seminars in June
2002 and July 2001, the Commission indicated various
options each country could consider to expedite implementa-
tion.
6.31. The key risk areas referred to by the Court (for more
details see the reply to point 6.20) are the issues of sound
financial management and double funding. Sound financial
management is considered at the programme development
and system accreditation stages, although, with a system that
is not yet operational, verification is difficult. As for the ‘double
funding’ issue, this is addressed in the Commission’s audit
programmes and examined via the review of procedures.
The existence and experience of staff (for more detailed replies
see the comments under points 6.19 and 6.24) and assur-
ance that the procedures would operate as designed in practice
(thereby ensuring proper use of EU funds) was obtained
through discussions with staff (assessing their familiarity with
the procedures) and an in situ observation of (re)performance
of duties (as per point 6.24).
Adequate follow up is assured through receipt of assurances
from the candidate countries as to progress made, and con-
firmation by means of (ongoing) on-the-spot visits (for details
see comments to point 6.23).
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Recommendation
— When the Commission monitors compliance with
the conditions for decentralised management, it
should ensure that the shortcomings identified by
the Court are sufficiently covered. The Commission
should also review that the items mentioned in its
own audit reports are rectified.
Insufficient verification that the systems work in practice
for Sapard
6.32. In 2001, the Commission did not start testing
the Sapard management and control systems to ensure
that they function in practice. The conferral of manage-
ment was granted on a provisional basis. However, the
Commission does not have a timetable or a methodol-
ogy as to how and when full conferral of management
will be granted. Therefore, the candidate countries are
unaware of the requirements they will have to fulfil. In
addition, the MAFAs do not provide for sufficient timely
information.
Recommendations
— The Commission should systematically monitor the
implementation of Sapard, which is necessary to
verify that systems work in practice. The Commis-
sion should carry out audits shortly after the provi-
sional conferral of management and should cover
all levels of control between the Commission and
the final beneficiaries.
— The Commission should develop a timetable and a
methodology as to when and how full conferral will
be granted and inform the candidate countries about
them.
— TheCommission shouldmake the necessary changes
to the MAFAs to ensure that it receives more timely
annual reports, audit reports, and information con-
cerning the amount of interest and its utilisation.
In the Commission’s view, the significant shortcomings con-
cern the lack of filed evidence as to the experience of staff.
These matters will be addressed. As regards follow-up, the
Commission already has a suitable mechanism in operation,
as explained in point 6.24.
6.32. The Commission has carried out missions in Bul-
garia (in February 2002) and in Lithuania (in July 2002)
to evaluate the management and control system. The Com-
mission also carried out financial clearance audits in Bulgaria
and Estonia in 2002 (see point 6.30 above). The Commis-
sion has also received SAPARDAgency internal audit reports,
which show the results of reperforming the key processes. No
major findings were highlighted in these reports.
The Commission has monitored systems operation through
receipt of process re-performance reports from the Internal
Audit departments of the SAPARD Agencies and, when nec-
essary, through subsequent on-the-spot controls (both finan-
cial and conformity clearance missions, as explained above
and in the MAFAs). These are both ongoing processes; the
Commission considers that this recommendation is being
adequately addressed.
Candidate countries were asked at a seminar in June 2002 to
provide a timetable for national accreditation of the remain-
ing measures. Full conferral of management is not a current
priority either for the Commission or for the candidate coun-
tries.
For the reasons indicated in the reply to point 6.29 the Com-
mission sees no advantage in modifying theMAFAs as regards
the timing of annual reports but will seek to include inMAFAs
the obligation to present quarterly reports on interest earned
by the SAPARD accounts.
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Administrative expenditure
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ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE OF THE
INSTITUTIONS AND COMMUNITY BODIES
Introduction
7.1. Heading 5 of the financial perspective, ‘Adminis-
trative expenditure’, contains the Institutions’ and other
bodies’ administrative appropriations (Part A of the bud-
get in the case of the Commission). These appropria-
tions are managed directly by these authorities and are
used primarily to pay the salaries, allowances and pen-
sions of persons working for the Community Institu-
tions, as well as rent, property, purchases and miscel-
laneous administrative expenditure. In theCommission’s
case, these appropriations also enable subsidies to be
given to associations and organisations that assist in the
implementation of various aspects of the European
Union’s activities.
Analysis of budgetary management
7.2. The Court has reviewed the information presented
in Volumes I to IV of the revenue and expenditure
account. Volumes I and III provide a commentary on
budgetary management for the year and, in particular,
explanations of variations between the approved bud-
get and the appropriations finally available, as well as
between the appropriations finally available and those
utilised. This review did not seek to provide assurance
as to the reliability of these explanations. Rather, it
sought to identify any significant variations for which
explanations are not provided and to identify any expla-
nation that might be considered misleading. The review
did not reveal any such case.
7.3. In response to the Court’s observations in para-
graph 7.3 of the Annual Report concerning the finan-
cial year 2000 (1), the Commission and the Parliament
have improved the presentation and user-friendliness of
their analysis of budgetary management. In particular,
the Commission has provided some global analysis and
has introduced a more logical and consistent presenta-
tion between chapters and the Parliament has given fac-
tual information about the results achieved with the
budgetary appropriation used. However, Institutions
other than theCommission continue to focusondescrib-
ing changes in levels of appropriations during the year
and on commitments made and not on the differences
7.3. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLY
Parliament notes the improvement detected by the Court and
will pursue its efforts in accordance with the Court’s wishes.
7.3. REPLY OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE
The analysis of budgetary management in respect of the
financial year 2001 of the Court of Justice focuses on the
explanations given with regard to the main differences between
(1) OJ C 359, 15.12.2001.
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between sums committed and sums paid. It is still the
Court’s opinion that it would be desirable for all the
Institutions to provide a more global analysis of their
budgetary management which highlights and explains
trends over time in expenditure and the funding of
major capital items, and which offers key measures of
economy and efficiency. Sufficient explanations are now
given on the specific issue, highlighted in paragraph 7.3
of the Annual Report concerning the financial year
2000, of the way the Parliament transfers to the budget
heading ‘Rent and annual lease payments’ unused appro-
priations from other budget headings to make capital
repayments on buildings. Moreover, the Parliament
explains that additional appropriationsweremade avail-
able for such repayments through Supplementary and
Amending Budget No 5 for the financial year 2001.
7.4. The Council used 1,4 million euro of budget item
2501 (Meetings in general) to pay expenditure actually
incurred in 2000 but not paid in that year because the
budgetary appropriations for 2000 had already been
used up. For a similar reason, expenditure of the same
kind incurred in 2001 for an amount of 1,84 million
euro has been paid in 2002 using appropriations of the
2002 budget. This does not conform to the principle of
annuality as described in Article 6, fourth subpara-
graph, of the Financial Regulation. Where initial bud-
getary appropriations prove to be insufficient, they
should be increased through transfers or supplemen-
tary budgets.
the initial amount of the appropriations and their ultimate
utilisation. As regards the view expressed ‘that it would be
desirable for all the Institutions to provide a more global
analysis of their budgetary management which highlights and
explains trends over time in expenditure, the funding of major
capital items, and which offers key measures of economy and
efficiency’ (1), the Court of Justice considers that that desire is
satisfied by its revenue and expenditure account, taken as a
whole, including the relevant tables and its balance sheet as
at 31 December 2001.
However, the Court of Justice will be happy to participate in
any inter-institutional action aimed at harmonising the analy-
sis of budgetary management.
7.3. REPLY OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE
In future, the EESC will take account of the Court’s comments
on the presentation and readability of its analysis of budget-
ary management.
7.3. REPLY OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
In future, the Committee of the Regions will take account of
the Court’s comments on the presentation and readability of
its analysis of budgetary management.
7.4. REPLY BY THE COUNCIL
With regard to the management of budget item 2501 (Meet-
ings in general), the Council shares the Court’s analysis and
recommendations. It is intended that the measures needed to
prevent the problem noted by the Court from occurring in
future will be taken before the end of the financial year 2002.
(1) Court of Auditors’ Annual Report, financial year 2000,
point 7.3.
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Specific appraisal in the context of the Statement of
Assurance
Scope of the audit
7.5. The audit of the reliability of the accounts con-
sisted of analytical and substantive testing on all bal-
ancesmaterial to the consolidated accounts.With regard
to the legality and regularity of the underlying transac-
tions, the audit was based on an overview of the audit
field (budget, final accounts, administrative practices,
etc.) and on substantive testing of transactions relating
to administrative expenditure included in a sample
drawn from the entire budgetary accounts. In addition,
a specific examination was carried out of expenditure
relating to salaries of officials and temporary staff of the
Commission and the Parliament. In this area, an evalu-
ation of the internal control systems and substantive
testing on a sample of transactions were performed.
Reliability of the accounts
7.6. This section summarises the most significant find-
ings and observations relating to the Court’s audit of
the reliability of the accounts of each of the Institutions.
Parliament
7.7. The Court maintains the observations concerning
the Louise Weiss building in Strasbourg made in para-
graph 7.8 of the Annual Report concerning the finan-
cial year 2000. The notes to the balance sheet still do
not indicate that the net accounting value of 329,9 mil-
lion euro is an estimated value or that various
construction-related costs are contested by the Parlia-
ment. Furthermore, the Parliament has continued to
depreciate ‘special equipment’ (historic cost: 80 million
euro) at the maximum rate of 25 %, with the result that
full depreciation is achieved at the end of the financial
year 2001. The nature of the different components of
the equipment should have been disclosed and the cor-
responding depreciation rates applied in accordance
with Commission Regulation (EC) No 2909/2000 (2).
7.7. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLY
Owing to an oversight at the time of preparation of the finan-
cial statements, the footnote to the balance sheet omitted to
mention that an estimated amount had been used. If the
definitive value of the building is not known by the end of
2002, the text of the relevant footnote will include a com-
ment that the cost is estimated. As negotiations relating to the
definitive cost of the buildings are ongoing, it is not considered
appropriate to disclose in the footnotes to the balance sheet an
amount of contested costs as this may prejudice the European
Parliament’s position in current negotiations. The exact nature
of the special equipment referred to in the Court of Auditors
sector letter is currently the subject of investigation. Detailed
information on the breakdown of the assets under this item is
being sought from SERS, the current owner of the building.
The outcome of these efforts should enable the Institution to
ascertain whether it is appropriate to continue to apply the
depreciation rate of 25 % to the special equipment item, in
line with the recommendations of the Court of Auditors and
in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC)
No 2909/2000.
(2) CommissionRegulation (EC)No2909/2000of29Decem-
ber 2000 on the accounting management of the Euro-
pean Communities’ non-financial fixed assets (OJ L 336,
30.12.2000, p. 75).
218 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 28.11.2002
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS
Council
7.8. The Council has completed the physical inven-
tory mentioned in its reply to the Court’s observations
in the Annual Report for the financial year 2000 (3).
However, the problem of the reliability of the account-
ing inventory that it was meant to resolve has, in fact,
not been resolved. Unexplained differences between the
physical inventory and the accounting inventory con-
tinue to exist, with the result that the value of the bal-
ance sheet subheadings B, C and D of the heading ‘tan-
gible fixed assets’ may be overestimated by about
0,9 million euro.
Commission
7.9. The Commission is purchasing over a four-year
period, partly on behalf of other Institutions, site
licences (4) for a total price of 3,3 million euro. The con-
solidated balance sheet only shows the value recorded
in the Commission’s balance sheet of the licences used
by the Commission itself. The value of the licences used
by other Institutions appears neither in the Institutions’
individual balance sheet nor in the consolidated balance
sheet.
7.10. As advances and payments on account in respect
of tangible assets are not recorded in balance-sheet
accounts as soon as payments are made, the total
balance-sheet value cannot be derived from an account-
ing balance. This value is established on the basis of
amounts determined at the year-end by the different
administrative units concerned and is not reliable. The
Court found that an amount of 1,4 million euro relat-
ing to the purchase of security equipment for ‘Eurodac’,
as well as a total amount of around 150 000 euro con-
cerning improvements to buildings were not included
in the abovementioned balance-sheet value.
7.8. REPLY BY THE COUNCIL
In order to ensure reliability of the accounting inventory, the
Council has decided to give greater priority to conducting a
physical inventory.
In view of the scale and complexity of the physical inventory
operation and the reconciliation work under way, the latter is
due to continue until the end of 2002, in parallel with stud-
ies concerning the upgrading of the inventory management
systems and procedures.
7.9. COMMISSION’S REPLY
The Commission checks and pays the annual invoice for site
licences on behalf of all the participating institutions. It records
its share of the site licences in its balance sheet under the
heading ‘Intangible fixed assets’ but does not declare the other
institutions’ shares. The Commission recently reminded the
institutions which are parties to the framework contract for the
purchase of site licences of their obligation to declare their
share under the heading ‘Intangible fixed assets’ in their bal-
ance sheet.
The Commission will be able to show this information in the
consolidated balance sheet only once it has received it from the
other institutions.
7.10. COMMISSION’S REPLY
The Commission’s accounting system does not enable advances
and payments on account to be recorded in the balance sheet
at the time when they are made. This problem will be solved
as part of the project for modernising the accounting system
which is currently under way.
Article 81 of the recently adopted Financial Regulation requires
a distinction to be made in the accounts between the different
types of payment.
(3) Page 316, point 7.12.
(4) A site licence for computer software requires the Institu-
tion to pay a flat charge irrespective of the number of
users (see Article 22(1) of Commission Regulation (EC)
No 2909/2000).
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7.11. The explanatory notes to the balance sheet do
not disclose that rental payments on a building since
October 1999 are provisional as the final rental value
has not been agreed with the owner.
Court of Justice
7.12. No observations arose from the audit of the Court
of Justice’s balance sheet.
Court of Auditors
7.13. No observations arose from the audit of the Court
of Auditors’ balance sheet.
Economic andSocialCommittee andCommitteeof theRegions
7.14. According to generally accepted accounting prac-
tices, land should not be depreciated. Contrary to this
principle, accumulated depreciation on the land of the
Montoyer building has been included in the accounts.
7.15. The reliability of the value of the heading ‘other
tangible fixed assets’ cannot be guaranteed as no physi-
cal inventory has been conducted since 1998. The head-
ing also includes items that have been disposed of with-
out the required writing-off procedure having been
properly completed.
7.11. COMMISSION’S REPLY
The objective pursued by the Commission in negotiations with
the owner is for the rental value for the period until the build-
ing is brought up to standard to be set at a level that does not
exceed the advance payable under the existing agreement.
7.14. REPLY OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE
Depreciation of the Montoyer building began in 2001. The
accounts were finalised on the basis of depreciation of the total
value of the building, including the site. In April 2002, the
Montoyer and Belliard buildings were valued by an external
expert. The depreciation will be recalculated accordingly and
will be accounted for correctly at the close of the 2002 finan-
cial year.
7.14. REPLY OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
Depreciation of the Montoyer building began in 2001. The
accounts were finalised on the basis of depreciation of the total
value of the building, including the site. In April 2002, the
Montoyer and Belliard buildings were valued by an external
expert. The depreciation will be recalculated accordingly and
will be accounted for correctly at the close of the 2002 finan-
cial year.
7.15. REPLY OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE
The Committees regret that in this case the rules were not fully
applied. They accept the need for the inventory rules to be
strictly applied in future. A physical inventory is now well
underway and will be completed by the end of 2002.
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Overall opinion
7.16. Except for the minor findings mentioned above,
the audit of the reliability of the accounts did not reveal
any evidence of misstatements considered material to
the consolidated accounts of the European Communi-
ties.
Legality and regularity of the underlying transactions
Legal questions concerning certain provisions of the 2001
general budget and of the related expenditure.
7.17. According to footnotes to the establishment plans
of the Parliament and the Court of Auditors, some of
the permanent posts shown in a given category have to
be considered as posts of a higher category. Based on
these footnotes, the two Institutions pay staff of a given
category the remuneration corresponding to a higher
category. This is not in accordance with the Staff Regu-
lations, Article 45(2) of which states that ‘an official
may be promoted from one category to another only
on the basis of a competition’.
A number of obsolete items of computer equipment were not
removed from the inventory, despite instructions for this to be
done. In future, the IT department will ask for confirmation.
7.15. REPLY OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
The Committees regret that in this case the rules were not fully
applied. They accept the need for the inventory rules to be
strictly applied in future. A physical inventory is now well
underway and will be completed by the end of 2002.
A number of obsolete items of computer equipment were not
removed from the inventory, despite instructions for this to be
done. In future, the IT department will ask for confirmation.
7.17. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLY
The only officials whose posts are the subject of the footnotes
referred to are those who have been awarded an ad personam
promotion. Such promotions are awarded, to a very limited
number of officials (principally in the lower categories) who
combine long service with exceptional merit, by Parliament’s
Bureau in accordance with the institution’s internal imple-
menting rules and are included in Parliament’s annual esti-
mates of revenue and expenditure.
7.17. THE COURT OF AUDITORS’ REPLY
In accordance with the authorisation given by the budgetary
authority in the table of posts for the financial year 2001, the
Court appointed six staff to a higher grade ad personam.
The Court has nevertheless decided not to make any further
appointments of this type.
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7.18. The remarks relating to heading 1 0 9 0 (Weight-
ings) in the budget sections of the Commission and the
Court of Justice state that appropriations are available
to cover weightings applied to the transfer of part of the
emoluments of Members of the Institutions to a coun-
try other than the country of employment. The remarks
relating to the same heading of the budget section of
the Court of Auditors are not so explicit, but can be
interpreted, as the Court of Auditors actually did, as
making appropriations available to cover the same kind
of weightings. The application of such weightings
increases the total amount of emoluments paid. The
rules applying to the remuneration of the Members of
the Institutions do not provide a specific legal basis for
such transfers. However, for several years there has been
an application by analogy of certain provisions of the
Staff Regulations. While awaiting clarification the Insti-
tutions decided to suspend the use of weightings for the
Members concerned as from July 2002.
7.18. COMMISSION’S REPLY
The Commission takes the view that transfers of part of the
remuneration of Members of the Commission have always
been carried out on a proper basis. Nevertheless, in line with
the position taken by the Court of Auditors, it has decided to
suspend such transfers.
7.18. REPLY OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE
The Court of Justice confirms that its Administrative Com-
mittee, meeting on 12 June 2002, decided, ‘having regard to
the decisions adopted by the Court of Auditors and the Com-
mission, and without calling in question the merits of the
practice followed hitherto’, to suspend, with effect from July
2002, transfers of remuneration byMembers to which weight-
ings are applied.
That suspension, which was decided on a provisional basis
and pending receipt of clarification, was intended to enable
the Administrative Committee to examine in depth the argu-
ments which had prompted the Court of Auditors to contest
the regularity of such transfers, in particular the contention
that there was no specific legal basis for that practice in the
absence of an express provision in the rules laid down by the
Council governing the emoluments of Members and that the
mere entry of the appropriations relating thereto could not
constitute a sufficient basis for that item of expenditure, which
would, moreover, necessitate the adoption of a basic act by the
legislative authority.
Having completed that examination, which it carried out on
25 September 2002, the Administrative Committee con-
cluded that the arguments thus raised were not such as to jus-
tify discontinuance of the arrangement enabling Members to
transfer part of their remuneration after the application of
weightings thereto, for the following reasons:
— that long-standing practice is founded on the consider-
ation that the provisions of Article 17 of Annex VII of
the Staff Regulations of Officials apply by analogy to
Members, as is moreover indicated in the commentary
relating to the budget heading under which the corre-
sponding appropriations are entered;
— such application by analogy satisfies the objective pursued
by the possibility of transferring part of the recipient’s
remuneration, which clearly applies as much to Members
as to officials;
— it is confirmed by the provisions of Article 4a of the rules
governing the emoluments of Members, according to
which Members’ basic salaries and allowances are to be
subject to the weighting fixed by the Council in respect of
officials employed in Belgium, and which were
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Parliament
7.19. The evaluation of the internal control systems
and the outcome of the substantive testing of a sample
of transactions relating to salaries paid to officials and
temporary staff did not give rise to any significant
observation. The issues mentioned in paragraph 7.17
also concern the Parliament.
7.20. As the Court has already observed in the Annual
Report concerning the financial year 1998 (5), the scales
used to paymission expenses to staff of categories C and
D are higher than those provided for in the Staff Regu-
lations (6). In its reply the Parliament stated that C and
D staff were treated in the same way as A and B staff
because of the difficulties arising from the dispersal of
its departments over the three main places of work and
because many meetings are held outside those three
working places. These arguments do not change the fact
that the Parliament’s practice does not comply with the
Staff Regulations.
introduced into the rules governing emoluments by Regu-
lation No 1546/73 of 4 June 1973, the sole recital in
the preamble to which refers to ‘the maintenance of a dif-
ferential between the salaries of… Members of the Court
of Justice, on the one hand, and those of officials of the
European Communities, on the other’. The very wording
of those provisions, and the intention expressed by the
legislature in the abovementioned recital, necessarily mean
that the weighting system is as much applicable to Mem-
bers as it is to officials.
The Administrative Committee consequently took the view
that the legal basis of the practice in question was to be found
in the provisions of Article 17 of Annex VII of the Staff
Regulations of Officials, which are applicable by analogy to
Members, and that the institution was obliged to discontinue
the suspension decided upon on 12 June 2002 and to resume
the transfers in respect of Members on the same conditions,
and in accordance with the same arrangements, as those
applicable to officials.
7.18. THE COURT OF AUDITORS’ REPLY
As indicated, the Court actually ceased to apply these weight-
ings on 1 July 2002.
7.20. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLY
Payment of mission expenses is in accordance with the Bureau
decision of 14 May 1992. The latter takes account of the par-
ticular nature of Parliament, with its work spread over three
sites and a large number of meetings held either in one or
other of these sites or indeed outside them. In its proposal for
a Council regulation amending the Staff Regulations the
Commission has abolished the difference which exists between
the categories as regards both reimbursement of travel expenses
and the value of mission allowances. The proposal is in accor-
dance with the provisions currently in force at Parliament.
(5) Point 6.18.
(6) Articles 12 and 13 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations.
Generally, for journeys by train under 800 km, C and D
officials should be reimbursed a second-class ticket. As to
the daily allowances, the difference between the scales for
A-B and C-D officials ranges, for most Member States,
from 10 to 15 euro.
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Commission
7.21. The evaluation of the internal control systems
and the outcome of the substantive testing of a sample
of transactions relating to salaries paid to officials and
temporary staff did not give rise to any significant
observation.
7.22. The audit of a payment relating to a legal service
contract revealed that the service had not been provided
on the basis of a written contract, as required by
Article 58(1) of the Financial Regulation. Furthermore,
the contract was made by private treaty although its
amount exceeded the limit within which private treaty
is allowed. There was no evidence of any of the specific
circumstances set out in Article 59 of the Financial
Regulation applying and hence justifying tendering pro-
cedures not having been carried out. According to the
information obtained, this situation applies, in general,
to the external legal services contracted by the Commis-
sion’s Legal Service.
AUDIT OF THE COMMUNITY SATELLITE
BODIES
Introduction
7.23. The annual audits of the Community satellite
bodies have been reported on in specific annual
reports (7). The main features of the satellite bodies are
shown in Table 7.1.
Implementation of the budget
7.24. The satellite bodies’ budgets totalled 1 060,1 mil-
lion euro in 2001, compared with 982 million in 2000.
The overall staff of these bodies has risen in number
from 1 634 in 2000 to 1 919 in 2001. Much of this
increase in staff is due to the development of the Euro-
pean Agency for Reconstruction.
7.22. COMMISSION’S REPLY
While the contractual agreement between the Commission
and the law firm was not fixed in a single document signed
by both parties, the Commission considers that a contract was
established in agreement with the Financial Regulation. How-
ever, the Commission will forthwith endeavour to propose to
external lawyers the signing of a single contractual document,
although formalised documents of that nature are somewhat
uncommon in the legal profession. The Commission consid-
ers that the present selection procedures for external lawyers
are in compliance with the spirit and letter of Article 59 of
the Financial Regulation, and in particular paragraphs (b),
(c) and (d) thereof.
(7) Being published in the Official Journal.
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7.25. The implementation of the budgets of most of
the satellite bodies is affected by carry-overs of appro-
priations, which remain at a high level, despite the
efforts that have been made. This situation is very often
due to the fact that the processes of deciding on and
implementing their work programmes and their bud-
gets are out of step with each other. Thought needs to
be given to determining the most suitable approach to
adopt so that the planning of the work is more tailored
to the principle of the annuality of the budget.
Table 7.1 — Budgets and staff for 2000 and 2001 — the Community satellite bodies (SBs)
Headquarters Year ofcreation
Budget (Mio EUR) Permanent posts
2000 2001 2000 2001
I. First-generation SBs
European Centre for the Development of Vocational
Training (Cedefop) Thessaloniki 1975 13,3 13,5 81 81
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions Dublin 1975 15,0 15,3 85 78
II. Second-generation SBs which are not self-financing
European Environment Agency (EEA) Copenhagen 1990 18,9 21,7 76 87
European Training Foundation (ETF) Turin 1990 16,2 16,8 130 130
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addic-
tion (EDMC) Lisbon 1993 8,2 9,2 48 71
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EAHS) Bilbao 1995 7,0 12 26 26
European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia Vienna 1997 4,9 5,3 26 25
III. Second-generation SBs which are wholly or partially self-financing
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products (EMEA) London 1993 55,3 65,9 210 211
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) Alicante 1994 133,0 163,6 713 798
Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) Angers 1994 7,2 8,6 44 31
Translation Centre for Bodies of the European Union
(TCBEU) Luxembourg 1994 20,7 27,2 144 140
IV. SBs for implementing Community programmes
European Agency for Reconstruction Thessaloniki 2000 682,3 701 51 241
Total 982,0 1 060,10 1 634 1 919
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Financial statements and the keeping of the accounts
7.26. The way in which the satellite bodies’ financial
statements are presented should be harmonised. The
presentation should also take account of the special
nature of the satellite bodies in order to highlight their
economic outturn more.
7.27. Special attention was paid to the satellite bodies’
cash-flow management. Some satellite bodies, in view
of the size of the funds they manage, should ensure that
they are obtaining the best possible return on these
funds, either by grouping certain bank accounts together
or by ensuring that better terms are negotiated with the
banks.
7.28. By the end of 2001, all the satellite bodies con-
cerned had implemented the SI2 budgetary accounting
system. They must keep up their efforts to interface it
with their general accounting systems.
7.29. In the Annual Report concerning the financial
year 2000 (8), the Court recommended that the satellite
bodies take the necessary steps to improve their inven-
tory systems andmake the requisite adjustments to their
own Financial Regulation to incorporate the provisions
on the accounting management of non-financial fixed
assets adopted by the Commission in December
2000 (9). Most of the satellite bodies have followed this
recommendation and they should continue to improve
their inventory-keeping.
7.26. COMMISSION’S REPLY
The new Financial Regulation extends the scope of consolida-
tion to include satellite bodies and stipulates that they must
apply the same accounting rules as the institutions so that
their accounts can be consolidated with those of the Commis-
sion for the 2005 financial year at the latest.
To that end, the Commission’s accounting officer will adopt
the accounting rules andmethods and the harmonised account-
ing plan to be followed by all the institutions, agencies and
satellite bodies.
Harmonisation of the way in which financial statements are
presented will thus be achieved.
(8) See point 7.98.
(9) CommissionRegulation (EC)No2909/2000of29Decem-
ber 2000.
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Procurement of goods and services
7.30. The procurement of goods and services was
examined at five satellite bodies (the European Environ-
ment Agency, the European Agency for the Evaluation
of Medicinal Products, the Translation Centre for Bod-
ies of the European Union, the European Monitoring
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, the Office for
Harmonisation in the Internal Market). During their
start-up period, pressure of time meant that the satel-
lite bodies were not able to set up rational planning for
their purchases and to strictly apply the principle of
invitations to tender. Over the last few years, the satel-
lite bodies have started setting up more rational sys-
tems, going beyond the context of preparing the annual
budget, particularly as regards the purchasing of IT
goods and services. If these efforts are to go on produc-
ing results, they need to be continued and stepped up.
7.31. The tendering procedures should be made more
user-friendly for the tenderers. It should be noted, in
this respect, that some satellite bodies have taken the
initiative of publishing the invitations to tender on their
website and of supplying links to useful information for
potential tenderers on the procedures to be followed.
7.32. The evaluation proceduresmust also be improved
in order to better ensure the comparability of the bids,
and the administrative procedures should be clarified in
order to guarantee their objectivity.
AUDIT OF THE EUROPEAN SCHOOLS
7.33. The Court’s audit of the European Schools is the
subject of a specific annual report which is sent to the
Board of Governors of the European Schools, but not
published in the Official Journal. In line with the cycli-
cal audits planned for the European Schools, the audits
conducted in 2001 focused on the Culham and Varese
Schools. At the start of the school year in 2001, 16 985
pupils were enrolled at the Schools, of which 10 072
were automatically entitled to a place. The staff of the
Schools comprised the equivalent of 1 492,5 persons
including 1 152 seconded teachers. The Schools’ budget
totalled 194 million euro, which was mainly financed
by a subsidy from the Commission (120,3 million) and
contributions from Member States (39,0 million).
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7.34. The efforts already made to achieve greater uni-
formity in the presentation of the Schools’ accounts
should be continued with a view to making their con-
solidation less difficult. The Schools’ accounting plan
fails to provide for any fixed-assets accounts and the
property which is supposed to be entered on the inven-
tory is not recorded in the general accounts: the fixed
assets are not entered in the individual balance sheets of
the Schools or of the Office of the Representative of the
Board of Governors. In the Court’s report concerning
the financial year 2000, shortcomings in the inventory-
keeping were highlighted. In this respect, there has been
hardly any change in the situation.
7.34. COMMISSION’S REPLY
The European Schools will continue to work towards more
uniform presentation of their accounts.
The Schools are currently taking the necessary steps to com-
plete the inventories as soon as possible. The inclusion of fixed
assets in the general accounts is currently being discussed
between the Office of the Representative of the Board of Gov-
ernors and the Schools.
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GUARANTEE FUND FOR EXTERNAL ACTIONS
Introduction
8.1. TheGuarantee Fund for external actionswas estab-
lished on 31 October 1994 by Council Regulation (EC,
Euratom) No 2728/94 (1) and was built up by contribu-
tions from the EU budget over the following years. The
Fund is drawn on if the beneficiary of a loan granted or
guaranteed by the Community to or in a third country
defaults. The Commission carries out the administrative
management of the Fund and the European Investment
Bank (EIB) its financial management (treasury manage-
ment). The Court audited the Fund for the financial year
ended 31 December 2001.
Guarantee operations and budgetary management
8.2. The outstanding capital liabilities for loans and
loan guarantees for third countries including unpaid
interest due amounted to 15 577 million euro as at
31 December 2001, the Fund’s assets were 1 774 mil-
lion euro (2) or 11,4 % of that total. The Council Regula-
tion (3) states that the Fund has to reach an appropriate
level (target amount), set at 9 % of the amount guaran-
teed, for potential payments. On the basis of this the
target amount was set at 1 402 million euro at the end
of 2001 and the amount to be refunded to the EU bud-
get at 372,5 million euro.
Handling fee for late payments
8.3. Following an implementation agreement, which
was signed in 1999 by the Commission and the EIB, the
latter receives an additional ‘handling fee’ for repay-
ments of loans on which the guarantees have been
8.3. Following negotiations, stretching well into 2002, the
European Investment Bank (EIB) reduced its handling fee to
EUR 3 million as in this incomparable case the Commission’s
services have been pivotal in the resettlement of the debt.
(1) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom)No2728/94 of 31Octo-
ber 1994 (OJ L 293, 12.11.1994, p. 1), as amended by
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1149/1999 of
25 May 1999 (OJ L 139, 2.6.1999, p. 1).
(2) Annual Report from the Commission on the Guarantee
Fund and its management in 2001, (COM(2002) 305
final, 13.6.2002).
(3) Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom)
No 1149/1999.
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activated earlier. This fee is calculated as 1 % per annum
on the time between the date on which the loan in
default is paid by the Commission to the EIB until the
date on which the EIB recovers this loan amount. In
2001, the EIB deducted a handling fee of 10,8 million
euro from the reimbursement of a significant loanwhich
was partially related to the Guarantee Fund. This reim-
bursementwas a result of a restructuring of loansmainly
handled by the Commission. Following negotiations in
2002, the EIB agreed to reduce the handling fee for this
case to 3 million euro. The Court recommends that the
Commission takes steps to amend the implementation
agreement to ensure that the fees in all future situations
are known in advance.
Follow-up to previous observations
8.4. In its annual report on the financial year 1999,
the Court recommended that the annual fee of 0,05 %
for the treasury management should be reviewed. In its
reply, the Commission said it would ask the EIB ‘to
present an overview of the costs incurred’ (4). No such
overview has, as yet, been presented to the Commis-
sion.
8.5. In May 2002 the fee structure was modified by a
new agreement amending the last agreement in force
dated September 1996. This agreement was retroac-
tively applied in 2001.
THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT FUND (EIF) —
MANAGEMENT OF MEASURES UNDER
MANDATE
Support for innovative and job-creating small and
medium-sized enterprises
8.6. In its communication of 31 March 1998 ‘Risk
capital — A key to job creation in the European
Union’ (5), the Commission stated that ‘many good Euro-
pean ideas — themselves the result of expensive public
investments in education and research — end up being
8.4. The Commission has received from the Bank some
information on the subject.
(4) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, Com-
mission’s reply, paragraph 7.8.
(5) Commission communication of 31 March 1998: Risk
capital — A key to job creation in the European Union,
SEC(1998) 552 final.
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developed in the United States where capital, know-
how and the business environment are more conducive
to their development and success’. The Commission
considered that ‘developing risk capital in the European
Union is essential for major job creation in the EU’ and
that ‘the real political challenge is to provide the tools,
enabling technologies and financial instruments for a
new generation of European entrepreneurs to start up
and succeed.’
8.7. On 19 May 1998, the Council issued a decision on
measures of financial assistance for innovative and job-
creating small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) —
the growth and employment initiative (6). It is a pro-
gramme aimed ‘at stimulating job-creation by facilitat-
ing and strengthening the establishment and growth of
innovative SMEs’ (7). The programme (for its historical
development, see Annex 8.1) consists of three comple-
mentary facilities (8):
(a) a risk-capital scheme (ETF (9) Start-up) managed by
the European Investment Fund (EIF);
(b) a scheme for financial contributions supporting the
creation of transnational joint ventures by SMEs
within the Community (Joint European Venture —
JEV) managed by the Commission; and
(c) a guarantee scheme (SME Guarantee facility) man-
aged by the EIF.
The detailed terms and conditions for implementing the
ETF Start-up facility and the SME Guarantee facility by
the EIF — including monitoring and control — are laid
down in agreements between the Commission and the
EIF (10).
(6) Council Decision 98/347/EC of 19 May 1998 (OJ L 155,
29.5.1998, p. 43).
(7) Article 1 of Council Decision 98/347/EC.
(8) Article 2 of Council Decision 98/347/EC.
(9) European Technology Facility.
(10) Articles 3(2) and 5(4) of Council Decision 98/347/EC; see
also Annex I and Annex III to the Council Decision.
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8.8. Budgetary appropriations committed from 1998
to 2001 for the two measures implemented by the EIF
amount to 433,2 million euro: 184,3 million for the
ETF Start-up facility and 248,9 million for the SME
Guarantee facility (11). The EIF makes disbursements fol-
lowing the requirements of the financial institutions
participating in these facilities.
The Court’s audit
8.9. During 2001 the Court audited the management
of the two facilities by the EIF. The Court’s audit was
mainly focused on the following topics: achievement of
the objectives of the facilities, completeness and cor-
rectness of information provided on the implementa-
tion of the measures and accordance of the EIF remu-
neration with the accepted market practices. Visits were
made to the premises of the EIF (12) and the Commis-
sion’s departments involved. In addition, on-the-spot
visits were carried out to venture-capital Funds (glos-
sary of terms used, see Annex 8.2) in Germany, France
and Luxembourg and to Guarantee institutions (inter-
mediaries) in six Member States (Germany, France, Italy,
Austria, Portugal and United Kingdom). 30 SMEs, as
final beneficiaries, were also visited.
Increasing the availability of risk capital: the ETF
Start-up facility
8.10. The objective of the ETF Start-up facility is to
increase the availability of risk capital to innovative and
job-creating SMEs during their establishment and their
early stage development. The EIF invests the Commu-
nity funds in specialised venture-capital Funds through
equity participations. These Funds invest in SMEs. Funds
are selected by the EIF and submitted to the Commis-
sion for approval.
(11) Heading B5-5 1 1—Programme for enterprises: improve-
ment of the financial environment for SMEs and heading
B5-5 1 2 — Completion of the Employment initiative
(1998 to 2000) in the 2001 budget.
In 2001, an additional amount of 13,6 million euro was
budgeted as income from investments and interest earned
up to the end of 2000.
(12) The audit was carried out in accordance with Article 248
of the EC Treaty.
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Delays in the implementation
8.11. As stated in the indicative outline annexed to the
Council Decision, the ‘EIF will use its best efforts fully
to commit the funds allocated to the facility not later
than during the calendar year following the year in
which the relevant budgetary payments are made’ (13).
8.12. Out of the total amount of 184,3 million euro
committed from 1998 to 2001, at the end of 2001 the
EIF had contracted 105,3 million euro with venture-
capital Funds, an amount of 49,8 million euro had been
disbursed to them and the net amount invested by these
Funds in final beneficiaries stood at 32,2 million
euro (14) (for comparative evolution, see Figure 8.1).
The Commission considers that there is bound to be a
time lag between the transfers made to the trust account
8.11 to 8.12. Concerning the take-up of the Facility, by the
end ofMay 2002, the European Investment Fund (EIF) Board
and the Commission had committed to European Technology
Facility (ETF) Start-up investments (including related EIF fees
and expenses) an amount of EUR 181 million. Of this EUR
181 million, the EIF has signed contracts with venture-capital
funds for an amount of EUR 105 million.
The Commission is therefore of the opinion that the scheme is
successful and that take-up has been good, even more so con-
sidering the difficult macroeconomic market circumstances
and the general trends in the venture-capital industry as
reported by US and European venture-capital associations.
Furthermore, the ETF Start-up has quite specific eligibility
criteria (new venture-capital teams, early stage investments,
(13) Annex I(5) to Council Decision 98/347/EC.
(14) Net invested amount in final beneficiaries of 32,2 million
euro: disbursed capital of 49,8 million euro minus cost of
realised investments, minus cash held by venture-capital
Funds and minus management fees of the Funds.
Figure 8.1 —‘ETF Start-up’ — Accumulated commitments and investments
Source: EIF’s annual reports to the Commission 2001.
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by the Commission and the draw-downs made by the
EIF to the venture-capital Funds and that this has no
adverse budgetary impact since the treasury generates
returns. The Court notes that the rate at which the
scheme is being implemented is slower than that
expected by the Council. The Commission should adapt
the transfers made to the trust account to the real needs
of the EIF, also taking into account that a net gain of
13,6 million euro from realised investments became
available for reuse.
No indicators established at the launch of the programme
to measure its effectiveness
8.13. Under the Council Decision ‘the Commission
shall report annually to the European Parliament and to
the Council on the implementation of this Decision and
the different schemes under it, notably this Decision’s
impact on the access to financing by SMEs, its immedi-
ate effects on the creation of employment, the prospects
for the creation of employment in the long term and
the coherence between the financial allocation to the
different schemes and the objectives of the pro-
gramme’ (15). The Commission admits that the invest-
ment of Community funds in this scheme was not tied
to particular requirements concerning its impact. This
was not in conformity with the principle of sound
financial management according to which Community
spending for the financing of public interest schemes
must be accompanied by indicators to measure the
effectiveness of the spending. The Court notes that the
Council Decision of 20 December 2000 on a multian-
nual programme for enterprise and entrepreneurship
(MAP) (16) stipulates the adoption of performance
less-favoured geographical regions, 50 % of funds from pri-
vate sources, pari passu, etc.) that do not follow the typical
investment criteria of ‘mainstream’ funds. This choice was
made deliberately by Council to address identified market fail-
ures and taking into account existing mainstream venture-
capital market activity.
With regard to the transfers, in line with standard venture-
capital market practice, money is ‘called’ (drawn-down) by the
venture-capital funds (VCFs) in accordance with their projected
investments into SME portfolio companies. The drivers in the
disbursement process are thus the VCFs supported through the
facility, who determine the actual rhythm and timing of these
draw-downs, and not the Commission or the EIF.
The Commission is convinced that sufficient liquidity on the
trust account is necessary to cover the Commission’s and the
EIF’s legal commitments to VCFs and to be able to honour
their draw-down requests.
8.13. The Financing Proposal prepared prior to the launch
of the G & E programme, in 1998, did indeed not provide for
detailed performance indicators.
The Commission’s July 2000 communication on evalua-
tion (1) stipulates that when proposing a new legal base for
any action incurring expenditure from the general budget, the
operational service(s) responsible will set out the intervention
logic of the proposed programme.Where possible, the expected
results and outputs should be expressed by way of verifiable
indicators.
Now existing procedures require operational services to define
verifiable objectives before a programme is initiated and to
describe evaluation procedures in financial statements accom-
panying legislative proposals.
In line with these procedures, indicators have been defined for
ETF Start-up under the multiannual programme for enter-
prise and entrepreneurship (MAP).
(1) SEC(2000) 1051.
(15) Article 7 of Council Decision 98/347/EC.
(16) Article 4(1) of Council Decision 2000/819/EC of
20 December 2000 (OJ L 333, 29.12.2000, p. 84).
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indicators for evaluating the actions needed to achieve
the objectives of the programme. The MAP programme
provides a new legal basis and additional resources for
the ETF Start-up facility.
Reporting problems
8.14. Since there are no precise targets to be achieved,
it is particularly important that reports on the imple-
mentation of the facility and on employment and job
creation are reliable, that the relevant figures are accu-
rate and that the facility is coherent with others man-
aged by the EIF and running parallel to it.
8.15. The information on commitments and draw-
downs made by the EIF for investments in venture-
capital Funds is available for the full year ‘n’ during the
first quarter of the following year (‘n + 1’). On the other
hand, information on employment from SMEs concern-
ing year ‘n’ is transmitted to the Commission through
the venture-capital Funds and the EIF in the third quar-
ter. The Commission considers that it is reasonable to
keep the existing deadlines, rather than to oblige SMEs
to either change their financial reporting cycle or send
a report in two parts. The Court notes that the budget-
ary authority is not informed about the development of
the scheme before budgetary decisions are made in the
year ‘n + 1’.
The Commission wishes to stress that the actual reporting
done to the budgetary authorities for ETF Start-up under the
Growth and employment initiative covers de facto all the rel-
evant indicators that have been identified and formalised in
the context of MAP, thus providing the necessary informa-
tion to measure the effectiveness of the spending in line with
the principles of sound financial management.
In addition, these questions have been addressed in more detail
in the context of the evaluation report on the Growth and
employment initiative, that is attached to the 2002 Annual
Report from the Commission to European Parliament and to
Council.
It must be stressed that under ETF Start-up equity invest-
ments are being undertaken on commercial terms and there-
fore no subsidy exists. Therefore it is not possible to directly
link as a condition of investment the number of jobs created
to the equity participation. However, the development of the
portfolio companies including the number of jobs created is
regularly followed up. Obviously, the financial performance of
the companies is a key monitoring item.
8.14. Like the Court, the Commission and EIF attach great
importance to the reliability of figures provided regarding the
implementation of the facility. Figures regarding commit-
ments, contract signature, draw-downs and repayments are
verified by the EIF and monitored by the Commission.
The Commission considers that the collection and analysis of
statistical data including employment is best addressed in the
context of evaluation. In accordance with the Council Deci-
sion, an ex post evaluation was recently carried out.
8.15. Until the new fiduciary and management agreement
entered into force the EIF provided information on commit-
ments and draw-downs twice a year. Under the new frame-
work agreement the information will be provided four times a
year.
The Commission considers that the budgetary authority is
adequately informed about relevant parameters concerning the
development of the scheme.
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8.16. As regards financial information supplied by the
EIF to the Commission, the EIF assumes full responsibil-
ity both for the reports and for the accounts. The EIF
does not, however, assume any responsibility for statis-
tical data provided by venture-capital funds and final
beneficiaries in response to surveys, neither is the reli-
ability of these statistical data verified by the Commis-
sion (17).
8.17. The EIF managed (on behalf of the EIB or on the
basis of its own resources) other instruments targeting
venture-capital Funds; such instruments operated in
parallel to the Funds selected for the ETF Start-up facil-
ity. The way in which these instruments fit together or
complement each other is not addressed in the Com-
mission’s annual report on the implementation of the
ETF Start-up facility.
8.16. The Commission considers that the verification of
information of a microeconomic and financial nature received
in response to questionnaires is not an area presenting specific
risks to Community funds and hence requiring particular veri-
fications to ensure the correct use of funds.
Furthermore, the Commission wishes to point out that the
investment of Community funds under ETF Start-up is not
tied to particular requirements of job creation. The beneficia-
ries providing the information referred to by the Court do not
have any valid reason for providing inaccurate information.
8.17. The particular investment policy of ETF Start-up has
a clear focus on higher risk profile VC funds (new VC teams,
early stage investments, less-favoured geographical regions).
ETF Start-up is indeed targeting specific funds with a higher
risk profile than those targeted by the other EIF mandates,
which have a much wider scope and a correspondingly wider
market throughout the different member states. The market
circumstances were such that during the initial period of the
ETF Start-up Facility, it was easier for new VC teams to raise
new early stage funds in countries where the venture-capital
culture was more developed.
The Commission and the EIF are convinced that ETF Start-up
is addressing a clear market failure and that the market
requires such an instrument.
This conviction is strengthened following the MAP Council
Decision, as ETF Start-up will ‘reinforce further upstream’ the
other facilities managed by EIF by financing only start-up
companies.
(17) Therefore the information given in the latest available
Commission report (COM(2001) 0399 final of 16.7.2001),
that a total number of 4 796 employees was counted in
the 133 investee companies supported by the facility at
year-end 2000 has to be taken on the proviso that the
underlying data were in some cases unreliable, as the
Court found during its audit.
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Target distribution of investments not yet achieved
8.18. The Council indicated that the EIF should ‘use its
best efforts to target investments throughout the Com-
munity’ (18). Nevertheless, under its management agree-
ment, the EIF is entitled to assess each proposed invest-
ment on its own merits. At the end of 2001, after three
and a half years, investments had been made in venture-
capital Funds in eight Member States (19) (see Table 8.1).
52 % of the 181 investees were located in one Member
State (20). No indication is given as to whether and by
when investments throughout the Community can be
achieved.
8.18. The Commission has set indicative geographic targets
to be followed. Such target distribution was defined as ‘indica-
tive’ as the Commission was fully aware of the market differ-
ences and the possible absorption difficulties in certain Mem-
ber States. The EIF made considerable efforts to achieve a
broad geographic distribution and has succeeded to date in
finding venture-capital funds in 12 countries.
Based on the experience gained under the Growth and employ-
ment initiative and given the different needs of each Member
State, it was considered that it would be more appropriate to
(18) Annex I(2) to Council Decision 98/347/EC.
(19) Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Fin-
land, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
(20) France.
Table 8.1 — Cumulative ETF Start-up investments compared to cumulative EIF portfolio as at 31 December 2001
(Mio EUR)
Member State
Cumulative ETF Start-up investments (1) Cumulative EIF portfolio (2)
Number of VCFs Amounts invested Amounts invested
Belgium 1 2 33
Denmark 1 3 31
Germany 2 11 235
Greece 20
Spain 160
France 5 19 264
Ireland 79
Italy 239
Luxembourg 1 5 19
Netherlands 41
Austria 42
Portugal 22
Finland 1 1 99
Sweden 1 4 60
United Kingdom 1 5 296
TOTAL 13 50 1 640
(1) Source: EIF: Paid in capital.
(2) Source: EIF: EIF Equity operations — Cumulative portfolio including ETF Start-up investments.
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The calculation of the EIF’s remuneration lacked objec-
tive basis
8.19. Under the Council Decision ‘management fees
paid to the EIF shall be determined in accordance with
the accepted market practice’ (21). In line with the
accepted market practice fees must be clearly linked on
the one hand to the take-up of the scheme (based on
amounts committed and the number of agreements
signed by the EIF), and, on the other, to the monitoring
of and reporting on the investments made (based on
outstanding commitments). Up to the end of 2001, the
EIF’s remuneration was in two different parts: a fixed
annual management fee of 1 million euro and a quar-
terly performance fee, which was variable. Management
and performance fees amounted to a total of 1,4 mil-
lion euro in 2001.
8.20. As to the annual management fee, neither the
fiduciary and management agreement nor the fee letter
indicated how the amount of 1 million euro had been
calculated, which costs it should cover and which ser-
vices it should remunerate. The Commission stresses
that the fee corresponded to slightly less than 0,6 % of
the total budgetary allocation of the Start-up facility.
This notwithstanding, it is the view of the Court that
the fee amount was arbitrary since it was not based on
any analysis. Furthermore, the full amount of the fee
was paid for 1998, although the management of the
facility was only delegated to the EIF at the end of July.
seek a balanced global geographical distribution for all the
financial instruments together managed by the EIF in the
context of MAP.
Concerning geographical distribution of beneficiary SMEs, it
should be stressed that the facility started its activities on a
‘first come, first served’ basis. This resulted at the beginning
in an unevenly balanced absorption.
8.19. EIF’s total fees for ETF Start-up of 1,33 % of com-
mitments, compare in fact rather favourably with rates in the
market of between 0,75 % and 2 % of total available amounts,
to which is added a substantial participation (7,5 % to 15 %)
in the proceeds from investment returns once the original
capital has been repaid (carried interest).
The EIF’s remuneration under ETF Start-up is not comparable
on annual basis with the remuneration perceived under the
EIB risk-capital mandate. In fact, the latter includes a part
linked to the performance of the VC funds (carried interest),
which is not the case under ETF Start-up. The carried interest
normally materialises towards the end of the life of the VC
funds in which the EIF has invested. Therefore a comparison
could only be made taking into account the whole life of the
respective facilities.
8.20. The Commission considers that the level of remunera-
tion of the EIF is in line with accepted market practice, as
required by the legal basis of the ETF Start-up facility.
Due to the initial costs linked to the launch of the facility (e.g.
contractual arrangements, product development, promotion,
extensive travel, hiring of staff, etc.), a minimum annual fee
of EUR 1 000 000 was agreed for the initial period of five
years. This annual fee corresponds to slightly less than 0,6 %
of the total budgetary allocation for ETF Start-up.
An overall cap on the management fees during the 16 year
life of the facility, expressed as a percentage of the final overall
budget allocation, was agreed in order to counterbalance the
front-loading of fees and keep an appropriate balance between
the resources devoted to the management of the facility and
the resources invested in VCFs. The management fee for 1998
covers the costs of the EIF as regards the preliminary work
during the negotiation phase with the Commission prior to
the Council decision in May 1998 as well as the set-up costs
of the facility. It also covers the implementation costs for that
year, including the costs incurred by the EIF before July 1998.
(21) Article 6 of Council Decision 98/347/EC.
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8.21. A new fee structure was agreed with effect from
January 2002 onwards. This new structure is very com-
plicated and not clear.
Covering the cost of guarantees within limits: the SME
Guarantee facility
8.22. The aim of the SME Guarantee facility is to cover
the cost of guarantees and counter-guarantees issued by
the EIF in order to promote an increase in the loans
granted to innovative and job-creating SMEs (22). The
facility increases the capacity of guarantee schemes oper-
ating in the public or private sectors in the Member
States. There are different systems applied for the guar-
antees: in the simplest case, the EIF gives a global guar-
antee directly to the lending institution, which gives
loans to SMEs. In most cases, the EIF gives counter-
guarantees on guarantees given by the intermediaries to
banks. If the SME as final beneficiary does not pay back
the loan, the intermediary will reimburse the bank. The
intermediary is then partially reimbursed by the EIF.
The budgetary allocation (see Figure 8.2) is to cover the
full cost of the facility, including the EIF’s guarantee
losses and any other eligible costs or expenses of the
8.21. The revised fee structure is, in line with the Court’s
remarks, linked on the one side to the take-up of the scheme
(based on amounts committed and number of agreements
signed by the EIF), and on the other to the monitoring of and
reporting on the investments made (based on outstanding
commitments). While not affecting the maximum amount of
remuneration payable to the EIF over the full life of the facil-
ity, this will make the calculation more transparent and rel-
evant to the work carried out by the EIF.
Given the more refined nature of the principles governing the
new fee structure, the corresponding calculations needed to
determine the fees are necessarily more sophisticated.
(22) There are more than 19 million SMEs in the European
Union. 86 935 SMEs were benefiting from the SME Guar-
antee facility at the end of 2001. According to prelimi-
nary data transmitted by the EIF to the Commission in
February 2002, the number of employees of these 86 935
SMEs stood at about 385 000 at the end of 2001.
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Figure 8.2 — SME Guarantee facility — Accumulated commitments and EIF contracts as at 31 December 2001
Source: Commission/EIF.
Figure 8.3 — Guarantee amounts in favour of intermediaries compared with effective risks for the EU budget,
situation as at 31 December 2001
Source: EIF/Commission.
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facility. However, the cost of the facility to the Commu-
nity budget is capped (23) (see Figure 8.3). Thus it may
not under any circumstances exceed the budgetary allo-
cations made available to the EIF (24).
Target distribution to the Member States is not yet
achieved
8.23. The appropriations committed by the Commis-
sion from 1998 to 2001 amount to a total of 248,9 mil-
lion euro. Out of these resources the EIF had contracted
163,9 million euro with intermediaries at the end of
2001. No contracts had been signed for Greece, Ireland
and Luxembourg. In the United Kingdom there is a big
gap between target and the commitment because a suit-
able contractor has not yet been found.
Insufficient visibility of the facility
8.24. Intermediaries were obliged in their contracts
with the EIF to include in all promotional material an
indication that they are supported by an EU-facility.
Many SMEs benefiting from the SME Guarantee facility
were informed neither about the existence of the EU
support, nor about the Court’s right to verify the regu-
larity of the guarantee procedure.
8.23. As for ETF Start-up, the EIF made considerable
efforts to achieve a broad geographic distribution and has suc-
ceeded to date in finding suitable intermediaries in 12 Mem-
ber States.
As regards the United Kingdom, discussions with the British
Banking Association as well as with some leading banks did
not lead to meaningful results. The selected intermediary in
UK was chosen after consultation with the relevant national
authorities.
Finally, the Commission refers to its reply concerning geo-
graphic distribution under point 8.18, that is applicable also
to SME Guarantee.
8.24. The Commission agrees with the Court that the vis-
ibility of the EU support should be ensured by every interme-
diary.
The new MAP guidelines of the Facility require the intermedi-
ary to ensure that each beneficiary is made aware in writing
of the origin of this support.
Concerning the audit access clause, all intermediaries and
SMEs chosen by the Court provided all information requested.
The EIF has included the obligation as regards the audit clause
in the standard terms that have been signed with each inter-
mediary. However, it is acknowledged that the audit clause
was not transposed in some agreements between intermediar-
ies and SMEs.
In addition, the EIF has sent several reminders to the inter-
mediaries concerning these two issues.
The EIF is requested to monitor this.
(23) Example: intermediary ‘X’ gets a guarantee volume of 100
guarantees from the EIF and gives 100 guarantees, each of
1 million euro, to 100 different banks. The EIF states in
that context that it will not pay more than a maximum
amount of 5 million euro i.e. the cap amount. After two
years ‘X’ has made demands for 4 million euro and is
reimbursed. Suppose that in the following years, ‘X’ has
to pay, following further bankruptcies, another 20 mil-
lion euro. Then ‘X’ will only be reimbursed with 1 million
by the EIF because it has reached the cap of 5 million.
In the light of the future ‘Basel II’ Agreement, only the
small cap amount will count as effective guarantees given
to the intermediaries. Formore information on the Agree-
ment and the Basel Committee, see the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlement’s website:
http: //www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm
(24) Article 5 of Council Decision 98/347/EC.
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Priority for signing contracts with public schemes
8.25. The Council Decision focused on the objective
of promoting better access to financing for SMEs (i.e.,
reducing banks’ reluctance to fund SMEs). The Commis-
sion and the EIF implemented the measure focusing on
increasing the volume of the existing guarantee schemes.
Wherever available (25), the EIF gave priority to signing
contracts with public schemes that can also benefit from
support through the national public budgets. For those
public schemes, the contribution from the EU-budget is
welcome but not substantial. Under the Council Deci-
sion (24), it would however also be possible to support
any other risk-sharing SME instruments made available
by the EIB or other appropriate financial institutions.
No verification on State aid to beneficiaries
8.26. Neither the Commission nor the EIF were aware
that, in certain cases (26), SMEs were benefiting from
both the SMEGuarantee facility and the European Struc-
tural Funds (ERDF).
8.25. The Council Decision refers to existing guarantee
schemes of which the EIF made an analysis. Based on this
analysis and discussions with the authorities in the Member
States it was felt that the most efficient way to implement the
facility was via the existing, mainly national guarantee insti-
tutions.
In line with the Council requirements, the EIF consulted
national authorities prior to the selection process of interme-
diaries. In countries where national public schemes were not
operational, like in Italy or in Greece, the EIF has launched a
call for expression of interest in order to select the most suit-
able financial intermediaries. National guarantee schemes in
most countries are public schemes.
8.26. The Community’s State aid rules place on Member
States the responsibility to ensure that the aid awards to indi-
vidual beneficiaries under various public aid schemes comply
with the eligibility conditions and aid limits laid down in
those rules and in the Commission’s decisions approving the
aid schemes. In the majority of cases enforcement is not prac-
ticable at any other than Member State level, as aid to be
counted towards the limits in terms of percentages or (de
minimis) amounts can legitimately come from different
sources and at different times. As regards the implementation
of measures which are partly financed by Community funds,
Commission’s task is mainly to ensure that the necessary
monitoring systems to control the level of aid awards to indi-
vidual projects are in place and operate satisfactorily. It does
of course check on individual cases in connection with audits
and in response to complaints. The Commission would refer
to its answer to points 3.86 to 3.88 of the Court’s report for
the year 2000.
(25) Germany, Spain, France.
(26) In two of the Member States (Austria and Portugal) visited
by the Court.
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Late reporting on employment data
8.27. The fiduciary and management agreement
obliges the EIF to deliver its annual report by 30 Sep-
tember, at the latest, including factual data on employ-
ment as well as an estimation for the future. Therefore,
the EIF’s annual reports to the Commission arrive too
late to be included in the Commission’s reports to Par-
liament and to the Council.
Best practices not sufficiently established
8.28. The intermediaries in the Member States have
strengths and weaknesses in their rules, programmes
and procedures. Appropriate market research has not
been carried out to establish best practices, although
the Council stated that intermediaries should be selected
in conformity with best business and market practice in
a fair and a transparent manner (27) having regard to:
(a) the effect on the volume of debt finance made avail-
able to SMEs; and/or
(b) the effect on access to debt finance by SMEs; and/or
(c) the effect on risk-taking in SME lending by the inter-
mediary concerned.
8.27. There is a very long chain of participants in the
implementation of these programmes involving (after the
approval by the budgetary authority), the Commission, the
EIF, the financial intermediaries and the final SME benefi-
ciaries. As a result, it is only possible to report in the year fol-
lowing the year under review facts pertaining to the EIF and
the intermediaries, i.e. budgetary facts such as commitments
and payments, geographical distribution concerning contracts
with financial intermediaries, and levels of utilisation by
financial intermediaries.
For detailed information pertaining to the final beneficiaries
the annual report must refer to information gathered by the
intermediaries during the year under review and pertaining to
the previous year. This covers information on employment at
SME level.
Finally, the Commission considers that only overall evalua-
tion (currently being carried out) can provide relevant infor-
mation as regards job-creation effects throughout the Com-
munity.
8.28. At the end of 1997 and beginning of 1998 the EIF
carried out a thorough analysis concerning the guarantee
schemes operating in the Member States. The EIF carried out
an extensive market research and it met with the national
authorities that are best placed to advise on existing national
schemes and ensure respect of subsidiarity principle. Further-
more, the EIF contacted and visited all relevant guarantee
schemes in the Member States. Based on such discussions,
standard information sheets were compiled. In a second stage,
more detailed project sheets were prepared.
As a confirmation, the EIF was in a position to advise two
Member States as to the design and implementation of new
guarantee systems.
In addition the EIF organised a conference where all interme-
diaries were given the opportunity to exchange best market
practice.
(27) Annex III(2) to Council Decision 98/347/EC.
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The EIF fees lack objective basis
8.29. The fees for 2001 amounted to 1,97 million
euro, which is below 0,1 % (10 basis points (bp)) of the
theoretical EIF guarantee amount, but 1,2 % (120 bp) of
the upper limit of the budgetary commitments made to
financial intermediaries of 164 million euro (see Fig-
ure 8.3 and footnote 23). These feesmerely cover admin-
istration, as the EIF takes — unlike the banking industry
— no credit risk. The Court reiterates the observations
in paragraph 8.20 that the fee amount was not based
on any analysis.
Conclusions and recommendations
8.30. The Court is aware of the difficulties inherent in
the implementation of the schemes audited. A fair bal-
ance has to be struck between potentially profitable
uses for the funds and requirements owing to the char-
acter of these funds as public money intended to be for
public interest objectives used. Nevertheless, the Court
recalls that:
(a) the implementation of the ETF Start-up facility is
still slow;
(b) difficulties remain in establishing the ETF Start-up,
and to a lesser extent the SME Guarantee facility
equitably throughout the Community.
8.31. In accordance to the above the Court recom-
mends that the Commission and the EIF should study
the way to find remedies for the weakness observed by
the Court in the speed and the extension of the schemes’
implementation.
8.29. The fee rate negotiated with the EIF is justified by:
— the challenge of implementing a number of new instru-
ments across an extended number of eligible countries
(EEA/EFTA and accession countries);
— the large number of guarantees to be issued, including
with new intermediaries in participating countries, result-
ing in substantial work at all stages of the implementa-
tion process (market research, origination, selection of
suitable intermediaries, negotiation and closing).
This is not comparable to the tasks of any national guarantee
scheme.
The guaranteed portfolio has already reached more than
100 000 loans, with consequences on the servicing costs of
the portfolio (database maintenance, reporting), as well as on
the risk management (payment demands, monitoring, etc.).
As regards 2001, the fees paid were below 10 bp (EUR
1,971 m in relation to the EIF guarantee amount).
8.30 to 8.31. While recognising that programme imple-
mentation is an ongoing process and that there is always
scope for improvements, the Commission and the EIF consider
that procedures put in place to implement ETF Start-up and
the SME Guarantee facility are appropriate and have proven
to work.
The cooperation with trustees, like the EIF, not only entails a
professional management of the instruments under mandate,
but also enables the Commission to deepen its knowledge on
market needs for policy purposes.
The EIF in turn delegates the investment and credit assess-
ment regarding final beneficiary SMEs to financial interme-
diaries such as venture-capital funds, incubators and guaran-
tee institutions. This delegation system allows the Commission
and the EIF to benefit from the significant experience devel-
oped by these market operators.
The SME Guarantee facility has established itself as an effec-
tive instrument reaching a sizeable population of SMEs active
in a wide range of different activities.
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8.32. The Court also draws attention to the fact that
the management fees paid to the EIF should be clear and
appropriate for the services provided.
The differences in the take-up of the facilities were identified
by the Commission at an early stage and largely taken into
account in defining the framework for implementation of the
MAP. The new MAP proposes modifications and extensions
of the ETF Start-up facility and the SME Guarantee facility
and introduces a new action, the Seed capital action. All three
actions are to be managed by the EIF and aim to address
recognised market failures in order to improve SMEs’ access
to finance.
As regards the geographic distribution of the instruments, the
Commission considers it appropriate to seek within the con-
text of the MAP a balanced global geographical distribution
for all the financial instruments together, reflecting the char-
acteristics of the different markets.
8.32. With regard to the ETF Start-up facility, the Com-
mission negotiated in December 2001 with the EIF a revised
fee structure. Fees are now clearly linked on the one side to the
take-up of the scheme (based on amounts committed and
number of agreements signed by the EIF), and on the other to
the monitoring of and reporting on the investments made
(based on outstanding commitments).
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Annex 8.2 — Glossary of terms used
Source: Annex III to the communication from the commission to European Parliament and to Council — Progress report on the risk capital action plan (COM(2000) 658 final).
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STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
I. The European Court of Auditors (‘the Court’) has examined the consolidated accounts of the European Com-
munities for the financial year ended 31 December 2001. The accounts consist of the consolidated revenue and
expenditure account and balance sheet as well as explanatory notes (1) and are the responsibility of the Com-
mission. Pursuant to the Treaties (2), the Court is required to provide Parliament and the Council with a state-
ment of assurance as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the transactions which
underlie these accounts.
II. The Court carried out the audit in accordance with its own audit policies and standards. These adapt gener-
ally accepted international standards to the Community context. The audit comprised an appropriate range of
procedures designed to examine, on a test basis, evidence relating to the amounts and disclosures in the con-
solidated accounts and to the legality and regularity of the transactions underlying the accounts. It also included
an assessment of the accounting principles used and of significant estimates made by management, as well as
of the presentation of the accounts. Through this audit the Court obtained a reasonable basis for the opinion
expressed below. The scope of the Court’s opinion is restricted as regards own resources (see paragraphs 1.23,
1.35 and 1.37) and external action (see paragraph 5.14).
*
* *
Reliability of the accounts
III. Except for the effects of the observations summarised in indents (a) to (d) below and the remark made in
paragraph IV, the Court is of the opinion that the accounts of the financial year closed on 31 December 2001,
as published in the Official Journal, faithfully reflect the Communities’ revenue and expenditure for the year and
their financial position at the year-end:
(a) overstatement by 148,7 million euro of provisions paid to the Member States in respect of agricultural inter-
vention stocks (see paragraph 9.12);
(b) entry without adequate justification under ‘Sundry debitors’ of 980 million euro relating to cash transfers
in third countries (see paragraph 9.25);
(c) provision of 564 million euro set up on doubtful bases in respect of the cost of dismantling the Joint
Research Centre’s nuclear installations (see paragraph 9.31);
(d) overstatement of commitments still outstanding by about 1 318 million euro (see paragraph 9.32).
(1) Volume IV of the documents was submitted by the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Court
on the official date of 1 May 2002 (SEC(2002) 406-FR).
(2) Article 248 of the EC Treaty, Article 160c of the Euratom Treaty and Article 45c of the ECSC Treaty with regard to the
ECSC’s former administrative budget, which was incorporated into the general budget by the Merger Treaty of 8 April
1965.
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IV. The Court emphasises that most of its reservations and observations are matters that regularly recur. These
weaknesses stem to a large extent from the Community accounting system which was not designed to provide
an assurance that the various components of the Communities’ assets have all been recorded. The Court consid-
ers that urgent in-depth action in the Commission’s departments to cope with the risks arising from the short-
comings in the accounting system is required (see paragraphs 9.6 to 9.8).
Legality and regularity of the underlying transactions
V. As regards revenue, the errors affecting own resources found in the course of the audit are not significant
(see paragraph 9.37).
Except in the field of administrative expenditure (see paragraph 9.47) the audit revealed, as regards payments,
the persistence of errors affecting their amount, the reality or eligibility of the underlying transactions (see para-
graphs 9.38 to 9.46).
In view of the results of the audit, the Court is of the opinion that the transactions underlying the financial state-
ments, taken as a whole, are legal and regular in respect of revenue, commitments and administrative expen-
diture; however it still cannot provide this assurance in respect of the other payments.
10 October 2002
Juan Manuel FABRA VALLÉS
President
European Court of Auditors
12, rue Alcide De Gasperi, L-1615 Luxembourg
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INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF THE SOA
Introduction
9.1. Pursuant to Article 248 of the Treaty, the Court of
Auditors provides the European Parliament and the
Council with a Statement of Assurance concerning the
reliability of the accounts and the legality and regular-
ity of the underlying transactions (SOA).
9.2. The aim of the work on the reliability of the
accounts of the European Communities is to obtain a
reasonable assurance that all the revenue, expenditure,
assets and liabilities have been entered in the accounts
properly and that the financial statements faithfully
reflect the financial position at the end of the year.
9.3. The aim of the work on the legality and regularity
of the underlying transactions is to obtain enough evi-
dence of a direct or indirect nature to prove that the
underlying transactions are in accordancewith the regu-
lations or contractual provisions in force and that the
amounts involved in these transactions have been cor-
rectly calculated.
9.4. For the financial year 2001, particular attention
was paid to the following when examining the legality
and regularity of the transactions:
(a) the process of reform at the Commission, in par-
ticular its financial management aspects (see para-
graph 9.48 et seq.);
(b) an analysis of the transactions (see paragraphs 9.36
to 9.47).
9.5. This examination was supplemented by an analy-
sis of several sectoral management systems, the conclu-
sions from which have been set out in the preceding
chapters devoted to the various headings of the finan-
cial perspective.
Reliability of the accounts
Accounting principles and practices
9.6. Since the first Statement of Assurance (SOA) in
respect of the financial year 1994, the Court has repeated
its reservations in respect of the reliability of the
accounts. These reservationsmost often have their roots
9.6 to 9.8. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission recognises the accounting problems still
present as highlighted by the Court. A reform of accounting
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in the weaknesses of the accounting system and in the
low level of awareness in the Commission’s operational
DGs with regard to questions concerning records and
accounting controls. The reservations contained in the
Director-General of Budgets’ declaration confirm the
Court’s findings, but nevertheless no precise plan of
action accompanied by a realistic timetable has been
proposed to remedy the situation.
9.7. In the absence of a comprehensive accounting
system, the year-end financial statements are drawn up
largely on the basis of records which are not part of the
accounts (see paragraphs 9.22, 9.24, 9.27 and 9.29).
The evaluations established during this procedure are
not linked to the entries in the budget from which they
are derived and the central accounts departments are
not always able to guarantee that they are accurate (3).
In addition, the accounting system, which is based, to a
large extent, on cash accounting principles, does not
enable a distinction to be made between administrative
expenditure and capital expenditure, between final pay-
ments and payments on account or advances, or even
total debts and receivables to be determined.
9.8. For several years, the Commission, aware of these
numerous shortcomings, has been developing a new
accounting framework which complies with the prin-
ciples of accruals-based accounting. Nevertheless, the
new Financial Regulation (4) states that the reformed
accounting system will only gradually be brought in
and that it will not be fully operational until the finan-
cial year 2005. A draft action plan was submitted in
June 2001 (5). The steps set out in it should enable a
solution to be found for the main deficiencies which the
Court has been highlighting for several years. By the
end of May 2002, no start had been made on imple-
menting this action plan, which has remained at the
draft stage. The deadline for adopting the new Financial
will be launched as a matter of urgency. The Commission is
strongly committed to the modernisation of the accounting
system. By the end of 2002 the Commission will take a deci-
sion on the options for development, the proposed calendar for
implementation and the projected costs and allocation of
resources.
Furthermore, given that the new Financial Regulation requires
the production of accrual accounts by 2005, urgent and wide-
ranging action is necessary to ensure that the Commission has
the necessary rules and procedures in place.
A new accounting framework is necessary to enable the Com-
mission both to meet the requirements of the new Financial
Regulation and to conform with current best practice. The
framework must change on several fronts:
— evolution towards an integrated system of accounting
which contains all the information necessary for drawing
up the accounts and from which all accounting data are
drawn directly,
— respect of generally accepted accounting principles; the
Commission now fully complies with the cash-based
accounting standards, which have constituted the tradi-
tional accounting standards used by the public sector. The
new accounting framework has to conform with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles for the production of
accrual-based accounts,
— improvement of the financial statements so that they give
an accurate picture of assets and liabilities, the financial
situation, budget implementation, the entity’s outturn
and the cash flow for the year.
The reform of accounting is a major exercise and will require
considerable time, effort, expertise and financial resources to
put in place. The aim is for the detailed development of both
the accounting framework and the system to be launched in
2003 with the relevant testing and implementation phases
beginning in 2004. In particular, the question of implement-
ing accrual accounting principles will be examined in detail
to identify the accounting treatment of each type of transac-
tion for each different service or activity.
(3) See the Annual accounts of the European Communities,
Volume IV, p. 5, ‘Development of the European Commu-
nities’ accounting system’ and the reservation in the dec-
laration accompanying the Budget DG’s annual report.
(4) See Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of
25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to
the general budget of the European Communities
(OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1).
(5) See the Annual Report concerning the financial year
2000, paragraph 9.32.
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Regulation is no justification for these delays in imple-
mentation. In short, the provisions of the Financial
Regulation will not be sufficient, in themselves, to make
up for the present shortcomings in the accounting sys-
tem and a good many practical measures need to be
taken.
Scope of consolidation
9.9. The Commission has stated its intention of adjust-
ing the scope of consolidation to bring it into line with
international standards (6). For 2001, this scope
excluded, in particular, the European Agency for Recon-
struction and the European Training Foundation, which
both implement the Commission’s aid programmes in
the field of external action. Excluding these bodies affects
the picture that is given of the consolidated financial
position. If the Agency had been consolidated, the 105
million euro shown under ‘Sundry debtors’ would have
appeared under ‘Cash’.
Observations concerning the consolidated statements on
the implementation of the budget
The making available of own resources
9.10. The Court cannot express an opinion on a sum
of around1 230 million euro representing import duties
collected in Germany in 2001 under the deferred-
payment system (see paragraph 1.35). The fact is that
shortcomings in the computer system and the internal
control procedures, plus the lack of an audit trail, meant
that the Court was unable to obtain assurance that all
the own resources had been correctly made available to
the Commission (see paragraph 1.24).
The move towards accrual accounting will be supported by a
parallel development in the functionality of the computerised
accounting system. Several options have to be considered.
Whatever the solution adopted, it is clear that the objective
should be to ensure the reliability and quality of financial data
as well as their security from unauthorised access or interven-
tion.
On a regular basis, the Commission will inform the discharge
authority and the European Court of Auditors of the progress
made in this exercise.
9.9. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The new Financial Regulation adopted in June 2002 requires
that Commission extend its scope of consolidation to include
the agencies.
9.10. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In its replies to the report paragraphs cited by the Court the
Commission undertakes to examine, as part of its inspection
programme for 2003, the new computerised system now
introduced by Germany. The results of this inspection will be
used to further examine the credibility of the own resources
information provided previously and,where appropriate, finan-
cial corrections may follow.
(6) Annual accounts of the European Communities, financial
year 2001, Volume IV (SEC(2002) 406-EN), p. 6.
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Negative expenditure (revenue)
9.11. For the financial year 2001, negative expenditure
for agriculture amounted to 2 804 million euro
(3 798 million euro in 2000 (7) and 3 058 in 1999 (7)).
The Court considers, as already stated in its Opinion
No 1/2001 (8), that the agricultural revenue shown in
the budget as negative expenditure should be entered in
the general statement of revenue.
Expenditure (commitments and payments)
Agr i cu l tura l expend i ture
9.12. At the closure of each financial year, the Com-
mission applies an additional depreciation of agricul-
tural stocks on the basis of the estimated prices of their
disposal on the market, assessed on the date of the stock
inventory (30 September (9). As the Court has already
pointed out in its report concerning the financial year
1999 (10), this second depreciation is groundless. At
31 December 2001, the Commission estimates, in the
off-balance-sheet commitments, that the provision for
depreciation paid to the Member States was overstated
by 148,72 million euro.
9.11. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The current regulatory framework for negative agricultural
expenditure does not allow this revenue to be treated as mis-
cellaneous revenue (see in particular Article 102(4)
and 102(5) of the 1977 Financial Regulation).
The new Financial Regulation adopted by the Council on
25 June 2002, which comes into force on 1 January 2003,
maintains negative agricultural expenditure until 31 Decem-
ber 2006.
9.12. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
As the Court of Auditors points out, the additional deprecia-
tion of agricultural stocks is based on the estimated prices of
their disposal on the market.
This estimate, which is carried out by the Commission in Sep-
tember, takes account of all the relevant data on the agricul-
tural markets available at the time.
On the other hand, the closing figures at 31 December 2001
include the market forecasts available in February 2002, so
there is actually a six-month gap between the two selling price
estimates.
During this period, there may be considerable fluctuations in
the expected selling price for some products (for example, cere-
als and milk products) depending on events in the world mar-
kets, which are rarely stable.
These are the same reference prices that the Commission uses
for the sake of transparency when drawing up the letter of
amendment to the preliminary draft budget.
(7) See:
— theAnnual Report concerning the financial year 2000,
paragraph 2.12,
— theAnnual Report concerning the financial year 1999,
paragraph 2.10.
(8) Opinion No 1/2001, paragraph 29 (OJ C 55, 21.2.2001).
(9) Article 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1883/78, which
serves as the basis for the Community depreciation of
stocks in public intervention, stipulates in paragraph 2
that the depreciation must correspond at the most to the
difference between the purchase price and the estimated
disposal price. The depreciation can be divided up into
depreciation upon purchase (first depreciation) and addi-
tional depreciation.
(10) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, para-
graph 8.9.
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Str uc tura l opera t ions
9.13. In its Annual Report concerning the financial
year 2000 (11), the Court pointed out that, in the area
of structural operations, decisions concerning the 2000
to 2006 programmes were not recorded under budget-
ary commitments (1 034 million euro corresponding
to the 2000 tranche of 16 programmes). These com-
mitments were entered in the accounts in 2001 and
charged against the appropriations carried over. In the
same way, decisions taken in December 2001 covering
a total of 8,2 million euro are to be found under the off-
balance-sheet commitments since they were not entered
in the accounts under the commitments for the finan-
cial year 2001.
9.14. In conformity with the regulations, the commit-
ments in the area of structural operations show only
the annual tranches which have fallen due or are being
implemented. The legal commitments for subsequent
annual tranches (approximately 170 200 million euro
for structural operations and 1 830 million euro for
ISPA) are shown under the off-balance-sheet commit-
ments. For all other areas of expenditure, the regula-
tions make no provision for any distinction between
legal commitments and budgetary commitments. These
differences in the methods used for entering commit-
ments in the accounts, which, moreover, are not clearly
indicated in the explanatory notes to the financial state-
ments concerning the implementation of the budget,
undermine the consistency of the financial statements.
As pointed out in the Court’s Opinion No 2/2001 on
the recasting of the Financial Regulation (12), the provi-
sion whereby commitments may be broken down into
annual instalments (tranches) is incompatible with the
definition of differentiated appropriations in the con-
text of multiannual measures and does not allow all the
expenditure decisions that have actually been taken to
be fully recorded.
9.13. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Court states that legal commitments were entered into
without the corresponding budgetary commitments being
made. This results from different practices in the adoption
procedures for programmes.
In these circumstances, it is to be expected that commitments
not yet entered in the accounts should be shown in the off-
balance-sheet commitments.
When legal commitments were not covered by budgetary com-
mitments at the end of the financial year, the only alternative
to carrying over appropriations would have been to leave the
legal commitments not covered by budgetary commitments
— which would have been unacceptable — or to carry out a
revision of the financial perspective.
9.14. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The new Financial Regulation explicitly provides for the sys-
tem of commitments by instalments (tranches).
The Commission considers that the system is very useful for
promoting better financial and budgetary management of
multiannual measures for significant amounts which may
require adjustments during implementation, such as the Struc-
tural Funds programmes or Cohesion Fund and ISPA projects.
(11) Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000, para-
graphs 3.28 and 9.16.
(12) Opinion No 2/2001 on a proposal for a Council Regula-
tion on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general
budget of the European Communities, paragraphs 6, 29
and 30 (OJ C 162, 5.6.2001).
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9.15. In the case of the international agreements in
the fisheries sector, the legal commitments exceeded the
appropriations available for 2001 by 610 million euro.
Likewise, for the other external actions, the legal com-
mitments exceeded the appropriations available by
239 million euro. These amounts are shown under the
off-balance-sheet commitments.
9.16. Legal commitments relating to the financial pro-
tocols with Mediterranean third countries totalled
159 million euro (13). Some of these protocolswere con-
cluded more than 20 years ago (14) and commitment
appropriations are no longer allocated to the budget
headings concerned. This being the case, the Commis-
sion should initiate the negotiation procedure for wind-
ing up these protocols and also the accounting commit-
ments still in abeyance.
9.15. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The international agreements in the fisheries sector and cer-
tain agreements in the field of external relations are legal
frameworks which run over several years but define on a yearly
basis the obligations of each of the parties (Community —
non-member countries). The financial obligation of the Com-
munity is clearly broken down into annual instalments in the
basic text (financial protocol). For this reason, in a given
financial year, the Commission only makes the commitments
for the relevant instalment.
As the Commission is aware of the Court’s repeated observa-
tions and wishes to act in all openness, the Commission has
been including in the off-balance-sheet commitments since
1997 all amounts for which commitments have not yet been
made in respect of legal obligations under existing agree-
ments.
The new Financial Regulation provides, both under Title I
‘General provisions’ and Title II ‘Implementation of the bud-
get’ for the possibility of annual instalments for commitments
where the action extends over several financial years, as long
as the basic instrument provides for this, as it does in the case
of the international fisheries agreements
9.16. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The EUR 159 million referred to by the Court is the differ-
ence between the total amount for all the protocols
(EUR 2 112 million) and the amount for budgetary commit-
ments made since 1978 (EUR 1 953 million).
Only payment appropriations to cover outstanding commit-
ments are entered under the budget headings for these proto-
cols. Projects funded under the latter are being wound up
satisfactorily each year and the pace was stepped up consider-
ably in 2001 (27 projects wound up with a total value of
EUR 31 million).
(13) Chapter B7-4 0.
(14) Commitments for the 1970s and 1980s.
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Observations concerning items on the consolidated bal-
ance sheet
9.17. The total of the consolidated balance sheet for
the financial year 2001 shows an increase of 76 % com-
pared with the total for the previous financial year. This
increase is mainly due to a change in the accounting
policy applied by the Commission in respect of pension
rights. This change in method comes in the wake of an
observation by the Court (15), asking for the annual
liability representing the rights acquired during the
financial year to be deducted from the economic result.
However, the Commission does not record this expen-
diture, as it has entered the total amount of the poten-
tial debt for pensions in the financial statements for a
single financial year and, in compensation, has entered
revenue for the same amount, thus neutralising the
impact on the economic result. In so doing, it is not
complying with the Court’s request. At the time, more-
over, the Commission considered that a thorough
accounting analysis (16) was required. The Court is con-
sequently of the opinion that it would be useful for the
Commission to continue its analysis of the way in which
the pensions scheme is treated in the accounts, bearing
in mind the Community context.
Fixed assets
9.18. With regard to tangible assets, the Commission
stressed in its reply to an observation in the Court’s
report concerning the financial year 2000 (17) that the
accounting and consolidation manual was ‘designed to
establish a uniform set of rules for accounting and pre-
senting the accounts of the European institutions’. An
examination of the accounts at the end of the financial
year 2001 showed several instances where failings
pointed out in the past were still occurring in spite of
the improvements that were found.
9.17. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
For several years now, the Commission has been supplying
detailed information on pension rights in the Annex to the
annual accounts (in the off-balance-sheet commitments). A
major step forward was made in the 2001 accounts, when the
provisions for pension rights were entered for the first time as
liabilities in the accounts, although no IPSAS (1) rule has
been introduced to date.
The Commission feels that the method used is correct, but is
nevertheless willing to discuss with the Court the best method
of entering pension rights in the financial statements. As
indicated in the comments on the balance sheet, the Commis-
sion entered in the budget an allocation for pension rights
equivalent to the estimated amount of the rights accrued by
staff until 31 December 2001 (EUR 15,3 billion) via the
result of the adjustments.
At the same time, it also established a debt payable by the
Member States using the result of the adjustments, since the
Member States are collectively liable for paying these sums.
Moreover, the surplus of contributions over expenditure for the
year is reimbursed annually to the Member States.
As part of the reform, the Commission has made several pro-
posals concerning the pension scheme, including the carrying
out of a feasibility study on the possible setting-up of a pen-
sions fund. This study, which is still under way, will estimate
the financial impact of such a step and will enable the poten-
tial financial impact on the accounts of the institutions to be
assessed.
9.18. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
Owing to an oversight at the time of preparation of the finan-
cial statements, the footnote to the balance sheet omitted to
mention that an estimated amount had been used. If the
definitive value of the building is not known by the end of
2002, the text of the relevant footnote will include a com-
ment that the cost is estimated. As negotiations relating to the
definitive cost of the buildings are ongoing, it is not considered
appropriate to disclose in the footnotes to the balance sheet
(1) IPSAS: international public sector accounting standards.
(15) Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000, para-
graph 7.6.
(16) See the Commission’s reply to paragraph 7.6 of theAnnual
Report concerning the financial year 2000.
(17) Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000, para-
graph 9.28.
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9.19. These shortcomings concern the failure to regu-
larise the differences found between the Council’s physi-
cal inventory and its records of fixed assets, physical
checks on movable property which are still incomplete
at the Joint Research Centre for the sites other than
Ispra, the lack of physical checks at the Economic and
Social Committee and at the Committee of the Regions,
where entries include items which have been disposed
of (see paragraphs 7.8 and 7.15). For the European Par-
liament, the notes to the balance sheet fail to indicate
either that the value of one of its buildings is being con-
tested or the fact that Commission Regulation (EC)
No 2909/2000 has not been applied to calculate the
depreciation of special equipment (see paragraph 7.7).
All these practices limit the significance of the account-
ing entries shown on the Communities’ consolidated
balance sheet.
an amount of contested costs as this may prejudice the Euro-
pean Parliament’s position in current negotiations. The exact
nature of the special equipment referred to in the Court of
Auditors’ sector letter is currently the subject of investigation.
Detailed information on the breakdown of the assets under
this item is being sought from SERS, the current owner of the
building. The outcome of these efforts should enable the insti-
tution to ascertain whether it is appropriate to continue to
apply the depreciation rate of 25 % to the special equipment
item, in line with the recommendations of the Court of Audi-
tors and in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC)
No 2909/2000.
9.18. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The accounting and consolidation manual and the regulation
on the accounting management of the European Communi-
ties’ non-financial fixed assets have improved the reliability of
information on non-financial fixed assets through harmoni-
sation of the rules on valuation and accounting methods,
although some discrepancies still remain and will be corrected
in the future.
9.18. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE’S REPLIES
See comments on point 7.15.
9.18. THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS’ REPLIES
See comments on point 7.15.
9.19. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
— The Council has decided to give the highest priority to the
drawing-up of a physical inventory so as to improve the
reliability of the accounts. In view of the size and com-
plexity of the operation and the reconciliation work which
is under way, these will continue until the end of 2002,
together with the studies on improving inventory man-
agement systems and procedures. The supplementary work
carried out after the Court’s audit has already signifi-
cantly reduced the discrepancies between the physical
inventory and the accounts.
— The physical control of assets outside Ispra was indeed not
completed in 2001. For other sites (Brussels, Geel, Petten,
Karlsruhe and Seville) this control will be completed by
the end of 2002.
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Participations and loans granted from the budget
9.20. ECIP (European Community Investment Part-
ners) is a Financial Instrument created during the 1980s
to support joint ventures founded by companies estab-
lished within the Community and companies in devel-
oping countries (ACP (18), Latin America and Asia). The
Court considers that the Commission’s accounts do not
give a true picture of this Instrument’s situation for the
following reasons:
(a) participations in the joint ventures (22,9 million
euro) have not been evaluated by the Commission,
which does not know the real position of each of
them;
(b) the Commission has created a provision of 49 mil-
lion euro for depreciation of the long-term and
short-term loans, but it is unable to explain the gross
amount of 67,6 million euro to which this provi-
sion, which was entered in the accounts on
31 December 2001, applies.
— The Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of Regions accept the need to ensure that the inventory
rules are strictly applied in future. A physical stock-take
is now well under way and will be finished before the end
of 2002.
— The European Parliament admits that it omitted to specify
in the explanatory notes to the balance sheet that the
value shown for the building in question was an estimate.
If the value of the building has not been fixed by31 Decem-
ber 2002, Parliament will indicate this clearly in the
explanatory notes to the 2002 annual accounts.
As regards the depreciation of special equipment, the current
owner of the building is being consulted about the precise
nature of these goods. The information obtained will allow
the institution to determine whether it is appropriate to con-
tinue to apply a depreciation rate of 25 % to this equipment.
9.20. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission has made progress in the field of account-
ing and reporting, although some problems are still to be
ironed out.
It should be emphasised that most of the activities of the
European Community Investment Partners (ECIP) will be
wound up, recovered or converted into a definitive subsidy
before the end of 2002. The programme cannot be defini-
tively wound up until the last joint venture has been com-
pleted.
The Commission will make a more thorough examination of
the status of this instrument and the relevant recovery orders.
(18) African, Caribbean and Pacific States.
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9.21. Recovery orders for a total of 21,3 million euro
were issued in 2000 and 2001 but the Commission has
no information on the exact position as regards repay-
ments on the loans it has granted. Some of the repay-
ments were collected in 2000 but were not entered in
the accounts until 2001. Other recovery orders issued
in 2001 were not collected until 2002, and, for the rest
of the recovery orders, it is not possible to determine
whether they have been collected or not.
9.22. Furthermore, in the field of external action, cer-
tain Community programmes and measures provide for
the possibility of co-financing or giving support in the
form of loans or participations in the capital of com-
panies or Funds. The Commission was not able to pro-
vide a complete list of these operations, which should,
in principle, be shown in the financial statements.
Amounts receivable
Trad i t iona l own resource s
9.23. As at 31 December 2001, the total balance on
the separate accounts, known as the B accounts (see
paragraphs 1.25 and 1.26), after deduction of collection
costs (19),was2 119,4 million euro. Thenet figure shown
on the Commission’s balance sheet is 538 million euro,
after application of a value adjustment of 1 581,4 mil-
lion euro. The fact that the latter exists is an admission
that there is doubt about full recovery of many of the
amounts receivable entered in the B accounts. Because
of the lack of detailed information about the amounts
in question, the accuracy of this value adjustment can-
not be confirmed.
EAGGF -Guarantee
9.24. A number of certifying bodies have expressed
concern as to whether the figures for debtors reported
by the paying agencies are complete and accurate. The
total value of established debt stood at 2 263 million-
euro at the end of the financial year 2001. The Com-
mission has created a provision for doubtful debts
amounting to 1 641 million euro. This amount is con-
siderably higher than the amount reported by the pay-
ing agencies in the Member States.
9.22. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission is drawing up a comprehensive list of these
programmes. The questionnaire sent in September 2002 to
all departments in connection with the modernisation project
also contains a question on this subject.
9.23. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The recovery of amounts entered in the separate account (the
‘B’ account) is doubtful but not impossible.
Following an observation by the Court of Auditors, the Com-
mission itself determines the amount of the correction, in
accordance with the principle of prudence, based on two recov-
ery ratios: a flat-rate ratio based on recovery statistics over the
previous five years and a ratio based on an individual analysis
of certain current cases.
9.24. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The situation with respect to the completeness and accuracy of
debtors is improving each year. The Commission is continu-
ing its efforts to ensure that debtors are properly managed and
recovered.
Where the Commission, on the basis of its own enquiries and
experience, did not consider that the provisions given by the
paying agencies were sufficient it substituted its own judge-
ment. It particularly took account of the accounting concept
of prudence.
(19) 10 %, as prescribed by Article 2(3) of Council Decision
94/728/EC, Euratom of 31 October 1994 on the system
of the European Communities’ own resources.
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9.25. As at 31 December 2001, the total shown in the
balance sheet under sundry debtors for the amounts
held by financial intermediaries (980 million euro,
including 73 million euro of interest) comes from a
non-accounting record. The procedure that is followed
does not enable the Commission to demonstrate the
justification for the sums thus entered in the accounts.
Consequently, the declarations by the Directors-General
of the Enlargement DG and the EuropeAid Cooperation
Office include reservations concerning the reliability of
the estimates in their fields which amount to 685 mil-
lion euro. These uncertainties stem from the lack of an
accounting system which would allow the sums paid by
the Commission to the financial intermediaries to be
monitored in respect of their actual use by the projects
and measures concerned. To rectify this situation, the
Commission must set up an accounting system of this
kind. Furthermore, it should demand certification, by
an independent auditor, of the data forwarded at the
end of the financial year by the financial intermediar-
ies.
9.26. In March 1999, the Commission was obliged to
issue a recovery order for 3,05 million euro to a bank
which had failed to implement the payments due to one
of the Commission’s partners in the field of external aid
(Balkan region) in accordance with the provisions.
Although the debt existed and was due and payable, the
Commission has undertaken no action since that date
in respect of the bank, with which the Commission and
the Reconstruction Agency continue to do significant
business.
Yield on advances and payments on account made to third
parties
9.27. The interest yielded by the advances and pay-
ments on account is not always notified to the Commis-
sion by the financial intermediaries. Where it is notified,
it is not always recorded as budgetary revenue. At
31 December 2001, interest on the funds held by the
financial intermediaries known at central level (see para-
graph 9.25) amounted to 73 million euro, of which
9.25. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
As the Court points out, non-accounting records are inherent
to the Commission’s current accounting system and are neces-
sary for drawing up the annual accounts.
The Commission wishes to highlight the enormous amount of
work carried out by the various Directorates-General in order
to draw up the list of financial intermediaries. This work will
be useful for the changeover to integrated accounting as all the
relevant information will already have been collected. From
that point onwards, the use of non-accounting records will be
minimal as the recently adopted new Financial Regulation
requires that prefinancing payments be identified.
The balances received from the national authorities are certi-
fied by them, and as such are reasonably reliable. Neverthe-
less the Commission will consider whether controls in this area
can be strengthened.
9.26. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
As the Court points out, several payments by the Commis-
sion to an NGO operating in the field of external aid did not
reach their intended recipient. At the time, the Commission
issued a recovery order against the bank which had received
instructions to carry out the payment. The bank contested the
Commission’s position. As the funds were not recovered, the
Commission has since been trying to gather information on
the spot (in Bosnia) to establish where the responsibility lies
(NGO/bank). As a result of the Court’s observations, the
Commission has restarted action against the bank and will
follow it up with the appropriate measures.
9.27. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission will ensure that such interest is entered in the
accounts on a regular basis and will regularise the past situ-
ation.
The new Financial Regulation requires that estimates of
amounts receivable be drawn up when prefinancing payments
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only 28 million euro were recorded as budgetary rev-
enue. When the sums received in this way are allocated
to measures or programmes, they are not automatically
recorded as budgetary expenditure. It follows from this
that the accounts do not reflect the whole of the Com-
munity contribution.
Disposable assets
Impres t ac counts under the Medi t e r ranean protoco l s
9.28. The total on the imprest accounts held with
banks in respect of the financial protocols with Mediter-
ranean third countries (21,4 million euro as at
31 December 2001) is overestimated by 11,2 million-
euro because expenditure carried out before 31 Decem-
ber 2001 was not entered in the accounts.
Bank accounts
9.29. In 2000, the Commission opened three bank
accountswith theCentral Bankof Jordan.These accounts
were intended to meet the needs of three MEDA pro-
grammes. The funds paid into these accounts were
regarded as expenditure by the authorising department
concerned at the Commission. On 31 December 2001,
the deposits on these accounts totalled 639 927 euro.
Apart from the fact that these amounts had been classed,
in advance, as the equivalent of budgetary expenditure,
they were not shown under disposable assets on the
Commission’s balance sheet as the accounting officer
was not aware the accounts had been opened. Such
practices are contrary to the most elementary principles
of internal control and the Commission should forbid
them from being used by its authorising officers by sub-
delegation.
are made and that interest yielded by funds which remain the
property of the European Communities be entered in the bud-
get as miscellaneous revenue.
This new provision will ensure that the interest yielded by
Community funds is accounted for more rigorously from
1 January 2003.
Furthermore, the Commission will spell out in the new imple-
menting rules for the new Financial regulation, which will be
applicable as from 1 January 2003, that interest arising from
prefinancing of actions under the preaccession Instruments is
not to be considered the property of the Commission.
9.28. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The overestimate of EUR 11,2 million relates to the regulari-
sation operations still to be carried out at 31 December 2001.
Most of this amount concerns countries involved in the first
wave of devolution. As devolution started at the beginning of
January 2002, priority was given to the payments to be made
(follow-up of payment deadlines), with regularisation taking
second place. This state of affairs has since been rectified.
In any event, with the exception of EUR 0,3 million, the situ-
ation referred to by the Court was regularised at the begin-
ning of September 2002. The Commission will see that most
of the expenditure incurred during the year in question is
regularised.
9.29. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission will take all the necessary steps to ensure the
correct implementation of the Financial Regulation so that
this situation does not occur again.
The funds paid into these accounts were regarded as expendi-
ture since they were to be transferred to recipients.
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Provisions for risks and liabilities
9.30. A provision for liabilities of 15 300 million euro
was entered in the consolidated balance sheet as at
31 December 2001 (20) in respect of pensions to be paid
to staff of the Community institutions. This amount is
based on an actuarial study made in 1997. In his report
the actuary recommended, at the time, that complete
re-evaluations of the liability should be carried out at
regular intervals in view of the scale of the amounts
involved. Since 1997, the Commission’s departments
have re-evaluated the liability themselves using a simpli-
fied model. In the absence of a recent, comprehensive
actuarial evaluation, the reliability of the amount entered
cannot be verified (see paragraph 9.17).
9.31. A provision of 564 million euro for risks and
liabilities was entered in the consolidated balance sheet
as at 31 December 2001 to cover the cost of disman-
tling the JRC’s installations, the activities of which have
ceased (374 million euro) or are still inprogress (190 mil-
lion euro). Apart from the fact that the cost of deploy-
ing the JRC’s own staff (estimated at between 75 and
100 million euro) was not included in this provision,
the amount of the provision is the result of an internal
evaluation by the JRC. Until the technical evaluation on
which it is based has been the subject of an independent
examination involving consultation of the parties
involved, its probative value will remain limited.
Off-balance-sheet commitments
9.32. Commitments against differentiated appropria-
tions still outstanding at 31 December 2001 totalled
86 760 million euro. Of these, commitments still out-
standing for more than two years accounted for
28 840 million euro, of which 9 790 million euro had
not been the subject of any payment during the last two
years. Of the latter amount, the Court considers that
some 1 318,2 million euro (13 %) no longer represent
an obligation to make payments.
9.30. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
For the calculation of pension rights, the Commission employs
an expert to carry out a full actuarial study every five years.
The next one is scheduled for 2003. Besides this five-yearly
analysis, the figures are adjusted every year, using the method
suggested by the expert, on the basis of changes in rates.
9.31. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission took a first step by entering in the 2001
budget a provision for risks and liabilities to cover the dis-
mantling of the entire JRC installations, based on a study car-
ried out by the Commission.
A contract will be placed with an external evaluator. It is
hoped that the first draft report of the evaluation will be avail-
able by the end of January 2003.
(20) The long-term assets include an identical amount on the
assets side of the balance sheet in order to establish the
fact that in reality the liability has to be borne by the
Member States.
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9.33. The action plan to eliminate abnormal outstand-
ing commitments, solely for the budget headings identi-
fied in the Annex to the Joint Declaration (21) (estimated
at 3 500 million euro as at 31 December 2001 out of a
total of 11 600 million euro in potentially abnormal
commitments), only led to the Commission’s decom-
mitting approximately 97 million euro (of a total exam-
ined of about 1 000 million euro) in the course of the
first four months of the financial year 2002.
9.34. With regard to the ERDF, the EAGGF Guidance,
the FIFG and the ESF, the Court again found that the
commitments outstanding for the period 1994 to 1999
and the previous periods no longer had any grounds for
existence because they concerned:
(a) files which had already been closed and for which
the unused balance had not been decommitted;
(b) cases in which closure had not been carried out but
where it had been established that a part of the
commitment was no longer necessary, in particular
where claims for paymentwere less than the remain-
der to be settled;
(c) measures decided before 1994 for which there had
been no claim for final payment by 31 March 2001
and for which automatic decommitments should
have been made on 30 September 2001, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Regulation (EC)
No 1260/1999, for 11 % of the 532,5 million euro in
commitments which were still open at 31 December,
i.e. 56,1 million euro (see paragraphs 3.53 to 3.55);
(d) measures for which closure was suspended because
of legal proceedings in respect of that part for which
a partial closure could have been made.
9.33. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
For the budget headings identified in the Declaration, the
EUR 97 million in decommitments reflect only part of the
effort made by the Commission to review the outstanding
commitments under these lines. During the period mentioned
by the Court, the Commission paid some EUR 147 million
against these outstanding commitments; a further
EUR 745 million in commitments was examined, but the
Commission services considered that they should remain open
for various reasons –contract still valid, awaiting final report,
legal dispute ongoing, etc. At the end of April 2002, the
Commission had reviewed one quarter of all the commitments
to be examined. The report also shows that the rate of exami-
nation is planned to accelerate by the end of 2002. The action
plan aims at examining all potentially abnormal RAL by the
end of 2003.
9.34. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
For general points, please see the answers to points 3.27 to
3.29, 3.53 and 3.55.
(a) The specific cases highlighted by the Court will be regu-
larised as soon as possible.
(b) The Commission tries to adjust systematically the amount
of outstanding commitments to the maximum amount
of payments it might be asked to make. It would point
out, however, that most of the cases from before 1994
are the subject of litigation or legal proceedings which
would not allow the decommitments desired by the Court
to be carried out with certainty.
(c) As regards this point, please see the Commission’s reply
to point 3.55.
(d) The Commission does not adjust systematically the
amount of outstanding commitments as individual files
are closed because of the administrative costs that would
be involved.
(21) Joint Declaration of the Parliament, the Council and the
Commission of 20 November 2001 on an action plan to
eliminate abnormal outstanding commitments.
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9.35. A financial risk concerning a lease was neither
shown under the off-balance-sheet commitments nor
mentioned in the explanatory notes to the balance sheet
(see paragraph 7.11).
Legality and regularity of the underlying transactions
9.36. One of the features of the way the general bud-
get of the European Union is implemented is the coex-
istence of several types of management which are very
different in nature. They range from the centralised
management of the Commission authorising officers to
the large number of local beneficiaries who are very
scattered geographically and in terms of their function.
Between the two are several types of national or regional
decentralised management. In the areas of agricultural
policy and structural operations, which accounted for
80 % of the budget in 2001 (payments), the Commu-
nity measures are managed, on the ground, by national
and regional authorities and bodies. In the areas of
internal policies and external action (14 % (22)), the Com-
mission manages the funds directly, making use of the
services of numerous intermediaries in Europe and else-
where in the world. Lastly, the Community institutions
all manage their own administrative expenditure (6 %)
directly.
Own resources
9.37. For own resources, bearing in mind the restric-
tions on the audit scope (see paragraphs 1.23, 1.24 and
1.37), the Court, as for the previous financial years, con-
siders the transactions underlying the revenue that has
been collected to be legal and regular. Nevertheless,
where traditional resources are concerned, the Member
States should improve their national instructions in
respect of the control regime for customs warehouses.
As regards the VAT and GNP balances, the Commission
should present the actual data in the revenue and expen-
diture account. Furthermore, for the correction in favour
of the United Kingdom, the Commission should pro-
vide the essential information concerning the basic data
and the calculation operations (see paragraphs 1.19,
1.20 and 1.38 to 1.40).
9.35. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Negotiations with the owner are still under way. If the situ-
ation is not resolved by the end of 2002, the Commission will
show this financial risk in the annual accounts.
9.37. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In its replies to Chapter 1 of this report the Commission out-
lined its activities under the Customs 2002 project which
should help Member States to make the improvements recom-
mended by the Court. The Commission also indicated its
intention to make the changes recommended for VAT/GNP
in the next presentation of the accounts and to look for an
opportunity to include more data on the UK correction in the
accounting tables.
(22) Including preaccession aid (2 %).
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Common agricultural policy
9.38. The observations set out in Chapter 2 show that
errors exist in the declarations made by the farmers and
other aid recipients. The monitoring systems bring to
light and rectify many errors. However, they still allow
a significant level of error to persist in the legality and
regularity of the underlying transactions. A comparison
between the audit findings of the Court and those of
the IACS inspection reports supplied by the Member
States indicates that the latter tend to underestimate the
overall rate of error found (see paragraph 2.19). The fact
is that the consolidated summaries of the IACS inspec-
tion reports, although constituting an important infor-
mation tool, do not distinguish between the results of
checks based on risks and results arising from random
checks (see paragraph 2.44). Furthermore, verifying the
veracity of the facts declared by the aid recipients in
their payment claims is excluded from the tasks of the
certifying bodies (see paragraph 2.54).
Structural operations
9.39. The examination of the transactions showed
that, for the part of the management process taking
place outside the Commission, the latter did not yet
have sufficiently relevant and exact overall information
to assess the legality and regularity of the transactions
in the Member States.
9.38. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The current regulations require the certifying bodies to check
that the accounts are complete and correct and check the inter-
nal control system. This is an integral part of the reform of
the system of clearance of accounts which was, in fact, wel-
comed by the Court (see Special Report No 22/2000). Veri-
fication of the accuracy of the facts declared by the beneficia-
ries in their requests for payment is expressly excluded from
the tasks of these bodies.
The Member States are required as laid down in Article 17(3)
of Regulation (EEC) No 3887/92 and Article 52 of Regula-
tion (EC) No 2419/2001 to send to the Commission no later
than 31 March (for arable crops) and 31 August (for animal
premiums) each year a report covering the previous calendar
year. For this purpose the Commission services have produced
questionnaires in which, for the arable crops sector, Member
States are required to report separately the results of cases
selected on a risk and random basis. For animal premiums,
although Member States are not required to distinguish
between random and risk-based checks, this has indeed been
examined regularly, as appropriate in the context of audits. In
respect of both sectors, the aim is to ensure that the selection
of farmers for on-the-spot checks is representative as provided
by Regulation (EEC) No 3887/92.
Furthermore, Article 19(1) of Regulation (EC)
No 2419/2001, applicable as from 1 January 2002, pro-
vides that Member States ‘shall select randomly between 20 %
and 25 % of the minimum number of farmers to be subject
to on-the-spot checks’. This regulatory requirement will fur-
ther ensure the achieving of properly based audit conclusions.
9.39. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Given the decentralised management of the Structural Funds
by the Member States, the Commission seeks to ensure that
the systems in place generate sufficient information to provide
it with reasonable assurance as to the eligibility of the expen-
diture declared.
In the closure of 1994 to 1999 programmes the basis for the
assurance of the legality and regularity of the operations
co-financed will be the closure statements submitted, which
the Commission services will check carefully. For the 2000 to
2006 period, as well as closure declarations and the findings
of the audit work required under Regulation (EC)
No 438/2001, the Commission will have the assurance pro-
vided by expenditure declarations certified by the paying
authority.
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9.40. The examination of the transactions at Com-
mission level also showed that errors which do not have
any direct impact on the budget frequently occur. These
include delays concerning payments (23) and delays con-
cerning the approval of programmes.
9.41. Theobservations inChapter 3 indicate that errors
still persist in the expenditure declarations submitted by
the Member States in respect of interim payments relat-
ing to the period 1994 to 1999 (see paragraph 3.59 to
3.61), closures of the period 1994 to 1996 for Objec-
tive 2 (see paragraph 3.64) and, lastly, interim payments
relating to the new programming period 2000 to 2006
(see paragraph 3.76). For the latter, ineligible expendi-
ture similar to that of the previous periods was found,
despite the management and control arrangements
specified in the regulations having been strengthened
(see paragraph 9.91).
Internal policies
9.42. The examination of the transactions showed
that it was only in a limited number of cases that the
Commission had sufficient data to assess the legality
and regularity of the underlying transactions.
9.40. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Some of the delays concerning payments noted by the Court
were due to objective circumstances. However, in order to
observe the time limits set by the rules, steps have been taken
to improve the administrative structure in charge of payments
in 2002.
The delays in the approval of programmes were mainly due to
the tighter requirements imposed to ensure compliance with
the Community rules or to improve the quality of operations.
As a result decisions tended to take longer than the five months
stipulated in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC)
No 1260/1999. However, there the time limit is qualified by
the proviso that ‘all the requirements of this Regulation are
fulfilled’.
9.41. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission will ensure that the errors detected by the
Court, which the Commission acknowledges, are corrected as
swiftly as possible.
9.42. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
With regard to the evaluation of the legality and regularity of
the underlying transactions, the Commission makes a distinc-
tion between the controls at the Commission level and at the
final beneficiary level. At the Commission level, for example,
within the Research area, a comprehensive set of procedures,
both financial and operational are in place, supervision
arrangements such as checklists, reporting, etc. are used exten-
sively and control mechanisms are applied rigorously for the
assessment of the underlying transactions. Audits of benefi-
ciaries to assess the legality and regularity of the underlying
transactions have increased and will continue to do so.
(23) Despite the fact that the White Paper on reforming the
Commission provides for a specific action in this area.
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9.43. The observations in Chapter 4 relating to indi-
rect measures under the fifth framework programme
for research and technological development (42 % of
internal policies) highlight the persistence of errors in
the declarations of costs submitted by the contractors
(see paragraphs 4.41 and 4.44). The a posteriori checks
carried out by external auditors under the fourth frame-
work programme confirm this conclusion (see para-
graph 4.59). For the TEN-T programme (8 % of internal
policies) the transactions underlying the payments were
legal and regular, except as regards the studies (see para-
graphs 4.27 and 4.29).
9.44. Although the White Paper makes provision for
a specific action in this respect, at Commission level a
significant number of payments are made late.
External action
9.45. The examination of the transactions showed
that, for the part of the management process that takes
place outside the Commission, the latter did not always
have sufficient data to assess the legality and regularity
of the underlying transactions.
9.46. The observations in Chapter 5 on humanitarian
aid and food aid (25 % of the area, see paragraph 5.14)
highlight the existence of errors at local level and of
problems with the application of control procedures by
the implementing partners (intermediaries) who are
called upon to manage the aid (see paragraphs 5.50 to
5.52).
9.43. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission agrees that errors in the cost statements con-
tinue to be an important issue, even if the new audit strategy
implemented since 2000 does not yet make it possible to
measure the changes in the situation. The Commission will
continue to reinforce its efforts to reduce such errors, both in
the implementation of the fifth framework programme and
with a view to the sixth framework programme (see replies to
points 4.47 to 4.50).
With regard to the TEN-T studies, the problems identified by
the Court concern a difference in interpretation of the defini-
tion of eligible costs. The Commission is committed to improv-
ing the clarity of the definitions in order to avoid this type of
disagreement in future (see point 4.29).
9.44. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission agrees that the payment time objectives are
not always reached yet. However, in order to improve the situ-
ation the Commission has put in place an initiative, which
includes detailed monitoring and reporting of payment times.
A major improvement in terms of reducing the time to pay-
ment should emanate from the audit certificates accompany-
ing the cost statements, currently in a pilot phase but expected
to be widely used in the sixth framework programme.
9.45. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission accepts that certain issues still need atten-
tion and is already taking the necessary measures. See also
replies to points 5.50 to 5.52.
9.46. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission has already taken the necessary measures to
tighten procedural and accounting checks on the various
projects, in particular with NGOs. This policy is now applied
systematically for all new contracts awarded or calls for pro-
posals.
In respect of humanitarian aid, the Commission takes note of
the Court’s conclusion and will review the cases cited. It con-
siders that the measures undertaken in the context of the
reform of financial management will address the problems
identified (see also replies to points 5.50 to 5.52).
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Administrative expenditure
9.47. As regards administrative expenditure, in addi-
tion to an audit based, inter alia, on an overall survey of
the entire general budget, a specific examination was
made of the salaries paid by the Commission and the
European Parliament, which account for about 38 % of
payments in this area. The evaluation of the internal
control system and the results of the substantive tests
did not reveal any difficulties concerning the legality
and regularity of the transactions underlying the pay-
ments (see Chapter 7).
Reform of the Commission’s internal control system
9.48. In January 2000, the European Parliament (24)
invited the Commission to undertake a reform of its
management. Accordingly, on 5 April 2000, the Com-
mission presented its White Paper ‘Reforming the Com-
mission’ (25), one of the main strategies of which is a
reorganisation of the internal audit, management and
financial control. This was the aspect on which the
Court focused its enquiries in the context of the SOA
for the financial year 2001. As regards the financial
year 2001, however, the reform could not yet have any
impact on the Court’s audit approach because its imple-
mentation was too recent (see paragraph 9.70).
Main aspects of the reform
9.49. Chapter V of the White Paper entitled ‘Audit,
financial management and control’ sets out the new
arrangements for internal control. In particular, it pro-
vides for:
(a) the creation of a Central Financial Service (CFS)
under the Budget Directorate-General;
(b) the setting-up of an Internal Audit Service (IAS)
under the responsibility of the Vice-President for
Reform and backed up by an Audit Progress Board
(APB);
(c) the setting-up of internal audit structures (audit
capabilities) in each Directorate-General;
(d) the Financial Controller’s ex ante approval to be
retained provisionally, pending a revision of the
Financial Regulation.
(24) Resolution of 19 January 2000.
(25) COM(2000) 200 final of 5.4.2000.
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9.50. The reform undertaken by the Commission is a
thorough one and is based on the COSO (26) objectives.
It should bear fruit in the years to come. The keystone
of this reform is the principle of the responsibility of
the Commission Directors-General. The latter must
henceforth put in place effective internal control sys-
tems which meet minimum standards defined by the
CFS.
9.51. Under action 82 of the White Paper, each
Director-General is required to publish an annual activ-
ity report (AAR) and sign a declaration confirming,
amongst other things, that the internal control proce-
dures applied by his/her departments give him/her
adequate assurance as to the legality and regularity of
the underlying operations.
Matters concerning some of the procedures of the reform
9.52. At this stage, three aspects could usefully be
altered to some extent in order to make the whole pro-
cess more coherent in practical terms.
Timetable for the submission of declarations and reports
9.53. The declarations of the Directors-General and
the Commission’s summary report are spontaneous
expressions of opinion (27) which the external auditor
(the Court) cannot disregard in the context of its State-
ment of Assurance. However, the dates set by the Com-
mission for submitting these declarations are incompat-
ible with the timetable for the Annual Report laid down
by the Financial Regulation. The reports of theDirectors-
General are the basis for the synthesis report which the
Commission sends to the European Parliament, the
Council and the Court (see paragraphs 9.94 to 9.100)
at the end of July, despite the fact that, according to
Article 88(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Court is
required to send the observations likely to be included
in its Annual Report to the Commission by 15 July at
the latest (28).
9.53-9.54. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission acknowledges that in the first year of annual
reports and declarations it was impossible to keep to the time-
table initially laid down in the Charter for authorising offic-
ers by delegation (communication of 27 June 2001). Under
action 10 of the synthesis report (2) the Commission intends
to examine the methodology and guidelines for the coming
financial year and will, on that occasion, take the first step
towards establishing the timetable.
(2) Action 10: The Secretariat-General, in collaboration with the
Budget DG, the Personnel and administration DG and the
Internal audit service, will review and enhance before end of
2002 the methodology and guidance for producing the Annual
Reports for 2002, paying particular attention to the question
of materiality, the definition of the scope of potential reserva-
tions to be included in the accompanying declarations, and the
handling of cross delegations.
(26) Coso is a voluntary private-sector organisation dedicated
to improving the quality of financial reporting through
business ethics, effective internal controls and corporate
governance.
(27) Management representations.
(28) Article 88a of the Financial Regulation, in conjunction
with Article 88 thereof, stipulates that the Court must
present the SOA to the European Parliament and the
Council at the same time as the Annual Report (by
30 November at the latest). For practical reasons, since
1994 the SOA has formed an integral part of the Annual
Report.
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9.54. This timetable therefore does not enable the
Court to make a detailed examination under proper
conditions of the declarations and reports submitted
both by the authorising officers and by the Commis-
sion itself. The deadline set by the Charter for authoris-
ing officers by delegation for the submission of annual
reports (15 March) would be much more suitable. The
alterations to the timetable provided for by the new
Financial Regulation make it even more necessary for
the Commission to review the deadlines for the submis-
sion of the declarations and annual reports by its depart-
ments.
The Audit Progress Board
9.55. The APB examines the reports of the IAS and
must monitor the implementation of its recommenda-
tions. It is the guarantor of the IAS’ independence and
is made up of five members, four of whom are Mem-
bers of the Commission. The external member was
appointed by the Commission on a proposal from the
other four members of the APB.
9.56. TheAPB is chaired by the Commissioner respon-
sible for the budget, which runs contrary to the usual
rules forbidding the chairman of an audit board from
playing a role, in the organisation, that is likely to give
rise to a confusion of interests.
Taking into account of the systems of the Member States and
the third countries
9.57. The European Union’s budget is implemented
largely on a decentralised basis, depending on the case
(see paragraph 9.36).
9.56. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The responsibilities of the Audit Progress Committee are not
the same as those of an ‘audit committee’ in the public or pri-
vate sector. In the start-up phase the Committee’s primary
focus has been on the work of the Internal audit service, par-
ticularly to ensure that the service’s reports receive adequate
follow-up by the auditees. For instance, the Committee does
not have a role in examining the financial statements of the
Commission, a role which a ‘traditional’ audit committee in
the private sector would have.
The chairmanship and the vice-chairmanship of the Commit-
tee was decided explicitly by the Commission to be attributed
to the Commissioner for the Budget and the Commissioner for
Reform, as these two, by virtue of their portfolios, have the
strongest interests in improving financial management per-
formance. In cases where an audit covers a Directorate-General
under the direct responsibility of a member of the Committee,
the member does not chair the point.
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9.58. Splitting up the implementation of the budget
makes the control of the legality and regularity of the
underlying transactions a complicatedmatter. The Com-
mission, which, under Article 274 of the EC Treaty, is
responsible for implementing the budget, is in fact
dependent on the good cooperation of the third parties
on whom it calls.
9.59. Even though the White Paper points out that,
given ‘the size and complexity of its financial opera-
tions, the Commission needs an assurance that financial
risks are being properly managed’, in practice the Com-
mission’s reform fails to take proper account of the
complexity of the decentralised management. Whereas
the White Paper specifies that the Commission ‘needs
an overall strategy that permits ongoing monitoring of
the operation of its internal control systems and of con-
trols on expenditure funded from the EU budget, rev-
enue or own resources’ (29), the measures planned for
this purpose mainly cover aspects of the Commission’s
internal management.
9.60. For the decentralised forms of management, the
Charter for authorising officers by delegation (30)
requires the activity reports to include a description of
the measures taken to:
(a) determine the extent to which the Member States
have set up management and control systems giv-
ing reasonable assurance as to the legality and regu-
larity of the underlying transactions;
(b) verify the validity of the amounts declared;
(c) make financial corrections in cases where the Mem-
ber States’ control procedures have proved to be
defective.
9.59-9.60. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission considers that the current provisions con-
cerning responsibility for the decentralised management of
Community funds are unsatisfactory. In its synthesis report,
the Commission therefore put forward two specific actions in
this area. Under action 4 (3), the aim is to clarify the respec-
tive responsibilities and competence of the Commission and
the Council as regards management, control and supervision
of the Structural Funds. Action 12 (4) of the synthesis report
is intended to spell out more precisely the scope of authorising
officers’ responsibilities in these areas so that Directors-
General can take appropriate action in the event of uncertain-
ties or where problems are discovered.
(3) Action 4: The Commission will seek to clarify with the Council
its share of responsibility in meeting the objectives established
for the shared management of the Structural Funds. The Com-
mission will also make proposals in order to align its monitor-
ing and control powers to its responsibilities.
(4) Action 12: The Budget DG, in collaboration with the Person-
nel and administration DG and the departments concerned, will
analyse this problem by March 2003. It will make a proposal
to the Commission on the scope of the responsibilities of the
Authorising Officer in each domain where shared management
applies. This should enable Directors-General to take the appro-
priate measures in case of uncertainties or identified problems.
(29) COM(2000) 200 final, 5.4.2000, p. 64.
(30) SEC (2000)2203/5 of 13.12.2000. See also the Charter of
tasks and responsibilities of authorising officers by sub-
delegation.
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9.61. Nevertheless, any reservations expressed by the
authorising officers in their declarations are supposed
to relate to deficiencies found within each Directorate-
General. Only in exceptional circumstances may exter-
nal factors be mentioned. It has been stressed, however,
that the Director-General is still responsible for the
internal measures to be taken to minimise the impact of
external constraints (31).
9.62. Ambiguities concerning the question ofwhether
particular aspects of the decentralised management are
taken into account are also evident in the internal con-
trol standards. For example, Standard No 17 requires
each Directorate-General to implement certain provi-
sions regarding supervision, in particular ex post control
of a sample of transactions. It makes no reference to the
Member States’ control systems. Similarly, it does not
deal with the question of external audits carried out by
the Commission, in particular in the external action
area.
State of progress of the reform
Original timetable
9.63. Originally, the actions set out in Chapter V of the
White Paper were supposed to be implemented by July
2001 (32), and betweenApril 2001 andDecember 2002
the IAS was to carry out a series of checks focusing on
the management and control systems in all the DGs.
Actions carried out within the time limits
9.64. During the first stage of the reform, the Com-
mission obtained (in May 2000) an amendment to the
Financial Regulation whereby internal audit and finan-
cial control were separated. Furthermore, it embarked
on a general recasting of the Financial Regulation. The
latter is due to come into force at the beginning of 2003.
9.61-9.62. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Standard 17 lays down procedures for supervision of internal
control in the Directorate-General and also deals with adapt-
ing control systems in the Member States to the requirements
of Community legislation. Along the same lines, the Charter
indicates that the authorising officer must alsomonitor actions
managed outside his/her structure. Some Directors-General
expressed specific reservations concerning the management of
funds by third parties. Thus it is not a question of an ambigu-
ous declaration.
(31) This ambiguous statement was made by the Methodology
Group in the ‘Guidelines on the declaration of the autho-
rising officer by delegation and its reservations in the
context of the annual activity report’.
(32) Action 91 providing for the training of staff not respon-
sible for financial management and control is due to be
carried out during the period September 2001 to
July 2002.
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Several documents essential to a proper understanding
of the role of the officers involved (33) were, moreover,
adopted in the last quarter of 2000. Lastly, the Commis-
sion’s Directorates-General undertook a self-assessment
of their own implementation of the internal control
standards. The results of this were used to reorganise
the financial circuits and to improve the management,
control and audit capabilities.
Delays in implementation
Se t t ing-up of new depar tments
9.65. Difficulties in recruiting skilled staff and the
vagaries of the administrative arrangements resulted in
some of the new departments not yet being fully opera-
tional by the end of 2001. This was the case for the CFS,
the IAS and the internal audit structures (34) of the vari-
ous Directorates-General.
In t e r na l cont ro l s tandards
9.66. The deadlines for introducing certain internal
control standards, which were originally fixed for the
end of 2001, were extended to dates ranging, on the
whole, between March and December 2002 (35). The
postponement of the introduction of the internal audit
capabilities until the end of 2002 is likely to restrict the
scope of theDirectors-General’s declarations in the com-
ing financial years.
9.65. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Whilst the overall staffing of the Internal audit service (IAS)
grew steadily during 2001, it had not reached its target level
at the end of 2001, mainly because of a lack of candidates for
auditor posts having an appropriate professional profile. The
same could be observed for the internal audit capabilities
(IACs), as in 2001 most of the departments were still put-
ting in place their internal control systems because of lack of
sufficient resources. Two internal audit open competitions had
been launched by the Commission at A 4/A 5 and A 6/A 7
level to assist with recruitment to both the IAS and the IACs.
9.66. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The introduction of internal control standards has been under
way since 2000. For authorising departments the deadline as
regards priority standards for financial management was
30 June 2001.
The impact of the delay in setting up the internal audit struc-
tures must be viewed in proportion. The latter are only one of
many sources of information for the Director-General; on the
other hand, this year a good many of them were able to offer
the benefit of their advice and experience in the process of
drafting the annual activity reports.
(33) The IAS Charter (action 68); the APB Charter (Action 71);
Communication on the conditions for creating an audit
capability in each DG of the Commission (Action 81);
Charter for authorising officers by delegation and Charter
for authorising officers by sub-delegation (Action 63);
Guidance Note on the segregation of duties and financial
circuits (Action 79). The Charter for accounting officers
and for assistant accounting officers (Action 63) was not
adopted until November 2001.
(34) Audit capabilities.
(35) For example: Standard No 3: ‘Staff competence’; Standard
No 4: ‘Staff performance’; Standard No 5: ‘Sensitive func-
tions’; Standard No 11: ‘Risk analysis and management’;
Standard No 22: ‘Internal audit capability’.
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Recove r i e s
9.67. The deadline for Action 96 of the White Paper
onmore effectivemanagement of the recovery of unduly
paid funds (see paragraph 9.26) was set for July 2000.
In December 2000 the Commission adopted a commu-
nication (36) laying down the principles for a reform of
its procedures and an action plan for this purpose con-
sisting of operational decentralisation and greater sup-
port for its Legal Service. In the wake of administrative
difficulties, thedeadlinewasdeferreduntil 30 June 2002.
Control functions
9.68. Action 78 of the White Paper emphasises that
the Directorates-General’s description of their manage-
ment and financial control systems plus the reports
from the audit capabilities and from the IAS provide the
CFS with the information it needs to oversee the imple-
mentation of the Commission’s minimum internal con-
trol standards. It is up to the CFS to update these stan-
dards when necessary.
9.67. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
With a view to more effective management in recovering funds
paid unduly in the area of expenditure directly managed, the
Commission communication of December 2000 redefined the
roles of the various actors and spelt out improvements in
terms of computer aids and procedures.
The operational decentralisation of the debit note to authoris-
ing departments will apply from 1 January 2003, when the
new Financial Regulation, the implementing rules, and the
internal procedure provisions concerning recovery come into
force.
In 2002 further improvements were put in place:
— on the computer side, the first stage in improving moni-
toring was completed,
— more staff were assigned to recovery; coordination of dos-
siers at the recovery stage has also been centralised,
— OLAF set up a new unit to monitor the financial aspect
of irregularities.
A new Commission communication on improving the recov-
ery of debts arising from direct and indirect management of
Community expenditure is due to be approved by the Com-
mission before the end of 2002.
(36) SEC(2000) 2204/3 of 12.12.2000.
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9.69. Because of the delays affecting some aspects of
the reform, audit reports have become rare. By the end
of 2001, neither the IAS nor the internal audit capabili-
ties had performed in-depth audits on the introduction
of the internal control standards. By the end of 2001,
the CFS, which does not carry out any checks itself, had
not yet been able to fully discharge its duties of super-
vising the application of the minimum internal control
standards.
9.70. In general, there is nothing exceptional about
the delays that have been noted. In most cases, they
stem from an unrealistic timetable and a grave under-
estimation of difficulties which are nevertheless wholly
foreseeable, since they involve administrative and tech-
nical constraints.
The Commission’s summary report (24 July 2002)
Annual activity reports and declarations of the Directors-
General
9.71. The declarations of the Directors-General con-
stitute a step forward that is likely to have an impact on
the Court’s audit approach. It is thus important for the
scope of these declarations to be free from any ambi-
guities, especially as regards the handling of material
failings in the Member States, third countries and at
final beneficiary level (see paragraphs 9.57 to 9.62 and
9.86), and for the procedures leading up to them to be
sufficiently transparent to allow the external auditor to
examine their validity. This is not yet the case. The sub-
mission of activity reports and declarations by the
Directors-General in respect of the financial year 2001
9.69. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Control standards are gradually being implemented. The Cen-
tral financial service (CFS) assists Commission departments
and supervises their implementation. In particular this has
entailed a revision of the standards adopted by the Commis-
sion at the end of 2001.
The internal control standards, the annual activity reports and
the declarations by departments were the necessary baseline
for the Internal audit service (IAS) to start in-depth audits.
Pending their availability, the IAS looked first at the reform
process itself and secondly at some specific areas of risks or
subjects for which there was a management request for review.
The audit and review carried out enabled the service to gain
in experience, to make a preliminary survey of the institution
and its control environment and to identify the major systemic
issues and risks affecting it.
9.70. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The initial objectives were indeed very ambitious, especially in
view of the shortage of specialist staff for audit and control.
The lack of availability of these specialised profiles in due
time, has been recognised by the Commission in its synthesis
report (see action 14 (5)).
9.71. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In its synthesis report the Commission put forward a series of
actions to improve the quality of the annual activity reports,
particularly on aspects relating to the shared management of
Community funds and on ways of providing support for draft-
ing the reports.
(5) Action 14: The Personnel and administration DG will review
as soon as possible in 2002 profiles for new recruitments needed
by services in financial management and related issues, compare
these with the current competitions programme in this area and
launch additional open competitions as appropriate. In this
respect, the Personnel and administration DG will draw up a
plan to be executed by the new European Personnel Selection
Office, EPSO, as from early 2003. As an interim measure, the
recruitment of temporary agents on vacant permanent posts will
be extended up to the point at which sufficiently long reserve
lists for the related competitions will be exploitable.
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represents an experiment which has several aspects that
could be improved. It is only as of 2002 that these
reports and declarations could, if need be, form one of
the cornerstones of the Court’s Statement of Assurance.
Draf t ing proce s s
Insuf f ic ient back-up
9.72. For the financial year2001, theDirectors-General
had to submit their activity reports and declarations
without having had the benefit of being able to rely on
fully operational reformed structures. The procedures
to be followed, the standards to be complied with and
the terminology to be used had only just been
adopted (37) and it was not always possible for the cen-
tral departments to back up the work of the 36
Directorates-General.
9.73. Because of this late preparation, the guidelines
were not always interpreted in a harmonised manner.
Moreover, it was not possible to organise an initial
analysis of the drafts which had been drawn up in order
to identify errors, inconsistencies and contradictions
between the declarations of the various Directorates-
General and to make the requisite amendments. The
period of respite offered by the decision to defer full
presentation of the first reports and declarations for a
year could have been put to better use to ensure the
back-up and give the necessary support to the Commis-
sion’s authorising officers by delegation.
The reports and declarations do not, however, constitute a
statement of assurance in the sense of the Court’s statement
and do not follow the same methodology. They were designed
to ensure the accountability of Directors-General as well as the
Commission as regards the administrative management of its
departments.
9.72. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission has made a substantial effort in reforming
its management systems. This is an initial exercise covering
all Commission departments and forms part of the introduc-
tion of the new activity-based management system. Neverthe-
less the Commission believes that the corrective measures initi-
ated by its synthesis report may already help substantially to
improve the shortcomings noted.
The methodology review (see action 10) and, above all, the
experience of this exercise should make it possible to harmo-
nise procedures. Nevertheless the declarations will never be
entirely harmonised as account has to be taken of the specific
nature of different Commission departments.
9.73. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission took advantage of the one-year postpone-
ment of ‘full’ presentation of the reports by drawing up for
each Directorate-General a report on the implementation of
internal control standards, especially financial management,
as at 30 June 2001.
(37) On 27 June 2001 the Commission adopted a communi-
cation on the annual reports and declarations of the
Directors-General which lays down that the annual activ-
ity reports for 2001 are to be submitted by 1 May 2002
at the latest. On 9 January 2002, a circular on the annual
activity reports for 2001 defined the systems for gather-
ing the necessary data. It was not until 9 April 2002, i.e.
three weeks before the deadline, that guidelines were
adopted for helping the Directorates-General to prepare
their declarations, if need be together with reservations,
and provisionally laying down the concepts, terminology
and scope of the declaration and the reservations.
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Lack of prec is ion in the rules
9.74. According to the guidelines, the Directors-
General, in their declarations, express their reasonable
assurance that there are neither systemic weaknesses in
the internal control systems nor particular problems
which could have a material effect on the legality and
regularity of the transactions of the financial year.
9.75. Materiality is defined in the guidelines as any
condition that has caused or is likely to cause errors,
inefficiencies, irregularities or fraud or other adversities
of such importance as to force senior managers to
undertake immediate corrective action to mitigate the
associated risk and possible consequent damages to the
organisation. In such cases, the declaration should
include reservations.
9.76. Several examples attached to the guidelines were
intended to clarify the definitions. However, without
sufficient experience, only a rigorous analysis of the
phenomena to be covered and an in-depth discussion of
their classification could have guaranteed consistent
treatment in all the activity reports and declarations.
Because the practical guidelines were issued late, it was
not possible to organise harmonisation measures of this
kind.
Content o f the dec la ra t ions and annual ac t i v i t y repor t s
Reser vat ions undermining the posi t ive assurance
9.77. For 2001, the 36 Directors-General concerned
all confirm that they have reasonable assurance that the
control procedures put in place give the necessary guar-
antees as to the legality and regularity of the underlying
transactions. However, 22 of these declarations contain
reservations which highlight difficulties that are serious
enough for the Commission itself to want to find a rem-
edy by undertaking an action plan (see paragraph 9.96).
The very broad spectrum of measures envisaged under-
mines the assurance given by the Directors-General’s
declarations.
9.78. Seventeen Directors-General confirm that they
have reasonable assurance that the control procedures
put in place give the necessary guarantees as to the
legality and regularity of the underlying transactions
9.75 and 9.76. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission identified several problems in its synthesis
report, in particular as regards the methodological aspects and
the guidelines for drafting annual activity reports and declara-
tions. To remedy them, the Commission launched specific
measures (see action 10) to clarify the definition and scope of
reservations (concept of materiality).
9.77 to 9.79. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In the Commission’s view, the declarations made by the vari-
ous Directors-General, though qualified by some reservations,
indicate a reasonable degree of assurance on their part.
In the context of this exercise, issuing a reservation shows that
the problem has been identified and that the Directorate-
General undertakes to remedy it through action plans. In
many cases they reflect concerns or uncertainties still to be
verified regarding certain transactions or systems; this does
not mean that all the underlying operations are necessarily
covered by the reservations expressed.
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but also declare that they do not have the necessary
information concerning the functioning of these sys-
tems. Indeed, in some cases, they explain that the sys-
tems in place have major shortcomings.
9.79. The following examples serve to illustrate this
problem:
(a) for the Social Fund, the Employment DG considers
that it does not have reasonable assurance of the
sound functioning of the Member States’ systems
for the programming period 2000 to 2006 with
regard to the legality and regularity of the underly-
ing transactions;
(b) the Agriculture, Information society and Energy and
transport DGs qualify their declarations with several
notable reservations, but nevertheless do not specify
the share of expenditure to which these reservations
relate.
Inadequate or obscure reser vat ions
9.80. Six of the annual activity reports and declara-
tions do not distinguish in any way between reserva-
tions and observations (38), and the observations con-
tained in someof the declarations are in fact reservations.
For example, for the Regional policy DG it is stated that
the audits under way concerning the programming
period 2000 to 2006 for the ERDF, the Cohesion Fund
and ISPA offer only a limited and uncertain assurance,
without this actually constituting a reservation. Further-
more, it is either impossible or else very difficult to
assess the significance of the reservations or observa-
tions because of the lack of information on the true or
estimated impact of the problems cited (see para-
graph 9.79b)).
(a) The planned number of preventive audits for 2001 of
DG EMPL concerning a first evaluation of the descrip-
tions of management and control systems (Article 5 of
Regulation (EC)No 438/2001) had to be reducedmainly
because of missing descriptions or late transmission of
these descriptions.
The declaration by the authorising officer by delegation
concerning the 2001 annual activity report states that
this situation is also due to operational and recruitment
problems in the audit and control service in DG EMPL.
As the situation has improved, all the Member States will
have undergone at least one preventive audit by DG
EMPL in 2002.
(b) The Court’s finding is primarily due to the fact that this
was the first year that every Director-General had to pro-
duce a declaration. In its synthesis report, the Commis-
sion acknowledges that in view of the results of this ini-
tial exercise, a more harmonised approach is needed,
especially as regards the scope of reservations. Action 10
will make it possible to pursue this approach.
9.80. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
DG REGIO accepts that the observation referred to by the
Court is in the nature of a reservation, as is clear from the
explanations in the body of the activity report. The gravity of
the ‘reservation’ is qualified by the confidence that the lack of
reasonable assurance is a temporary situation. The amount of
funding affected is roughly quantified in the explanations
underlying the Director-General’s declaration, in terms of the
numbers of programmes desk-checked and audited on the spot
in the case of ERDF and of audits carried out for the Cohe-
sion Fund and ISPA, the assumption being that for pro-
grammes or countries not covered by such checks the assur-
ance provided must be partial.
(38) Whereas a reservation qualifies the assurance given for a
particular aspect of the management, observations focus
on a specific aspect of the management that one wishes
to highlight.
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9.81. Furthermore, the annual activity reports often
contain information concerning risks which are outside
the scope of the checks and for which no reservation
has been issued in the declaration. ECHO’s annual activ-
ity report, for example, points out areas in need of
improvement (tendering procedures, quality of the
accounting and checks carried out by the partnerNGOs).
These various aspects are not included in the reserva-
tions.
Inconsis tencies
9.82. Some matters which concern most of the
Directorates-General are not treated consistently. For
example, the shortage of skilled staff, the lack of assur-
ance given by the audit structures (audit capabilities)
and the non-compliance with internal control standards
have in some cases been cited as a reservation and in
other cases merely mentioned in an observation or a
comment in the activity report without its being appar-
ent how the difficulties pointed out differ in terms of
their importance.
9.83. As regards the research and technological devel-
opment (RTD) framework programmes, the Energy and
transport DG has issued a reservation as to whether the
present checks on expenditure declarations are able to
satisfactorily reduce the risks of overpayment, empha-
sising that no joint solution to this question has been
found by the various Directorates-General concerned.
This question is also taken up in a reservation issued by
the Information society and Enterprise DGs. By con-
trast, the Research DG states in its annual activity report
that, in respect of the fourth framework programme,
the results of its audits confirm that the system is rea-
sonably reliable. Nevertheless, of the 232 audits per-
formed, 155 revealed over-declarations of costs by con-
tractors (see Table 4.8).
9.81. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
According to the guidelines on the declaration of the authoris-
ing officer by delegation and the reservations in the annual
report, reservations relate to shortcomings concerning internal
controls within the DG/service which limit the authorising
Officer by delegation in signing a declaration with reasonable
assurance. When ECHO mentions that many of the humani-
tarian organisations (NGOs) could improve the quality of
financial accounting and controls and also that NGO part-
ners sometimes have difficulties in respecting EC procurement
rules as they are not adapted to the circumstances of humani-
tarian aid, it is referring to controls operated by the interme-
diaries responsible for implementing the operations and not
to the internal controls within the DG.
9.82. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission considers that the methodology review (see
action 10) and, above all, the experience gained from the
exercise should make it possible to harmonise procedures. On
the other hand, the declarations will never be entirely harmo-
nised, as account has to be taken of the specific nature of dif-
ferent Commission departments.
9.83. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In the annual activity reports by DGs RTD, INFSO, TREN
and ENTR, similar difficulties were found regarding the prob-
lem of application of contractual provisions by beneficiaries
when presenting their cost statements. To deal with this, mea-
sures have been taken to strengthen control mechanisms by
applying an audit strategy with the aim of auditing around
10 % of contractors under a framework programme cadre and
exploring the avenue of cost certification. To achieve further
improvements a specific action to address these problems has
been adopted by the Commission in the synthesis report of the
annual activity reports.
The Commission undertakes to harmonise the approach even
further as regards the annual reports and the declarations by
Directors-General, where the situations are comparable. As
for the discrepancies noted by the Court in the field of research,
these, too, are due to circumstances that are not entirely com-
parable.
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9.84. The Budget DG for its part has issued reserva-
tions on the financial information systems, on the
accounts and financial statements and on the debt-
recovery process which are supposed to cover the prob-
lems encountered in the other Directorates-General. In
so doing, the Budget DG wanted to take on responsibil-
ity for the accounting data attached to the activity
reports of the Directorates-General.
9.85. Most of the activity reports and declarations
thus make no mention of the difficulties affecting the
accounting data, especially as regards the recording of
the Communities’ assets and liabilities. This situation
may give rise to misunderstandings because readers of
the various activity reports and declarations are not sys-
tematically informed about the Budget DG’s general res-
ervation. The situation is further complicated by the
fact that some of the activity reports and declarations
do contain reservations, observations or comments con-
cerning the problems in question.
Inadequate handl ing of external d i f f icul t ies
9.86. In application of the principles described in
paragraphs 9.57 to 9.62, most of the declarations relate
only to areas which come under the direct responsibil-
ity of the Commission, without this being explicitly
mentioned in the declaration itself. For example, there
is an ambiguity due to the fact that the declaration relat-
ing to the Agriculture DG seems to cover all the budget,
whereas in his declaration the Director-General refers to
his report in which he specifies that he is focusing on
the areas that belong more directly under his control
(see paragraph 9.79(b)).
Thus DG RTD entered no reservation regarding the difficul-
ties referred to, making the point that it carries out its activi-
ties in a representative control and audit environment provid-
ing a reliable picture of the situation.
9.84 and 9.85. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Concerning the three reservations made by the Budget DG,
only the one concerning the consistency of accounting data
had any implications for the declarations by other Directors-
General; the Directors-General themselves took the view, in
the process of drawing up their declarations, that it was more
appropriate to reflect this problem via a general reservation
from the Budget DG, in view of its responsibilities in this
area.
— The reservation on the financial statements is indeed of
major interest for the Commission as a whole but does
not fall within the competence of Directorates-General.
There is therefore no reason to mention it in any declara-
tion other than that of the Director-General for Budgets.
— The reservation on the recovery process concerns the stages
of the process that occur internally within DG Budget. It
does not concern the other Directorates-General.
9.86. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The declaration by the Director-General of DG AGRI gives an
assurance as regards the correct functioning of his department
and in particular on the reliability of his internal control sys-
tem. This includes the controls carried out by the Directorate
for Audit of agricultural expenditure on expenditure managed
by the Member States and candidate countries, known as
‘indirect expenditure’. The declaration therefore does indeed
cover the entire budget.
It covers the areas of monitoring and control that are the
responsibility of the Director-General. In other words, the dec-
laration does not cover the control and management respon-
sibilities assigned by existing legislation to the Member States
as regards indirect expenditure.
DG AGRI considers there is no ambiguity.
The allocation of responsibilities for shared management
between the Director-General and the beneficiary States is
described in the specific legislation and reproduced in the char-
ter for authorising officers by delegation.
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9.87. Even though the EuropeAid CooperationOffice’s
annual activity report stresses that the external audit
function must be swiftly and substantially strengthened
in order to obtain better control of operations both at
the head office and in the delegations, the declaration
does not contain any reservation on this point.
Lack of informat ion on the act ion plans
9.88. The practical guidelines require that the declara-
tions contain a brief description of the nature of the res-
ervations and a summary of the proposed solutions.
More detailed information on the reservations (prob-
lems, impact and action plan) must be presented in
Chapter 4 of the annual activity report. For 2001, only
a minority of the declarations contain an action plan
describing remedies being considered for each of the
problems identified.
9.89. The exerciseof submitting annual activity reports
and declarations will help to improve the internal con-
trol systems in so far as the Commission departments
will implement the various action plans that have been
announced (see paragraphs 9.96 and 9.97).
Cons i s t ency wi th the Cour t ’ s aud i t f ind ings
9.90. The standard formula used in the declaration
explains that reasonable assurance is based, amongst
other things, on lessons learnt from the Court of Audi-
tors’ reports on financial years prior to that of the dec-
laration in question. It is only in a minority of cases that
the Court’s main findings concerning specific areas have
been the subject of a reservation.
9.91. In its Special Report No 10/2001 (39) on the
implementation of Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 (40) by
the Commission and the Member States, the Court con-
cluded, for example, that, unless prompt action was
taken to ensure correct application of the Regulation by
Member States, the Commission would not have suf-
ficent, reliable information to form the basis uponwhich
to close the various forms of assistance. These observa-
tions were repeated in the Court’s Annual Report con-
cerning the financial year 2000 (41). Despite these obser-
vations, the Directorates-General responsible for the
management of the Structural Funds have not issued
any reservations covering this matter.
9.87. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
An action programme to boost external audit activities and
procedures has been adopted by AIDCO.
9.88. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In its synthesis report the Commission put forward a series of
actions with a clear timetable to cover the reservations com-
mon to several DGs or weaknesses found when drawing up
the synthesis report.
The last of these (action 18 (6)) calls on Commission depart-
ments, by September 2002, to include action plans in the
annual management plans for 2002, with explicit provision
for a monitoring procedure.
9.91. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
A substantial audit activity was undertaken in 2001 relating
to the application of Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 by the
Member States in order to ensure that there would be an
adequate basis for closure of interventions for the period 1994
to 1999.
(6) Action 18: AAR action plans will, by September 2002, be
included in the annual management plans for 2002. These
action plans will be translated into the annual management
plans for 2003 as appropriate. Progress will be monitored by
the Commissioner responsible and will be reviewed in the next
annual report exercises.
(39) OJ C 314, 8.11.2001.
(40) OJ L 290, 23.10.1997, p. 1.
(41) Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000,
paragraphs 3.44 to 3.56.
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The conclusions of the Internal audit service
9.92. At the end of July 2002, the IAS submitted an
evaluation of the annual activity reports and the decla-
rations made by the Commission’s authorising officers
by delegation. This evaluation relates not to the sub-
stance of the declarations but to the application, by the
departments, of the methods adopted by the Commis-
sion. It would thus be improper to regard its conclu-
sions, which in some instances contain criticisms, as
being an audit opinion on the overall legality and regu-
larity of the Commission’s transactions. Many of the
recommendations made in this report (which strives to
be transparent) have been incorporated into the synthe-
sis of the declarations which the Commission has sent
to the European Parliament and the Council (42).
9.93. Three observations from the report merit high-
lighting:
(a) the fact that it would be of benefit to the Commis-
sion to adopt a ‘cascade’ procedure for drawing up
the declarations, whereby each person responsible
would supply the hierarchical step immediately
above with a declaration for the area of activity that
concerned him;
(b) the very diverse way in which the declarations are
presented and above all the great variety in the range
of both the observations and the reservations. This
situation makes it difficult for the conclusions
expressed by the authorising officers by delegation
to be consolidated in any logical manner;
(c) the ambiguities of the declarations for sectors where
management is sharedwith theMember States point
to reluctance on the part of the authorising officers
by delegation to commit themselves regarding trans-
actions over which they do not consider they have
control.
9.93. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
(a) The methodology adopted by the Commission for draw-
ing up the declarations rests on the principle of centralis-
ing information at the top of the hierarchy. The Director-
General makes his/her personal assessment on the basis
of the information directly available to him/her, but also,
of course, on the basis of the information supplied by
his/her department. However, in this first exercise the
cascade process was not retained.
(b) The Commission realises that there was some lack of uni-
formity, due mainly to the innovative and recent nature
of the exercise. To deal with this the synthesis report
includes action No 10, which aims to improve ‘the meth-
odology and guidance for producing the annual reports
for 2002, paying particular attention to the question of
materiality, to the definition of the scope of potential res-
ervations to be included in the accompanying declara-
tions’.
As regards consolidation of the conclusions, the Commis-
sion would like to emphasise that this is precisely the pur-
pose of its synthesis report, showing up the Commission’s
main achievements and shortcomings, analysing the cur-
rent state of progress on reform and defining 18 actions
to be implemented.
(c) The charter for authorising officers by delegation clearly
states that the authorising officer must also monitor
action managed outside his/her structure. Some declara-
tions contained clear reservations concerning the man-
agement of funds by third parties. Actions 4 and 12 of
the synthesis report provide for more far-reaching mea-
sures in this respect.
(42) Synthesis of the annual activity reports and declarations
of theDirectors-General andHeads of Service, COM(2002)
426 final of 24.7.2002.
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The Commission’s synthesis
9.94. The Commission’s report concerns all aspects of
the reform that has been set in motion with the publi-
cation of the White Paper. The following observations
are restricted to the aspects that relate to financial man-
agement in the broad sense of the term.
9.95. Whilst theCommissionemphasises that the intro-
duction of the annual activity reports and the Directors-
General’s declarations does improve transparency and
accountability, it also finds that, despite the progress
that has been made, ‘there remains much to be done to
make the financial management improvements long-
lasting’ (43).
9.96. With a view to making matters clear, the Com-
mission expresses its willingness to find a solution for a
number of difficulties that have been identified by under-
taking an 18-point action plan which supplements the
action plans announced by the Directors-General in
their annual reports. Of the questions requiring urgent
action, the most noteworthy are:
(a) rationalisation of themechanisms for financing indi-
rect actions (action 1);
(b) clarification of responsibilities in the shared man-
agement of the Structural Funds (actions 4 and 12);
(c) enhancement of the methodology and clarification
of the scope of the declarations made by the
Directors-General (44) (action 10);
(d) strengthening of the effectiveness of the supervi-
sory functions of internal control at the various lev-
els of management (actions 8 and 13);
(e) modernisation of the accounting framework (action
16).
(43) Synthesis report, page 16.
(44) In this respect, part 5 of the synthesis report provides an
accurate overall view of the situation, unlike the conclu-
sions, which are still ambiguous as regards the scope of
the declarations.
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9.97. Of the questions which the report does not
tackle clearly enough, the following should be singled
out:
(a) with regard to actions 6 and 18 concerning the
back-up given to the operational services by the
central services, the need for centralised monitoring
of the action plans that have been undertaken both
at Directorate-General level and by the institution as
a whole in respect of the application of minimum
standards of internal control (45);
(b) the role of the central accounting system, Sincom II,
which ought to have been highlighted in action 7
on the ‘interoperability’ of the information systems
and in action 17 on the future core financial infor-
mation systems. The fact is that the Commission
cannot account for its operations properly unless it
has the assurance that the relevant data from the
many management systems used by its authorising
officers by delegation are correctly reflected in the
central accounting system;
(c) the link between risk analysis and the scope of the
declarations, which would benefit from being bet-
ter established by making distinctions by domain
according to the type of management used for the
activities (direct management or shared manage-
ment). Since the Commission states that the
Directors-General’s reports ‘suggest that there is
some uncertainty about how to assess and manage
risks and indeed how to consider them in relation
to the overall declaration’ (46), a specific actionwould
have been useful as a supplement to actions 4 and
10 (47);
9.97. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
(a) The last action in the synthesis report (No 18) calls on
Commission departments, by September 2002, to include
action plans in the annual management plans for 2002.
It also provides for progress to be monitored by the Com-
missioner responsible and reviewed in the next annual
report exercises. The synthesis report for 2002 will also
take stock of implementation of actions in the 2001
report.
(b) The Commission has launched a reform of the account-
ing system which is studying the actions necessary to
implement the requirements of the new Financial Regu-
lation. As part of this work, the Commission is also con-
sidering the computer systems options to support this
development. The Commission has been examining the
coherence of the subsystems forming the central account-
ing system. It will study how to use the lessons learned
in order to examine the coherence between the central and
local systems.
(c) The Commission believes that actions 4 and 10 are likely
to meet the Court’s observations since they will deal with
the risk-assessment aspects and the scope of declarations.
(45) In this connection, see paragraph 4.2 of the synthesis
report.
(46) COM(2002) 426 final of 24.7.2002, paragraph 4.1.2,
page 21.
(47) Action 4 seeks to clarify the respective responsibilities of
the Commission and the Member States as regards the
shared management of the Structural Funds, whereas
under action 10 particular attention should be given to
the scope of reservations to be included in the declara-
tions of the Directors-General.
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(d) the way reservations are confused with observa-
tions, because the services have failed to take a con-
sistent approach (48). Far from dispelling inconsis-
tencies, this hotchpotch tends to undermine the
value of the conclusions because it leads to matters
that differ widely in nature and scope being consid-
ered as having equal importance. In so doing, the
statistics supplied are not only likely to be poorly
interpreted but also to distort the picture of the
situation.
Genera l conclus ion
9.98. The Commission’s synthesis report quite plainly
constitutes an unprecedented degree of openness as
regards its accountability for its management. The fact
that the shortcomings disclosed in this report are very
often accompanied by the stated intention to draw up
and implement action plans to remedy the weaknesses
that have been detected bears witness to the Commis-
sion’s commitment to improving the protection of the
Communities’ financial interests.
9.99. With future discharges in mind, there is still a
need to remove the ambiguities which are encumber-
ing the declarations of the Directors-General, as not all
the parties involved in this process have perceived their
role in the same way. It is a fact that, in certain cases,
the authorising officers by delegation have directly
linked their declarations to the increased responsibility
which the reform has given them and that, in formulat-
ing their reservations, they have sought to restrict this
responsibility to the aspects of management over which
they have direct control, in particular in the shared-
management areas (49).
(d) In its synthesis report, the Commission identified some
methodological problems. The various approaches or
interpretations taken by departments when qualifying
their declarations show that further effort is needed in
terms of methodology. The Commission believes that
action 10 should produce substantial results in this area
by clarifying the definition and scope of reservations
(principle of materiality).
9.99. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission considers that Directors-General have ful-
filled their responsibilities in identifying existing weaknesses
and have proposed action plans to deal with them (7).
The Commission will endeavour in future to limit the ambi-
guities and shortcomings in its synthesis report through the
action plans that are put in place (see point 9.100).
(7) The declaration of the Director-General for AGRI also covers
activity relating to the clearance of the EAGGF accounts, as
indicated in the reply to the Court’s comment in point 9.89.
(48) Paragraph 5.1 of the synthesis report. The Commission
considers that ‘a more consistent approach to the process
and to ensuring that the declarations reflect as accurately
as possible the real situation will be necessary’.
(49) In this respect, several Directors-General have emphasised
the fact that they were not in charge of their services for
the entire duration of the financial year 2001 and that
they could not make any commitments on behalf of their
predecessors.
It should also be emphasised that, evenwhere they directly
supervise the delegated management procedures, as is the
case for the clearance of the EAGGF accounts, they do not
give an assurance.
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9.100. For 2001, the high number of reservations
which are due to the risks run andwhose extent remains
uncertain (see paragraph 9.79(b)) makes it difficult to
give a reasoned appraisal of the Commission’s manage-
ment as a whole. This being so, the Commission’s con-
clusions remain ambiguous (50) and are not such as to
enable the Court to consider them as one of the bases
for its own Statement of Assurance (see paragraph 9.71).
9.100. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In their declarations, authorising officers gave a reasonable
assurance that the control procedures set up offer the neces-
sary guarantees as to the legality and regularity of the under-
lying operations, though accompanying their declarations by
reservations:
— some of these are due to shortcomings in the control sys-
tems,
— others were due to running-in problems with the system
of declarations,
— others simply highlight real risks (clearly those relating to
external aid and, to a lesser extent, to other areas with
decentralised management).
The Commission is determined to resolve the problems encoun-
tered and to reduce the risks to acceptable level, as witness its
action plans.
(50) In paragraph 6 of the report the situation is described as
‘generally positive’ despite the profusion of risks and
shortcomings encountered in most areas.
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